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The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Alliance: Electoral Politics and Political 
Change in Manchester and Stoke-on Trent, 1906-1922 
This dissertation explores electoral politics in two of Britain's important industrial 
localities between 1906 and 1922, a period which witnessed unprecedented political 
change. The study focuses particular attention on the politics of the Progressive 
Alliance and explores the character, development and difficulties of progressive co-
operation in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent before the outbreak of the First World 
War and examines the consequences of its collapse afterwards. The study provides 
detailed analysis of election campaigns before and immediately after the First World 
War, assessing the influence of ideology, the role of candidates and political 
mobilisation and shows how local political activists were of central importance within 
the political process and consequent outcomes. The study supports the view that the 
British Liberal Party appeared strong before the outbreak of war and suggests that a 
Labour breakthrough appeared unlikely in the foreseeable future. The study shows 
that popular working-class Liberalism in Stoke-on-Trent remained strong and 
traditional political loyalties retained considerable purchase. In Manchester political 
support had become more spatial; party strength was concentrated in specific parts of 
the city and the fledgling Labour Party made only tentative progress in the years prior 
to 1914. Analysis of Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent demonstrates that the Edwardian 
political system was to a considerable extent dependent upon the continuation of the 
Progressive Alliance yet the long-term viability of alliance between the two left-of-
centre parties is questioned. The study concludes that reasons for the decline of the 
Liberal Party and subsequent rise of Labour were intrinsically related to the 
experience of the First World War. The political situation and ideology were of 
central importance to the reconfiguration of party politics in Britain from 1918. 
Political events aided the Labour Party's expansion at the expense of a weakened 
Liberal Party but this does not mean that political allegiances were simply constructed 
from above. The Labour Party had to consolidate its position on the basis of its policy 
appeal and as this study shows it did so particularly effectively from 1918. A principal 
objective of this study is to refocus attention on what has often been a major omission 
in the study of the historical development of electoral politics during the early 
twentieth century: the power of politics within the electoral process. 
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Chapter 1: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Alliance: Electoral Politics and 
Political Change in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent, 1906-1922: Introduction 
The Decline of the Liberal Party Debate 
The collapse of the Liberal Party after 1918 and the subsequent advance of Labour 
remains one of the most important events in modem British political history. Few 
subjects have attracted more attention, nor indeed debate. l Such fascination is 
understandable not least because the scale and speed of Liberal collapse was so 
dramatic. The tum of the twentieth century had seen the Liberal Party reinvent itself; 
the party's organisation had been overhauled on Herbert Gladstone's initiative and 
ideologically the period witnessed the emergence of profound Liberal radicalism and 
the doctrine which become known as 'New Liberalism'. These two aspects were 
interconnected in that throughout the process of reorganisation the party sought to 
focus on the democratisation of its selection policy. New candidates were younger and 
tended to be more radical than their predecessors. It is possibly true to suggest that the 
early twentieth century saw the modernisation of British Liberalism. 
At the same time Britain saw the appearance of a new political movement. The impact 
of the formation of the Labour Representation Committee on British politics was 
immense. Few could have predicted, however, that just over two decades later this 
organisation would be in a position to form its first, albeit minority, government. 
During the 1900s both parties of the left, although maintaining their own strict 
independence, sought to advance their electoral position by way of a policy of co-
operation with each other; the policy that became known as the Progressive Alliance. 
Although the exact extent of its acceptance within both parties may be questioned on 
the eve of war the Progressive Alliance remained more or less intact. More 
importantly, it seemed unlikely there might be an imminent (and overwhelming) 
restructuring of the political system, a significant 'rise' of Labour at the expense of 
the Liberal Party. On the contrary, the Liberal Party appeared to be comfortably 
sustaining its position as a major electoral force. The 1906 general election had seen 
the Liberal Party returned to office with one of the most significant victories of 
I For a straightforward overview of the historiography in relation to the decline of the Liberal Party and 
rise of Labour (up to 1995) see K. Laybourn, 'The Rise of Labour and the Decline of Liberalism: The 
State of the Debate', History, 80 (1995). 
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modem times; 400 seats and a majority of a 130. Similarly, the Labour Representation 
Committee could also afford to be satisfied after securing forty members in the new 
parliament. By 1924 the respective figures were 40 and nearly 200 of the foregoing. It 
needs little reiteration therefore that after 1918 the collapse of the Liberals to the 
status of a third party was swift and unrelenting. One contemporary observer after the 
1918 general election went so far as to describe the new political situation for the 
Liberal Party as a ~holocaust'.2 Nearly a century later, entirely satisfactory 
explanations for the 'decline' of the Liberal Party and rise of Labour remain elusive. 
The first major work examining the post-First World War fortunes of the Liberal 
Party appeared remarkably close to the time of the transformation itself; George 
Dangerfield's The Strange Death of Liberal England' (published in 1936) set the tone 
of interpretation for the next three decades.3 Dangerfield's main contention was that 
the decline of the Liberal Party was a reflection of the wider collapse of Liberal 
political culture and he suggested that it was connected to specific difficulties during 
the pre-war period. After 1906 the Liberal Government had been confronted with an 
array of disaffected groupings and political problems; trade unionists, the House of 
Lords, suffragettes, Tariff Reform and the Irish Question to name just a few. In 
embarking upon the radical course that it had the Liberal Government (and party) 
managed to alienate itself from substantial sections of public opinion; all these factors 
undermined the party's energy and strength. Furthermore, there was the question of 
the emergence of the Labour Party with its demand for increased independent labour 
representation. By 1914, for Dangerfield, British Liberalism was defunct because it 
simply could not cope anymore. Implicit in Dangerfield's assessment, therefore, was a 
degree of inevitability about the 'death' of Liberal England. Effectively, his overall 
conclusion was that, in fact, it was not strange at all, it was easily explainable. The 
Strange Death of Liberal England (which remains in print today) was a pioneering 
work of its age. Whilst modem historians are generally sceptical about Dangerfield's 
array of events and the effects these had upon political change 4 (in particular the 
extent to which the Liberals were completely unable to cope with the problems they 
encountered) The Strange Death of Liberal England remains an important part of the 
2 The Times,30ili December 1918. 
3 G. Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (London, 1936). 
4 See for example, D. Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party, 1900-1918 (Cambridge. 1990). 
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historiography on Edwardian England. Dangerfield successfully identified four great 
crises omnipresent within Edwardian politics and society: amongst workers, women, 
the aristocracy and in connection to the Irish Question. In his view, these 'problems' 
overwhelmed not just Edwardian Liberalism but the 'assumptions' of 'Liberal 
England' and (equally) he recognised that the Labour Party was as much a part of this 
culture and, indeed, just as much at sea in many ways as the Liberals themselves. Of 
course, Dangerfield's interpretation of Edwardian politics generated significant debate 
and in a sense the importance of The Strange Death of Liberal England lies not 
necessarily in the strength of its own specific argument but rather in relation to the 
historical debate it helped to foster. 
Interest in the decline of the Liberal Party was heightened from the 1960s. The period 
coincided with the emergence of social history alongside a greater predominance of 
left-inclined historians. Many of the new generation of historians became interested in 
debates surrounding the development of class-consciousness during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which, of course, overlapped with the period 
of Liberal resurgence followed by decline. It was not surprising, therefore, that some 
historians began to focus attention on the transformation of the political parties during 
this period. The 'rise of Labour' approach was appealing for some historians because 
that party's 'onward march' could be presented as a victory of the working-classes 
against a backdrop of elite intransigence with respect to their political rights.5 
Left-leaning historians and their perceptions of class consciousness, politicisation and 
political mobilisation became hugely influential in the debate surrounding the decline 
of the Liberal Party. 6 For them, it was important to highlight examples of independent 
working-class action which would ultimately destroy the existing order. The collapse 
of the Liberal Party could be used as a case in point. Some historians suggested that 
even before the Home Rule crisis many nonconformists were beginning to move away 
5 For a summary of the debate on class politics and the Liberal Party see G. Searle, The Liberal Party, 
Triumph and Disintegration 1886-1929 (London, 1992), pp. 55-9. Generally speaking, most recent 
studies have recognised the complexity of class and have rejected the supposed homogeneity of the 
British working class. 
6 Some of the most prominent exponents of the inevitable rise of Labour school include K. Laybourn 
and 1. Reynolds, Liberalism and the Rise of Labour, 1890-1918, (London, 1984); P. Thompson, 
Socialists, Liberals and Labour, (London, 1967); A. Howkins, 'Edwardian Liberalism and Industrial 
Unrest', History Workshop Journal (1977). 
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from the Liberals but this became an even more pronounced feature after the party 
had embarked upon an attempt to court the working-class vote more directly.7 
Alongside this, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century the middle-classes also 
had noticeably higher aspirations. These factors contributed, therefore, to a drift 
towards the Conservatives placing the Liberals in an increasing difficult dilemma.8 
The subject of the development of class consciousness and its impact on political 
development has been controversial and more recently historians have tended to move 
away from perceiving class as the major determinant of political behaviour. 9 
The publication of Ross McKibbin's Evolution of the Labour PartylO in 1974 
represented a significant turning-point in the historiography of the Labour Party and it 
served to ignite considerable debate on Liberal and Labour politics before the 
outbreak of the First World War. McKibbin's work suggested that the seeds of future 
Labour growth were already in place as 1914 approached. Labour's 'rise' was assured 
for a number of reasons including the growth of an acute sense of working-class' class 
consciousness,' trade union expansion and (eventually) extension of the franchise. 
Other factors such as better party organisation, continuity of personnel and appeal of 
policy also served to underpin Labour's 'natural' and 'inevitable' expansion; as 
McKibbin concluded 'everything pointed to Labour's enduring Ante-bellum 
character,.l1 For McKibbin, what limited Labour's expansion during the early 
twentieth century was the parliamentary franchise as this blocked an immediate 
advance because the party's 'natural' constituency was effectively (or actually) 
disenfranchised. McKibbin's core argument was that war acted as an accelerator of an 
already established process; it was not the sole instigator of the political 
transformation that occurred afterwards. The implication of McKibbin's thesis, 
7 See H. Perkin, The Origins of Modern English SOCiety 1780-1880 (London, 1969). 
8 Ibid, pp. 431-5. 
9 See, for example, D. Cannadine, Class in Britain (Yale, 1998), pp. 8-12; J. Lawrence, 'Popular 
Radicalism and the Socialist Revival in Britain', Journal of British Studies, 31 (1992), pp. 168-86. 
Even those who still perceive class to be a significant aspect of social and political change recognise it 
is a highly complex phenomenon; see J. Thompson, 'After the Fall: Class and Political Language in 
Britain, 1700-1900', Historical Journal, 39 (1996), pp. 785-806. Furthermore, of course, there is the 
possibility that experience of class injustice and the development of class consciousness can be 
mitigated by the process of political, economic or social inclusion; see R. McKibbin, 'Why was there 
no Marxism in Great Britain?' in The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880-1959 
(Oxford, 1990). It has been suggested a disproportionate focus on class has resulted in the relative 
neglect of other identities, see P. Joyce, Visions of the People, Industrial England and the Question of 
Class 1848-191-1 (Cambridge, 1991). 
10 R. McKibbin, Evolution of the Labour Party 1910-1924 (Oxford, 1974). 
11 R. McKibbin, Evolution, p. 240. 
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therefore, was that throughout the decade following its formation, the Labour Party 
existed as a 'sleeping monster on the political landscape'. In collaboration with 
Matthew and Kay, McKibbin argued even more explicitly that had there been a wider 
franchise the decline of the Liberal Party would have happened even more quickly.I2 
Historians such as Pelling, McKibbin and Layboum also argued that developments in 
municipal politics before the outbreak of war equally suggest that Liberal support 
amongst the working-classes was beginning to ebb away and this was connected 
principally to the emergence of a new class-based politics. Historians such as 
Layboum questioned the extent to which New Liberalism had permeated all areas. 13 
In his study of the West Riding Layboum concluded that New Liberalism never 
managed to become a powerful force, on the contrary, the Liberals remained 
'aggressive' and 'unwilling to compromise.,14 In his examination of Leicester, 
Lancaster also contended that New Liberalism had failed to stem the tide of an 
ascendant Labour Party and he even went so far as to suggest that the victory of 
Ramsay MacDonald in 1906 heralded 'the beginning of the end for the Liberal Party' 
in Leicester as a result of an acute class-based politics. IS 
McKibbin has since modified his position quite dramatically, recently stating, for 
example, he now believes his earlier interpretation 'inadequately represents the reality 
of Edwardian politics' and he has stated how he no longer considers 'the Edwardian 
system as already disintegrating' .16 McKibbin's view now is essentially that the 
Edwardian political system was based upon an 'equipoise in balance' although, 
critically, it was one 'delicate enough for it to be severely unbalanced by events' 
which began in 1914.17 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s a number of historians began to argue that 
structural and class-based interpretations of the collapse of the Liberal Party severely 
12 H. Matthew, R. McKibbin and 1. A. Kay, 'The Franchise Factor in the Rise of the Labour Party', 
English Historical Review, 91 (1976). 
13 See also, D. Powell, 'The New Liberalism and the Rise of Labour, 1886-1906', Historical Journal, 
29 (1986). 
14 See K. Laybourn, The Rise of Labour: The British Labour Party 1890-1979 (London, 1988), p27. 
15 See B. Lancaster, Radicalism, Co-operation and Socialism: Leicester Working Class Politics 1860-
1906, (Leicester, 1987), p. 22. 
16 R. McKibbin, Parties and People: England 1914-1951, (Oxford, 2010). 
17 For McKibbin's full exploration of his position today see ibid pp. 1-32. This will be discussed more 
fully later within the present study. 
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exaggerated Liberal disintegration before the outbreak of the First World War. They 
contended that the Liberals, in fact, remained incredibly robust in most respects; 
ideology, organisation and electoral appeal. If the Liberals had passed through 
troubled times (primarily as a result of the Home Rule crisis) the party's electoral 
victories from 1906 confirmed that it had fully recovered. In Downfall of the Liberal 
Party (1968) Trevor Wilson argued that it was only war itself that 'initiated a process 
of disintegration' within the Liberal Party which by 1918 had 'reduced it to ruins' .18 
Wilson accepted that before 1914 the Liberal administrations encountered significant 
difficulties (Ireland, the constitutional crisis and industrial unrest, in particular) but if 
these aspects represented 'problems' it was no reason to believe that the Liberal Party 
might soon be out of office; they did not mean the party itself was doomed to near 
extinction. 19 In a famous analogy Wilson likened the Liberals as being akin to 'a sick 
man run over by a rampant omnibus ,20 although the sickness had been non life-
threatening and suggestions to the contrary were wildly exaggerated. In 1971 Roy 
Douglas's The History of the Liberal Party supported Wilson's proposition that the 
Liberal Party had remained strong before the outbreak ofwar.21 Douglas claimed that 
what shattered the Liberal Party most of all was a series of accidental factors which 
had arisen both during and after the war. So both Wilson and Douglas contended that 
the Liberals ( essentially) were in good shape before 1914 and in no sense in an 
apparent state of 'decline'. Douglas went even further by suggesting that if any party 
was in a state of decline before 1914 it was, in fact, the Labour Party. Both of these 
studies revolutionised historical analysis of the decline of the Liberal party.22 
Another influential work appeared in 1971 with Peter Clarke's Lancashire and the 
New Liberalism.23 Clarke appeared to be an even stronger advocate of pre-war Liberal 
strength and his detailed examination of Lancashire contended that the Liberal Party 
had become the most powerful medium for political change. Clarke argued that the 
Liberal Party possessed substantial electoral appeal based upon traditional principles 
such as Free Trade and individualism whilst incorporating a new, more reformist and 
18 T. Wilson, Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-1935 (London, 1966) p. 23. 
19 Ibid, p.16. 
20 Ibid, p.18. 
21 R. Douglas, History of the Liberal Party (London, 1971). 
22 See R. Douglas, 'Labour in Decline, 19lO-1914', in K. D. Brown, (ed) Essays in Anti-Labour 
Histon', (London, 1974). 
2J P. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971). 
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collectivist ideology most clearly expressed within what had become known as 'New 
Liberalism'. In short, Liberalism entered the twentieth century re-energised and 
attentive to the needs of a mass electorate and it was unwise to perceive that the 
Liberals were unduly challenged by the fledgling Labour Party or that the arrival of 
Labour would inevitably be detrimental to the party's long-term prospects. On the 
contrary, Clarke's analysis suggested that the Labour Party was, in fact, fading before 
the appeal of the 'New Liberalism'. In essence, Clarke's argument appeared to 
suggest that before 1914 the Liberals had successfully 'out-trumped' Labour. Such an 
evaluation of Edwardian politics represented a radically different interpretation to that 
which had been presented by the Labour historians. 
Paul Thompson's study of London (which had been published four years earlier), 
however, appeared to suggest that the position of the Liberal Party in the capital was 
less secure. Thompson demonstrated how there had been an apparent (and sharp) 
decline in the fortunes of the Liberals in London after 1892.24 Factors such as the lack 
of a viable working-class electoral base, organisational and financial problems all 
contributed to this Liberal malaise. He also made the (not insignificant claim) that the 
early twentieth century Liberal revival was to the greater extent issue- based and once 
these issues began to lose their political effect so too would the Liberals' position 
become increasingly fragile. Thompson claimed that the Liberal Party had not 
reinvented itself as a 'classless party of reform'; it was in reality specific issues such 
as Free Trade, education, trade union grievances and Home Rule which helped the 
party pick up the Nonconformist, trade union and Irish vote in 1906 and thereafter the 
Liberals were 'held together by success'. Thompson's conclusion was that the post 
1906 Liberal revival was a 'deceptive illusion' because, as he contended; behind the 
apparent electoral success, the party itself was 'rotting at its roots' .25 
More recent studies of political change during the early decades of the twentieth 
century have contributed enormously to our understanding. Most notably, Duncan 
Tanner's Political Change and the Labour Party (1990) provided an exhaustively-
researched examination of Liberal and Labour politics during this critical period in 
British history. Tanner concluded that political change was extremely fragmented and 
24 P. Thompson, Socialists, Liberals and Labour: The Struggle/or London, 1885-1914 (London, 1967). 
25 Ibid,p.10andpp.167-189. 
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complex as was social and economic change. He illustrated how early twentieth 
century Liberalism was a broad reforming coalition and there were few signs before 
the outbreak of war that the party was in a state of 'decline' although there were 
problems connected with this composite nature since it meant that it could not easily 
adopt radical measures?6 It would not always be so easy to maintain unity within a 
party which (in many ways) possessed contradictory views. A key point of Tanner's 
work therefore was that the split during the First World War had proved fatal because 
existing problems had become more serious. Moreover, for Tanner, the rise of Labour 
could not adequately be explained by reference to an increasing working-class 
consciousness (and similar propositions) because the Labour Party itself was a 
practical party with a practical programme; it was progressive and reformist (in 
exactly the same way as the Liberal Party was). After 1918 the Labour Party inherited 
the vacuum left by the collapse of the Liberals because it was not so dissimilar to that 
party. 
Tanner's study represented a major turning point III the historiography of early 
twentieth century British party politics because it demonstrated the complexities of 
political culture and electoral re-alignment and illustrated how neat and simple 
explanations might prove unhelpful. Tanner's analysis, based upon a number of 
detailed regional studies, also demonstrated how fragmented political developments 
were during the early twentieth century; political change was highly regionalised. 
There was no uniform experience across the whole of the country and consequently 
earlier studies of the decline of the Liberal Party and rise of Labour had been 
problematic because their scope had been too wide or at least it could be suggested 
their focus had been too exclusively based upon national politics and so had not 
appreciated the significant extent of regional variation. 
The Local Study 
Study of the development of local politics is central to a more contextualised 
understanding of the respective positions of the parties especially during the early 
twentieth century. Recent years have seen an increase in the number of detailed local 
studies which have served to confirm Tanner's view that there was no uniform 
"6 D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 431. 
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experience. Savage has raised a number of critical points in relation to the local 
study?7 The use of the local study as simply 'illustrative' has serious drawbacks; it 
can make the central argument weak because the locality has been used simply in 
order to prove a point. Thus, prior conceptions of an eventual conclusion tend to 
produce a highly selective approach. Yet, if approached carefully, as Savage suggests 
the detailed local study can prevent an overly determinist account of political change 
which presents party performance as essentially the product of changing social and 
economic circumstances and national development. The local study is also useful in 
order to prevent an overly autonomous reading of politics where political change is 
perceived to be in consequence of autonomous processes, such as the impact of 
national political leadership. The health of local organisations has to be seen as a 
critical factor in contextualising the debate concerning the national strength (or 
otherwise) of political parties. Furthermore, it is essential to appreciate from the outset 
the sheer extent to which local politics touched people's everyday lives during the 
early twentieth century. To use Savage's apt expression 'the local was the bedrock of 
political life,.28 Indeed, Savage's own detailed study of the 'dynamics of working-
class politics' in Preston successfully stresses the importance of the local dimension. 
In fact this study suggests that political development in Preston remained almost 
exclusively influenced by local factors right up to 1939.29 
The local study helps give us a more thorough understanding of the period under 
consideration, not least, because it allows us to examine popular responses to policy 
in microscopic detail and to assess the changing character of the political parties 
themselves by evaluating aspects such as the character of candidates, changes in 
ideological approach as well as developments at the municipal level. Given that much 
of the activity of the early Labour movement focused attention upon local government 
it seems especially appropriate to assess in some detail Labour's role and influence in 
municipal politics. Although there has been a proliferation in local studies of political 
change during the early twentieth century, there have been relatively few studies 
27 See M. Savage, 'The Rise of Labour in Local Perspective', Journal of the of Local and Regional 
Studies, 10 (1990), p.12 and 'Political Alignments in Modern Britain: Do Localities Matter?' Political 
Geography Quarterly, 6, (1987), pp. 53-76. 
2R Ibid, p. 7. 
29 Ibid, p.187. 
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providing detailed comparative examination of a number of localities. 30 Yet, there are 
many advantages of detailed comparative analysis. Like the local study, comparative 
historical analysis needs to be approached carefully; simplistic comparisons between 
areas might not, in fact, prove very much at all. 
Geographical Context: Studies of Local and Regional Politics 
A number of local studies have suggested that previous interpretations of political 
change in the early twentieth century had significantly overestimated the extent to 
which the Labour Party had made progress by 1914. In the localities they evaluated 
Pugh, Purdue and Adams, for example, concluded that the Labour Party's progress 
was extremely limited prior to 1914?1 Others, however, including Thompson, Hill, 
Layboum and Lancaster have claimed that Labour had made identifiable progress in 
the areas they assessed. One of the key features of Edwardian politics, however, was 
its local variety; voters remained responsive to local issues as much as they did to 
national questions. Nonetheless, examination of politics at the constituency level 
provides an invaluable insight into how the political parties responded to the 
challenges they faced and, equally important, how voters reacted to the issues with 
which they were presented. 
A number of historians have made valuable contributions to our understanding of 
political change during the years before 1914 by detailed examination of Liberal and 
Labour politics in various localities across Britain. As highlighted above, some have 
supported Clarke's analysis that the Liberal Party was gaining ground in working 
class communities before 1914. In his study of the North East of England, Purdue 
concluded that after 1906 the area remained dominated by the Liberal Party and, 
30 Exceptions include T. Adams, 'Labour and the First World War: Economy, Politics and the Decline 
of Local Peculiarity', Journal of Local Studies (Summer, 1990); G. Bernstein, 'Liberalism and the 
Progressive Alliance in the Constituencies 1900-1914: Three Case Studies', Historical Journal, 26, 
(1983), pp. 617-640; S. Davies and B. Morley, 'The Politics of Place: A Comparative Analysis of 
Electoral Politics in Blackburn, Bolton, Burnley and Bury', Manchester Region History Review, 14, 
2000; M. Dawson, 'Liberalism in Devon and Cornwall, 1910-1931: The Old Time Religion', 
Historical Journal, 38 (1995), pp 425-437; J. Moore, The Transformation of Urban Liberalism, 
(Aldershot, 2006) and P. Hollis, Ladies Elect: Women in English Local Government /865-/9/-1 
(Oxford, 1987). 
31 M. Pugh, -Yorkshire and the New Liberalism', Journal of Modern History, Supplement, 50 (1978); 
A. W. Purdue, 'Liberal and Labour Politics in the North East of England: the Struggle for Supremacy', 
International Review of Social History, 11 (1981); T. Adams, 'Liberals, Labour and the First World 
War: Politics, Economy and the Decline of Local Peculiarity', Journal of Local and Regional Studies 
(Summer 1990). 
1.+ 
moreover, the limited presence Labour did possess was only in consequence of 
Liberal acquiescence.32 Pugh's study of Yorkshire also claimed that the Liberals 
remained remarkably successful (within the context of a predominantly working-class 
electorate); Labour's share of the popular vote never reached more than 20% and the 
party performed badly in the one (triangular) by-election it chose to contest.33 More 
significantly, Pugh illustrated how across the West Riding mining communities as a 
whole, Labour never polled more than half of the miners' vote. Morgan concluded 
that among the Welsh mining communities, Lib-Labism there remained the 'dominant 
and unifying creed' and it seemed unlikely there would be a significant Labour 
advance in the immediate future. 34 Stead's examination of Wales supported Morgan 
in contending that Liberalism remained strong, although he did suggest that Labour's 
improving organisation and growing presence in municipal government in Wales may 
have laid the foundations for future development.35 Significantly, Pugh, Purdue, 
Morgan and Stead agreed that relations between the two progressive parties in these 
particular areas were deteriorating by 1914. In Scotland, too, evidence suggests that 
an imminent Labour breakthrough seemed unlikely. Fraser concluded that Labour's 
progress north of the border (especially within the mining districts) was sluggish; the 
party's organisation remained weak and popular support was limited.36 Fraser cited 
poor performance in a number of by-elections before 1914 as evidence to support the 
assertion that Labour's progress was tentative to say the least and, ultimately, 
Liberalism demonstrated a remarkable ability to retain its traditional support among 
the Scottish industrial working-classes. 
Lawrence's study of popular politics in Wolverhampton before 1914 highlights the 
complexities of political change before the outbreak of war. Lawrence contends that 
there 'is little reason to believe that structural changes within the economy and society 
had created a new base for class politics' and he even questions the extent to which 
Labour saw itself as representing a 'new type of party' the basis of which was 
32 A. W. Purdue, 'The Liberal and Labour Parties'. 
33 M. Pugh, 'Yorkshire and the New Liberalism?' Modern History Journal, 50, supplement (1978). 
34 K. Morgan, 'New Liberalism and the Challenge of Labour; the Welsh Experience' in K. D. Brown, 
The First Labour Party 1906-1914, (London, 1985), p. 172. 
35 P. Stead, 'Establishing a Labour Heartland' in ibid, pp. 69-72. 
36 W. Hamish Fraser, 'The Labour Party in Scotland', in ibid, pp. 52-59. 
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working-class solidarity.37 In Wolverhampton, Labour had to compete with 'highly 
developed Liberal and Conservative appeals' to the working man and, furthermore, its 
activists were in fact only 'marginally more representative' than the party's 
opponents.38 For Lawrence, factors retarding a wider Labour advance in the area 
included aspects such as the party's inability to exploit the 'politics of place' 
successfully because it was too constrained by co-operation with official Liberalism.39 
Lawrence's work also suggested that the Labour Party in Wolverhampton suffered an 
additional disadvantage in being perceived as being too reliant on 'outsiders'; this, of 
course, was a natural consequence of local organisational weakness. 
Other studies have presented a similar picture of the problems Labour faced in 
constructing a distinct and viable political appeal before 1914. Davies's evaluation of 
the development of the Labour Party in Liverpool, for example, demonstrates the 
considerable difficulties the fledgling party faced when confronted with weak 
unionisation, a predominantly poor population and religious division.4o His study 
concluded that there existed an array of factors which contributed towards the Labour 
Party's inability to make early progress in Liverpool. These included the impact of the 
electoral system (in local elections) and an inability of the Labour Party to cope with 
the problems it encountered. In consequence the development of Labour in Liverpool 
lagged behind other areas.41 
The Progressive Alliance 
Regional and national studies of Liberal and Labour politics have also illustrated the 
complexity of progressive co-operation. A number of historians have contended that 
the Progressive Alliance appeared to be on the verge of breaking down by 1914. 
Petter's study of the Progressive Alliance, for instance, pointed to a number of by-
37 See J. Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1860-
1914 (Cambridge, 1998), p. 266. Lawrence does determine, however, that class consciousness was 
highly developed by 1914. The key point, however, was that the Labour Party was ill placed to 
translate [this] into a new form of class-based political identity. 
38 J. Lawrence, Speakingfor the People, p. 266. 
39 Ibid p.267. 
40 See S. Davies, Liverpool Labour: Social and Political1nfluences on the Development of the Labour 
Party. 1900-1939 (Keele, 1996) and 'The Liverpool Labour Party and the Liverpool Working Class, 
1900-1939', Bulletin of the North West Labour History Society, 6 (1980). 
41 The first Labour MP was elected for a Liverpool seat at a by-election in 1923 and even by 1939 only 
3 of the city's 11 divisions were held by Labour. In municipal politics Labour's record was even worse; 
before 1914 the party held just 7 seats on the council (of 140) and even after the war progress was 
sluggish; the most being 59 seats from 157, see S. Davies, Liverpool Labour, pp. 81-94. 
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elections before 1914 as evidence that the Progressive Alliance had started to break 
down by that point.42 He suggested that conflict at by-elections served to undennine 
an already fragile alliance between the parties in the constituencies and concluded that 
(ultimately) there existed a significant contrast between relations in Parliament and 
those across many areas of the country.43 Bernstein's examination of the Progressive 
Alliance in a number of case studies (Norwich, Leicester and Leeds) supported 
Petter's findings. His study highlighted the considerable difficulties the Liberal Party 
faced in 'containing' Labour within the framework of a 'progressive' alliance' not 
least because in many areas there simply no longer existed the conviction to maintain 
the policy.44 Bernstein suggested that particularly at the municipal level Labour 
candidates appeared more willing to stand as out-and-out socialists and therefore 
assert their distinctiveness from the Liberals more obviously. This served to 
undennine prospects for the survival of the Progressive Alliance and furthennore, as 
Bernstein contends, the Liberals were in any case 'unable to come to tenns with a 
movement which insisted upon espousing an ideology [often] hostile to their own,.4S 
Tanner's study of political change prior to 1918 adopted a very different approach to 
the politics of the Progressive Alliance. He concluded that the Progressive Alliance 
remained more or less intact in 1914 and prospects for continued co-operation 
between the left-of-centre parties appeared more positive than perhaps some previous 
interpretations might have implied.46 He suggested that an 'immediate and 
fundamental realignment of forces' appeared unlikely.47 For Tanner, the Liberals' 
inability to break the hold of the Conservatives in shaping working- class opinion in 
many parts of the country (alongside the existence of a genuinely social-democratic 
outlook) served to encourage and consolidate the party's willingness to co-operate 
with Labour. Whilst for the Labour Party its as yet 'half-fonned appeal' (to specific 
groups) remained 'insufficient to make it a major anti-Tory party in the country as a 
whole' .48 The fledgling Labour Party's strengths ultimately 'complemented those of 
42 See M. Petter, 'The Progressive Alliance', History, 58 (1973). 
43 M. Petter, ibid, p. 48. 
44 G. Bernstein, 'Liberalism and the Progressive Alliance in the Constituencies 1900-1914: Three Case 
Studies', Historical Journal, 26 (1983) p. 617-40. 
45 Ibid, p.637. 
46 See D. Tanner, Political Change, pp. 317-348. 
47 Ibid p.347. 
48 Ibid. 
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its progressive ally' .49 For Tanner, these factors ensured that for the time being at least 
neither party was likely to opt out of a general framework of an electoral progressive 
coalition. What changed the political situation completely was the experience of 
war. 50 
In his recent Parties and People: England 1914-1951, McKibbin offers a new 
interpretation of the character and long-term viability of the Progressive Alliance in 
1914. Whilst he recognises that the Progressive Alliance existed as a central plank of 
the stability of the Edwardian political system, and that co-operation with Labour 
'upheld the Liberal Party' throughout its various crises after 1906, he concludes, 
however, that ultimately such an alliance had a pronounced sense of 'impermanence' 
about it. 51 Essentially, McKibbin's argument is that it is imperative to recognise that 
alliance between the Liberal and Labour parties was not in reality 'based upon a long-
term programmatic affinity ... but fundamentally on what proved to be the unfinished 
business of nineteenth century politics' .52 By this he means that the Progressive 
Alliance was not ultimately about ideology (a new progressive and radical politics) 
but, as he perceives it, the 're-emergence of issues which most people thought had 
been settled' .53 These included aspects such as the defence of Free Trade, the 
nonconformist conscience and industrial rights. 54 When, after 1918, these 'unifying 
issues' disappeared or were superseded by others the Progressive Alliance fell apart. It 
is hard not to see the logic in this argument and McKibbin's recent contribution to the 
debate surrounding the politics of the Progressive Alliance will be explored fully 
throughout this study. 
49 See D. Tanner, Political Change, pp. 347-48. It is important to note that Tanner acknowledges that 
Labour was evidently unhappy to remain the 'junior partner' in the Progressive Alliance forever and 
beneath the veneer of alliance, as he points out, Labour clearly sought to expand its electoral base. 
Although, as things stood in 1914, the party appeared disinclined to break free and risk any progress 
which had been made. 
50 For Tanner's analysis of the impact of the First World War and the Progressive Alliance see Political 
Change, pp. 395-408. 
51 For McKibbin's evaluation of the Progressive Alliance see R. McKibbin, Parties and People: 
England 1914-1951 (Oxford, 2010) pp. 2-20. 
52 Ibid p.3. 
53 Ibid. 
54 McKibbin even suggests that had the Conservative Party not adopted the outright opposition which it 
did on various issues (the 1909 budget, the constitution, Ireland, education to name just a few) the 
Progressive Alliance might have collapsed much sooner than it did. Moreover, he suggests that, in the 
first instance, had the Balfour administration overturned (for example) the Taff Vale decision, the 
Progressive Alliance might never have happened in the first place; see R. McKibbin, Parties and 
People. pp. 4-5. 
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The Position of the Parties after 1918 
The 1918 general election recorded one of the most sweeping victories in modem 
British political history. Given the importance of the 1918 election it is perhaps 
surprising that it has been relatively neglected within the historiography (with the 
exception of Wilson, Turner and Morgan).55 These studies of national politics (and in 
particular the split within the Liberal Party) have provided invaluable insight into the 
subject from this perspective as have studies examining the transformation of Labour 
during this critical period in the party's development.56 Only a limited number of 
studies, however, have examined in detail the 1918 general election and its immediate 
aftermath at the local constituency level. 57 Many studies of Liberal and Labour 
politics at the constituency level have also tended to neglect the immediate post-war 
period (1918-1922) although it is arguably during this period that Liberal 'decline' is 
most appropriately located. 58 
Most historians agree that war damaged the Liberal Party in various critical ways; the 
party's unity and organisation was smashed and (equally important) war had a 
detrimental impact on Liberalism ideologically and culturally. 59 Wilson, however, 
suggests we should be careful in how we view 'the decline of the Liberal Party' 
reminding us that the parties of the left (i.e. Liberals and Labour combined) did not do 
as badly (during the early inter-war years) as subsequent Conservative domination 
55 See T. Wilson, Downfall; T. Wilson, 'The British General Election of 1918', Journal of Modern 
History (1964); J. Turner, British Politics and the Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918, (New 
Haven 1992); K. O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, the Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-
1922 (Oxford 1979); E. David, 'The Liberal Party Divided 1916-1918', Historical Journal, 13, 1979; 
B. McGill, 'Asquith's Predicament, 1914-1918', Journal of Modern History (1967) and R. Douglas, 
'The Background to the 'Coupon' Election Arrangements', English Historical Review (1971). 
56 See R. McKibbin, Evolution. 
57 These include M. Savage, Dynamics; B. Doyle, 'Urban Liberalism and the Lost Generation, Middle 
Class Culture in Norwich 1900-1935', Historical Journal, 38 (1995); 1. Smyth, Resisting Labour: 
Unionists, Liberals and Moderates in Glasgow between the Wars, Historical Journal 46, 2 (2003). 
These vary in depth of electoral analysis and assessment of issues, however, and tend to focus on 
municipal politics (in particular Liberal-Conservative alliances) and pay limited (if any) attention to the 
locality'S wider constituency politics (including the general elections). 
58 Lawrence, for example, ends his study of Wolverhampton in 1914, Tanner in 1918 and Cook's 
examination does not begin until 1922, neither does Clarke pay any great attention to either the 1918 or 
1922 general elections; see J. Lawrence, Speaking for the People; D. Tanner, Political Change; C. 
Cook, The Age of Alignment (Toronto, 1975) and P. Clarke, Lancashire. 
59 For the best analysis of how the war impacted upon the Liberal Party ideologically and in tenns of 
organisation see T. Wilson, Downfall, pp. 23-48. An equally important factor connected to this was a 
perceived decline of the political influence of religious nonconformity; see T. Wilson, Downfall, pp. 
23-8. 
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might suggest.60 The key difference was that before 1914 the parties 'managed their 
affairs between them to ensure maximum advantage from votes cast against the 
Conservatives,' i.e. within the context of the Progressive Alliance, whereas after 1914 
Labour made a determined bid for power as a completely independent force. This 
served to destroy Liberalism as a potential governing force but, as Wilson rightly 
suggests, it also limited Labour's own chances of office in an immediate sense. 
Tanner argues that what was in fact developing was a three party system but given the 
effects of the British electoral system upon third parties the Liberals found themselves 
on the periphery (parliamentary results, of course, never reflected total popular 
support).61 
Clarke suggested that organised Liberalism in Lancashire had been seriously 
undermined by the impact of war because the 'premises underpinning the progressive 
vote had been destroyed' .62 The Liberal Party was simply no longer the 'best available 
instrument of progress'; by 1924, therefore, Lancashire Liberalism was only able to 
return MPs, in Clarke's words, 'on the basis of a sort of nonconformist bastard 
Toryism' .63 Other historians have also suggested that a post-war Liberal recovery 
remained feasible and had a Progressive Alliance been re-established, inter-war 
politics could have been very different. 64 
In his study of the Liberals, the war and the franchise, Hart made the significant claim 
that pre-war Liberal voters formed the majority of the post-war Labour vote and a 
principle reason for this was simply because (for the most part) the Liberals were 
simply no longer 'progressive' after 1918.65 Both propositions are, of course, complex 
and not necessarily easy to determine. Turner offers a detailed and interesting 
60 Tanner has also suggested that it is very wise not to understate the Liberal Party's potential from 
1918. He points to the fact that despite the party's poor national standing, the Liberals could still 
outpoll Labour in a number of working-class seats (particularly in areas where the candidates 
articulated a radical programme). Furthermore, the Liberals' performance in 1918 and up to 1922 was 
influenced by other factors, most notably, the impact of the Coalition which 'blurred their public image 
and damaged their performance', see D. Tanner, 'Class Voting and Radical Politics: the Liberal and 
Labour Parties, 1910-1931' in 1. Lawrence and M. Taylor (eds) Electoral behaviour in Britain since 
1820 (Aldershot, 2002), p. 117. 
61 See D. Tanner, Political Change, pp. 419-422. 
62 See P. Clarke, Lancashire, pp. 395-397. 
63 Ibid. 
64 See E. F. Biagini and A. 1. Reid, Currents of Radicalism: Popular Radicalism and Party Politics in 
Britain 1850-/9U, (Cambridge, 1991), p. 19. 
65 See M. Hart, 'Liberals, War and the Franchise', English Historical Revie)\". 97, (1982), pp. 820-32. 
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examination of how new electors may have voted in post-war general elections. He 
suggests that, contrary to the expectations perhaps, the higher the number of new 
voters, the less the swing towards Labour was. So, rather than propelling Labour 
forward, therefore, Turner concluded that franchise reform, in fact, hindered the party 
considerably.66 This implies that trade-union based support (in the short term at least) 
continued to form the bedrock of Labour's support and the party did well primarily in 
areas where there was already an established presence. Given the localities examined, 
this will be an aspect of particular interest within the present study. Equally, one 
would assume that issues and policy during and after 1918 formed an essential 
component of any transfer of allegiance from Liberal to Labour. Whether such factors 
as the presence of sizeable groups of trade unionists or local political culture and party 
activity were more or less significant will be central to the discussion of post-war 
political change in subsequent chapters. One key example concerns the voting 
behaviour of miners. Turner claims that voters in the mining constituencies especially 
switched more strongly to Labour than elsewhere after 1918. The critical question, 
therefore, is to what extent was such transference of allegiance principally connected 
to the experience of the war itself or to what extent it may be attributed to more long 
term trends. In his study of the miners and British politics, Gregory concluded that in 
many mining areas Labour's prospects before 1914 appeared 'reasonably fair' and it 
was clear that a new generation of leaders were becoming increasingly committed to 
Labour 'almost to a man' so consequently the position of the Liberals in these 
constituencies might (implicitly) have become somewhat less secure than it had been 
to that point.67 Detailed examination of an area such as Stoke-on-Trent may throw 
valuable light on this proposition. 
In a major revision of his earlier thesis McKibbin has re-considered how the First 
World War impacted upon British politics and he illustrates very effectively how and 
why the experience of war changed the political landscape forever. War benefited the 
Conservatives whilst obviously disadvantaging the Liberal Party but, as McKibbin 
shows, more fundamentally, the experience of war served the Labour Party's 
'ideological and tactical interests' not least because it decidedly 'settled the vexed 
66 See J. Turner, 'The Labour Vote and the Franchise after 1918: An Investigation of the English 
Evidence', History and Computing (1987), pp. 136-142. 
67 See R. Gregory, The Miners and British Politics (Oxford, 1978), p. 191. 
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question of [the party's] relationship with the Liberals' and wartime policies and 
issues surrounding reconstruction were clearly 'more associated with Labour than any 
other party'. War strengthened the position of the trade unions but perhaps more 
importantly, as he perceives it, it turned the Conservatives and Labour into class 
parties and this was concurrent with increasing class 'homogenization' (within both 
the working and middle classes).68 McKibbin suggests that the effect of this was to 
ultimately give those two parties 'an irreducible core of social support'. The Liberal 
Party meanwhile was not a class party and was consequently ill-positioned to attract 
widespread electoral appeal in the way it had been able to in the past. McKibbin's 
new analysis is, of course, highly significant and these themes will be explored fully 
in the later sections of this thesis. 
The Electoral Sociology Approach69 
As is evident from what has been discussed, a number of historians have placed 
considerable emphasis upon the importance of sociological change and its role in 
electoral politics in the aftermath of the First World War. They have contended that, 
above all else, class was fundamental to influencing political realignment after 1918.70 
The 'sociological' approach to British political history suggests some neatness in 
connection to electoral development, that sociological change, principally the 
emergence of a homogenised working class identity, more or less exclusively explains 
electoral change.71 An obvious advocate of this view was Henry Pelling who saw the 
rise of the Labour Party (at the expense of the Liberals) as virtually inevitable, 'a 
result of long-term social and economic changes which were simultaneously uniting 
Britain geographically and dividing her in terms of class' .72 
68 R. McKibbin, Parties and People, pp. 29-32. 
69 For an excellent consideration of electoral sociology and its application to the decline of the Liberal 
Party and rise of Labour debate see D. Tanner 'Class Voting and Radical Politics: Liberal and Labour 
Parties, 1910-1931 in 1. Lawrence and M. Taylor, Party, State and Society: Electoral Behaviour in 
Britain since 1820 (Aldershot, 2002), pp. 107-130. 
70 See for example H. Pelling, Origins of the Labour Party; R. McKibbin, Evolution; K. Laybourn and 
J. Reynolds, Liberalism and the Rise of Labour. 
71 For a good evaluation of the debate on the emergence of class politics see G. Searle, The Liberal 
Party, Triumph and Disintegration 1886-1929 (London, 1992), pp.55-59. For a defence of class-based 
interpretations of the period see N. Kirk, 'In Defence of Class: A critique of recent revisionist writings 
upon the nineteenth century English working-class', International Review of Social History, 32 (1987), 
pp.2-47. 
72 See H. PeIling, 'Labour and the Downfall of Liberalism' in Popular Politics and Society (London, 
1979 edition), p. 120. Pelling did, however, recognise that such change would inevitably be slow 
because sectional interests such as religion remained powerful forces and so were likely to inhibit 
Labour's expansion (before the First World War in any case); see H. Pelling, Modern Britain, /885-
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The social and economic consequences of the First World War have been the subject 
of intense historical debate. For many years labour and social historians perceived the 
First World War as the instigator of considerable social and political change, the latter 
transformed in consequence of the former since war (they claimed) created a more 
homogenised working-class and served to encourage antagonistic class sentiments. 
These social changes, they contended, had a significant impact upon party politics and 
upon the voting behaviour of manual workers in particular. 
First published in 1965, Arthur Marwick's The Deluge emphasised economic gains 
made by some of the working-classes in the form of wage increases and new 
employment opportunities.73 Another aspect of his interpretation of the impact of war 
was that the process of change it instigated was of critical importance in determining 
political outcomes; war circumstances, he suggested, were 'critical in the precise way 
in which the Labour Party developed in the 1920s', not least because war 'tested old 
laissez-faire ideas [which] gave appeal and credibility to Labour's aims' .74 Other 
historians supported Marwick's interpretation, most notably Waites (in a number of 
studies examining the effects of the First World War on class, status and the British 
working-class), Winter (particularly in his assessment of the impact of war on living 
standards and aspects such as civilian health) and Cronin (in his important work 
Labour and Society in Modern Britain). 75 Explicit in the work of social and labour 
historians was the belief that socio-economic change during the war created a climate 
of dissatisfaction, raised expectations of entitlement and increased confidence about 
what government might achieve served to propel Labour forward as the principal 
party of the industrial working-classes.76 Other historians, however, have highlighted 
the complex nature of socio-economic change and its relationship to the political 
1955 (Edinburgh, 1960), p.6 and also F. Bealey and H. Pelling, Labour and Politics. In his Social 
Geography of British Elections (London, 1967), however, Pelling suggested how regional influences 
continued to shape electoral behaviour well into the twentieth century (including after the First World 
War). 
73 See A. Marwick, The Deluge (London, 1991), p. 344. 
74 Ibid, pp. 345-348. 
75 See B. Waites, 'The Effects of the First World War on Class and Status 1910-1920', Journal of 
Contemporary History, 11 (1976); B. Waites, A Class Society at War 1914-1918 (Leamington Spa, 
1987); 1. Winter, The Great War and the British People (1985); 1. Cronin, Labour and Society ( ) and 1. 
Cronin, 'The Crisis of State and Society in Britain 1917-1922 in L. Haimson and C. Tilly (eds) Strikes. 
Wars and Revolution in International Perspective ( 1989), pp. 462-468. For an alternative view see A. 
Reid, 'The Impact of the First World War on British Workers' in A. Wall and 1. Winter (eds) The 
Upheaval of War: Family, Work and Welfare in Europe 1914-1918 (1988). 
76 See, for example, K. Laybourn and J. Reynolds, Liberalism and the Rise of Labour (1984). 
transformation which occurred in the aftermath of the First World War.71 In 
particular, a number of historians have provided a valuable insight into a range of 
occupational groups and specific industrial sectors and their findings have questioned 
earlier assumptions about the precise impact of war upon the British working-classes. 
This research has suggested that the impact of war was less pronounced and far less 
uniform than traditional interpretations might have contended.78 Whilst war may have 
no doubt improved the position of some workers, it did not (they suggest) transform 
the position of all workers and in the process encourage feelings of repression and 
class antagonism across the entire working-class. Furthermore, historians such as 
Tanner have suggested that, in the first instance, changes in national wages rates and 
living standards, critical (and commonly used) measures of the impact of war, have 
always represented an unsatisfactory means of determining the real impact of war 
since they do not take in to account the regional and sectoral nature of change.79 As 
Tanner points out, it is imperative to recognise that the' experience of war was mixed 
and that the interpretation of that experience was equally variable'. 80 This meant that 
attitudes of workers towards the government and politics were exceptionally varied; it 
was dependent upon sector. The experience of workers in the non-essential sectors 
(consumer goods such as pottery, for example) was far less favourable than for the 
state-controlled industries. Here, as a number of historians have illustrated, workers 
experienced longer hours, poor conditions and insecure employment prospects.81 This 
was in significant contrast to the state-controlled industries which benefited from 
regular employment, higher wage increases, and collective bargaining. 82 
77 See, for example, D. Tanner, 'Class Voting and Radical Politics: the Electoral Expansion of the 
Labour Party 1910-1931' in M. Taylor and J. Lawrence (eds.) Party, State and Society: Electoral 
Behaviour in Modern Britain (1997). For the opposing approach to Marwick et al see also T. Wilson, 
The Myriad Faces of war: Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (1986); R. Rubin, War Law and 
Labour: the Munitions' Acts, State Regulation and the Unions 1915-1921 (Oxford, 1987) and H. 
Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England Since 1880 (London, 1989); It ought to be noted that 
a small number of historians have supported Marwick's approach, see, for example, N. Whiteside, 'The 
British Population at War' in J. Turner, Britain and the First World War (1988) and J. M. Bourne, 
Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (1989). 
78 For a good analysis of this body of work see D. Tanner, Political Change (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 
353-355. 
79 See D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 357. 
80 Ibid. The emphasis is mine. 
81 See P. E. Dewey, 'Military Recruiting and the British Labour Force during the First World War'. 
Historical Journal (1994) and R. Whipp, Patterns of Labour: Work and Social Change in the Pottery 
Industry (London, 1990), pp. 110-116. 
82 For analysis of the state controlled industries see B. E. Supple, The History of the Coalmining 
In dustn , (London, 1987): P. S. Bagwell, The Railwaymen (London, 1963) and E. Taplin, The Dockers 
Union (Leicester, 1985). 
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Recent studies, therefore, have emphasised the fragmented nature of the working-
class experience of war on the home front. Approaches which suggested an 
increasingly common experience of work underpinning a 'uniform oppositional class 
consciousness' has gained little support among historians in the recent past. 
Consequently, historians have argued that sociological change alone does not explain 
the changes British politics witnessed in the early decades of the twentieth century83 
and have stressed the complexities of society and culture suggesting that there existed 
a multitude of influences in relation to how class groups perceived themselves and the 
world around them. 84 Moreover, like Tanner, some have also questioned the basic 
methodological presumptions underpinning the electoral sociology approach. 
The most significant assault upon a class based approach to the political history of the 
first half of the twentieth century has been from Lawrence and Taylor. 85 They have 
argued that political historians should 'pause and think' before adopting an electoral 
sociology approach and instead should 'develop a more contextualised and less 
concept-driven understanding of electoral behaviour in the past' and, moreover, adopt 
an approach which recognises the wide array of influences on voting behaviour.86 
Tanner has also made a significant contribution to the reassessment of how we ought 
to interpret the role of sociological change in political re-alignment in Britain.87 He 
advises the need to adopt a 'fuller and [more] interdisciplinary analysis' of the 
changes facilitating Labour's electoral growth and his own work suggests that 
Labour's expansion was, in fact, ' a long, drawn-out and incremental process which 
was incomplete [even] by 1931,.88 Crucially, Tanner argues that whilst social change 
created a 'potentially encouraging new climate for Labour', post-war expansion was 
not, however, simply a result of the 'inevitable outcome of class'; rather 'Labour 
83 See for example J. Lawrence, 'Popular Radicalism and the Socialist Revival in Britain', Journal of 
British Studies, 31 (1992), pp. 163-86 and D. Cannadine, Class in Britain (Yale, 1998), pp. 8-12. 
84 See P. Joyce, Visions of the People, Industrial England and the Question of Class, 1848-1914, 
(Cambridge, 1991) and Democratic Subjects: The Self and the Social in Nineteenth Century England, 
(Cambridge, 1994). 
85See introduction in J. Lawrence and M. Taylor, Party, State and Society: Electoral Behaviour, pp. 1-
26 and chapter in the same book by J. Lawrence, 'The Dynamics of Urban Politics 1867-1914', pp.79-
105. 
86 See ibid p. 15. 
87 See in particular D. Tanner, 'Class voting and Radical Politics: the Liberal and Labour Parties, 1910-
1931 in J. Lawrence and M. Taylor, Party. State, Society, pp. 106-130. 
88 Ibid, p, 1 06. 
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created its own expansion ... by learning to represent peoples needs,.89 As Tanner 
explains, this may have created 'a deep sense of political loyalty (expressed in terms 
of class) but it was a gradual, partial and uneven process which was not determined by 
social and cultural forces alone' .90 Ultimately, Tanner rejects the absolute determining 
role of social change and argues the case for a more integrated assessment of political 
development, in particular one which recognises the 'power of politics'. Political 
events contributed significantly to determining the fortunes of the respective parties 
but that was only half the story, as Tanner concludes: 'Labour's breakthrough in 1918 
had to be built into a firm political platform ... it had to prove itself as a practical party 
[and] meet the needs of a new electorate and a new set of social circumstances'. 91 
The way Labour set about doing this and, indeed, the response of the party's rivals 
will be explored throughout the later sections of this study. 
Municipal Politics and the Historical Debate 
F or a number of historians Labour's expanding municipal representation before 1914 
underpinned their arguments for an inevitable (or likely) advance.92 They have 
concluded that, between 1908 and 1914 the Labour Party made an 'unbroken series of 
gains' .93 Moreover, had it not been for structural impediments such as the limited 
franchise and the complexity of registration laws Labour's expansion in local politics 
might have been even more rapid.94 Others, however, have questioned the extent to 
which the Labour Party had 'broken the mould' of municipal politics in Britain before 
1914.95 Furthermore, the extent to which the municipal franchise did in fact 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid, p.124. 
92 See R. McKibbin, Evolution, 1974; K. Laybourn and J. Reynolds, Liberalism and the Rise of 
Labour; M. G. Sheppard and 1. L. Halstead, 'Labour's Municipal Election Performance in Provincial 
England and Wales 1901-1913', Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History (1979); B. 
Lancaster, Radicalism, Co-operation and Socialism, Politics in Leicester 1860-1906 (Leicester, 1987). 
93 McKibbin points out how Labour's net gains across the country were 23, 78 and 85 in 1909, 1911 
and 1913 respectively, see R. McKibbin, Evolution, p. 85. 
94 See M. G. Sheppard, 'The Effects of the Franchise Provisions on the Social and Sex Composition of 
the Municipal Electorate 1882-1914', Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, 45 
(1982). 
95 See T. Adams, 'Liberals, Labour and the First World War; Politics, Economy and the Decline of 
Local Peculiarity', Journal of Local and Regional Studies (summer 1990); c. Cook, 'Labour and the 
Downfall of the Liberal Party 1906-1914' in A. Sked and C. Cook (eds) Crisis and Controversy: 
Essays in Honour of A. 1. P. Taylor (London, 1976); A. W. Purdue, 'The Liberal and Labour Parties in 
North East Politics 1900-1914; the Struggle for Supremacy', International Review of Social History, 11 
(1976); M. Pugh, 'Yorkshire and the New Liberalism', Journal of Modern History. Supplement, 50 
(1978). For analysis of the municipal franchise and the position of Labour, see D. Tanner, 'Election 
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disadvantage Labour has also been questioned. Tanner, for example, has claimed that 
the case as advanced by McKibbin et al (that the un-enfranchised before 1914 might 
be perceived as a natural Labour block) is neither 'sociologically plausible nor 
empirically sustainable,.96 Davis's research has also shown how registration laws and 
requirements relating to ratings no longer discriminated heavily against the working-
class; in fact, he suggests that the electorate in areas such as factory towns and poor 
inner-city slums became dominated by the working-class.97 Arguments concerning the 
municipal franchise existing as an obstacle to Labour's early progress, therefore, are 
now generally approached with caution. 
The extent to which a Labour advance in municipal politics provides evidence for an 
inevitable national realignment remains an area of considerable debate. Irrespective of 
debates surrounding the municipal franchise a number of local studies have concluded 
that by 1914 Labour experienced considerable difficulties in making progress in 
municipal representation; in some areas it appears the fledgling organisation had 
'failed miserably' to obtain a foothold in municipal govemment.98 Others, however, 
have concluded that, despite being incomplete, Labour's potential was clearly 
apparent; after all obstacles such as the franchise, weakness of local organisation and 
finances could all change in time. In his study of municipal politics, Cook suggests 
that the Liberal Party had failed to achieve an effective electoral strategy at the 
municipal level and, in particular, had been unable to determine what ought to be 
done with respect to Labour. Significantly, Cook claimed that in some places the 
Liberals had even begun to form alliances with the Conservatives in order to 'pre-
Statistics and the Rise of Labour 1906-1931', Historical Journal, 34 (1991). Tanner's evidence 
suggests that the relationship between the extension of the franchise and the growth of Labour was far 
less straightforward than some historians had implied, see, D. Tanner, 'Election Statistics', p. 906. 
96 See D. Tanner, 'The Parliamentary Electoral System, the Fourth Reform Act and the Rise of Labour 
in England and Wales', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 56 (1983), pp. 205-219. 
97 See J. Davis, 'Slums and the Vote, 1867-1890', Historical Research, 64 (1991), pp. 375-388 and 
more recently; 'The Enfranchisement of the Urban Poor in Late-Victorian Britain' in P. Ghosh and L. 
Goldman (eds) Politics and Culture in Victorian Britain (Oxford, 2006). 
98 Adams evaluation of Labour's progress in Hull, Cardiff, Sheffield, Liverpool and the East End of 
London, for example, demonstrates the fragility of Labour's pre-war municipal position; see T. Adams, 
Liberals, Labour and the First World War. Likewise, Tanner demonstrates how Labour's municipal 
fortunes fluctuated across the country and he concludes that in many areas it was the Liberal Party 
which remained the most important working class party at the local level, see D. Tanner, Political 
Change. pp. 4-8, 149, 157-58,275-278 and 300-303. 
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empt' a Labour challenge.99 Although ultimately Cook admitted that apart from a few 
industrial areas the Labour Party's progress remained tentative or non-existent. 
Consideration of municipal politics and the debate surrounding the decline of the 
Liberal Party and rise of Labour has tended to focus primarily on the question of 
numerical expansion (i.e. the respective representation of the parties on the local 
authorities). In order to obtain a more thorough understanding of political change 
before and after 1914, it is equally important to examine council politics itself. 
Aspects such as the influence of the new Labour representatives on the councils, the 
degree of 'progressive' co-operation and the ideological position of the established 
parties (especially the Liberals) are all important when evaluating political change 
during the early twentieth century. Although overall control might have remained a 
distant prospect for the Labour Party before 1914, this should not necessarily be taken 
to imply that the new Labour groups remained of peripheral importance. lOO Although 
there is some restriction on the depth of analysis possible, the present study provides a 
broad overview of these dimensions of municipal politics in the localities examined. 
Analysis of municipal politics is also invaluable in terms of assessing how Liberalism 
at the local level responded to the wider challenges it faced after the First World War. 
Recently, historians such as Doyle have provided a valuable insight into the ways in 
which the Liberal Party in some areas continued to be a successful electoral force in 
local politics long after 1918.101 Whilst municipal performance presents a number of 
methodological problems in that one is often not comparing like for like or that a 
locality's 'peculiarities' are often more pronounced at this level, local politics (in 
particular the local municipal elections) nonetheless can provide a valuable insight 
into the parties general progress in a given locality.102 Given the frequency of the 
municipal contests they also provide more opportunities to assess change in popular 
electoral preferences. 
99 C. Cook, 'Labour and the Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1906-1914' in A. Sked and C. Cook (eds), 
Crisis and Controversy: Essays in Honour of A. J P. Taylor (London, 1976), pp. 55-58 and 62. 
100 For a full consideration of the ability of Labour councillors to get proposals adopted see M. Cahill, 
'Labour in the Municipalities' in K. D. Brown (ed) The First Labour Party, 1906-1914 (London, 
1985). 
101 See Doyle's work on the Liberal Party in Norwich which concludes that the Liberals managed to 
sustain considerable middle-class nonconformist allegiance well into the 1930s, B. Doyle, 'Urban 
Liberalism and the Lost Generation: Politics and Middle Class Culture in Norwich 1900-1935', 
Historical Journal, 38 (1995), pp. 617-34. 
102 For a consideration of the methodological difficulties of examining municipal election performance 
see D. Tanner, 'Election Statistics and the Rise of Labour 1906-1931', Historical Journal, 34 (1991). 
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The State of the Debate 
It is fair to say that historians have tended to move away from structural and 
sociological explanations of the decline of the Liberal Party and subsequent rise of 
Labour and have instead stressed a multitude of factors which influenced political 
change before and after the First World War. Aspects underpinning political change 
during this period continue to attract considerable academic attention and will no 
doubt generate debate for some time. Politics in Britain before 1914 presents a 
complex picture and firm predictions as to what might have been are necessarily 
fraught with danger. One thing is clear, however, and that is that much depended on 
the relationship between the two left-of-centre parties. McKibbin has astutely 
concluded that there were two pivotal determinants vital to that relationship (and thus 
critical to the whole political system as it stood); first, the extent to which there 
existed issues on which the progressive parties could agree and secondly, the extent to 
which Labour was prepared to remain subordinate within the party system. 1 03 
Answers to both these questions are difficult to ascertain although the present study 
intends to explore them within the context of comparative analysis of two important 
English industrial localities, Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent. 
Reasons for the Study of Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent 
In 1844 Disraeli declared that 'rightly understood Manchester is as great a human 
exploit as Athens' .104 Many contemporary observers agreed that Manchester 
represented a significant transformation in urban development (for good and for bad). 
Manchester became symbolic of a new era and it was perhaps inevitable that it would 
also be hugely significant in the context of political development in Britain during 
both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Manchester developed a strong and 
distinctive Liberal political tradition personifying the Free Trade movement of the 
nineteenth century and in the process produced Britain's first ever modem pressure 
group, the Anti-Com Law League, established in 1838. Manchester appeared to 
symbolise a new era in relation to class. The industrial and commercial middle-classes 
catapulted to a new position of influence. At the same time Manchester played a 
central role in the development of a national campaign for democratic reform, 
103 See R. McKibbin, Parties and People, p. 32. 
104 Disraeli quote cited in A. Kidd, Manchester, (Keele, 1993), p. 38. 
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Chartism. l05 The development of the national Labour movement also owed a 
considerable debt to Manchester. Historians have recognised the city's radical 
journalist Robert Blatchford as being hugely influential in giving the movement for 
independent labour representation a significant push at a critical time in its 
development. 106 Besides his Clarion newspaper, Blatchford's Merry England 
published in 1893 was influential for many radicals and the establishment of a 
Manchester Independent Labour Party in 1892 represented a new type of political 
organisation, its very name implying a new purpose. Alongside the Bradford Labour 
Union the Manchester ILP precipitated the emergence of the national Independent 
Labour Party, the creation of which was to change British politics forever. 
Manchester's contribution to the development of Liberal and Labour politics was 
immense; as one historian has suggested it had become a 'pioneer of 
Progressivism' .107 From this perspective alone, examination of Manchester during a 
period of significant political change is of special interest and certainly for 
contemporaries the city had always been regarded as having a national significance 
beyond almost all others. The symbolic value of success or failure in Manchester 
remained considerable well into the twentieth century. 
The last twenty years or so has seen a number of studies examining constituency 
politics in various localities and several have considered Liberal and Labour politics 
in Manchester. 108 Moore's recent assessment of the transformation of urban 
Liberalism provides an excellent study of the Liberal Party in Manchester towards the 
end of the nineteenth century whilst McHugh's examination explores Labour Party 
105 J. Walton, Lancashire: A Social History 1558-1939 (Manchester, 1994), p. 129. 
106 See, for example, H. Pelling, The Origins of the Labour Party and A Short History of the Labour 
Party. 
107 See J. Moore, 'Progressive Pioneers: Manchester Liberalism', Historical Journal (2001), p. 991. 
108 Studies which examine aspects of Manchester's political, cultural and social history include T. 
Adams, 'Labour Vanguard, Tory Bastion, or the Triumph of New Liberalism? Manchester Politics 
1900-1914 in Comparative Perspective', Manchester Region History Review, 14,2000; L. T. Bather, 
'Manchester and Salford Trades Council from 1880', Bulletin for the Society for the Study of Labour 
History, 6 (1963); A. Davies and S. Fielding (ed), Workers' Worlds: Cultures and Communities in 
Manchester and Salford, 1880-1939, (Manchester, 1992); s. Fielding, 'Irish Politics in Manchester, 
1890-1914', International Review of Social History, 33 (1988) M. Hewitt, The Emergence of Stability 
in the Industrial City: Manchester, 1832-67 (Aldershot, 1996); J. Hill, 'Manchester and Salford Politics 
and the Early Development of the Independent Labour Party', International Review of Social History, 
24 (1981); A. Kidd, Manchester (Keele, 1993); D. McHugh, 'The Labour Party in Manchester and 
Salford before the First World War: A Case of Unequal Development', Manchester Regional History 
RevieH', 1~ (2000); N. Reid, 'Manchester and Salford ILP: A More Controversial Aspect of the Pre-
191~ Era', Bulletin of the North West Labour History Society, 5 (1978) and E. D. Simon, A City 
Council From II'ithin (London, 1926), 
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politics in the city throughout the 1920s.109 No single study, however, has examined 
in detail Liberal and Labour politics in Manchester during the critical period between 
1906 and 1922. A number of national surveys of constituency politics have paid some 
attention to Manchester: Tanner's study of political change between 1900 and 1918 
provides interesting analysis of the North-West region and Clarke's seminal study of 
Lancashire also provides invaluable consideration of the county's largest and most 
important urban area. These do not, however, provide an exhaustive consideration of 
electoral development in Manchester throughout the whole period examined here 
(before and immediately after the First World War). 
Like Manchester, the SIX towns in North Staffordshire (popularly known as the 
Potteries) which merged into a federated borough called Stoke-on-Trent in 1910 
represented an obvious product of British industrialisation. I 10 The area was at the 
forefront of Britain's earliest industrial development. III Josiah Wedgwood's Etruria 
works (founded in 1763) represented one of Britain's earliest factories and the region 
became recognised as the world's leading centre of ceramic manufacture. Stoke-on-
Trent was one of Britain's great industrial cities but impressions of the area have 
largely been negative. Perceptions of the Potteries have been shaped to a large extent 
by two of the twentieth century's most successful novelists; Arnold Bennett and J. B. 
Priestley. Published in 1902, Bennett's popular series of stories set against the 
backdrop of the Potteries evoked a seemingly unchanged world, an area 'as remote 
from the rest of England as any part of the country could be'. 112 Over thirty years later 
Priestley, in his enormously influential English Journey, found the Potteries still 'like 
no other industrial region .... unique in their remote, self-contained provincialism' and 
he concluded that this part of Britain represented Victorian industrialism in its' dirtiest 
109 See 1. Moore, The Transformation of Urban Liberalism and D. McHugh, Labour in the City: The 
Development of the Labour Party in Manchester 1918-1931 (Manchester, 2006). 
110 For consistency I have used the title Stoke-on-Trent throughout although it did not come into actual 
being until 1910 with the federation of the borough. Any reference simply to Stoke refers specifically to 
that town (i.e. Stoke-upon-Trent) which is one of the constituent components of the federated borough 
(after 1928, city) of Stoke-on-Trent. 
III In many ways North Staffordshire has been overlooked in the history of economic and industrial 
development in Britain. Whilst the role of regions such as Lancashire and cities like Manchester is well 
established this region appears particularly neglected. Yet Stoke-on-Trent was a boom area; during the 
earlier part of the nineteenth century, at 60,000, its popUlation was growing as rapidly as Manchester. 
see F. Burchill and R. Ross, A Hist01T of the Potters' Union, 1977. 
112 Frank Swinnerton in his introduction to the 1953 edition of Bennett's Anna of Five TO\\TIS reprinted 
in A. Bennett, Anna of the Fi"t' Towns. (London, 2001). 
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and most cynical aspect' .113 Though clearly appreciative of the aesthetic impact of the 
local industry, both Bennett and Priestley depict an area remarkable in its sense of 
place and community; Priestley went so far as to suggest that the Staffordshire potters 
were the most contented of workers in any industrial area he had come across.114 
Historians have generally perceived Stoke-on-Trent as an area in which both socio-
economic and political development were notoriously slow; put simply, the Potteries 
changed little after the initial phase of industrial development. Common perceptions 
have been that the pottery industry remained backward, industrial relations were 
distinctly harmonious and trade unionism remained painfully slow to develop. In 
consequence political development in the area lagged behind Britain's other major 
industrial regions and demands for independent labour representation in particular 
were extremely slow in emerging. This was an area where loyalty to the Liberal Party 
was exceptionally strong and popular working-class Liberalism was underpinned by 
the predominance of religious nonconformity. Essentially, the North Staffordshire 
Potteries represented a tightly knit industrial community where traditional political 
loyalties and allegiances were especially pronounced. During an era which saw the 
appearance of a political movement whose aims represented a major attempt 
fundamentally to change the face of politics and political structures in places like the 
Potteries, Stoke-on-Trent makes an interesting area to evaluate. 
Compared to many of Britain's other major industrial regions the literature on the 
North Staffordshire Potteries is extremely limited. A number of studies have assessed 
the history of trade unionism in the area notably Gregory's The Miners and British 
Politics which considers the politics of the miners in the region, providing extremely 
detailed analysis of the area's development in this respect. llS There have been a 
number of wider electoral studies that have included some assessment of the area. But 
despite an increase in the number of detailed studies of early twentieth century 
constituency politics in various localities (some of which have already been 
mentioned) few have paid attention to the North Staffordshire area and no single study 
has exclusively examined the political history of the Potteries. One historian who has 
1 \3 J. B. Priestley, English Journey (Ilkley, 2009), p. 207 and p. 193. 
114 Ibid p. 201 and p. 207. 
115 R. Gregory, Miners and British Politics. 
shed valuable light on many aspects of social and political change in this region is 
Richard Whipp in his excellent study Patterns of Labour: Work and Social Change in 
the Pottery Industry (1990)116 although, again, the area's political development does 
not constitute the principal focus. As alluded to above, Stoke-on-Trent is particularly 
worthy of detailed study for a number of reasons. The North Staffordshire Potteries 
are an extremely good example of what can be described as 'an isolatable case study 
which offers scope for intensive investigation' .117 The area's boundaries were clearly 
defined and the six towns remained more or less isolated from the surrounding 
industrial regions of Manchester, Birmingham and Liverpool. Communities within the 
Potteries were exceptionally close-knit, more so perhaps than most other parts of the 
country. In terms of class composition, the six towns were dominated by the industrial 
working-classes. This is not to suggest there was not a middle-class presence but 
compared to other towns and cities the Potteries lacked the distinctively middle-class 
enclaves that had become a key feature of social development towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. Religious nonconformity, particularly Primitive Methodism which 
had been conceived in the area, bound the tight-knit communities together more so 
than in many other regions of England. 1 18 Ultimately, Stoke-on-Trent was remarkably 
homogeneous in socio-economic and religious composition and this gave the area a 
special character. This study offers a good opportunity to examine how the working-
classes in such an industrial community responded to political change over a period 
that witnessed a rapidly changing political context. 
Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent: Post-War Analysis 
Few historians have paid attention to the political history of Stoke-on-Trent or 
Manchester during the immediate post-First World War period. As we will see, 
studies which have included some assessment of Stoke-on-Trent have tended to focus 
on the years before 1914 largely due to the national significance of the 1912 by-
election. 119 No study has examined constituency politics in this area after the First 
World War. Analysis of political change in Stoke-on-Trent provides a valuable insight 
into political realignment after the upheaval of war. Before the outbreak of war 
116 R. Whipp, Patterns of Labour: Work and Social Change in the Pottery Industry ( London, 1990) 
1I7 Thistlewaite quoted in R. Whipp, Patterns of Labour, p. 2. 
lIS Pelling suggests that by the turn of the century the influence of nonconfonnity could on~r be 
maintained in smaller (and somewhat isolated) towns; see H. Pelling, Social Geography, pp. 430-33. 
119 See R. McKibbin, Evolution, R. Gregory, Miners and British Politics and D. Tanner, Political 
Change. 
industrial North Staffordshire was an area where popular working-class Liberalism 
remained strong and the prospect of an imminent Labour breakthrough seemed 
unlikely. The 1918 general election, however, saw a major advance for the Labour 
Party in the area (one of the most impressive across the country) and this was 
consolidated in 1922, by which time Labour held all of the borough's three 
parliamentary seats. The Liberal Party meanwhile had been fatally destabilised by the 
experience of war and whilst they successfully recaptured one of the borough's 
parliamentary seats very briefly in 1923, electoral politics in this former heartland had 
changed dramatically. In municipal politics Labour's advance after 1918 in Stoke-on-
Trent was equally dramatic. The 1919 municipal elections resulted in Labour 
possessmg 34 of the 100 seats on the town council and the party comfortably 
maintained its position thereafter. The following year saw Stoke-on-Trent being one 
of Labour's most successful towns (with 11 candidates elected from a total of 19) and 
from that point the party's representation steadily increased. 12o Given the political 
history of Stoke-on-Trent such a transformation was remarkable and evaluation of the 
locality from 1918 thus provides an excellent opportunity to explore factors 
underpinning political change during this critical period. 
The city of Manchester has also been neglected within the historiography on post-war 
political change in Britain. Despite some detailed evaluation of Manchester's post-war 
politics in recent years it is necessary to make a number of points here. First, existing 
studies have tended to focus exclusively on the development of the Labour Party and 
have virtually ignored the position of the Liberal Party. Secondly, assessment of the 
process of political development itself (electoral campaigns in particular) has lacked 
depth of critical analysis. 121 Examination of Manchester suggests that the Liberal 
Party was not entirely decimated by the experience of wartime events and neither was 
a Labour advance immediately inevitable; in fact, the party found it difficult to 
maintain electoral stability in Manchester in the years immediately after 1918. This 
120 See S. Davies, Liverpool Labour (Keele, 1996), pp. 84-85 (table showing Labour representation in 
county boroughs in descending order of Labour strength). By 1929 Stoke-on-Trent ranked in eighth 
place on this table (from 40) and the party's position (although dipping slightly in 1929) remained 
solid. 
121 McHugh's study of Manchester Labour politics after 1918, for example, provides little examination 
of the party's electoral strategy, policy or appeal during the 1918 or 1922 general elections or the two 
by-elections in 1919 and 1922 respectively; see D. McHugh, Labour in the City: the De\'elopment of 
the Labour Party in Manchester 1918-1931 (Manchester, 2006). 
presents a marked contrast to Stoke-on-Trent where Labour had established a strong 
(and seemingly secure) hold on the parliamentary politics of the borough from very 
early on in the post-war period. The 1923 general election demonstrated that the 
Liberals could still capture parliamentary seats in Manchester despite persistent 
difficulties and determined opposition. The city's Liberals had re-united the previous 
year and the party's organisation appeared to be in relatively good shape. The Labour 
Party's post-war ascendancy in Manchester on the other hand was neither immediate 
nor complete by 1923. 
Religion and Local Political Culture 
It is widely recognised that religion remained of critical significance in party political 
affiliations in Britain before 1914. As already mentioned, in Stoke-on-Trent religious 
nonconformity was exceptionally important in cementing popular working-class 
Liberalism. In Manchester, Anglicanism served to underpin popular working-class 
Conservatism in certain parts of the city whilst in other districts nonconformity may 
be linked to Liberal support and in others Catholic (i.e. Irish) communities were 
associated with Liberalism because of the Home Rule issue. 122 Religious affiliation 
played a critical role in party choice amongst voters. The question of religion and 
politics, therefore, is of especial interest within the present study. Historians have 
illustrated how the Liberal Party's resurgence after 1900 was fundamentally 
underpinned by the revival of political nonconformity. This was clearly a short-lived 
phenomenon, however, which did not survive the First World War and some 
historians have even gone so far as to suggest that nonconformity ceased to count at 
all politically after 1918.123 Koss and Catterall, for example, have suggested that the 
Free Church leadership evidently became less exclusively Liberal after 1918 and this 
had the effect of lessening the political profile of nonconformity. 124 The influence of 
nonconformity in the evolution of the Labour Party has also been well documented; 
from its inception the parliamentary party had drawn the greater majority of its 
membership from the Free Churches and ideologically Labour drew a great deal of its 
122 For a good evaluation of the influence of Anglicanism in Lancashire see T. Griffiths, The 
Lancashire Working Classes 1880-1939 (Oxford, 2001). 
123 See S. E. Koss, Nonconformity in Modern British Politics (Connecticut, 1975). 
124 See ibid, p.324 and also P. Catterall, 'Nonconformity and the Labour Party', Historical Journal. 36, 
3 (1993), pp. 668-676. For a very good assessment of how the social networks of nonconformity 
increasingly 'withdrew from active political Liberalism' after the war see R. McKibbin, Classes and 
Cultures. England 1918-1951 (Oxford, 1998), pp. 90-92. 
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inspiration from radical nonconformity.I25 Many nonconformists were keen social 
reformers and their religious outlook underpinned their politics, as Smith suggests; the 
socialism of many early Labour activists was a peculiarly' ethical kind and owed little 
to Marxist theory' .126 In Stoke-on-Trent (an area which was predominantly 
nonconformist), as we will see, religious identity was central to both Liberal and 
Labour activists. Significantly, Koss claims that the most significant shift from 
Liberal to Labour after 1918 was amongst working-class nonconformists. 127 In an area 
such as Stoke-on-Trent which was both largely working-class and predominantly 
nonconformist such a shift (alongside political and economic change) has to be seen 
as of considerable relevance. This study aims to illustrate how local political culture 
(factors such as religion, the character of local trade unionism and social structures) 
could playa critical role in shaping the political development of an area. In the period 
before 1914, even in a place as industrial and as predominantly working-class as 
Stoke-on-Trent, the local political culture served to undermine the political influence 
of class consciousness. I28 Politics was very largely shaped by local issues and 
personalities. Of course, as Moore has recently pointed out, the 'everyday experience 
of politics' remained largely through the medium of local networks such as political 
clubs, trade unions and the like. I29 These were not only important as a means of 
political participation at the local level but also as a critical mechanism of political 
communication and furthermore they were essential for the efficiency of political 
organisation. From many perspectives, local political culture, i.e. the essential 
political, social and cultural features of the locality and the way in which these 
interconnected was of considerable significance and remained so throughout the 
period under consideration here. A study of Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent provides 
an interesting opportunity to examine first the solidity of the early twentieth century 
125 See D. W. Bebbington, The Nonconformist Conscience: Chapel and Politics 1870-1914, (London, 
1982); S. E. Koss, Nonconformity in Modern British Politics (Connecticut, 1975); L. Smith, Religion 
and the Rise of Labour (Keele, 1993) and P. Catterall, 'Nonconformity and the Labour Party'. 
Historical Journal, 36, 3 (1993). 
126 L. Smith, Religion and the Rise of Labour, p. 164. 
127 See Koss, Nonconformity in Modern British Politics, p. 234. It is important to note, however, that 
there might have been some variation between the Free Churches; Catterall's study, for example, 
suggests that after 1922 there was an identifiable shift by Methodists (the most working-class of all the 
chapels) towards the Conservative Party; see P. Catterall, 'Nonconformity and the Labour Party', p. 
678. 
128 Recent works such as Lawrence's study of Wolverhampton have highlighted the significance of 
local factors on class identity and its relationship to political development (in particular the progress of 
the Labour Party): see J. Lawrence, Speakingfor the People. 
129 See J. R. Moore, Transformation of Urban Liberalism, p. 14 and p. 20. 
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Liberal revival, secondly the impact of the emergence of Labour and thirdly the 
position of the respective parties in the aftermath of the First World War. 
The Political Significance of By-Elections 
In addition to the five general election campaigns, Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent 
also saw six by-elections between 1906 and 1922. Detailed analysis of these by-
elections offers a particularly valuable opportunity to examine aspects of political 
change in these localities. At the time, by-elections were perceived to provide an 
important insight into the way the political tide was flowing and the political parties 
certainly took them very seriously indeed. Whilst analysis of by-elections may be 
somewhat problematic in that the extent to which they demonstrate more long-term 
political realignment may be questioned they remain enormously useful in showing 
how the parties presented policy and, likewise, how the electorate responded to policy 
and issues. By-elections also provide additional insights into the strength of party 
organisation, relations between parties, internal party unity and the role of candidates. 
In particular, this study will emphasise the critical role played by candidates in 
shaping the political agenda and influencing political change on the ground. Some 
historians have cited poor by-election performance as evidence of a wider potential 
re-alignment in Britain politics in years immediately before the outbreak of the First 
World War. McKibbin, in particular, stressed that poor by-election results provide 
evidence of increasing Liberal weakness.130 Surprisingly, however, few historians 
have evaluated, in detail, by-election campaigns in the early twentieth century. Yet, 
detailed evaluation of by-elections across a number of constituencies between 1906 
and 1922 provides a valuable opportunity to test arguments relating to the position of 
the respective parties before 1914 (as indeed after). 
Methodological Approaches and the 'New Political History' 
Recent years have seen the emergence of what has been termed the 'new political 
history' .131 This approach to the subject matter and methodology of the study of 
130 See R. McKibbin, Evolution, pp. 82-7. 
131 Those associated with the 'new political history' include D. Tanner (Political Change and other 
work); L. Black, 'What Kind of People are You?: Labour, the People and the New Political History' in 
J. Callaghan et al (eds), Interpreting the Labour Party: Approaches to Labour Politics and History, 
(Manchester 2003) and J. Lawrence, Speaking/or the People. Also, the recent series of books dealing 
with social and political aspects of English history since 1914 by R. McKibbin (Classes alld Culture 
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twentieth century British politics has prompted some re-evaluation of what constitutes 
'political history' and how the historian (as opposed to the political scientist) ought to 
go about examining it. The approach of the so-called 'new political history' is 
essentially a more holistic one in that the 'new' political historians have sought to 
provide a more integrated analysis of 'high politics' (institutions and leadership) 
alongside aspects such as political culture, ideology and, in Fielding's words, 'how 
this related to the people at large' .132 There is an obvious appeal to the approach of the 
'new political history'. Amongst other things political history was traditionally 
somewhat London-centric, tended to neglect the political importance of aspects such 
as local government and the regions and, furthermore, as Readman suggests, was 
perhaps guilty of a 'narrow-minded cult of the archive' .133 The 'new political history' 
has aimed to avoid some of these pitfalls and sought to understand more fully the 
nature and development of the political parties (at the widest level) across the country. 
A critical aspect to emerge from the 'new political history' (implicitly perhaps) has 
been the recognition that, to use Tanner's phrase, the 'politics of place' remained 
enormously significant well into the twentieth century. The detailed study of electoral 
politics and political change in specific localities (such as those evaluated here) thus 
provides an opportunity to explore the evolving character of English progressivism 
during a period of significant political change. 
The extent to which the 'new political history' offers an entirely innovative or radical 
approach to the study of twentieth century British politics might be questioned; after-
all, the groundbreaking work between 1970 and 1990 of writers such as Russell, 
Blewett, Cook and Thorpe set new parameters for historians considering electoral 
politics and political change during the earlier part of the twentieth century.134 These 
and Parties and People) should also be recognised as providing an integrated approach to political 
history. 
132 For an assessment of the impact of the 'new political history' see S. Fielding, 'Looking for the 'New 
Political History', Journal of Contemporary History, 42 (2007), pp. 515-524. Fielding concludes 
ultimately, however, that whilst it has been increasingly recognised by political historians that there is a 
need to 'transcend conventional notions of party politics' it is not always the case that such an approach 
is in fact obtained in practice, sees article cited above, p. 523. 
133 P. Readman, 'The State of Twentieth- Century British Political History', Journal of Policy History. 
21, 3 (2009), p. 219. Readman provides an excellent overview of the waning fashions of British 
political history writing in recent years; see ibid, pp. 219-238. 
134 See A. K. Russell, Liberal Landslide: The General Election of 1906 (Newton Abbot, 1973); N. 
Blewett, The Peers, the Parties, and the People: The General Elections of 1910 (London, 1972); C. 
Cook, The Age of Alignment: Electoral Politics in Britain, 1922-1929 (London, 1975) and A. Thorpe, 
The British General Election of 1931 (Oxford, 1991). 
historians were influenced by 'modem' political science methodologies (such as those 
pioneered by the Nuffield series) although their analysis remained very much from a 
historian's perspective. Yet overall, it is probably accurate to suggest that the 'new 
political history' has in many ways 'rediscovered and redefined' political history.135 
The 'new political history' has seen historians move away from (absolute) class-based 
interpretations of Labour expansion and Liberal decline and has clearly encouraged a 
more contextualised understanding of political change as it developed. 
The electoral process and consequent political outcomes form the principal focus of 
this analysis of the rise and fall of the Progressive Alliance in Manchester and Stoke-
on-Trent between 1903 and 1922. Its methodological approach therefore rests 
significantly on detailed analysis of the various election campaigns (general elections, 
by-elections and municipal contests). It devotes particular attention to detailed 
consideration of the evolving character and influence of ideology and so examines 
contemporary issues and how the parties presented these to the electorate. In doing so 
it places the individual candidates at the centre of the political process as opposed to 
the periphery where one might conclude some political history writing appears to 
locate them. Traditional political historians overwhelmingly tended to concern 
themselves exclusively with 'high politics' and political leadership at the centre; in 
Cowling'S famous phrase, 'the politicians that mattered' .136 It could also be suggested 
that that the left-inclined writers of the 1970s and 1980s appeared also to negate the 
role of the individual; as Evans asserts, during that period of historical analysis one 
might have concluded that 'individual people [had] all but disappeared from the 
historian's vision' .137 Another significant appeal therefore of the 'new political 
history' is a much greater recognition that individual political activists 'mattered' and 
ought not to be written out of the political process. Related to this, it is important not 
to overlook the extent to which political organisation and campaigning, as Davies and 
Morley comment, 'actively influenced, created and altered political opinion' since 
whilst 'cultural traditions might dispose different localities to varying political 
135 For a good assessment of how the 'new political history' has done this see S. Pedersen, 'What is 
Political History Now?' in D. Cannadine (ed) What is History Now (Basingstoke, 2002), p. 37. 
136Cowling quote cited in P. Readman, 'The State of Twentieth Century British Political History', 
Journal of Policy History, 21, 3 (2009), p. 232. 
I37 See R. J. Evans excellent prologue 'What is History?' in D. Cannadine (ed) What is History' Sen!"? 
(Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 1-17. 
allegiances ... the mobilisation of these allegiances could make a difference' .138 This 
study devotes considerable attention to political organisation and campaigning and 
how such influenced political development in the two localities examined here. 
One historian has recently argued that 'the need for political historians to enhance 
traditional approaches in deed as much as declaration is now more pressing than 
ever' .139 Together with a far greater emphasis on the role of political culture, language 
and ideology, it seems ever more important that studies examining electoral politics 
and political change in Britain need to provide as holistic an approach as possible. 
One might concluded therefore that this requires detailed evaluation of each political 
campaign during the period examined before analysis of the wider political 
significance can be considered. 14o This study of electoral politics and political change 
in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent aims to employ such an approach and utilises a 
variety of resources including (where they are available) the respective party archives. 
However, it is worth acknowledging here that its singularly most important source is 
that of the contemporary press. Without doubt the press exists as the greatest portal 
the historian of early twentieth century politics has into the past. For the purpose of 
the study of election campaigns and party organisation, without it, it would simply be 
impossible to obtain a full understanding of political change. 
Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent were localities where the Liberal Party had 
consolidated its position as a party representing large sections of the working class 
whilst retaining the support of its more 'traditional' (middle class support) and had 
developed a strong degree of co-operation with Labour but all these aspects presented 
potential difficulties for both parties. 141 The study of constituency politics by way of 
comparative analysis of two significant localities therefore provides an invaluable 
context by which to explore such themes of political identity, appeal and the 
138 S. Davies and B. Morley, 'The Politics of Place: A Comparative Analysis of Electoral Politics in 
Four Lancashire Cotton Textile Towns, 1919-1939', Manchester Region History Review, 2000, 
Volume 14. p. 63. 
139 S. Fielding, 'Looking for the New Political History', Journal of Contemporary History, 42 (2007), 
p. 516. The emphasis is mine. 
140 For discussion of the various approaches to analysis of political history see, for example, 1. 
Lawrence, 'Political History', in S. Berger (ed), Writing History: Theory and Practice (London, 2003), 
pp. 183-202; S. Pedersen, 'What is Political History Now?' in D. Cannadine (ed) What is History Now? 
(Basingstoke, 2002); P. Readman, 'Speeches', in M. Dobson and B. Ziemann (ed) Reading Primary 
Sources (London, 2009). 
141 See for example D. Tanner, Political Change. 
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development of the 'progressive' parties. How did the Liberal Party in particular deal 
with the challenges it faced? How did the new Labour Party respond to a resurgent 
Liberalism and attempt to establish an independent political identity? These will 
constitute areas of particular interest throughout the earlier sections of this thesis. 
Whilst the experiences of Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent may not necessarily reflect 
developments elsewhere, such analysis, nonetheless, offers an extremely valuable 
insight into how politics evolved immediately before and after the outbreak of war in 
1914. 
Structure 
The study is structured simply, in two main parts: the first section explores political 
change in the respective localities (the six constituencies of the city of Manchester and 
the two parliamentary seats of the borough of Stoke-on-Trent) between 1906 and 
1914. The principle focus of this section shall be analysis of elections and party 
support. This entails detailed examination of the three general election campaigns and 
four critical parliamentary by-elections which took place in these localities before 
1914. Additionally, municipal politics (elections and some evaluation of council 
politics) in Manchester will be evaluated.142 The second section of the study evaluates 
political change in the aftermath of the First World War including analysis of (by 
now) ten Manchester and three Stoke-on-Trent parliamentary constituencies in the 
context of the critical general election campaigns of 1918 and 1922. Two important 
Manchester by-election campaigns (in 1919 and 1922) will also be considered 
alongside assessment of developments in municipal politics in the aftermath of war. 
The study is intended as a contribution to the body of work which has evaluated 
political change in Britain before and after the First World War paying particular 
attention to the politics of the Progressive Alliance at the local level in Manchester 
and Stoke-on-Trent. 
Conclusions 
This study of electoral politics and political change between 1906 and 1922 by way of 
comparative analysis of Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent lends support to the view that 
141 It is necessary to note that evaluation of municipal politics in Stoke-on-Trent prior to 1914 presents 
some difficulty for reasons which are mentioned below; this dimension of political development, 
therefore, cannot be explored as fully in analysis of Stoke-on-Trent before 1914 as in Manchester. Post-
war municipal politics in Stoke-on-Trent is far less problematic and that period is explored more fully. 
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a natural (or inevitable) advance of the Labour Party was by no means assured before 
1914; at best the new party's prospects appeared tenuous. Assertions that future 
Labour growth was cemented prior to the outbreak of war appear to be wholly without 
foundation when one considers electoral politics in these parts of industrial Britain. 
Furthermore, Labour's progress was in consequence of a considerable degree of 
Liberal acquiescence. The Labour Party did not achieve its parliamentary 
breakthrough on its own accord; it did so from within the framework of the 
Progressive Alliance. As this study shows, the Progressive Alliance came under 
certain pressure in the period immediately before the outbreak of war although it 
would be unwise to predict its imminent demise. The historian can only guess as to 
how long the Progressive Alliance would remain a feature on the political landscape. 
When the Progressive Alliance did break down before 1914 the consequences served 
to demonstrate the fragility of Labour's progress; when the new party challenged the 
Liberals it fared extremely badly. Breakdown of progressive co-operation could also 
undermine the electoral position of the Liberal Party since Labour intervention could 
split the so-called 'progressive' vote thus facilitating a Unionist victory at the expense 
of the Liberals. Recognition of this fact may, however, have encouraged the re-
establishment of the policy of the Progressive Alliance, although this remains 
speculative. 
Analysis of the Liberal Party pnor to 1914 in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent 
illustrates the extent of regional variation in relation to the permeation of the 'New 
Liberalism'. In Stoke-on-Trent, Liberalism (as indeed Labour) appeared progressive 
and receptive to advanced policy formation, yet in Manchester this study shows that it 
is unwise to exaggerate the impact of the 'New Liberalism' in the city; Liberalism 
there appeared noticeably traditional and conservative. Clarke's contention that the 
Edwardian period heralded an altogether new era for Liberalism, and that this 
constituted a major element in relation to the party's revival and continued electoral 
strength, needs to be viewed with some caution. This study suggests that Liberalism 
in Manchester appeared to be electorally significant although it did not appear to be 
ideologically vibrant. 
A number of historians have identified poor by-election perfonnance as an indicator 
of increasing Liberal weakness in the years leading up to the First World \Var. 
Detailed examination of the four by-elections in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent 
between 1908 and 1912 provides little support for such a view. Poor by-election 
performance can be explained largely by adverse public reaction to specific policy 
and legislation and whilst electoral defeat demonstrates the fine line the Liberal Party 
was treading with the introduction of advanced social, economic and political reform 
it does not, however, necessarily imply a wider and long-term crisis for the party. 
Examination of electoral politics in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent from 1918 
illustrates the fragmented nature of political change in the aftermath of the First World 
War. In 1918, Stoke-on-Trent saw a significant swing to the Labour Party and the 
virtual destruction of the Liberals which, given the electoral history of the borough, 
represented a monumental reversal in party fortunes. Labour's advance was 
consolidated further in 1922, by which time the party held two of the three 
parliamentary constituencies and had come very close to capturing the other (from an 
independent Labour member). In Manchester, however, the Labour Party saw no such 
electoral breakthrough and in some respects its position remained as precarious as it 
had done before the war. Equally, the Liberal Party fared much better in Manchester 
than in industrial North Staffordshire. There were a number of political events which 
disadvantaged the Liberals from 1918 which at the same time helped Labour's 
expansion but this study concludes that, besides the political situation (the national 
Liberal split) the power of politics (policy and issues) was of central importance in the 
speed and character of the political re-alignment which took place in the aftermath of 
the First World War. 
Chapter 2: Electoral Politics and Party Support in Manchester, 1906-1914 
2.1: The 1906 General Election in Manchester 
Throughout the decade before 1905 Liberalism had remained organisationally and 
electorally weak in Manchester. 1 The party had fared badly in the parliamentary 
elections of 1895 and 1900 and had been divided over the Boer War. Many of the 
party's wealthier supporters had left the city leaving an inevitable dent in the party's 
financial position. Neither was the Liberal Party making identifiable progress in 
municipal politics and the Unionists had consolidated their position on the council. 
The cumulative effect of these factors was that early twentieth century Liberalism in 
Manchester appeared to be something of a lame duck. Consequently, a major re-
organisation of the Liberal Party in Manchester was essentiaL This happened in 1903 
with the formation of the Manchester Liberal Federation. The main objective of the 
federation was to co-ordinate the work of the six divisional Liberal Associations of 
the city. It should be remembered that the early twentieth century saw a major 
overhaul of the Liberal Party nationally and this was to prove critical to the revival of 
Liberalism after 1905. As Russell suggests, on becoming Chief Whip in 1899 
Gladstone had recognised that the local Liberal organisations had become largely 
ineffective. Registration and canvassing work was poor and, more worryingly, 
candidates who did not possess their own independent wealth were effectively 
discouraged from putting themselves forward? Gladstone therefore set about 
addressing the critical question of organisation. Between 1900 and 1905 Gladstone 
and his staff had reinvigorated the Liberal organisation, the party possessed a 
substantial election fund, good quality candidates had been in constituencies for some 
time, the central office was well equipped with propaganda material and crucially 
there had been a successfully negotiated 'agreement' with the newly created Labour 
1 For a detailed examination of Liberal politics in Manchester during the 1880s (to 1895) see J. Moore, 
The Transformation of Urban Liberalism: Party Politics and Urban Governance in Late Nineteenth 
Century England (Aldershot, 2006). 
2See A. K. Russell, 'Laying the Charges for the Liberal Landslide: The Revival of Liberal 
Organisation, 1902-1905' in A. J. Morris (ed) Edwardian Radicalism, 1900-191-1. Some aspects of 
British Radicalism, (London and Boston, 1974), pp. 62-74 and see also the Liberal Party treasurer's 
warning to the National Liberal Federation at its annual general meeting in 1903; National Liberal 
Federation Proceedings of the Annual Meetings, 1903. 
Representation Committee.3 Consequently, Liberal organisation in Manchester had 
improved enormously.4 
From the beginning of the campaign, the 1906 general election was conducted amidst 
an air of considerable optimism within the Liberal ranks across the country. The 
record of the late Conservative Government had alienated many voters and the Liberal 
Party's ability to exploit these prevailing grievances gave the party the edge 
throughout the campaign. This, combined with a wider range of issues addressed by 
the Liberal candidates was in marked contrast to the Unionists who chose to focus on 
an extremely narrow range of issues. Furthermore, the Liberals presented a more 
united front, all candidates appearing strongly supportive of the official (national) 
party policy. The Unionist candidates did not display such unity and these (well 
publicised) disagreements, primarily concerning fiscal policy, proved detrimental to 
the party's prospects. 
Of Manchester's six parliamentary divisions, four were contested by Liberals, two by 
the Labour Representation Committee (hereafter LRC) while all were contested by 
Unionist candidates. The two left-of-centre parties had selectively targeted seats they 
believed each would be most capable of winning. The Liberal and Labour candidates 
were all what might be described as 'traditional' in terms of their occupations and 
background. The Liberals included two businessmen (Charles Schwann and Arthur 
Haworth), a Kings Council (Thomas Horridge) and a journalist (Winston Churchill) 
and the LRC candidates were both prominent local trade union organisers (1. R. 
Clynes and George Kelley). From the beginning of the contest both the local Liberal 
organisation and press were anxious to affirm their support for Clynes and Kelley. 
The Manchester Evening News concluded that official Liberalism had 'realised that 
3 See speeches by Augustine Birrell and Dr John Massey, National Liberal Federation Proceedings of 
the Annual Meetings, 1905. 
4 See Manchester Liberal Caucus Minutes, 24th September 1906. Note that some historians suggest that 
the revival of Liberal organisation after 1906 was not in fact uniform across the country; see for 
example, A. Howkins, 'Edwardian Liberalism and Industrial Unrest: A Class View of the Decline of 
Liberalism', History Workshop Journal, 4 (1977), p. 143. Russell also highlights how the Liberal's 
relative financial position remained weak not least because in many areas the party was heavily reliant 
upon an extremely small number of individuals for financial support. See A. K, Russell, Liberal 
Landslide: The General Election of 1906 (Newton Abbot, 1973) p. 39. Clarke also identifies a similar 
situation in Lancashire; see P. Clarke, Lancashire, p. 213. 
organised Labour had become a political force and must be recognised'. 5 Yet, a 
feature of both the Liberal and Labour campaigns was a relative neglect of labour 
questions and social reform.6 Overwhelmingly, the most prominent issues for all 
candidates were Free Trade, education (opposition to the 1902 Education Act) and the 
question of Chinese Slavery in South Africa. These issues allowed both Liberal and 
Labour candidates to present themselves as concerned with moral, humanitarian as 
well as economic considerations, whilst at the same time recognising the freedom of 
the individual. 
Of all of the city's constituencies, it was generally considered that Manchester North-
West was one of the most important. Perceived to be the 'citadel' of Free-Trade, 
commerce and capital, it represented the heart of the cotton industry; Britain's largest 
export trade and one of its greatest wealth providers. Since 1885 the seat had been 
held by the Unionist Sir W. H. Houldsworth who had been unopposed in 1900. It was 
widely believed that the rejection of a Unionist here would have an 'immense effect 
upon other constituencies,.7 The constituency was a large one with nearly 12,000 
voters and although it had an image as a business constituency it was in fact mixed in 
its social and economic composition. Certainly, it included some of the richest men in 
the country (mainly non- resident voters who qualified through their businesses in the 
division) but it also included a very sizable number of urban poor and significant Irish 
and Jewish communities. The Liberal candidate in Manchester North-West in 1906 
was Winston Churchill who had joined the party two years earlier in protest over the 
Tariff Reform issue. Churchill Gust 32 years of age at the time) had represented the 
nearby Lancashire constituency of Oldham from 1900 and was perceived to be a 
rising star in British politics. Throughout the 1906 contest, local commentators 
reported that Churchill's campaign was conducted with considerably more energy and 
enthusiasm than was usual. Churchill was publicly supported by many of the 
division's most prominent businessmen (of all party persuasions) primarily on the 
basis of their objection to an alteration in fiscal policy. Churchill's opponent was a 
London barrister, William Joynson-Hicks. In contrast to Churchill's exuberant 
5 Manchester Evening News, 5th January 1906. 
6 Nationally, two-thirds of candidates included social refonn proposals in their election addresses, see 
Russell, Liberal Landslide, p. 66. Russell notes that candidates who did give some priority to social 
refom1 tended to be younger. 
7 Manchester Guardian, 12th January 1906. 
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platform performances, Joynson-Hicks (at least according to the Liberal press) 
appeared somewhat dull in comparison. He presented himself (essentially) as a 
defender of the status quo and paid most attention to the issue of the union. For the 
Manchester Guardian, however, this appeared to be a flawed tactic since it was 
assumed that the North-West voters cared little about the 'Home Rule bogey,.8 In a 
division so heavily influenced by commercial interests, the most crucial issue 
remained the fiscal question and the possible impact an introduction of protection 
would have upon the cotton trade. Churchill's capable advocacy of the virtues of Free 
Trade proved to be a Godsend to the Liberal campaign in this important division. Of 
course, Churchill possessed a gift with words and avoided becoming submerged in the 
technicalities of the issue and simply asked 'if Free Trade is not a good thing, why did 
you build the Manchester ship canal? ... what is the good of constructing it to make 
the delivery of goods as cheap as possible if you are going to put customs officers on 
duty to place a tax on them before they reach you? You might as well throw your 
money into the canal'. 9 These sentiments were bound to go down well in the city 
where the cult of Cobden and Bright had reached quasi-religious proportions. It is 
important to note, however, that Free Trade was not a subject exclusively of interest 
to the commercial classes and business elite; for the working-classes the matter was a 
'bread and butter' question and any suggestion that their material well-being might be 
unduly affected by a reversal in policy could prove to be decisive for many of these 
voters. In areas such as North-West Manchester large parts of the industrial working-
classes might have therefore supported the Liberal Party not because of any particular 
political or cultural identification to the party but because at particular times it was 
perceived to be more economically advisable to do so. 
The Tariff Reform issue must have at times appeared an incredibly complicated and 
confusing debate for the average elector. Confronted with an array of complex 
economic arguments and propositions which suggested both Free Trade and some 
form of Protection offered the best chance for securing economic stability, protect 
jobs and guarantee low food prices, how could they determine which to believe? In 
1906 Joynson-Hicks regularly told electors that the maintenance of the existing 
8 Manchester Guardian, 5th January 1906. 
9 See Churchill speech, Manchester Guardian, 10th January 1906. 
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system would lead to increased unemployment. 10 Churchill challenged this 
proposition by suggesting that it was rather the late government's unnecessary and 
wasteful expenditure which contributed more than anything else to economic 
instability. As all Liberal candidates did, Churchill argued that Chamberlain's 
proposals would lead to retaliation and economic disaster. 
Churchill's ability to explain the basic aspects of Tariff Reform in simple terms was 
an electoral asset for the Liberal Party in Manchester throughout the campaign. 
Although, whilst his platform performances lifted the spirits of Liberals they clearly 
provoked consternation from his former Conservative associates who believed he was 
simply courting 'cheap notoriety'; as one Unionist supporter writing to the 
Manchester Courier expressed 'whilst we admire talent from whatever source, we 
would prefer it blended with modesty rather than precocity and calm language rather 
than vituperation' .11 
The Unionist advocacy of Tariff Reform in large part represented a direct appeal to 
working-class self-interest since it was argued imperial preference would secure jobs 
by protecting British trade against foreign competition. Yet there was one obvious 
flaw with this strategy; as a leading historian of the Tariff Reform issue suggests, it 
was not perceived to be an attractive policy outside the region of its birth (the 
Midlands) so ultimately it proved to be an 'even more disastrous policy' in the regions 
where trade was principally export-led. 12 Neither did the movement for Tariff Reform 
enjoy the widespread grass-roots support that Free-Trade did. In areas such as 
Manchester the movement to maintain Free-Trade amounted to a coherent and well 
organised campaign. Neither was Tariff Reform supported by the majority of trade 
unionists, as Savage concludes; in one fell swoop the Unionists 'lost their credibility 
as the party of the economic interests of the workers' . 13 This is a critical point to bear 
in mind when considering cities such as Manchester which possessed both significant 
10 Joynson-Hick's explanation of how Protection would eradicate unemployment appeared highly 
complicated and he possibly made matters worse by arguing that the erection of tariff barriers would 
widen the total area of Free Trade. By this, of course, he meant within the empire, but his suggestion 
that Protection meant more Free Trade was reported to have not been well received by audiences and 
he was advised by his campaign managers to avoid the subject, Manchester Guardian 6th January 1906. 
11 Manchester Courier, 4th January 1906. 
12 A. Sykes, Tariff Reform in British Politics 1903-1913 (Oxford, 1979), p. 26. On Tariff Reform see 
also P. Fraser, 'Unionism and Tariff Reform: the crisis of 1906', Historical Journal, 5 (1962). 
13 See M. Savage, Dynamics, p. 148. 
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commercial interests and extensive working-class communities whose prosperity 
relied heavily on the fortunes of the cotton trade. 
For symbolic value Manchester-East was another seat which the Liberal Party was 
desperate to capture in 1906. The constituency had been represented by Arthur 
Balfour for more than 20 years. In 1900 he had been returned with a majority of 
nearly two and a half thousand. That majority had been unusually high on the basis of 
support for the Boer War. 14 Manchester East was by no means a safe Unionist seat. 
Whilst no doubt Balfour attracted a certain degree of personal support in his 
constituency he also carried a huge burden of the unpopularity associated with the late 
Unionist administration and this was very much apparent throughout the 1906 
campaign. Balfour was routinely heckled; on one occasion even having a herring 
thrown at him and the customary vote of confidence in his candidature at meetings 
was lost more often than it was supported 15. Clearly, the mood had swung against 
Balfour and this was possibly exacerbated by his seemingly confused policy on Tariff 
Reform. The former prime minister clearly had no definite policy on the fiscal 
question. He even went so far as to inform voters that he would be 'ill performing my 
duties if I were to profess a settled conviction where none exists' .16 In the opinion of 
one Liberal agent afterwards, Balfour's 'mystifying' election speeches simply made 
electors 'extremely indignant' .17 
Across the whole of the city, the President of the Master Cotton Spinners Association, 
Charles Macara, was unusually active throughout the campaign in his condemnation 
of any form of Tariff Reform. The Association issued a wide array of pamphlets and 
circulars advising voters that any alteration of existing arrangements would be 'bad 
for the cotton industry and the consumer alike' .18 The 1906 general election also saw 
14 Previous contests had seen Balfour obtain relatively small majorities and had even been as low as 
398. 
15 Manchester Guardian, 10th January 1906. The 1906 general election was perceived to be a 
particularly ill-natured contest. The press across the country reported a discemable ~c~ease in instances 
of disorder at meetings and the Unionist candidates in particular were at the receIvmg end of much 
abuse; see A. K. Russell, Liberal Landslide, pp. l30-l31. 
16See Balfour's speech, Election Speaker (East Manchester edition), January 1906. 
17 See Zimmerman's post election assessment, Manchester Guardian, 15th January 1906. 
18 Manchester Guardian, 10th January 1906. 
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the formation of the Manchester Free Trade League. 19 Although this was ostensibly a 
non-party organisation the Free Trade League (hereafter FTL) was extremely active 
and influential in the Liberal Party's anti-Tariff Reform campaign throughout the 
1906 contest. Significantly, the Manchester FTL also included a large number of the 
city's most prominent Conservatives (a point not lost upon either Liberal organisers or 
the Liberal press nationally and locally). 
Balfour's Liberal opponent (Thomas Horridge) worked exhaustively throughout the 
campaign. Together with his wife, it was estimated he had canvassed over three 
hundred homes per day (on top of the huge number of meetings he addressed). 
Horridge's central planks were Free Trade, Chinese Slavery and the Trades Disputes 
Act. East Manchester (which included Ardwick) was a major centre of the railway 
industry which employed large numbers of men in the area. Balfour's voting record in 
connection to the Trades Disputes Act had been ominous and no doubt was likely to 
lose him support from amongst this group of workers in particular. Manchester East 
also possessed areas of extreme poverty, especially the area bordering the city centre 
(Ancoats and Ardwick)?O Liberal suggestions that Tariff Reform would lead to higher 
taxes on essential foodstuffs (tea and sugar especially) and contribute to rising 
unemployment probably proved significant in Balfour's declining popularity in his 
constituency. Furthermore, whilst anecdotal, the contemporary press suggested that 
the (long-term) influence of the brewers in this particular district had also been 
declining in the years leading up to 1906.21 The licensed trade had always thrown 
their weight behind Conservatism (as it continued to do so) and had been an enormous 
influence on the extent of popular Conservatism in some places. Of significance in 
East Manchester in 1906 was a strong co-operation between the local Liberal 
Association and the LRC. After the contest Horridge's agent remarked that the Liberal 
organisation had 'put themselves into full and sympathetic line with Labour' and he 
believed support for labour representation was the 'foundation of modem 
Liberalism,.22 The question of Chinese Slavery (one which had been pushed very hard 
in this division) also appealed to the 'labour' interest; the rights of the Chinese 
19 The Free Trade Union (later League) had been fonned nationally in July 1903 in response to 
Chamberlain's campaign for imperial preference. See P. Barberis, M. Tyldesley and J. McHugh (eds.) 
Dictionary of Political Organisations (London, 2000), p. 306. 
20 See A. Kidd, Manchester, pp. 120-123. 
21 This was the opinion of the local Liberal press; see Manchester Evening Nt'll'S, lOth January 1906, 
22 Manchester El'ening News. 10th January 1906. 
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labourer (it was suggested) was a question connected to the rights of labour more 
generally.23 
South Manchester was the largest constituency III the city (with nearly fifteen 
thousand electors) and up to 1895 it had always returned a Liberal member. This 
predominantly suburban division of the city included the middle-class enclave of 
Moss Side and it was generally felt that this district determined the results of the 
whole constituency. A large number of Moss Side's residents worked in the textile 
warehouses on the Whitworth Street corridor. The Manchester Guardian believed 
these workers to be 'typically progressive,?4 Indeed, the Liberal candidate, Arthur 
Haworth, was on the radical side of his party and at the beginning of the twentieth 
century was one of Manchester's most radical Liberals. Haworth came from a well-
known local Liberal family and was a central figure in the Manchester Liberal 
Federation. Interestingly, he was the only out-and-out (evangelical) nonconformist 
among the Liberal candidates. During the 1906 campaign he inevitably focused on 
aspects of policy perceived to affect the nonconformist interest.25 Throughout the 
1906 contest Haworth was one of the city's strongest advocates of sympathetic trade 
union legislation. He fervently argued for state subsidies for the unemployed; ones 
which did not result in the 'taint of pauperism and electoral disqualification' .26 He 
also made land reform another central plank of his campaign arguing that the 
'unearned increment in urban sites ought to bear its fair share of the burden of the 
rates,.27 Additionally, whereas most of the city's other Liberal candidates tended to 
avoid the question of Irish Home Rule, Haworth chose to discuss the issue in great 
detai1.28 
According to the local Liberal press, a noticeable feature of the 1906 general election 
contests in Manchester was an apparent weakness of Unionist organisation and 
somewhat ineffective candidates. In South Manchester, in particular, the Manchester 
Evening News reported that the Unionist rank and file did not give 'whole-hearted 
23 See Election Speaker (East Manchester edition), January 1906. 
24 Manchester Guardian, 13th January 1906. 
25 See also S. Koss, 'Revival and Revivalism' in A. J. A. Morris (ed) Edwardian Radicalism 1900-
1914: Aspects o/British Radicalism (London and Boston, 1974), p.91. 
26 Manchester Guardian, 15t January 1906. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Manchester E"cl1ing News, 1ih January 1912. 
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support' to their candidate.29 The extent to which this was the case remains uncertain 
but the fact that it had even been reported may have damaged the Unionist' s 
prospects. 
The last constituency to be contested by the Liberals was Manchester's only seat 
currently held by the party; Manchester North. Manchester North was a largely 
working-class constituency. Charles Schwann had represented the division since 1886 
and enjoyed considerable local support. Manchester North was overwhelmingly 
working-class and organised labour here threw its weight behind the Liberal Party. 
During the 1906 campaign Schwann received the public support of both the railway 
and post office workers. The Unionist candidate, Sowler, also gave considerable 
attention to the question of trade unionism declaring that he was in favour of the 
Trades Dispute Bill although he qualified his position by adding that whilst he 
believed that the unions 'should have liberty' they 'should not mistake that for 
licence' which might not have given the impression of wholehearted support30 The 
Unionist candidate also focused heavily on education claiming that if the Liberals 
were elected they would 'endeavour to take away the discretion of parents [in respect 
to] the religious beliefs they would have taught their children' .31 
The LRC contested two seats in Manchester in 1906. Both of these were in areas 
where historically popular Conservatism had a significant influence for large parts of 
these predominantly working-class communities.32 Manchester North-East had been 
held by the Unionist member, Sir James Fergusson since 1885. He was so sure of 
retaining his seat that he did not feel it necessary to campaign at all during the 1906 
general election. Throughout the entire campaign he attended just four meetings 
although he might have been put off since, according to the Manchester Evening 
News, two of these were of a particularly hostile character.33 On one occasion he even 
refused to continue. It was believed that Unionist organisation was rather weak in this 
29 Manchester Evening News, 13th January 1906. 
30 Manchester Courier, 13th January 1906. 
31 Manchester Courier, 10th January 1906. 
32 This, however. did not manifest (to any great extent) in terms of organised popular Conservatism, 
notably membership of the Primrose League, which remained extremely small in even these parts of 
Manchester, see, M. Pugh, The Tories and the People, (Oxford, 1985), p. 123. 
33 Manchester Evening Nt'H'S. 12th January 1906. 
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constituency and in 1906 there were fewer party workers than at previous contests.34 
Ultimately, it seems that the Unionists put little effort into the contest in this part of 
the city. 
Manchester North-East was one of the city's poorest districts leading one shocked 
Edwardian observer to report of the 'reek and stench ... gloom and grime ... squalor 
and misery of this comer of hell' and to conclude 'what an appalling price Manchester 
pays for it's prosperity' .35 Indeed, the price was very high. Areas such as Ancoats and 
Miles Platting in particular contained poverty which had changed relatively little since 
Engels had so vividly described the area in the 1840s. It was upon the extent of 
deplorable poverty that the Labour Party candidate, J R Clynes, chose to focus some 
of his campaign. Clynes would become one of Labour's most important early 
politicians as a government minister during the First World War. In 1906, he was 
thirty-five years old. A former mill worker Clynes had become a prominent local 
trade unionist in the Gas Workers and Boilermakers Union. Whilst Clynes did not 
necessarily hide his socialist beliefs, he remained cautious not to overstate them and 
articulated a moderate (Liberal) programme. Throughout the 1906 campaign Clynes 
received the official support of a number of locally important groups including the 
Free Trade League, the United Irish League and the General Railway Workers Union. 
As an official LRC candidate Clynes was not expected to ask the local Liberals for 
assistance although various resolutions in support of Clynes were passed by the East 
Manchester Liberal Association who published a number of pamphlets and 
advertisement hoardings. 
Besides a direct appeal to the industrial working-classes, Clynes also targeted middle-
class electors in the division, in particular shopkeepers and other small traders. In one 
speech he suggested that Labour did not expect their support for altruistic reasons but 
'for the sake of their own pockets' .36 Similar to the Liberal candidates, Clynes' basic 
34From the few addresses that Ferguson delivered it seems his basic position was that he was 'entirely 
against a resort to Protection [but believed] it was the duty of the Government to do that which Mr 
Balfour recommended'. He identified areas in which workers rights had been greatly strengthened by 
the late Government (factory and mining laws, workmen's compensation and the Conciliation Act) and 
argued state aid for the unemployed would result in a 'great loss to the state'. Manchester Courier. 10th 
January 1906. 
35 Labour Leader, 21 st January 1910. 
36 Manchester Evening Nell'S, 8th January 1906. 
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proposition was that all had suffered in consequence of the late Unionist Government 
(mainly owing to its wayward fiscal policy) and if they were to be returned again. the 
people would continue to endure economic hardship. 
As has been seen, in Manchester, as elsewhere, the 1906 election was fought on the 
record of the late government which, of course, parliamentary elections generally are. 
But it is important to recognise that, irrespective of the legislation that followed 1906, 
the election itself (as analysis of Manchester illustrates) lacked the articulation of 
distinctly new ideas apart from rare exceptions such as Haworth in South Manchester. 
There was, in fact, little to distinguish Labour's programme from that of official 
Liberalism principally because they appeared to be at such pains to present 
themselves as Free Trade candidates. Consequently, this helps to explain why the 
Liberals appeared not to be alarmed by the Labour Party. Some writers have 
suggested that the Labour Party was more committed and united in relation to its 
social welfare policy compared to the Liberals who remained divided on the issue and 
made few specific reform proposals.37 The evidence in Manchester suggests that this 
depiction was largely, but not entirely, accurate. As has been seen, the city's Liberal 
candidates (with the exception of Haworth) did not make social reform a major issue 
throughout their campaigns. Similarly, the Labour candidates placed surprisingly little 
emphasis on social reform during the 1906 campaign. Whilst their election addresses 
mentioned aspects such as the Unemployed Workmen Act, Old Age Pensions, 
housing and taxation throughout the campaign itself neither Labour candidate paid 
special attention to such issues and no detail as to Labour's approach was 
forthcoming. 38 Perhaps this was simply a question of the LRC candidates playing it 
safe, wishing not to appear too radical at early parliamentary attempts. 
As noted above, one of the greatest difficulties for the Labour Party at this stage was 
limited organisation.39 Whilst the party may have not been so disadvantaged during 
the 1906 election itself (since most of the LRC's candidates received assistance from 
37 See Thane, P. 'The Labour Party and State Welfare' in K. D. Brown, The First Labour Party, 
London, 1985), p. 183 and 1. Harris, Unemployment and Politics: A Study in English Social Policy 
1886-1914, (London, 1985), p. 186. 
38 It should be noted that the LRC issued a collective policy statement alongside the candidates' own 
individual statements. 
39 Labour weakness in respect of organisation has been identified in a number of localities; see for 
example, M. Savage, Dynamics. p. 157 and p. 60. 
the local Liberals Associations), the greater problem was that Labour lacked 
pennanent ward organisation in any of the Manchester constituencies and undertook 
hardly any preparatory work.4o This was most noticeable in registration work such as 
tracking down removals. Whilst the established parties usually undertook three or 
more surveys, Labour had not been able to conduct any in 1906. Neither did the LRC 
possess the necessary funds for the adequate provision of agents. In 1906, for 
example, Clynes and Kelley (the LRC candidate in Manchester South West) shared 
the same election agent, Harry Nuttall, whose task was consequently enormous, as it 
was for his workers. 
The other constituency in the city which saw a LRC candidate in 1906 was that of 
Manchester South-West. Geographically the smallest constituency in England and 
Manchester's smallest division in terms of population (with just 8,500 voters) 
Manchester South-West was an extremely compact working-class division although it 
also incorporated the exceptionally poor area of Hulme and also possessed a relatively 
high concentration of Roman Catholics. The fact that it was so small served perhaps 
to intensify the fierceness of electoral contests there. The seat had been held by the 
Liberal Party until 1895 when it was captured by the sitting Unionist MP, W. J. 
Galloway. Labour's candidate, George Kelley was a 58 year old former lithographic 
printer, well-known trade unionist and Manchester City Councillor.41 Kelley was an 
interesting and emblematic political figure for this period who maintained a strong 
attachment to Liberalism. Some Labour radicals did not hide that they believed him to 
be a 'Lib-Lab wobbler'. The Clarion adopted a particularly harsh view of such 
candidates claiming they had only managed to secure election on the 'flowing Liberal 
tide' and confidently foresaw they would, however, find themselves 'washed up by 
the ebb' .42 The Labour Leader also bemoaned the fact that for candidates such as 
Kelley 'the claims of Labour had been subordinate to the interests of Liberalism' 
adding that he had only secured the support of the United Irish League because 'he 
was punishing some staunch anti-Home Ruler' .43 Of course, as an official LRC 
candidate George Kelley was expected not to seek Liberal assistance. Nonetheless, the 
South-West Manchester Liberal Association provided valuable support via repeated 
40See previous footnote. 
-II Liberal Yearbook, 1907. 
42 The Clarion, 19th January 1906. 
-13 Labour Leader, 5th January 1906. 
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appeals in the press and the distribution of circulars and pamphlets as well as 
advertisements on hoardings across the constituency. 
As the first day of polling arrived few people doubted that the Liberal Party would 
win the election although predictions varied as to the likely scale of a Liberal 
victory.44 The period after 1902 had seen the Unionist Government stumbling from 
one crisis to another. The fact that much of the press were already discussing a Liberal 
victory might also have served to influence the result in itself. There had been a slight 
worry for some Liberals about the appearance of the Home Rule question and 
certainly most of the Liberal (and Labour) candidates in Manchester were cautious not 
to promote this issue too much. Of course, the Irish vote would remain securely 
behind the Liberals (and Labour candidates) irrespective of whether the candidates 
promoted Home Rule or not. There was no tactical advantage, therefore, in giving it 
any greater prominence than was absolutely necessary. 
It is often contended that religious nonconformity was at the pinnacle of its political 
influence at the tum of the twentieth century. Whilst nonconformity had always been 
a major component of Liberal political campaigns, as Koss suggests, during 1906, 
however, it acquired an 'unprecedented dynamism' which infused this particular 
campaign with a 'moral fervour' and 'evangelical appeal' which proved powerful. 
Virtually every issue was espoused within the context of the nonconformist 
conscience.45 Yet, as has been seen, in Manchester, whilst most issues may have been 
infused with a certain moral fervour, the actual nonconformist dimension and context 
to these debates was extremely limited. This contrasts greatly to the other locality 
evaluated later. In Manchester, whilst a moral context to some issues was emphasised, 
the majority of candidates chose not to emphasis the religious (nonconformist) 
dimension. 
In Manchester, aspects such as lingering consternation over the Boer War and trade 
union grievances figured prominently in the rising anti-Unionist tide and these factors 
contributed significantly to the Liberal's confidence and optimism. Another aspect 
..)..) A. K. Russell, Liberal Landslide, p. 145. 
45 For details on the 1906 election and nonconformity see Stephen K Koss, 'Revival and Revivalism', 
pp.75-92. 
aiding the Liberal Party in 1906 was a greater part played by women. As Russell 
suggests, women ' threw their weight more heavily on to the Labour and Liberal side 
than at any time before ' primarily because of the Free Trade v Protection debate and 
the cheap food issue. 46 Of course, this had been the dominant issue in the majority of 
Manchester's constituencies. The Manchester Guardian suggested that ' a candidate 
had only to be a Free-Trader to get in, whether he was known or unknown, semi-
Unionist or thorough Home-Ruler, Protestant or Catholic, entertaining or dull [but] he 
had only to be a Protectionist to lose all chance of getting in. , 47 To a very great extent 
this was true, although this is not to suggest the Liberal campaigns in all 
constituencies rested exclusively on this one aspect. Arthur Haworth in South 
Manchester conducted an extremely thoughtful, wide ranging and ' progressive ' 
campaIgn. 
1906 General Election in Manchester: Results and Analysis48 
Fig. 1 Manchester North-West (Turnout 88%) 
44% 
o Liberal 
• Conservative 
56% 
Seat uncontested in 1900 
46 See A. K. Russe ll , Liberal Landslide, p. 176. Russe ll acknow ledges th a ~ the WSPU campaigned 
actively agai nst Churchill in North-West Manchester but concludes that , ultim ately. fears conce rnll1g 
food prices had the greatest impact. 
47 Man chester Guardian, 15 111 January 1906. 
48 Note that these fi gures have been rounded up or down . 
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Fig. 2 Manchester East (Turnout 85. 1 %) 
o Liberal 
• Conservative 
22.5% swing from Conservative to Liberal49 
Fig. 3 Manchester North (Turnout 84.5%) 
o Liberal 
• Conservative 
13.5% swing from Conservative to Liberal 
49 Sw ing fi gures have been calcul ated using the Butl er method of measurement ; see D. But ler and S. 
Van Beek, ' Why Not Sw ing? Measur ing Electoral Change ', Political Science and Politics. 23. 2 (June. 
1990), pp. 178-184. 
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Fig. 4 Manchester South (Turnout 82.8%) 
o Liberal 
• Conservative 
25.l % swing Liberal Unionist to Liberal 
Fig. 5 Manchester North-East (Turnout 86%) 
• Labour 
• Conservative 
Seat uncontested by Labour in 1900 
59 
Fig. 6 Manchester South-West (Turnout 81.6%) 
41% 
• Labour 
• Conservative 
59% 
21.4% swing Conservative to Labour 
The North West division saw the Liberal Party returned with a majority of 1,241 on 
the highest turnout since 1884 (see fig. 1). In the neighbouring division of East 
Manchester (see fig. 2) the former Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, was decisively 
rejected, the Liberals winning with a majority of nearly 2000. In his own 
constituency, as across the country as a whole, Balfour and his party had severely 
underestimated the impact of issues such as Tariff Reform, the Education Act and 
Chinese slavery. Manchester North and South (see figs . 3 and 4) saw equally 
impressive Liberal victories. In the former, the veteran member Charles Schwann saw 
his majority increase from just 26 (in 1900) to nearly 2,50050 and Arthur Haworth ' s 
victory in the latter constituted the Liberal ' s most impressive victory in Manchester, 
his majority of 4,232 represented 68% share of the vote. In Manchester North East 
and South West (see fig. 5 and 6) both Labour' s candidates were elected, Clynes with 
a majority of 2,432 (29.2%) and Kelley with 1,226 (17.6%). The Manchester 
Guardian believed that Labour' s success had been facilitated in large measure by high 
levels of support from four distinct groups: new voters, Labour supporters, Liberals 
and dissatisfied Conservatives (defecting principally over Free Trade).51 Interestingly, 
the Manchester Guardian also suggested that Conservative voters had also switched 
allegiance because they felt ' direct representation of labour was a cause more 
important to them than ordinary party considerations' . 52 Indeed, nationwide Labour 
50 The Liberal share of the vote was 63.7%. 
5 1 An unusually high number of remova ls in the constituency may have contributed to\-vards a higher 
than average percentage of new voters although the Manchester Guardian did not indicate wh y they 
felt this had aided the Labour cause. Manchester Gllardian , 12th January 1906. 
52 Ibid. 
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achieved an average swing of 16.8% from the Unionists, nearly twice the average of 
9.4% from Unionist to Liberal.53 Labour was winning over Conservative working-
class voters in the way the Manchester Guardian suggested it might be expected that 
Labour would retain this new support at both municipal and parliamentary level; 
whether this materialised will be considered in subsequent discussion of Manchester's 
electoral development. 
After the contest Clynes seems to have been anxious to impress that he believed 
Labour had won on a distinctly different agenda to the established parties; he told the 
Manchester Guardian, that he had been keen to promote the idea of a 'big Labour 
party that could decide legislation and be a determining influence on national 
policy' .54 Outlining the reasons for his success Clynes told The Clarion that he 
believed a crucial factor had been 'the spread of Labour opinions' although he 
conceded that other 'temporary issues like Chinese slavery and Free Trade had all 
helped' .55 As we can see, however, the extent to which Clynes actually articulated a 
distinctive Labour agenda is open to question. Of course, newspapers such as the 
Manchester Guardian might be expected to emphasise the more 'Liberal' aspects of a 
Labour candidate's platform, yet, even so, careful reading of Clyne'S addresses across 
an array of sources, however, suggests that Clynes (and Labour more generally) 
lacked a particularly distinctive appeal. This does not mean that there was a complete 
absence of 'labour' issues and, indeed, Liberal candidates also profited from these (as 
they continued to after 1906) but had the Free Trade issue been less prominent, there 
remains some uncertainty as to whether the fledgling Labour Party could have won 
this seat quite so easily. Manchester South-West also saw a significant Labour 
victory, with George Kelley winning the seat with a majority of 1,226 on a turnout of 
81.6%. Labour attained 64.6.80/0 of the vote (much more than in Manchester North-
East). In 1900 the Unionists had won the seat with 62.6% of the popular vote. Kelley 
enthused that his victory represented a 'blow struck at that shade of political thought 
which was not favourable to the workers' .56 
53 A. K. Russell, Liberal Landslide, p. 200. 
54 See Clynes interview with the Manchester Guardian, 15th January 1906. 
55 See The Clarion, 26th January 1906. 
56 Manchester Guardian, 15 th January 1906. 
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Analysis of the 1906 general election in Manchester suggests that issues such as Free 
Trade, repeal of the Taff Vale Judgment, education and ethical questions (such as 
Chinese Slavery) were critical in pushing the Liberals and Labour together in an anti-
Conservative alliance and the election resulted in a progressive landslide which, given 
the city's history, represented a significant shift in its electoral politics. These were all 
national issues and campaigns around the country had focused on the same themes. 
Nonetheless, the impact of place was significant in that the introduction of Tariff 
Reform into the political debate in Manchester, more than anything else, enabled the 
Liberal and Labour candidates to make a direct appeal to the city's electors on an 
issue which had by that time become almost an article of faith for both rich and poor. 
The 'progressive' candidates' constant re-iteration of the certain ill-effects (as they 
claimed) of any form of fiscal reform undoubtedly left many voters with little choice 
but to vote Liberal or Labour irrespective of previous party loyalty. The extent to 
which the progressive parties would be able to retain such support was yet to be seen. 
2.2: The 1908 North West Manchester By-Election 
By the beginning of the twentieth century by-elections had become an increasingly 
important and visible feature of British politics; a growing popular press ensured such 
contests attracted considerable attention, generating both local and national interest. A 
number of historians have concluded that by-election performance before 1914 
suggests a shift away from the Liberal Party. 57 Detailed consideration of by-elections 
in Manchester before the outbreak of war in 1914 does not suggest that there was a 
fundamental crisis for the Liberal Party at that time; arguably the Liberals were 
performing impressively, especially when set against the backdrop of the scale of 
forces ranged against them as a result of various unpopular pieces of government 
legislation. Although the Liberals did lose seats to the Conservatives; elsewhere, the 
Liberals retained seats with an increased share of the vote. Many of these had also 
been in triangular contests (where Labour had stood). Even in seats which the Liberals 
lost, the party often still managed to increase its share of the vote. On no occasion did 
the Labour Party do better than the Liberals in a three-cornered contest before 1914; 
in every instance the Labour candidate came bottom of the poll. Before the outbreak 
of war in 1914 there were a number of by-elections in the North-West of England and 
57 R. McKibbin, Evolution. pp. 82-7. 
these provide a valuable insight into the problems the Liberal and Labour Parties 
faced during this period. 
With elevation to the cabinet Winston Churchill was in 1908 required to resign his 
seat and stand in a by-election. 58 The sitting member would usually be returned 
unopposed but Unionist determination to recapture this important division made it 
unlikely such an opportunity would be allowed to pass. The 1908 contest in North-
West Manchester represents an interesting by -election in the region before 1914. 
North-West Manchester was perceived by both main parties as being important to 
capture; the constituency had acquired a reputation as one which influenced the votes 
not only of the wider region but also the nation. It was believed that North-West 
Manchester possessed significance unlike any other in the country. Unsurprising, 
therefore, the 1908 by-election captivated the national press for the duration of the 
campaign. 
In terms of class, ethnicity and political opinion North-West Manchester was a mixed 
constituency. It possessed some of Britain's richest men but also some of its poorest; 
it had a strong Jewish community (concentrated in areas such as Cheetham, 
8trangeways and Broughton) and a sizable Irish community. North-West Manchester 
contained a strong presence of Unionist Free-Traders who (it was widely understood) 
put the issue of Free Trade before party identifications. 59 The division included nearly 
12,000 voters split into eight wards; the largest of these was Cheetham with 3,840 
voters. Within the very heart of the city, Exchange and 8t. Anns were very rich wards 
in rateable value and represented the centre of the Lancashire cotton trade. Prior to 
1906 the constituency had never returned a Liberal and despite the Liberal Party's 
success in 1906 there was some uncertainty as to the exact political character of the 
division. The Liberal Magazine, for example, believed that 'in no other constituency 
[had] so many Unionists voted Liberal without becoming Liberal' .60 Essentially, 
many perceived that the Liberal Party had only won in 1906 on the basis of the Free 
Trade question since the commercial element of the electorate strongly believed the 
58 See Manchester Guardian, 10th April 1908. The Re-election of Ministers Act ended this requirement 
in 1926. 
59 See Liberal Magazine, May 1908. 
60 Ibid. 
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future of the cotton industry depended on it. They had voted Liberal III 1906 
exclusively on this issue. 
As in 1906 Churchill's opponent in 1908 was the local barrister, philanthropist and 
well-known temperance reformer, William Joynson Hicks.61 In his opening address 
Churchill sought to emphasise the importance of the contest for the country as a 
whole, not least because, as he perceived it, a Unionist victory would 'encourage the 
House of Lords to greater excesses of partisanship' .62 Churchill hoped the working 
man would not 'support six hundred peers over and above the wishes of six million 
electors,63 although the principle focus of Churchill's campaign was Tariff Reform. 
Joynson-Hicks chose to avoid the subject of Tariff Reform, however, and instead 
focused on issues such as education and Chinese Slavery. 
The 1908 by-election also saw a Socialist candidate. The decision of the Social 
Democrat's conference to send Dan Irving to fight North-West Manchester initiated 
considerable debate within Labour's ranks. Keir Hardie remained resolute that he 
would have voted against the decision, saying that whilst he generally favoured an 
increase in the number of socialist candidates, circumstances in Manchester were not 
favourable on this occasion. Moreover, he believed that such a campaign was likely to 
be detrimental to the Labour cause, claiming that it would be a 'fiasco' and thereby 
give a 'false impression as to the real strength of the Socialist movement'. 
Consequently it could 'injure the prospects of reasonable candidates elsewhere [and 
ultimately] damage the realisation of socialism nationally' .64 Neither of Manchester's 
Labour MPs supported Irving's campaign. Both Clynes and Kelly appeared to share 
Hardie's view and so refused to uphold the candidature of someone who represented 
an organisation which, as they saw it, did not accept the 'unity and common cause of 
the united Labour Party' .65 In terms of organisation the SDP was severely 
disadvantaged, Irving himself admitting there was virtually no organisation in the 
61 Joynson Hicks did not appear to be a hard-line temperance reformer, however, and he did not make 
the issue a central plank of his campaign during the by-election. 
62 Manchester Guardian, 16th April 1908. 
63 Manchester Guardian, 16th April 1908. 
64 See Labour Leader, 24th April 1908. 
65 Manchester Guardian, 16th March 1908. 
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division apart from a small Jewish branch66 and that no preparations had been made 
beforehand. It was also significant that the Manchester and Salford Trades Council 
were unable to support Irving on the grounds that 'for the purpose of [the] election he 
was not a trade unionist' .67 
Whilst it cannot be denied that the press (especially the Manchester Guardian) gave 
Irving ample coverage, it was generally recognised from the outset that his chances 
were exceedingly poor. In a constituency such as North-West Manchester with 
considerable commercial and business interests it was widely accepted that a socialist 
candidate would struggle to gain widespread support. Irving, however, believed the 
election offered a 'grand opportunity to make known the cause of socialism' and 
hoped he would be 'in the fight' .68 Irving suffered from the familiar accusations of 
atheism and was particularly disadvantaged by the circulation of a pamphlet 
(ostensibly issued by the SDP) entitled 'Socialism: Christ the enemy of the human 
race'. The pamphlet caused uproar and the Bishop of Manchester even joined in the 
denunciation of it. The circular was, of course, denounced as fraudulent by Irving, 
Hyndman and the SDP and its origins remained unclear, but it almost certainly did 
considerable damage to Irving's prospects. The issues Irving focused upon were those 
of unemployment, nationalisation of industry, universal suffrage, secular education 
and maintenance for children, old age pensions and Irish Home Rule. All of Irving's 
meetings had to be held outdoors as the SDP had been unable to secure halls; his 
speeches were emotional and evangelical in tone and called upon voters to vote for 
their 'own emancipation and on behalf of the oppressed ... success would encourage 
the struggling masses trampled under a soulless capitalism'. 69 
Churchill's campaign virtually ignored social reform altogether which might seem 
surprising in the wake of recent welfare legislation such as Old Age Pensions and the 
Children's Act. Churchill more or less exclusively concentrated on the issue of Free 
66 Whilst Irving declared that he would not pander to the Jewish vote, he did, however, express his 
disapproval of naturalization fees and argued that, as taxpayers, Jews ought to be given the right to 
vote, see Manchester Guardian, 17tl! April 1908. 
67 Irving was a member of the Gas Workers and General Union which was affiliated to the MSTC. The 
council stated a technicality meant he was not a trade unionist. What this was is unclear. .\/ollchester 
Guardian, 19th April 1908. 
68 Manchester Guardian, 13tl! April 1908. 
69 Manchester Guardian, 13tl! April 1908. 
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Trade leaving it to others in his party to discuss social reform. Making his first public 
appearance since his appointment as Chancellor, David Lloyd George came to 
Manchester in support of Churchill making a series of speeches. He launched a 
scathing attack upon 'monopoly and privilege' demanding a 'radical programme of 
social reform' and the need to 'redistribute wealth ... fair play to the worker. .. a war on 
poverty and destitution' .70 For the new Chancellor, social injustice represented a 'stain 
upon the flag and it was the duty of every man to put an end to it'. 71 Lloyd George 
stressed how the by-election had come at an especially opportune time allowing the 
people of the city to demonstrate a 'sense of community' and to show the government 
they were behind it in the quest for social progress.72 
As with all by-elections during the early twentieth century the Manchester contest saw 
the participation of a remarkable array of pressure groups, each attempting to impress 
upon the candidates, press and public their respective causes. One of the first to gain 
some degree of attention was the suffragette movement. It should be noted, however, 
that compared to later years, their tactics were somewhat restrained. The question of 
female suffrage was a topical issue. The Women's Enfranchisement Bill had recently 
passed through its second reading in the House of Commons and the women's 
campaign was anxious to use the by-election as an opportunity to promote the 
women's case. In 1908 Manchester's suffragettes chose not to embark upon disruptive 
action but to leave Liberal meetings alone and provide 'counter attractions' including 
having their own meetings, distributing leaflets and appealing to candidates to outline 
their position. From the beginning of the contest all three candidates expressed their 
general support for the women's vote. Joynson-Hicks appeared more enthusiastic 
however, declaring that he believed women should possess the vote on equal terms as 
men.73 He also addressed a wider range of issues as they affected women. One of 
these related to the hours of barmaids since there were current proposals to restrict 
their hours. Joynson-Hicks claimed he was opposed to any restrictions of women's 
labour.74 Somewhat less tactfully, Churchill told voters that he 'didn't like to see 
70 It was considered bad conduct for cabinet ministers to participate in by-election campaigns. The 
Unionists perceived the appearance of Lloyd George as a sign of desperation and argued it was 
inappropriate. Manchester Guardian, 22nd April 1908. 
71 Manchester Guardian, 22nd April 1908. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Manchester Guardian, 14th April 1908. 
7-1 Manchester Guardian, 16th April 1908. 
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women in bars anyway'. 75 These issues would have had limited impact in themselves 
although issues surrounding the drink question might help mobilise key groups of 
voters for both parties, however, Churchill's attitude seemed emblematic; 10ynson-
Hicks appeared more sincere and more liberal. None of the candidates 'came up to the 
standard of requirement' for the women, however, and so neither was endorsed by 
either the WSPU or the NUWSS. 
Other issues which achieved some prominence during the campaign included the eight 
hour day and workmen's compensation. For Churchill, the question of social 
advancement and Tariff Reform were inextricably connected and electors had a 
choice between 'progress and reaction'. He suggested that a proposal of Tariff Reform 
was essentially an attempt to 'reverse the social balance ... to set back the clock and re-
conquer the country for forces of capital and privilege'. 76 There was no question of 
the government being able to finance a scheme of old age pensions under a 
Protectionist system. For Churchill, everything came back to the question of the 
maintenance of Free Trade. His opponent, however, argued that the Eight Hours Bill 
was itself a clear infringement of the Free Trade principle and he told voters that this 
was something which had already been identified by the Chairman of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce (Tootal Broadhurst).77 Broadhurst was also Chairman of the 
Manchester Free Trade Unionist Association and during the by-election endeavoured 
to organise large Free Trade meetings in support of Churchill although he was unable 
to generate any great enthusiasm. 10ynson-Hicks also argued that the Eight Hours Bill 
would increase coal prices which, in turn, would add an even greater burden on the 
cotton industry. 1 oynson-Hicks claimed it was unfortunate that Churchill had 
supported the Bill 'in the imaginary interest of a million miners to the detriment of 
about forty three million people' 78 and in his closing speech he launched a ferocious 
assault on the Liberal government on a number of aspects, proclaiming it had 
alienated the colonies, weakened the navy, increased taxation, flouted religious 
convictions and 'let loose chaos and bloodshed in Ireland' .79 Overall, 10ynson-Hicks 
conducted a broader campaign (than Churchill) and for tactical reasons he had chosen 
75 Manchester Courier, 16th April 1908. 
76 Manchester Guardian, 16th April 1908. 
77 Manchester Guardian, 20th April, 1908. 
78 Manchester Guardian, 20th April 1908. 
79 See Manchester Courier, 2~th April 1908. 
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not to fight the by-election campaign on the fiscal question although in his election 
address he identified himself as a Tariff Reformer. 80 
1908 Manchester North-West By-Election Result 
Fig.7 (Turnout 89.7%) 
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The result of the by-election saw the Unionists recapturing North-West Manchester 
with a relatively small majority of 429. Given the constituency's electoral history this 
did not represent a substantial reversal for the Liberal Party. The Unionist ' s majority 
had been nearly 1,500 (a 17% margin of the total vote) in 1895 and the Liberals had 
not considered the seat worth contesting in either the 1892 or 1900 general elections. 
The Liberals may have recently come to consider this constituency the most famous 
Free Trade seat in England and might claim it ought to be naturally Liberal , the 
reality, however, was less straightforward. 
The contemporary press had some difficulty in interpreting the result. For some 
sections of the Liberal press it represented a ' heavy setback for the cause of 
progress ... an unmerited reverse for the government. . . and an absolutely disastrous 
blow for Free Trade ' .81 For others, the wonder was not Churchill 's 1908 defeat but hi s 
victory in 1906.82 That the Unionist candidate had decided to avoid the fi scal issue 
caused some degree of resentment across the Liberal press; the Daily News bemoaned 
so Publi shed on April 13th 1908 Hick 's election address stated that he would advocate at length the 
party 's Birmingham policy at a future Genera l Election . 
S I Morning Leader. 25 th April 1908 . 
82 Dai~) 1 Chronicle, 25 th April 1908 . 
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the fact that 10ynson-Hicks had won 'a victory under obscure colours' .83 Other 
newspapers simply perceived that with Catholics and the liquor trade raged against 
him, Churchill's defeat was ultimately inevitable.84 The Unionist press appeared 
equally divided. Some sections suggested that in making Free Trade the key issue of 
the by-election Churchill had 'staked all and lost'; the Manchester constituency most 
synonymous with Free Trade had given a firm endorsement for Tariff Reform. 85 Other 
sections of the Unionist press, including the Manchester Courier, took a more 
pragmatic view in arguing that the by-election was not primarily a victory for Tariff 
Reform because the candidate had not made it the immediate issue.86 Indeed, it is 
doubtful that the result did have much to do with Free Trade at all. In his post-election 
address, 10ynson-Hicks himself refused to cite Tariff Reform as a major reason for his 
victory, which he attributed instead to the 'absolute detestation on the part of the 
commercial and working classes of the current legislation of the present 
government' .87 Lloyd George displayed a remarkable ability to emphasise only the 
positive when suggesting that 'the polling of only 150 more votes [for the 
Conservatives] than the aggregate forces of progress confirmed the necessity for the 
government to proceed with measures of social reform' .88 Had 10ynson-Hicks not 
avoided the Tariff Reform issue and made it a central plank of his campaign (as his 
party wished him to) some speculated his majority would have been even greater.89 
Churchill, however, had attempted to please everyone and in the process satisfied no-
one as one regional newspaper expressed; Churchill had 'pandered to every clique 
that had a few votes to sell' and in the end had satisfied no-one.90 
The 1908 by-election in Manchester suggests a number of factors relating to party 
strategy and performance. As has been seen, the Unionist candidate had determined to 
avoid the issue of Tariff Reform altogether and his position on the majority of issues 
appeared moderate, balanced and he clearly articulated his points effectively though 
the key to his success was most likely to have been his focused attacks on current 
83 Daily News, 25 th April 1908. 
84 Bristol Mercury, quoted in Manchester Guardian, 25 th April 1908. 
85 Bristol Times and Bristol Mercury quoted in Manchester Guardian 25 th April 1908. 
86 Manchester Courier, 25 th April 1908. 
87 See Manchester Courier, 25th April 1908. 
88 Manchester Guardian, 27th April 1908. 
89 Acland Hood's position is cited in P. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism. p. 287. 
90 Nottingham Chronicle, 25 th April 1908 quoted in Manchester Guardian, 26th April 1908. 
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Liberal legislation. Equally, as analysis of the by-election illustrates, Churchill's 
campaign seemed somewhat weak by comparison. There are therefore a number of 
wider implications of the North-West by-election in Manchester. Firstly, by 1908 the 
Conservative Party had clearly come to recognise Tariff Reform as a serious electoral 
liability and so calculated that it was probably wise to avoid the issue (as best they 
could) during election campaigns. Conversely, the Liberals (as analysis of Churchill's 
campaign illustrates) continued somewhat dogmatically to focus on the fiscal issue. 
As an electoral strategy this may have been something of a flawed tactic however, 
given that by then it was clear that the Conservatives as a party were by no means 
united on Tariff Reform and it was not therefore guaranteed that an incoming Unionist 
administration would put such a policy into effect. Whilst it was understandable that 
in areas heavily reliant upon export trade (such as Manchester) the Liberals might 
continue to stress the benefits of Free Trade, it appears to have become unnecessary to 
exclusively focus campaigns on the subject. Secondly, whilst a few visiting speakers 
(David Lloyd George most notably) sought to emphasise the government's social 
reform programme, the candidate had not done so himself, suggesting that, at this 
stage at least, there was a significant extent of local (or candidate) autonomy where 
campaign issues were concerned. 
Given the symbolic nature of the North-West constituency the 1908 by-election might 
have been perceived as a disaster for the Liberal Party. However, closer examination 
reveals that the Liberals had in fact polled respectably, obtaining 48% of the vote.91 
Ultimately, North-West Manchester had become a marginal constituency and the 
Liberal's strategy at the next contest would essentially be determined locally, yet the 
problem of how to go about this (in light of the declining significance of the Tariff 
Reform issue) had a greater national significance. For the historian, however, the key 
significance of the 1908 by-election is that whilst it undoubtedly represented a blow 
to the Liberals in Manchester, as indeed nationally given the reputation it had 
acquired, it did not indicate any major crisis for the party. 92 
91 One factor which ought to be noted in relation to the Liberal poll in North-West Manchester in 1908 
was the Jewish vote. Given the Liberal Government's liberal administration of the religious persecution 
clause of the Aliens Act it was almost certainly the case that the Jewish vote was cast solidly for 
Churchill. This served to limit the swing at the by-election. For consideration of this aspect see J. 
Garrard, The English and Immigration 1880-1910 (Oxford, 1970). 
92 To put the Manchester North-West result in national perspective, of the fifteen Liberal held seats 
which saw by-elections during 1908 the party managed to retain nine. 
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2.3: The 1910 General Elections in Manchester 
In Manchester both the 1910 elections were fought primarily on the constitutional 
question by the Liberal and Labour parties, whilst Unionist candidates tended to focus 
their campaigns on other issues, particularly Irish Home Rule. A marked feature of the 
January contest was a reluctance of Unionists to engage in discussion on the 
constitutional question. For both the Liberal and Labour parties a key question would 
be to what extent the parliamentary gains of the 1906 general election would be 
retained? For the Liberal Party the 1910 contests produced somewhat mixed results in 
Manchester. They also demonstrated aspects of potential concern in relation to the 
position of the Labour Party in the city. As a result of the January 1910 election the 
city was represented by three Liberals, one Conservative and two Labour members. 
Whilst Manchester North-West had been regained the Liberals lost the South-West 
division in consequence of Labour intervention. Overall, however, the Liberal 
leadership deemed the results a further illustration that Manchester was 'emphatically 
against government by peer and beer' .93 For the Labour Party, the January election 
also proved to be somewhat disappointing. As the Labour Leader reported 'the 
condition of the local organisations was in no manner capable of bearing the severe 
test of having to fight the machinery of two powerful parties' .94 The same report went 
on to bemoan the 'deplorable lack of canvassers' and perhaps, more worryingly, a 
significant 'lack of contact between candidates and electors' .95 
The January 1910 General Election in Manchester 
The most significant aspect of the January 1910 general election in Manchester was 
that for the first time the Liberal and Labour parties opposed each other in a three-
cornered contest. 96 Manchester thus sheds valuable light on the Progressive Alliance 
before 1914 and illustrates how at the constituency level, despite the existence of a 
theoretical 'alliance', relations could be far from harmonious. By 1909 the sitting 
members for two Manchester constituencies (East, held by Labour, and South West, 
by a Liberal) had stated their intention to retire at the dissolution of Parliament. In 
accordance with the spirit of the Progressive Alliance, the Liberals ought to have been 
93 Manchester Guardian, 17th January 1910. 
94 Labour Leader, 4th February 1910. 
95 Ibid. 
96 The 1908 by-election had seen a three-cornered contest but the third candidate on that occasion had 
not been officially sanctioned by the Labour Party, rather, his candidature had not met with Labour 
approval. See previous section on 1908 by-election. 
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given a free run in East Manchester and Labour should have remained unopposed in 
South-West Manchester.97 The Labour Party had come to the conclusion, however. 
that East Manchester was a seat that their own organisation ought to contest (largely 
on the basis that they had a strong organisation in the district and were doing well in 
municipal contests there) and so proceeded to adopt their own candidate, Manchester 
city councillor and miners' agent, John Sutton.98 The Liberal Association was willing 
to accept this although on the condition that, in return, the Labour Party withdrew 
their candidate (J. M. McLachlan) in South-West Manchester. 
The MLF undoubtedly strove hard to find a compromIse solution but the East 
Manchester Liberal association had clearly resolved to make a serious challenge for 
the seat. This was reflected by the Association's choice of candidate; L.W. 
Zimmerman, who The Times reported was the 'strongest candidate the party could put 
forward' .99 As a last resort the federation urged a deputation from the East 
Manchester Liberal Association that 'in the interests of Liberalism as a whole [they] 
ought to withdraw their candidate'. 100 The deputation replied there was 'no necessity 
to consider the matter further [since] they had unanimously decided to continue,.l0l 
The MLF could not do anything else but declare that the Association had, ultimately, 
'placed upon themselves the responsibility of the contest' .102 Eventually Zimmerman 
decided he no longer wished to continue and formally retired on 29th December thus 
resolving the issue in East Manchester. 103 The MLF, no doubt relieved, declared its 
'high appreciation of [his] self-denial and self-sacrifice for the peoples cause'. 104 The 
episode is important for a number of reasons. Certainly, Labour did act as the 
aggressor by adopting McLachlan to contest South-West Manchester and this no 
doubt may have seemed ungracious to the local Liberals; the seat after all was held by 
them. The Federation's proposed solution seemed logical however. East Manchester 
97 South-Manchester had a background of problems. In 1900, for example, although the Liberals did 
not run a candidate, the local association refused to endorse the LRC candidate. 
98 That the party was performing well in the municipal politics of this district (Bradford, Beswick and 
Ardwick wards in particular) may have confirmed for Labour their claim to contest the parliamentary 
constituency. See appendix for municipal election results in these areas. 
99 The Times, 17th December 1909. It was generally considered that Zimmerman had been instrumental 
in the 1906 election victories in Manchester and this made him a popular choice with the Liberal rank 
and file. ... . th 
100 Manchester Liberal FederatIOn Executive Committee Minutes, 20 December 1909. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
\03 Zimmerman had clearly come to recognise his candidature would be a liability. 
104 Manchester Liberal Federation Executive Committee Minutes, 29th December 1909. 
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was an overwhelmingly working-class constituency and had never returned a Liberal 
before 1906; it was probably more Labour territory than Liberal. Furthermore, Sutton 
could be perceived to be a safe moderate candidate and would be unlikely to alienate 
traditionally Liberal voters. Sutton was certainly more acceptable to the MLF than 
Labour's candidate in South-West Manchester who was an out -and-out socialist. 
Manchester South-West, however, was a socially-mixed division and had previously 
returned Liberal members, so it made sense that this seat should be contested in the 
Liberal as opposed to the Labour interest. The consequences of this apparent 
breakdown in Liberal-Labour relations appeared clear to many contemporary 
observers, the Manchester Courier predicted that as 'negotiations had failed both of 
the progressive forces are faced with new dangers' .105 
The smooth operation of the Liberal-Labour electoral agreement in 1906 had been a 
crucial factor in the overall results for both parties. It is important to recognise, 
however, that there had been some significant developments in respect of Lib-Lab 
relations after 1906 at the national level and it has been suggested by some historians 
that by 1910 Lib-Labism effectively ceased to be the viable alternative it had 
previously been. In large part, this was because its most powerful supporter (the 
miners) had gone over to Labour. 106 Blewett suggests that the lines between the 
Liberal and Labour Parties by 1910 were 'more clearly drawn'.107 Yet, Lib-Lab 
sentiments remained strong amongst both political activists and sections of the 
electorate. This will be discussed further later. More significantly, and this was 
evidenced by the situation in South-West Manchester, attempts by the Labour Party to 
expand were clearly perceived by the Liberals as constituting acts of aggression. We 
should remember, however, that the Liberals clearly felt that the alliance was worth 
maintaining and so stood down in East Manchester; ultimately, Lib-Labism had not 
been seriously compromised despite some evident tension the episode had created. 
The January 1910 General Election Campaign in Manchester South-West 
Analysis of the January 1910 general election campaign in South-West Manchester 
demonstrates how Liberal-Labour relations were clearly fraught. McLachlan fought a 
105 Manchester Courier, 5th January 1910. 
106 N. Blewett, The Peers, The Parties and the People: The General Elections of 1910 (Toronto, 1972). 
pp.234-235. 
107 Ibid, p. 234. 
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vigorous campaign and pulled no punches with regards to his hostility towards the 
Liberals who he claimed were 'the real enemies of the workers' .108 In particular. he 
expressed his objection to the way the Manchester Guardian described Clynes as a 
Labour candidate yet himself as an Independent Socialist. Indeed, analysis of the 
electoral campaign demonstrates how the Liberal press did all it could to present 
McLachlan as a man undermining the unity of the Manchester's progressives 
forces. 109 The Liberal candidate, C. T. Needham, however, avoided blatant criticism 
of McLachlan although he did advise electors that a vote for Labour would be 'as 
good as a vote for the Unionists' .1l0 The Unionist candidate in Manchester South-
West was an out-and-out Tariff Reformer who directed most of his attention to 
attacking the Liberals on this question claiming that the House of Lords was a 'dead 
issue,.111 The central planks of (the Conservative) Arthur Colefax's campaign were 
Tariff Reform and the Budget although he also addressed a wide range of social 
questions such as unemployment, pensions and education. 112 Colefax launched a 
fierce condemnation of the budget; his argument was essentially that the Chancellor's 
taxes were economically irrational and he went to great lengths to present figures in 
support of this assertion but, more significantly, he argued that the burden of taxation 
(following the Budget) would not fall heaviest upon the rich but rather the ordinary 
working man. 113 As he told one meeting, the Budget hit hardest 'the luxuries of the 
poor. .. whisky, tobacco and beer' .1l4 Colefax was anxious to stress how he was 'fully 
in sympathy with the social reforms being advocated by the Liberal Party' but the 
critical question was how best to fund them and the answer lay with the fiscal 
question; he told one meeting that 'the Radicals' cried "never tax the foreigner" but he 
taxes you all the time .. .I say put some of your taxes on the foreigner' .1lS Colefax 
devoted considerable attention to demonstrating how British labour was 'exposed to 
108 See Manchester Guardian, 3rd January 1910 and 6th January 1910. 
109 See Manchester Guardian, 4th January 1910 and Labour Leader, 21 st January 1910. 
110 Manchester Evening News, 11th January 1910. 
111 Colefax' s position was that the Unionists had not 'rejected the Budget but had simply referred it to 
the people', see Manchester Courier, 3rd January 1910. 
112 Colefax policies were remarkably progressive. He argued strongly for the removal of the pauper 
disqualification (incorporated within the Pensions scheme), advocated the establishment of a national 
scheme for unemployment and invalidity insurance, extension of the education system and state-aided 
purchase ofland; see Manchester Courier, 8th January 1910 and 10th January 1910. 
113 See speeches in Manchester Courier, 3rd January 1910 and 6th January 1910. 
114 Manchester Courier, 6th January 1910. 
115 Manchester Courier. 5th January 1910. 
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unfair competition from abroad' .116 Interestingly, Colefax never embarked upon a 
full-scale assault upon Labour, simply stating how he disagreed with McLachlan's 
approval of the socialisation of the means of production and abolition of the House of 
Lords. In fact Colefax stressed he was in agreement with many aspects of 
McLachlan's election address, in particular the need to address the distress and 
poverty caused by unemployment. Analysis of the electoral campaign suggests that 
the Conservatives conducted an exceptionally vigorous campaign in Manchester 
South-West in January 1910Y7 Colefax (the Conservative candidate) was clearly a 
highly capable speaker on a wide range of issues. It is essential to remember that, as is 
suggested throughout the present study, the strength of individual candidates needs to 
be seen as of critical importance during the election campaigns. 
In terms of policy and approach, McLachlan regularly referred to his 'unflinching 
socialist principles' and focused attention principally on issues such as 
unemployment, poverty, trade unionism, the land question and abolition of the House 
of Lords. 118 On the surface, apart from the House of Lords issue, the Labour 
programme did not seem to differ enormously from than that of the Liberals, although 
McLachlan presented his policies in more overt socialistic language. The January 
1910 election placed Labour in a difficult position. Given the prominence of the 
constitutional question it was even harder for the Labour Party to offer a particularly 
distinct appeal. Blewett suggests that, essentially, Labour candidates were 'little more 
than surrogates for Radicals' and identified how little Labour speeches in 1910 
differed from most of the Liberals. 119 Analysis of Manchester's other Labour 
candidates tends to support this view. McLachlan in South-West Manchester was the 
exception. McLachlan's socialist inclinations help explain why both the local Liberal 
Association and McLachlan himself remained so determined to contest the seat. His 
predecessor George Kelley had been a prominent Lib-Laber whom most Liberals 
(activist and supporters) believed to be one of them. With a change of personnel, not 
to mention political stance, the situation changed quite dramatically. The episode 
clearly illustrates the complexities surrounding the political culture of Lib-Lab trade 
116 See Manchester Courier, 8th January 1910. 
117 Note that although the whole constituency was given significant attention throughout the campaign 
it appears that the Conservatives targeted Hulme in particular, addressing countless meetings there each 
day see Manchester Courier, 8th January 1910. 
, th 
118 Manchester E"ening News, 5 January 1910. 
119 Blewett, Peers. Parties and the People, p. 109. 
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unionists such as Kelley. The following section evaluates the remainder of the 
contests in Manchester. 
Labour v Conservative contests in Manchester in January 1910 
In Manchester North-East, 1. R. Clynes, like the other Labour candidates in January 
1910 made social reform the key focus of his campaign. Declaring himself' a worker 
for the workers', Clynes spoke of a need for a 'war on poverty [and] social injustice' 
and he argued in particular that the only way to enable truly effective social 
legislation was to 'abolish the House of Lords completely' .120 The extent to which this 
appeal proved to be effective was questionable however. Clynes later remarked that 
'the very poorest people, who least understand the causes from which they suffer, 
were the least responsive to our appeals [and were] deceived by the quack remedies of 
the Tariff Reformers' .121 This was an astute observation by Clynes; indeed, the 
Conservatives remained exceptionally strong among the poorest in the slum areas of 
Manchester. These areas (largely concentrated around the city centre) were occupied 
by casual workers who remained outside the influence of trade unions. 122 Nonetheless, 
throughout the campaign Clynes remained focused on the issue of social reform and 
the 'great Liberal work' which had been done. He told one audience how there had 
been 'more genuine endeavour to effect social advancement by legislation during the 
[previous] four years than in any previous ten years on the part of any political party 
in this country' .123 Overwhelmingly, Clynes campaigned on a virtually identical 
platform to that of the city's Liberal candidates; simply focusing on social reform and 
the obstructionist tactics of the House of Lords. His Unionist opponent, Manchester 
City Councillor and local solicitor, Sir W. Vaudrey, adopted the same approach as 
Colefax in Manchester South-West that was to argue that the Budget did nothing for 
the working man and that Tariff Reform offered the best prospect of improving the 
condition of the people, in particular in alleviating unemployment. 124 In his election 
120 Generally the attitude of Labour candidates was to provide support to the government with regards 
to the constitutional question. There was very little difference between the lines adopted by Liberals or 
Labour candidates. For a useful account of Labour and the constitutional question see Douglas, R. 
'Labour and the Constitutional Crisis' in K D Brown, The First Labour Party. Douglas highlights how 
Labour candidates were especially interested in land taxation and (ultimately) marked the high point of 
close Lib-Lab relations. 
121Manchester Guardian, 17th January 1910. 
122 For details on the character of these areas see A. Kidd, Manchester (Keele, 1996), pp. 120-123. 
123 See Manchester Evening News, 7th January 1910. 
12-1 See Manchester Courier, 5th, January, 7th January and 8th January 1910. 
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address he elaborated on how he favoured proposals for a second chamber to consist 
of appointed and elected peers only, strongly supported old age pensions, proper 
maintenance of the navy, the right of parents to 'have their children taught in their 
own religion' and how he was absolutely against the separation of Britain and 
Ireland. 125 
In Manchester East the sitting Liberal member had decided to retire at the dissolution 
of parliament and the prospective Liberal candidate had withdrawn just after 
Christmas 1909. This left a straight fight between the Labour and Unionist parties. 
Labour's John Sutton was a miner's agent and Manchester City Councillor. The 
number of electors had decreased since the previous contest. Sutton assumed this was 
in consequence of rising poverty in the district; many decent people he claimed had 
become disqualified because they had been forced to accept poor relief. 126 At the 
same time, the number of estimated removals in the division was high (amounting to 
approximately 15% of registered voters). A key question was how Liberal supporters 
in the division would vote? Initially, it was presumed that many of the constituency's 
Liberals remained hostile towards Labour but as the contest progressed the 
Manchester Guardian reported that most had 'swallowed their disappointment' and 
were 'rallying around Sutton in increasing numbers'. 127 Showing good grace 
Zimmerman also issued a personal appeal to the division's Liberals urging them to 
support the Labour candidate. The evidence strongly suggests that Sutton also 
received valuable campaign help from the Liberal party128 as well as from a number 
of other sources including students from the university, the local Baptist College and 
three local Co-operative Societies (Beswick, Droylsden and Manchester and 
Salford).129 The co-operative movement usually adopted a non-political role; the 
threat of increased or new taxation on food contributed to their decision to intervene 
in this instance. From this point, it appears that the co-operative societies in this 
constituency threw their weight behind Anti-Tariff Reform candidates. 130 Throughout 
125 Manchester Courier, 7th January 1910. 
126 Manchester Guardian, 11 th January 1910. 
J27 Manchester Guardian, 11th January 1910. 
128 A number of prominent local Liberals addressed Sutton's meetings; see speeches by Alderman 
M'Cabe and Councillor Norbury Williams at one of his meetings. Manchester Evening Nell'S. 1 t h 
January 1910. Sutton himself was keen to acknowledge the considerable assistance he received from 
the Liberals, see Manchester Evening News. 5th January 1910. 
IcC) Manchester Evening Nnl's. lih January 1910. 
130 Ibid. 
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the campaign the Conservative candidate, Elvy Robb, was met by particularly hostile 
audiences. This was probably not helped by the fact that he was reported to have 
commented that if he had to live in East Manchester he would become a socialist. 131 
Throughout the contest Sutton focused attention principally upon the Budget and the 
constitutional rights of the House of Commons (as compared to the unconstitutional 
exercise of the veto by the House of Lords). Sutton told electors how the Labour Party 
'were not robbers but policemen protecting the interests of the working-classes' and 
the Unionists rejection of the budget had nothing to do with the interests of the people 
but 'because they would have to pay something' .132 Sutton's opponent, Elvy Robb, 
adopted a pronounced pro-Empire and anti-Labour campaign and (as already 
mentioned) endured a difficult contest. 133 He focused his campaign almost entirely on 
the Tariff Reform question claiming that 'Free Trade was driving people to 
Socialism,134 though he also devoted some attention to the question of the navy (the 
necessity to maintain it). 135 
As we can see, analysis of the January 1910 general election in Manchester highlights 
the pronounced differences of approach individual candidates adopted during this 
period across their parties as much as between them. Whilst some Conservative 
candidates, for instance, appeared to elaborate on issues and policy fully and 
effectively (Colefax, for example) the evidence suggests that others (such as Robb) 
adopted a more confrontational approach, bereft of detailed policy discussion, and 
consequently endured tremendously difficult campaigns in areas with predominantly 
working-class electorates. 
131 Ibid. 
132 See Manchester Evening News, 4th January 1910. 
133 See Manchester Evening News, 11 th January 1910, which provides a striking illustration of this. The 
newspaper reported that Robb's audience had become extremely 'impatient with him' persistently 
interrupting with demands of 'talk about the budget'. It seems he reacted quite aggressively (and 
condescendingly), telling them to 'shut their mouths' and then proceeded to declare how 'Sutton might 
send his roughs ... but it did him more harm than good' and concluding by telling his audience of how 
they were going to 'have the facts rubbed into them whether they liked it or not. .. we are going to win 
this election on Tariff Reform'. Note also that the Manchester Courier reported how Robb's posters on 
hoardings were regularly being defaced or tom down; see Manchester Courier, 3rd January 1910. 
13..) Ibid. 
135 See Manchester Courier, 8th January 1910. 
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Liberal v Unionist Contests in Manchester in January 1910 
The remaining constituencies of Manchester North-West, North and South all saw 
straight fights between Liberal and Unionist candidates. The latter two were generally 
considered to be safe Liberal seats. Haworth's majority in South Manchester in 1906 
had been over four thousand, one of the highest in the country. Similarly, in 1906 
Manchester North had seen Charles Schwann retain the seat he had held since 1886 
with a majority of nearly two and a half thousand. Manchester North-West had been 
lost by Churchill at the 1908 by-election, although the Liberals believed that the seat 
would be regained at a future general election. The Unionists made a determined 
effort to hold Manchester North-West and challenge Liberal dominance in 
Manchester North although appeared to have made a weak effort in Manchester 
South. Press reports suggest that the local Conservative Association had made an 
unwise decision with regards to their candidate in this division, especially given the 
context of the peers versus the people debate. The candidate, Captain Ward Jackson, 
was a Yorkshire squire who had no background in politics and no connection with 
Manchester. This point was not lost on the Liberal campaign teams throughout the 
contest. Given the seat's electoral history, however, it might have been difficult for 
the Conservatives to secure a better candidate. In contrast, Arthur Haworth was a 
well-known cotton merchant, noted local Congregationalist with an impressive 
1·· I d 136 po Ihca recor . 
Unsurprisingly for the Liberal candidates, the central campaign Issues were the 
Budget, constitutional reform and (inevitably) Free Trade.137 Arthur Haworth in 
South-Manchester was emblematic of the Liberal approach: in asking should the 
working-man vote for 'handing over the power of his own vote to a non-
representative, utterly irresponsible and uncontrollable House of Lords?' 138 In North-
West Manchester the Liberal George Kemp was repeatedly questioned on Irish Home 
Rule yet attempted to avoid the subject leading the local Conservative press to 
conclude that he had 'failed to define his position' .139 The Conservative candidates 
varied in that whilst Howell (Manchester North) and Ward-Jackson (Manchester 
136 Liberal Yearbook, 1910 and Manchester Evening News, 5th January 1910. 
137 Schwann, in particular, focused on Free Trade and requested that the MLF provide election 
hoardings dealing solely with the subject. 
138 Manchester Guardian, 12th January 1910. 
139 Manchester Courier, 14th January 1910. 
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South) attempted to avoid the question of the Lords,140 in North-West Manchester 
10ynson-Hicks focused his campaign largely on the legitimacy of the second chamber, 
claiming that the House of Lords was ' the only means by which new legislation could 
be referred to the people of the country' .141 In relation to the Budget, he contended 
that it amounted to an ' unequal taxation of wealth [and] if land was to be taxed, so 
should commerce and other sources of unearned increment' .142 In a division where 
commercial interests dominated, such sentiments may not have represented the best 
strategy. 
January 1910 General Election in Manchester: Results and Analysis 
Fig. 8 Manchester North-West (Turnout 92 .6%) 
47% 
o Liberal 
• Conservative 
53% 
5.5% swing Conservative to Liberal (since 1908) 
140 Howell tried desperately to keep the question in the background, even going so fa r as to dec lare th at 
he 'was not a peer's man ' anyway . Instead he made more of the education questIOn clall11111 g h e poke 
on behalf of the National Uni~n of Teachers although thiS was actuall y rebuffed by the union It self. see 
Manchester Evening News , 7" Jan uary 19 10. 
14 1 See Man chester Guardian , II th January 19 10. 
142 Ibid . 
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Fig. 9 Manchester-East (Turnout 88.60/0) 
46% 
• Labour 
• Conservative 
54% 
Seat uncontested by Labour in 1906 
Fig. 10 Manchester North-East (Turnout 89%) 
42% 
• Labour 
• Conservative 
6.2% swing Labour to Conservative 
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Fig. 11 Manchester South-West (Turnout 89.6%) 
17% 
42% 
Seat uncontested by Liberals in 1906 
Fig. 12 Manchester South (Turnout 88.4%) 
41% 
59% 
9.1 % swing Liberal to Conservative 
• Conservative 
o Liberal 
• Labour 
o Liberal 
• Conservative 
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Fig. 13 Manchester North (Turnout 89.1 %) 
43% 
o Liberal 
• Conservative 
57% 
6.8% swing Liberal to Conservative 
The January 1910 general election produced a number of significant results for the 
Liberal Party in Manchester. By far one of the most satisfactory was the re-capturing 
of the Manchester North-West constituency (see fig. 8). The loss of the seat at a by-
election two years earlier had represented a significant blow to the Liberals (symbolic 
as much as anything else). Winning the seat back in 1910 had been a key priority for 
the Liberals so victory here (on a 5.5% swing) served to increase the party 's morale 
across the whole city as indeed the country. 
The result of the election in East Manchester (see fig. 9) saw the Labour Party 
winning the seat with a majority of 1,019 (54% of the vote). The percentage decline of 
the 'progressive vote' since 1906 amounted to only 4.6%. Despite the events leading 
up to the election it does not appear that Liberal voters in the constituency had 
deserted Sutton and switched to the Unionists in significant numbers. In fact , the 
swing to the Unionists in this division was the lowest of all the Manchester 
constituencies suggesting that Labour was strong here. Given the constituency ' s 
electoral background (it had consistently returned Unionists after 1885), the result was 
one that the ' progressives ' could be very happy with. Of course, had the Liberal 
candidate proceeded (against both Labour and Unionist) the result would have been 
very di fferent. Tellingly, Sutton believed he had won because '6,110 electors were in 
favour of the campaign against the House of Lords, [desired to maintain] Free Trade, 
83 
[supported] the Budget and [wanted] the abolition of poverty' .143 Clynes held 
Manchester North-East (see fig. 10) with a majority of 1,478 (58.4% of the popular 
vote) which represented a 6.2% fall in Labour's share of the vote since 1906. The 
result in South-West Manchester was disastrous for both progressive parties with the 
Unionists winning the seat with a majority of just 107 (see fig. 11). The Conservatives 
obtained 42.4% of the popular vote, the Liberals 41.0% and Labour 16.6%. For the 
Labour Party especially the result was immensely disappointing. Faced with Liberal 
opposition, the party had failed to successfully defend a seat which it had held, 
coming bottom of the poll. It seemed clear that the Liberal candidate had taken a 
substantial share of what in 1906 had been the LRC' s vote. The experience of South-
West Manchester demonstrated the difficulties Labour faced where the party lost 
sitting members owing to retirement or death. Retirements could encourage the 
Liberals to make their own claim (as will be seen in subsequent analysis of Stoke-on-
Trent). Another message from the result was very clear: as the Liberal press 
recognised, the combined 'progressive' poll amounted to 4,222 votes (57.6% of the 
total), a decisive majority against the Lords. The splitting of the 'progressive' vote 
had negated this however, and ultimately the seat had been lost by the progressive 
forces because of what one senior Liberal described as 'unnecessary conditions'. 
There were many lessons for the future here. McLachlan attributed his defeat to the 
'undeniable advantage of the Lords and the budget agitation to the Liberals' although 
he remained upbeat declaring that the seat had been lost temporarily to the Labour 
cause. Whilst McLachlan had himself placed significant emphasis on the House of 
Lords issue it was probably the case that voters identified the issue more specifically 
with the Liberal Party. Essentially, the principle lesson of the South-West result was 
that the seat undoubtedly contained a 'progressive' majority (as shown in the two 
previous elections) but this was not large enough for either the Liberals or Labour to 
win within the context of a three-cornered contest, i.e. the ultimate lesson was that the 
Progressive Alliance worked and that competition led to defeat. 
In Manchester South (see fig. 12) the Liberal Party managed to hold the seat but with 
a significantly reduced majority of 2,452 (58.9% of the popular vote compared to 
68.0% in 1906). This constituted a hostile swing of 9.1 % and was in the context of a 
143 Labour Leader, 21 51 January 1910. 
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weak Conservative candidate. In Manchester North (see fig. 13) the Liberal Party held 
the seat with a majority of 1,259 (56.9% of the vote). This represented a decrease of 
6.8% in the Liberal share of the popular vote when compared to 1906 although 
elections before then had seen the Liberal vote fluctuate between 50.2% (it's lowest) 
in 1900 and 52.8% (it's highest) in 1895. Therefore the January 1910 result, in this 
light, suggests that, here, the Liberal Party was retaining much of its support. 
Schwann, an elder statesman of Manchester Liberalism remained a highly popular MP 
and his personal prestige was possibly a major factor in sustaining the Liberal vote. 
The December 1910 General Election in Manchester 
The January 1910 general election campaign had been lengthy and intense. In 
contrast, the December contest was shorter and less heated and some observers sensed 
that a degree of apathy had begun to set in. The December 1910 general election 
proved to be anything but a dull contest, however. As Blewett suggests, it was, in fact, 
only during the December campaign that the constitutional question achieved the 
primacy it had been denied during the earlier contest. 144 Since the December election 
took place on an eleven month old register the efficiency of the party organisations 
would be of critical importance and, in particular, the timing of the election required 
some considerable effort in terms of locating removals. As soon as the election had 
been announced, in Manchester, officials from the MLF responded quickly by placing 
adverts in the city's newspapers requesting that notification of removals be forwarded 
to their offices. The immediate response to these adverts alone resulted in over 500 
replies providing details of changes. 145 Analysis of Manchester suggests that before 
1914 there were clear differences in respect to the efficiency of the respective party 
organisations. At both national and constituency level the Liberal Party organisation 
in 1910 was at the peak of its efficiency.146 In Manchester, Liberal organisation lacked 
neither workers nor funds. This was in sharp contrast to both the Labour Party and the 
Conservatives who clearly struggled to match the effectiveness of the Liberal 
organisation. 147 Yet, organisational shortcomings did not prevent the Conservatives 
144 See N. Blewett, Peers, Parties and the People, p. 379. 
145 Manchester Liberal Federation, Executive Committee Minutes (report on the conduct of the general 
election) 13th December 1910. 
146 For assessment of the national organisation in 1910 see N. Blewett, Peers, Parties and People. pp. 
276-279. 
147 Labour faced particular problems in respect of tracking down removals especially in the poorest 
parts of the city, for example, in East Manchester, of the 12.6..J.6 electors, it was estimated that 
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from mounting a full scale assault on one of Manchester's most famous seats III 
December 1910. 
By selecting one of the country's best known advocates of Tariff Reform, Andrew 
Bonar Law, for Manchester North-West, the Unionists had determined to attack Free 
Trade in a seat so fundamentally synonymous with it. 148 Bonar Law had given up the 
prospect of a safe seat in South Dulwich to contest the Manchester constituency 
although allegedly he had been promised another safe one were he not to win in 
Manchester. In his opening address, Bonar Law declared that the critical question was 
whether 'the British nation was going to be master of his own house, or is our 
government and country to be subject to a cabinet whose policy is dictated by a 
faction' (meaning the Liberal radicals).149 A major plank of Bonar Law's campaign 
was opposition to the Parliament Bill principally on the grounds that (he contended) 
'so long as the Government can command a majority in the commons for two years 
[it] can do anything it likes, not even excepting the power to abolish the crown' .150 A 
few days later he told an audience how the Commons 'could do what it liked; they 
could make Keir Hardie President of a British Republic' .151 In support of his Tariff 
Reform proposal Bonar-Law told voters how any increase in the price of food would 
be alleviated by taking taxation off other goods' and it would not disrupt trade in the 
cotton industry since trade between Britain and the empire would be increased. 
Ultimately, as the Manchester Guardian suggested (slightly sarcastically) Bonar 
Law's central message was for 'free trade between Britain and India against the rest 
of the world'. 152 Bonar Law's opponent, George Kemp (who had regained the seat for 
the Liberals in the J anuary contest) focused most attention to the question of the 
approximately half had moved since the register had been compiled, see Manchester Guardian, 9th 
December 1910. See also Manchester and Salford Labour Representation Committee Annual Report, 
1910 which reports that 'whilst Manchester [was] the only town in the country returning two Labour 
members it is one of the weakest in organisation'. 
148 Blewett suggests that there were two key objectives to Bonar Law's candidature in Man~hest~r 
North West, first, it was hoped that it would provide a much needed boost. for the Co.ns~rvatlves III 
Lancashire and secondly, it could encourage the wider unity of the party behilld ProtectIOnISm, see N. 
Blewett, Peers, Parties and People, p. 23. Contesting such a famous Free-Trade seat, or at .least in 
terms of how the Liberals perceived it, no doubt also boosted Bonar Law's personal reputatIOn as a 
leader of the Tariff Reform movement. 
149 Manchester Guardian, 22nd November 1910. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Manchester Guardian, 25 th November 1919. 
152 Manchester Guardian, 26th November 1910. 
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House of Lords veto, arguing that, had it not been for the veto, even more extensive 
reform legislation could have been introduced. 
In Manchester North-East, the seat's sitting Labour member, J. R. Clynes, contended 
that the contest was 'not one between the Commons and the Lords but a battle 
between the peers and the people' .153 The division's Liberals placed advertise!llents 
on hoardings, circulated over six thousand election addresses in support of his 
candidature and also assisted in the supply of motor cars. IS4 Without this assistance 
Clynes would undoubtedly have been disadvantaged. The Conservative candidate was 
a well-known local philanthropist, Arthur Taylor, and like Bonar Law, he sought to 
emphasise that the cotton industry would not be disadvantaged by a measure of Tariff 
Reform. 
In the neighbouring Manchester North division the Conservative candidate, the city 
councillor and journalist H. E. Howell, also enthusiastically advocated fiscal reform 
and placed this at the forefront of his campaign, ahead of the constitutional debate. 155 
He also gave some considerable attention to the Irish Home Rule Question. In other 
constituencies the Unionist candidates sought to evade the Tariff Reform question 
altogether. In South Manchester, for instance, Philip Glazebrook ignored the issue 
altogether and somehow managed to avoid the constitutional question although he 
went so far as to tell voters that 'if the will of the country is that the hereditary 
principle should go then it must go'. 156 The Unionist campaign in South Manchester 
came to an abrupt end, however, when after failing to submit his nomination papers in 
time, the candidate was disqualified from the contest and the sitting member was 
returned unopposed.ls7 Not surprisingly, this enraged many local Unionists and the 
following weeks saw a tirade of protests in the pages of the Manchester Courier. For 
some, this was the tip of the iceberg for a local organisation in a bad way; one 
153 Ibid. 
154 See Manchester Liberal Federation Minutes, 13th December 1910. 
155 Howell was a passionate anti-Irish Home Ruler; see, for example, Manchester Guardian, 24th 
November 1910. 
156See Manchester Guardian, 25th November 1910. 
157 Arthur Hawarth did offer to resign the seat in order to allow Glazebrook to fight the election but thi.s 
was declined. The episode was widely reported in the press and a general consensus emerged that It 
represented yet another indicator of the poor state of Conservative organisation in the city: see 
Manchester Guardian, 5th December, 1910, for example. 
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respondent went so far as to declare that ' Manchester Unionism was hopeless'. 15 8 The 
Unionist position was much better in the neighbouring constituency of Manchester 
South-West which the party had captured in January (albeit owing to a triangular 
contest resulting from a breakdown of Liberal-Labour relations). In the December 
contest the sitting Unionist member, H. A. Colefax, had a straight fi ght with a Liberal ; 
C. T. Needham. Both candidates attempted to capture the large working-class vote by 
focusing on questions such as unemployment, social reform and poverty. Unusually, 
the question of the veto was largely ignored by both candidates. Throughout the 
campaign it was generally expected that those who had supp0l1ed the Labour 
candidate in the January contest would now transfer their vote to the Liberals. The 
local Unionist press, however, took strong objection to this assumption arguing that 
such predictions were as ' unwarrantable as they were gratuitous ' . I 59 The Unionists 
were no doubt appreciative of the fact that their chances were indeed reduced on thi s 
occasion and mindful of the fact that constant press reports of a ' natural' transference 
of the Labour vote to the Liberal candidate could contribute to such happening. This 
might also help to explain the Conservative candidate ' s tactics in terms of the issues 
focused upon. 
The December 1910 in Manchester General Election Results and Analysis 
Fig. 14 Manchester North-West (Turnout 89.2%) 
48% 
o Liberal 
• Conservative 
52% 
1.4% swing Liberal to Conservative 
158 See Manchester Courier, 5 th December 19 10 and preceding day's coverage. 
159 See Manchester Courier, 25 th November 1910. 
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Fig. 15 Manchester North (Turnout 83%) 
46% 
o Liberal 
• Conservative 
54% 
3% swing Liberal to Conservative 
Fig. 16 Manchester North-East (Turnout 84.8%) 
49% 
• Labour 
51% • Conservative 
7.20/0 swing Labour to Conservative 
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Fig. 17 Manchester East (Turnout 80.5%) 
46% 
• Labour 
• Conservative 
54% 
0.2% swing Labour to Conservative 
Fig. 18 Manchester South-West (Turnout 84.6%) 
48% 
o Liberal 
52% 
• Conservative 
8.3% swing Conservative to Liberal 
The December 1910 general election proved to be a major setback for the 
Conservative Patiy in Manchester. The election saw the return of four Liberal s and 
two Labour members for the city. The contested seats resulted in two Liberal holds 
(North-West and NOlih), one Liberal gain (South-West) and Labour holding the seats 
which it already possessed (NOlih-East and East). In Manchester North- \\1est (see fi g. 
8) the Liberal Party held the seat but with a smaller majority of 445. Yet, important ly. 
this only amounted to a hostile swing of 1.4% and thi s had been within the context of 
a very high profile Conservative candidate. This equated to 52 .1 % of the popular vote 
compared to 53.5% and a 783 majority in January of that year. The Liberals appeared 
to be holding their own in this critical Manchester constituency although. of cour e. 
90 
the party had not won with a massive majority (and the issue of the veto no doubt had 
added significantly to the Liberal poll); the seat was not secure by any means. In 
Manchester North (see fig. 15) the Liberals again held the seat but with a much 
smaller majority (665 compared to 1,259 in January). The share of the popular vote 
had declined from 56.90/0 to 53.9%. It should be noted that the turnout had decreased 
from 89.1% in January to 83.0% in December (624 voters). Removals may have 
contributed to this figure. The result in Manchester North appeared to suggest that the 
Unionists were making some headway. It should be remembered, however. that 
historically margins had always been narrow in this division. Before 1906, Schwann's 
majority had been 455 at its highest (in 1895) and 26 at its lowest (in 1900). The 
majority of 2,454 in 1906 had been exceptional. In reality, Manchester North was a 
more marginal seat than the 1906 result might imply. The sitting member's personal 
appeal undoubtedly helped sustain the Liberal vote and perhaps helps to explain a 
swing against the Liberals here of just 3%; were he to retire, however, the Liberal 
position might be less secure. 
The most interesting contest in January 1910 had been that of Manchester South-West 
which had seen a triangular fight resulting in the Unionists capturing the seat from the 
Liberals. In December the Liberals regained Manchester South-West (see fig. 18) with 
a small majority of 259 (51.9% of the popular vote). In January this figure had been 
41.0%. The Unionist vote had increased by 10.9% (on a reduced turnout of 84.6% 
from 89.6% / 412 votes). The Liberal vote had increased by 1,264 (roughly the same 
as the Labour vote in January). Whilst we cannot assume that this represented a 
straightforward transference of votes from Labour to Liberal, a large number of the 
Labour voters in January must have switched to the Liberal candidate in the later 
contest. Results such as this served to reinforce the importance of the maintenance of 
the Progressive Alliance. 
The two Labour victories in the December 1910 general election were also won with 
reduced majorities. In Manchester North-East (see fig. 16) Clyne's majority fell from 
1,478 (in January) to just 205 in December 1910 (58.4%) to 51.2% of the popular 
vote). This represented a hostile swing of 7.2% since the previous election. As across 
the city, the turnout rate had fallen from 89.00/0 to 84.8% between January and 
December. In the East division (see fig. 17) John Sutton retained the seat he had won 
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earlier in the year with a majority of 871 (the highest of all the city's divisions). In the 
January election it had been 1,019, so in percentage terms the Labour share of the 
popular vote had decreased but only by a small fraction (54.5% to 54.3%) which 
amounted to a very small swing of just 0.2%. It should also be pointed out that the 
turnout had also dropped markedly here to 80.5% from 88.6 in the January election. 
Despite winning both the seats it contested in Manchester in December 1910, the local 
Labour organisation was quick to acknowledge that significant improvements were 
essential if the party was to maintain its parliamentary position in the city. Clynes told 
the Labour Leader afterwards that it was 'necessary for the Labour Party to make 
greater preparation in the future than we have done up to now ... the lack of permanent 
organisation must be removed' .160 The Labour Leader complained that 'one man 
cannot be expected to improvise an efficient organisation where none previously 
exists' and suggested that local shortcomings were largely because of the central 
party's 'inattention to the work of organisation' concluding that, in consequence, they 
had jeopardised the seat of so valuable an MP as Clynes. 161 
Evaluation of the 1910 general elections illustrates a number of aspects in relation to 
political development in Manchester. In terms of organisation, the Liberal Party 
appeared to be in good shape in all parts of the city. Historians such as Thompson 
have identified weaknesses in other parts of the country but the evidence in 
Manchester suggests that the Liberal Party had successfully overhauled its 
organisation by 1910. This did not mean that the party was complacent about its 
electoral position however; throughout the year the local organisation had made 
strenuous efforts to ensure that it was ready for a contest. The effectiveness of the 
party machine would be critical in order to ward off determined Unionist attempts to 
regain a foothold in the city's parliamentary representation. The Unionists were 
determined to recapture some of the lost ground of 1906 and this was especially the 
case in constituencies such as Manchester North-West which the party had re-
captured at an intervening by-election but had lost at the general election in January 
1910. Here, as we have seen, the choice of candidate reflected the Conservative 
Party's extent of ambition and Bonar-Law had himself relinquished the prospect of a 
160 Labour Leader, 5th December 1910. 
161 Labour Leader, 9th December 1910. 
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safe seat to stand in Manchester. But even with such a strong candidate the swing 
against the Liberals proved to be very small (at 1.4%) and suggests that, whilst this 
was certainly not a safe Liberal seat, the Liberal Party was performing very well here. 
For the Labour Party, as analysis of the election campaigns in Manchester illustrates, 
prospects for the future appeared somewhat insecure despite having two MPs in the 
city. The majorities in 1906 had been high (primarily because of the huge backlash 
against the Unionists) but by the end of 1910 these had been dramatically reduced. 
The North-East constituency in particular presented potential problems. Clynes was 
undoubtedly becoming a popular political figure locally but his majority had 
decreased alarmingly, 2,432 to 1,478 to 205 (29.2% to 2.4%) over the course of three 
elections. In Manchester North-East, a predominantly working-class constituency, 
Labour should have been strengthening its position but this was not the case; an 
obvious difficulty was organisation. As we have seen, the Labour Party had no 
permanent local organisation to match that of the established parties (especially the 
Liberals); its presence was limited to the work of the local councillors, activists and 
the candidates themselves. No matter how remarkable their efforts, they were not 
enough to sustain the party's electoral position in the area and considerable 
improvement in organisation was needed; given the limited numbers of canvassers it 
is probable that many potential Labour voters were simply missed. The support of the 
local Liberal Association was invaluable yet this did not serve to underline the Labour 
Party's distinct features. Significantly, Clynes stated that his party had met its weakest 
response from the poorest electors. These were probably the least likely to attend 
political meetings or take the initiative to register themselves. Labour's inability to 
take active measures to reach these voters may have been critical, though whether 
they would have voted in their favour remains uncertain. While clearly appreciative of 
the difficulties facing Clynes, the national party appeared slow to address these issues 
and had there been a general election in 1915 it is quite possible that Clynes may have 
lost his seat. 162 In terms of issues, both the general elections of 1910 had been 
dominated by the constitutional question though the extent to which this issue actually 
dominated the campaigns in the constituencies differed dramatically. 
162 See correspondence between 1. R. Clynes, W. T. Jackson (chairman of the Manchester and Salford 
LRC) and E. 1. Howarth (Miles Platting ILP) and Francis Johnson (at the NAC) in ~elation to th.is. It is 
evident that the local organisation remained anxious that improvements be made In the constItuency 
organisation; see Francis Johnson Collection, ILP -I, 09/1-10. 
2.4: The 1912 By-Elections in Manchester 
Manchester South <March 1912) 
During 1912 there were two by-elections in Manchester and it is arguable that in both 
instances the issue of National Insurance proved decisive in detennining the results. 
On its introduction the 1911 Insurance Act generated considerable controversy. Many 
of the skilled working-classes already paid into schemes run by either friendly 
societies or their trade unions. Consequently, many assumed (albeit wrongly) that 
with the arrival of a national scheme they would have to pay twice or at least receive 
lesser benefits under the state scheme. Conservative campaigning encouraged these 
misconceptions whilst the general principle of the scheme (providing for others as 
well as insuring oneself) remained anathema within a prevailing Victorian value 
system whereby a clear distinction was made between the deserving and undeserving 
poor.163 
The first of the two by-elections in Manchester during 1912 followed the appointment 
of Sir Arthur Haworth to the position of Junior Lord of the Treasury. Convention 
usually ensured that such elections were uncontested though the Unionists were eager 
to capture this critical seat as they had in 1908. Haworth's opponent was Philip 
Glazebrook, a candidate in December 1910 but who had been disqualified when his 
nomination papers had been returned too late. When this election was announced 
Glazebrook was unfortunately out of the country on a cruise and had to correspond 
with his party and electors via cablegram, returning for only the last few days of the 
campaign. Haworth chose to focus almost exclusively on the Insurance Act and the 
Irish Home Rule Bill. In relation to the insurance question he attempted to reassure 
voters that even if they were already in a scheme they would receive substantially 
increased benefits including not only sickness cover but, amongst other things, 
maternity cover and care for consumptives at no additional cost. Haworth specifically 
addressed employers asking if it were not better to have healthier workers than 
unhealthy ones and he stated that the scheme would see a significant reduction in the 
163 See B. B. Gilbert, The Evolution of National Insurance in Great Britain: The Origins of the ireiturl' 
State in Great Britain (London, 1984): D. Fraser, The Evolution of the Welfare State (London, 1996); J. 
Harris, Unemployment and Politics: A Study in English Social Policy 1886-191-1 (Oxford, 1972) and J. 
R. Hay. The Origins of the Liberal Wef/ilre Reforms, 1906-191-1 (London, 1975). 
numbers of people forced into seeking poor relief and so would therefore reduce 
expenditure in this respect. 164 
A major difficulty for the Liberals in South Manchester was that a sizable proportion 
of electors were already in schemes and enjoyed relative security of employment. 
Furthermore, it was customary for the warehouses based in the division to provide 
sick pay (albeit for a limited period). It was widely perceived, therefore, that an 
employee would be compelled to pay four pence per week for something he was sure 
of already and instead of receiving full wages during illness he would have to 'depend 
on a beggarly pittance from the state'. 165 Thus, trying to convince the warehousemen 
and clerks in the constituency of the wider benefits of the Insurance Act proved 
problematic for the Liberal Party. The insurance scheme was to revolutionise welfare 
provision in the United Kingdom. In comparison to existing provisions and 
entitlements provided by unions and friendly societies the Act marked a dramatic 
improvement. The Liberal campaign promoted the idea of the scheme as a 'state 
aided, employer aided thrift club,166, which to all intents and purposes it was. The 
aspect of compulsion, however, perhaps did more than anything to undermine the 
scheme's appeal. Moreover, Unionist portrayal of the measure as a 'serious menace to 
the prosperity of the country' which would have an 'especially adverse affect', in a 
district such as South Manchester further heightened voters concerns. 167 
As Glazebrook remained abroad, the Unionists relied upon a series of guest speakers. 
All focused on the alleged defects of the Insurance Act and other aspects of the 
Liberal Government's social programme. One spoke of the 'expensive amusement of 
old age pensions' .168 The Liberal party, on the other hand, argued that since the 
Unionists had voted for the measure in the House of Commons it was 'dishonest now 
to make [it] a plank at by-elections' and that the election had deteriorated into a 
campaign of 'negation and falsehoods' .169 Liberal speakers sought to appeal to the 
goodwill of the public spirit declaring the Act represented 'the greatest step in the 
cause of national health and in the individual happiness of humble homes there had 
164 See Manchester Evening News, 24th February 1912. 
165 Manchester Guardian, 27th February 1912. 
166 Manchester Guardian, 26th February 1912. 
167 Glazebrook via cablegram, see Manchester Guardian, 24th February 1912. 
168 Manchester Courier. 3rd March 1912. 
169 See Sir John Simon speech, ,\1anchester Guardian, 4th March 1912. 
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ever been produced ' . It was the first attempt to ' guard Engli sh people against the 
worst horrors of being poor' . 170 The Liberal Party clearly went into polling day 
anxious although they believed they were ' holding their own' in Longsight and Moss 
Side although less so in Rusholme (generally recognised as a Tory stronghold) but the 
party assumed that the electorate now had ' an increased awareness of the detail s of 
the ACt'171 and had come to recognise its ' soundness ' so the electoral response would 
be to ' show their confidence in [this] government policy' . 172 
Manchester South By-Election Result and Analysis 
Fig. 19 Manchester South (Turnout 840/0) 
48% 
52% 
11 % swing Liberal to Conservative 
• Conservative 
o Liberal 
The result of the Manchester South by-election seems to have come as a surpri se to 
both parties; the Conservatives captured the seat with a majority of 579 (4%) on 
turnout of 84% (see fig. 19). Although the swing against the Liberals was large (given 
that Haworth' s majority had previously been over 2,000) perhaps we ought to be 
cautious in interpreting such a loss as necessarily indicative of a wider crisis for the 
Liberal Party. The Conservative majority at the by-election was not a very large one 
and it is worth remembering that the constituency had an erratic electoral hi story 
before 1906. More specifically, however, as we have seen the result had largely been 
determined by clerks and warehousemen who perceived their interests to be 
threatened by current Liberal legislation (primarily the Insurance Act). In an 
170 Ibid . 
17 1 Manchester Evening Neil 'S, 5th March 19 12. 
172 See Asqui th' s message to the constituency, Mallchester G uardiall . 5
th 
March 19 12. 
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immediate sense this represented a problem for the Liberal Party but it did not mean it 
would continue to be a long-term or insurmountable one. 
The Manchester North West By-Election (July 1912) 
The resignation of the Liberal MP Sir George Kemp in July 1912 saw the voters of 
North-West Manchester participating in their fifth parliamentary election in the space 
of just six years. Few constituencies witnessed such regular change in their 
parliamentary representation as did this one. Of all by-elections in the North-West of 
England before 1914 this was one of the most hotly contested. For the Liberals the 
loss of North-West Manchester at this time (so close to Haworth's defeat in 
Manchester South) would represent a considerable blow, whilst for the Unionists its 
recapture could be seen to be emblematic of a wider turnaround in fortunes for their 
party and the beginning of the end of the present government. Given the evident 
unpopularity of much recent legislation, in particular the Insurance Act, the prospect 
of an election in this constituency in the summer of 1912 was, for the Liberals 
undesirable to say the least. The party did everything it could to avoid an election and 
this led to, as Clarke observes, to 'one of the most extraordinary and sustained 
campaigns to keep a man in parliament against his will'. 173 The precise reasons for 
Kemp's decision to resign caused considerable speculation in both the national and 
local press. The Unionist press believed it to be exclusively connected to his objection 
to the Home Rule Bill and he had certainly been at odds with his party over the 
question, having been one of only two Liberals elected at the last general election who 
had declared himself against home rule and he had spoken against it in the House of 
Commons. On the Bill's second reading he had abstained from voting altogether. 
Both party officials and Kemp himself repeatedly stated that his resignation was for 
personal (business) reasons and he even offered his services on the election 
platforml74 but the precise reason was almost certainly due to his objection to recent 
policy and it is likely that he wanted to be out by the third reading of the Home Rule 
Bill. 
By 1912 Kemp was clearly at odds with his party, not just in respect of Home Rule, 
however, but also in connection to Welsh Disestablishment. By the spring of 1912 his 
173 P. Clarke, Lancashire, p. 304. 
174 Letter to the Manchester Guardian, 16th July 191:2 
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resignation appeared increasingly inevitable. Correspondence with the Manchester 
Liberal Federation suggests Kemp had first intimated his intentions to resign as early 
as March 1912.175 The party, however, clearly desired that he stay longer, preferably 
up to a future general election but in the meantime persuaded him to put it off until at 
least June of that year. Kemp assured constituents that he would 'put in the occasional 
appearance in the House' and when he was unable to be there he would use the 
pairing system. 176 The manner in which the Kemp situation was handled appears to 
have damaged Liberal prospects. By delaying the inevitable it almost certainly 
allowed the Unionists to begin preparations for a contest. The Conservatives had 
secured a candidate and a good amount of campaigning in the constituency had 
already been undertaken 177 but it was clear that there existed uncertainty in respect of 
a prospective Liberal candidate. Rumours circulated that the local association had 
preferred Sir Arthur Haworth over the (assumed) nominee Gordon Hewart. As 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Royal Exchange and as a popular local 
Liberal, Haworth would have generally been considered a preferred candidate for 
many178 although it is possible that given the character of the electorate (in large 
measure anti-Irish, pro-empire and Anglican) it might have been politically necessary 
for the Liberals to adopt a unionist Free Trader. 
It seemed possible that Labour intervention might further damage Liberal prospects in 
North-West Manchester. A meeting of the North West branch of the ILP had been 
called on the 17th July to discuss the selection of a candidate and a full meeting of the 
full membership of the Manchester Labour Party had also been called. A possible 
candidate appears to have been J. M. McLachlan who had previously contested South 
West Manchester in January 1910. Furthermore, the Manchester and Salford ILP had 
issued a recommendation that the seat should be contested. 179 A week later the 
Manchester Courier was appalled at how the 'Labour Party had been left behind' 
suggesting that the Liberals had deliberately sped up the process in order to prevent 
I75 See Manchester Liberal Federation Minutes, 15 th March 1912. 
176Manchester Courier, 17th July 1912. 
177 The Unionist candidate, Sir John Randles, was a very well known local business~an. . . 
178 Given that Hawarth had only recently lost his seat in Manchester South in Ap.rtl of that year It IS 
unlikely that he would have wished to stand again so soon, especially in a seat conslder~d vulnerable. It 
is also believed that an approach had been made to the Unionist Free Trader Thomas G~bson ~o\\les tn 
stand as an Independent candidate but he declined the offer, cited in P. Clarke, Lancashire. p. jO-l 
179 Manchester Courier, 18th July 1912. 
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Labour from selecting a candidate thus 'showing their late allies little 
consideration' .IS0 Nothing carne of a Labour candidate, but the episode demonstrates a 
willingness of the Labour Party locally to consider the possibility of contesting a seat 
which the Liberals would have certainly perceived to have been naturally theirs. The 
Liberal Party adopted as their candidate a young local barrister, Gordon Hewart, who 
had been educated at Manchester Grammar School, Oxford University and had for a 
while pursued a career in journalism. The Conservative candidate was the more 
experienced John Randles who had previously been the MP for Cockermouth and had 
extensive business interests in Manchester. 
The Manchester North-West contest took place shortly after a by-election in Crewe 
which had seen the Unionists win with a sizable majority. The Liberal Party had seen 
a substantial decrease of its vote (2355) and it was understood this ensured the 
Unionists entered the Manchester contest with a renewed sense of confidence and 
optimism. It also gave the Unionists a recent victory to cite on the election platforms 
in Manchester. Furthermore, the close proximity of the Crewe contest (in time and 
location) also meant that a substantial number of party workers were able to be 
redeployed to the Manchester campaign. 
From the beginning of the contest it was clear that, although not totally dominant, the 
question of the Insurance Act would again be the most prominent issue of the 
campaign. In his opening address the Conservative candidate, Sir John Randles, 
argued that in a by-election, with no prospect of a change of government, it was 
pointless to even discuss the question of Tariff Reform. lSI Instead he sought to discuss 
the 'sufferings resulting from current legislation'. In a noticeably 'one nation' tone he 
spoke of social, political and economic justice and national unity. The commercial 
credentials of Randles were also emphasised with headlines such as 'a business man 
for business people' in contrast to the lack of a business record of the Liberal 
candidate. IS2 Moreover, it could be suggested that, in this case, it was the Manchester 
employers' opposition to the Insurance Act which did most to damage the Liberal 
180 Manchester Courier, 26th July 1912. 
181 Manchester Courier 27th July 1912. Randles even went so far as to suggest he was doing the Liberals 
"a areat service by not making Tariff Reform the most prominent issue of the election [because if he 
did] ... it would be clear that Manchester had repudiated the Free-Trade system' . . \/ol1chester Guardian. 
31 st July 1912. 
182 Mallchester Courier. 29th July 1912. 
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Party's prospects. As had been the case during a by-election the previous summer in 
Oldham and in Manchester South earlier in 1912, the basic position of the business 
sector was that the Act would severely handicap the British employer in the world 
market. Furthermore, it could lead to a rise in unemployment. Ultimately, National 
Insurance was neither liked nor understood and despite the Liberals considerable 
efforts to increase understanding of the measure it seems that electors of all classes 
remained unconvinced of its merits. For the Liberals the Insurance Act represented 
one aspect of the Government's drive to promote the 'social advancement of the 
people' and to 'awaken in the minds of [the people] a desire for something better by 
securing equality and financial justice' .183 Whilst for the Unionists it took away from 
trade unions, friendly societies and other working class organisations the management 
of their own funds. Additionally, they argued, the worker would receive fewer 
benefits while having to contribute more. They argued that it had been pushed through 
too quickly, drawing attention to the fact that in Germany it had taken seven years to 
develop such a scheme. 184 Crucially for employers and Unionists alike, the cost of 
implementation was huge and the charge on employers considerable. Unionist 
objections amounted to carefully considered criticism rather than blanket hostility, so 
Randles was able to happily declare he thought the Act 'a good thing [it was just that 
it] had been carried out in the worst possible way; creating maximum irritation with 
the minimum of benefits' .185 As the by-election demonstrated, the Liberals possibly 
confused some voters with an array of complex information relating to the Insurance 
Act and neither did the Liberal candidate help matters; at one meeting, for example, 
he told voters that he realised the scheme 'pressed hard on individuals [but ultimately] 
was capable of amendment' .186 In response the local Unionist press concluded that he 
should 'join the Amend the Act League' .187 
Home Rule was the other main issue which divided the parties during the by-election. 
The position of the Unionists was clear; any measure of Home Rule would lead to the 
disintegration of the nation, weaken the Empire and (in the process) would have a 
183 This is taken from an election address by the Liberal candidate during the previous year's by-
election campaign in Oldham, Manchester Guardian, 3rd November 1911. 
184 Manchester Courier, i h August 1912. 
185 Manchester Courier, 2nd Au~ust 1912. 
186 See Manchester Courier, 30 July 1912. . . 
187 Ibid; it is unclear whether there existed such an organisation or whether thIS was SImply the 
Manchester Courier's witty journalism. 
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detrimental impact upon trade (including trade between Manchester and Ireland). 
Given the importance of empire to the interests of the North-West constituency it was 
interesting that the Liberal candidate stated he was looking 'not only for Home Rule 
for Ireland but for each component part of the empire' .188 Hewart also sought to 
emphasise not only the moral rationale for Home Rule but rather wider practical 
considerations; he argued that delegating to Ireland management of its own affairs 
would relieve Parliament and also facilitate 'friendlier relations' with the United 
States. A significant misjudgement by the Liberal candidate, however, was his 
admission that Home Rule could 'only be carried at the price of civil war' .189 Hewart 
claimed that he had been misquoted although the Liberals could have done without a 
controversy on this issue, especially given the retiring member's record on the 
subject. 
On the eve of the poll the Manchester Courier confidently declared that the 
businessmen of Manchester, both Free Traders and Tariff reformers, would 'vote 
together and register their protest against the policies of the present government 
[deemed] injurious to their interests'. 190 Indeed, the scale of hostility towards the 
Insurance Act within Manchester's business community appeared to be considerable 
as demonstrated on the day before polling when Charles Macara issued a critical 
statement declaring that whilst he would not go so far as to break the law he would be 
. d··· 191 engaging in a most actIve propagan a campaIgn agamst It. 
188 Manchester Guardian 29th July 1912. 
189 Manchester Courier, 27ili July 1912. 
190 Manchester Courier, 7th August 1912. . . ., 
191 This appears to have been largely in con~equence ~fthe refusal ~f AsqUIth to receIve a deputatIon of 
representatives of Manchester business to dISCUSS the Impact of the Insurance scheme on them. 
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Manchester North-West By-Election Result and Analysis 
Fig. 21 (Turnout 81.9%) 
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The 1912 Manchester North-West by-election saw the Unionists capturing the seat 
with sizable a majority of 1,202 (on a relatively low turnout of nearly 82%).1 92 For the 
Unionists the result represented a substantial improvement on Bonar Law' s poll in 
191 0 (an increase of nine percent for them and decrease of twenty one percent for the 
Liberals). With the North-West Manchester victory the Unionists won their eighth 
seat at a by-election since December 1910 reducing the Liberal majority in the House 
of Commons to just fourteen. 193 This represented a fragile position for the Liberal 
Government, although of course the votes of Labour and the Irish representatives 
could be assured. The Manchester Liberal press determined that ' there can be no 
excuse in disguising the fact that the Insurance Act in its present condition is causing 
endless irritation and unpopularity ' .1 94 The same newspaper went on to affirm that 
this was only likely to be ' temporary trouble ', arguing that this was a Unionist victory 
won in Manchester itself, not the residential parts of the constituency. 195 The city 
men had voted against the Act because they had asserted it would mean an ex tra 
charge on their business. FUl1hermore, since Randles had refused to accept Tari ff 
Reform as a fundamental issue ' the result shouldn ' t be taken to imply that the Free 
Traders in the community had lost their faith '. If anything, the result served to 
192 This was 10% lower than that of the January 19 10 general election. 
193 The ' progress ive 'and nationali st majori ty over Unioni sts stood at 109 (389 to 280). After December 
1910, it had been 126. 
194 Manchester Evening Neil'S, 9th August 19 12. 
195 This was based on a cOlllment by a Unioni st officia l intimating that the part:- had polled fe\\ cr than 
fi fty votes in Cheetham; see Manchester COl/rier, 9th August 1912. 
102 
underline for the Unionists usefulness of remaining cautious in their promotion of 
Tariff Reform. Clarke recognises this and suggests that, ultimately, instances such as 
these 'stiffened the antipathy' of many Unionists in the region towards a full-blo\\n 
policy of Tariff Reform. 196 This could potentially have significant consequences for 
the Liberals in places such as Manchester ( and Labour) since to a very large extent 
their victories from 1906 were largely dependent upon hostility towards Unionist 
candidates on the issue of Tariff Reform. For The Times the result demonstrated that 
Manchester's businessmen were 'weary and distrustful' of the Liberal Government 
and alarmed by 'mad Lloyd George's finance' and his 'direct incitements to class 
hatred upon the industrial world' .197 
The prospect of the Liberals holding North-West Manchester during the summer of 
1912 seemed bleak from the outset. The Liberals had-done everything they could to 
persuade the constituency's sitting member to stay although this had been to no avail. 
Perhaps the Liberals expected to lose the seat; after all, it had always had a turbulent 
electoral history. Nonetheless, Manchester North-West had great symbolic value; its 
loss represented an embarrassment for the Liberal Party both locally and nationally. It 
was possible that once the benefits of the insurance scheme began to be recognised, 
levels of hostility and suspicion would subside. In turn, this would be reflected in 
terms of the Liberal Party's electoral performance. The Insurance Act was not fully 
operational in 1912. Whilst contributions were being made into the scheme no 
payments were made out. Whilst the Liberal Party lost a number of by-elections in the 
region during the period immediately before 1914 it would be unwise, however, to 
suggest that the party was facing a much wider and long-term crisis. Losses during 
1911 and 1912 can be almost exclusively explained by reference to the Insurance Act. 
None of these by-elections were influenced by the Tariff Reform debate and even in 
Manchester North-West this question played virtually no part during by-election 
campaigns. It was likely that at future elections Tariff Reform would remain, at best, 
low key with detrimental implications for the Liberals; at the very least they would 
have to re-assess their approach in such areas. Clarke contends that 'each election 
196 See P_ Clarke, Lancashire, p. 305. 
197 The Times, 9th August 1912. 
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campaign had unique aspects and the balance of issues and advantage was in constant 
flux' .198 
Analysis of the 1912 by-elections in Manchester demonstrates, the flagship Liberal 
policy of social insurance was crucial to the outcomes of both although for reasons 
specific to the particular constituencies. In South Manchester it was suburban 
working-class hostility to the measure which determined Liberal fortunes; in 
Manchester North-West it was, for the greater part, the city's commercial and 
businessmen who deemed their interests to be under threat from the impact of the 
scheme. At its inception the Unionists were able to exploit the widespread 
unpopularity of National Insurance to their electoral advantage. Analysis of by-
elections provides limited support for the assertion that the Liberal Party was in a state 
of severe disintegration before the outbreak of war in 1914. The local evidence in 
Manchester suggests that poor electoral performance during 1912 was associated with 
public dissatisfaction over specific pieces of legislation. 199 Consequently, the Liberals 
re-doubled their efforts in Manchester N orth-West securing the candidature of Sir 
John Simon for the division at the next contest.200 
Examination of the two campaigns in Manchester during 1912 demonstrates how poor 
by-election performance could clearly be determined by adverse public reaction to 
specific policy and legislation. The flagship Liberal policy of National Insurance was 
critical to the outcomes of both contests. The Conservatives obtained a significant 
electoral advantage from the unpopularity of the measure and aided this by 
conducting an aggressive propaganda campaign against it. National Insurance, of 
course, was a national issue and the Liberal Party was likely to face pronounced 
opposition for some time. The mobilisation of such hostility at the local level and (in 
particular) the Conservative candidates' application of their objections to local 
circumstances (be that specific occupational groups or interests such as business) 
198 Ibid, p. 365. 
199 Clarke neglects the impact of controversial issues such as National Insurance at this time, barely 
acknowledging it at all in his assessment of this by-election. . . 
200 A new selection committee under Sir Arthur Hawarth was formed the followmg year suggestIng that 
the Manchester Liberals remained responsive to organisational demands and the need to acquire good 
candidates. Hawarth himself was especially important in this respect; see Manchester Liberal 
Federation Executive Committee Minutes, 1st April 1913. Additionally. the party records show that 
plans for a forthcoming general election were in hand as early as January 1914, see Manchi!ster Liberal 
Federation Minutes. 28 th January, 18th February and 11th March 1914. 
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needs to be seen as significant when assessing the fortunes of the parties during this 
period. 
2.5: Municipal politics in Manchester 1906-1914 
Context 
The Liberals had lost their overall majority on the Manchester City Council in 1887, 
regaining it very briefly during the mid 1890s. Opposition to the Boer War served to 
alienate large sections of the working-classes and consequently the Liberal Party lost 
a large number of its seats on the council. By 1905, Manchester City Council's 
elected representation was dominated by the Conservatives though the Liberals 
possessed a high number of Aldermen. The local Liberal organisation was mindful of 
the need to improve its municipal position and so set about addressing this. In 1907 
the local Liberal caucus consisting of all Liberal councillors considered ways to 
increase the party's representation on the city council and two members were assigned 
to each ward particularly in an effort to secure candidates?OI The attempt to co-
ordinate more effectively the municipal progressive forces culminated in the 
formation of a cross- party organisation, the Municipal Progressive Association, 
(hereafter MPA) in 1911.202 The role of the MPA will be discussed fully below but it 
is worth mentioning that even before its inception the central Liberal organisation in 
Manchester had already begun to look into ways of providing assistance to wards in 
order to promote greater interest in municipal politics and to strengthen the position of 
the Liberal councillors.203 Of course, another significant aspect of the central 
organisation related to the Liberals relations with Labour and this might be regarded 
as the single most important aspect of the organisation's remit; electoral co-operation. 
It is important to recognise that prior to the formal creation of the MP A there appears 
to have been at least some tacit 'alliance' between the progressive forces in 
Manchester's municipal politics. How this impacted upon the electoral fortunes of the 
respective parties will be explored below. 
201 See Liberal Caucus Minutes, 24th September 1906. 
202 See below, p. 109. ., . 
203 The MP A became frustrated, however, in rela~ion to a perceived lac~ of mtere~t amongst retlf1n~ 
'progressive' members in supporting these meetmgs, see MPA ExeCl/flve Commlftee .\/ll1ules. 29 
February 1912. 
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Municipal Elections in Manchester 1906-1913: Labour Performance and the 
Progressive Alliance at the Municipal Level 
The progressive landslide across Manchester at the general election of 1906 might 
have appeared to offer the prospect of an equally significant advance in municipal 
politics yet the immediate contests after the general election saw the municipal 
electors voting in favour of retrenchment and against a programme of 
municipalisation which was advocated by both the Labour and Liberal candidates. 
The Conservatives fought principally on an anti-municipal trading platform and 
candidates who made this aspect the key plank of their campaigns overturned (sitting) 
Liberal majorities or, if they already held the ward, substantially increased their own. 
The net result of the 1906 contests was a Conservative gain of three seats.204 Despite 
Labour's endeavour to increase its municipal representation, the party saw its 
numbers in fact decline. From the seven wards Labour contested in 1906 the party 
was successful in just one, Ardwick (see appendix fig. 1). The local organisation was 
especially disappointed with the loss of Harpurhey where W.T. Jackson was 
considered to be one of the party's most capable advocates (see appendix fig. 3).205 
Some of the Labour losses were exceptionally close however; in Newton Heath and St 
Lukes, for example, the margins were 1 % (of the total vote) and 5% respectively (see 
appendix figs. 9 and 12) The Labour vote was generally respectable demonstrating the 
party's ability to pose a significant challenge yet overall the 1906 municipal contests 
were disappointing for both the Liberal and Labour parties. For the Liberals, the party 
had been defeated in wards such as Cheetham and New Cross (see appendix figs. 2 
and 8) whilst the Labour Party had failed to capture working-class wards such as 
Longsight, St. Lukes, Harpurhey and Miles Platting (see appendix fig. 4, 6 and 12).206 
Of course, the poor performance in the municipal elections of 1906 were most likely 
to have been in consequence of the fact that the 'progressives' were in government 
and also we need to remember the overall context. Given the unpopularity of the 
204 The LRC lost one seat (Harpurhey) and sitting Liberals were defeated in Cheetham and New Cross 
wards. It was believed that the Liberal Alexander Porter was defeated in Cheetham on the question of 
the new Education Bill; see Manchester City News, 3rd November 1906. 
205 Jackson lost by an extremely narrow margin of23 votes (1% ~fthose cast). H~urhey possessed a 
larae Catholic community who had previously been loyal to the LIberals on the baSIS of the ~ome Rule 
iss~e. The Educat!on Bill, however, ignit~d Ca~olic o?inion and proba~ly underpmn~d ~n~ 
Conservatives candIdate's poll (at the same tIme gomg agamst Labour), Manchester Guardran, -
November 1906. . . 
206 It as believed that the Liberal in Cheetham (Alexander Porter) had been prmcIpally defeated on the 
w . 1 M h C' \' ~ rd 
new Education Bill suggesting that region here played an Important ro e. anc ester lfy .eH's, -) 
November 1906. 
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Unionist government (and thus the party) by 1905 the Conservatives were perfonning 
badly in the municipal elections. By November 1906, however, the new Liberal 
government had already managed to upset many and, of course, they (and Labour for 
that matter) could not rely upon the issue of Free Trade to win at the municipal 
elections. Especially significant was the Education Bill which undoubtedly served to 
alienate some voters in parts of Manchester where Tory Anglican sentiment was 
strong. In 1906 there was just one three-cornered contest; in St George's, where the 
Conservatives won with a narrow majority of just 3% of the vote. Labour carne third 
obtaining 170/0 of the vote. Clearly, without Labour intervention here, the Liberals 
would have captured the seat. 
The 1907 elections in Manchester demonstrated the difficulties the Labour Party faced 
in presenting itself as a distinctive political force in municipal politics. Two issues 
dominated the 1907 contests. These were controversy over Aldennan Holt's 
assumption of the position of Lord Mayor and unemployment. 207 On both issues the 
Labour candidates found it difficult to corne up with any alternative proposals than 
their Liberal opponents. The 1907 contests saw no significant changes although W. T. 
Jackson, who had lost his seat the previous year in Harpurhey, was returned (in the 
same ward) after conducting a vigorous campaign on municipalisation (particularly 
for the mining industry). 
There were three three-cornered contests in 1907 involving Liberal and Labour 
candidates. These were in Harpurhey, Longsight and New Cross. In Harpurhey 
Labour managed to win with a majority of 8% over the second-placed Conservative 
(see appendix fig. 18).208 In Longsight and New Cross Labour carne bottom although 
the party's vote was fairly respectable; 23% and 21 % respectively (see appendix figs. 
19 and 21). One aspect which had become clear during the 1907 contests was an 
apparent weakness of the Labour organisation in some wards. In its annual review, the 
city's LRC was highly critical of a 'lack of enthusiasm' on the part of the majority of 
its affiliated societies during the municipal contests.209 
207 Given that Holt was a prominent Manchester brewer the Liberals believed his appointment as Lord 
Mayor was not necessarily appropriate. . o. 0 
208 In percentage terms the breakdown was as follows: Labour 44%, ConservatIve 36 Yo, LIberal 18 0 
and Independent 0.8%. 
209 Manchester and Salford Labour Representation Committee Annual Report. 1908. 
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The following year (1908) saw a large number of contested seats in Manchester (25 in 
total). Like the previous year a principal issue of the campaigns was the question of 
unemployment. The role of the municipality in attempts to alleviate the problem had 
been given considerable exposure throughout the year because the (Liberal) Lord 
Mayor, John Harrop, had given the matter significant attention, had arranged a series 
of public meetings and also established a registry for employers. The Liberal 
candidates focused virtually exclusively on the issue of unemployment which 
arguably made it difficult for the Labour Party's candidates to present the issue in a 
distinctive manner. This may explain the party's seeming lack of progress; from seven 
candidates fielded, Labour returned two (Joseph Billam in the mining dominated 
district of Bradford and T. R. Marr in New Cross). Even these successes, however, 
were negated by the loss of Miles Platting and Openshaw, both of which saw large 
winning margins between Labour and the winning Conservative opponents (see 
appendix fig. 41 and 46). The overall result of the 1908 contests was a net 
Conservative gain of 6 seats. The Labour Party now had 8 elected councillors (3 fewer 
than it had had in 1906) and the Liberals had 10 fewer than in 1906. Clearly, the 
period was one of some frustration for Manchester's 'progressive' forces at the 
municipal level. There were no three-cornered contests in 1908 involving official 
Labour candidates. 
The 1908 municipal elections illustrate a number of aspects in relation to party 
strategy and performance. The Labour Party was clearly focusing its efforts in its 
strongest areas (Openshaw, Harpurhey and Miles Platting for example) and, in the 
main, was unsuccessful (see appendix figs. 46, 38 and 41). More worryingly Labour 
was struggling to consolidate its position in some parts of the city we might expect it 
to have been performing better (see appendix fig. 31 and 45). This was evidenced by 
the fact that in 1908 the party saw a number of retiring members (for key wards) 
. 6 210 M h·l defeated at the municipal contests (see appendIX figs. 41, 44 and 4 ). eanw 1 e, 
the Liberals appeared to concentrate on the central and suburban wards. The 
210 These were J. E. Gilchrist, T. H. Marr and E. J. Hart in Miles Platting, New Cross and Openshaw 
respectively. 
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Conservatives, however, were clearly able to stand in virtually every ward and the 
party remained dominant in Manchester's municipal politics?ll 
Due to the inclusion of Gorton and Levenshulme, the 1909 municipal elections (like 
the previous year) saw a large number of contested seats. Yet, the Manchester City 
News lamented how there was no 'burning question other than the vague declaration 
that the rates must be reduced,.212 The elections saw contests in 24 wards for 33 
vacant seats. Unsurprisingly, the parties stood a record number of candidates; 64 in 
total. In a sense the 1909 contests provided the Labour Party with an opportunity to 
make some inroads in its municipal representation on the Manchester City Council. 
The party stood in 12 wards (with 17 candidates)?I3 The new additions to the city, 
however, provided somewhat mixed results for Labour. The two wards of Gorton 
returned 3 Labour members, 1 Liberal, 1 Conservative and an Independent whilst 
Levenshulme returned 3 Liberals, 2 Conservatives and an Independent.214 In 
Levenshulme North, Labour came bottom, polling just 14% of the vote (see appendix 
fig. 66).215 It is clear that in 1909 Labour had focused most of its efforts in three key 
wards, Ardwick, Harpurhey and St Lukes. But the party lost the fITst two very 
narrowly (see appendix figs. 57 and 65) although won the latter by a significant 
majority (see appendix fig. 78). While Labour was doing well in Gorton North the 
party had performed poorly in Levenshulme (see appendix figs. 63 and 66). This was 
largely connected to the social and religious composition of these districts. The 
Labour Party was doing best in the respectable working class districts; wards where 
the electorate primarily consisted of better paid workers216 (and more importantly) 
highly unionised sectors such as the miners, engineers and railway workers.217 These 
2Il Of the 25 contested seats in 1908 only 3 (All Saints, Bradford and Openshaw did not see a 
Conservative candidate. The Liberals contested 17. 
212 Manchester City News, 29th October 1909. 
213 This includes wards with more than one member to be elected. This compared with 21 wards and 26 
candidates for the Conservatives and 12 wards (14 candidates) for the Liberals. 
214 Labour performed much better in Gorton North. 
215 Labour did not field a candidate in Levenshulme South. 
216 A reflection of this, as Adams has noted, is how the Labour wards tended to be ones with higher 
rents; see T. Adams, 'Labour Vanguard, Tory Bastion, or the Triumph of New Liberalism: Manchester 
Politics 1900-1914 in Comparative Perspective', Manchester Region History Review, 14 (2000), p31. 
217 Adams concludes that the 'scale and effectiveness' oflocal trade union organisation was one of the 
most singularly important factors in determining Labour expansion at the municipal.level and ~'. as he 
states· the unions' most important contribution to the early Labour Party lay, less m the provlslon of finan~e and candidates for the parliamentary party, and more in building a local politics in which the 
concerns of certain types of working-class communities could be represented by Labour', see T. 
Adams, 'Labour Vanguard', p. 35. 
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groups were concentrated in places such as Bradford (mining), Gorton, Openshaw 
(engineering) and Newton Heath (railway workers). In contrast, districts such as 
Ardwick, Harpurhey and St Mark's contained sizable pockets of slum areas; with 
Irish communities though predominantly Anglican, these wards were hotbeds of 
popular Conservatism and thus unfruitful territory for a significant Labour advance.ll8 
There were just two contests which saw the Liberals and Labour in conflict.219 These 
were a three-way contest in Longsight and a two-way contest in Openshaw. The 
former saw Labour push the Liberals into third place and the latter saw the retiring 
Labour member returned with a majority of 9% (see appendix figs. 68 and 73). 
Clearly the Liberals were standing down in favour of Labour in many of the working-
class areas of the city and likewise Labour was not challenging the Liberals in the 
central and suburban districts area (for example, Didsbury, All Saints, Cheetham, 
Rusholme and St Johns). 
From 1910, a number of emergmg Issues effectively divided local politics in 
Manchester along more clearly-defined party lines and were also influential at the 
municipal elections. One of the most controversial was the future of the Royal 
Infirmary site and candidates at municipal elections sought to attach political meaning 
to utilisation of the site.22o Labour candidates attempted (although largely failed) to 
divert attention from this issue and onto the question of housing, particularly the 
purchasing powers of the corporation and the acquisition of land for building 
programmes.221 In 1910 Labour continued to focus on the areas of the city where it 
already had a strong presence; the party's 10 candidates were concentrated in what 
was now familiar Labour territory (as mentioned above, Ardwick, Bradford, Gorton, 
New Cross and Openshaw). The 1910 municipal elections proved highly successful 
for Labour with the party returning 7 councillors. It is worth recognising, however, 
that most of Labour's majorities were small; 5% (of the total vote cast) in Blackley 
and Moston and also in Harpurhey, 7% in Gorton North and just one actual vote in 
218 For a good analysis of the development of working-class neighbourhoods during this period see, M. 
Savage and A. Miles, The Remaking 0/ the British Working-Class 1840-1949 (London, 1994), pp. 64-
68 and also J. Lawrence, 'The British Sense of Class', Journal o/Contemporary History', 35, 2 (2000). 
219 This excludes wards with three seats. 
220 The essence of the debate related to whether or not a new city art gal1ery should be built on the site. 
Labour candidates argued the case for the site to be used for housing and others simply wished it be lett 
as an open public space. This debate persisted for some time. 
221 See speech by W. T. Jackson in Manchester City AeH's, 22nd October 1910. 
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Openshaw (see appendix figs. 82, 88, 86 and 96). Furthennore, the Labour Party 
evidently found it more difficult when faced with both Liberal and Conservative 
opponents.222 In a three-cornered contest in the socially mixed Longsight ward. for 
example, Labour came bottom of the poll, obtaining 20% of the vote to the Liberal's 
36% (see appendix fig. 91) and in New Cross (where there were two seats available) 
while a Labour candidate was elected the poll was some way behind the 
Conservatives; by 19% of the vote cast (see appendix fig. 95). In Ardwick, Labour 
intervention pushed the Liberals into third place, however, allowing the Conservative 
to sneak in (see appendix fig. 81).223 The result in Ardwick illustrated the futility of 
progressive confrontation given that the total anti-Conservative vote amounted to 63% 
of the vote.224 Altogether, there was little indication of a great leap forward for 
Labour. In relation to Liberal-Labour electoral co-operation, it appears that at the 
1910 municipal contests, at least, there was some tacit agreement. 
Consolidation of the Progressive Alliance at the Municipal Level 
After 1906 the Manchester Liberal Federation had become detennined to improve the 
performance of the progressive forces in Manchester's municipal politics. As 
previously mentioned in 1911 this culminated in the establishment of the Municipal 
Progressive Association. The role of the MP A was twofold; to assist the associations 
in finding candidates and to aid essential preparatory work for the municipal contests. 
In March 1911, for example, the MP A contacted all ward associations, requesting 
reports on election prospects and urging 'arrangements ... be made'. Scott and Royal 
were dispatched to Ardwick and St Lukes, areas where the party had experienced 
difficulties in previous contests and were anxious to improve their position in these 
wards.225Both wards were consequently given financial assistance so candidates could 
arrange meetings with voters at which they would draw attention to their councillors' 
222 In 1910, for example, three of the five gains were taken from independents and only two from the 
established parties. . . . . . 
223 The Conservative majority over Labour was just 2%. Certamly, WIthout LIberal mterventIOn Labour 
would have won this seat. 
224 The Conservative majority over Labour was just 45 votes. The respective poll was 33% and 30% for 
Labour and the Liberals respectively. . 
225 Municipal Progressive Association Executive Committee Minutes, 1 Oth Marc~ 1911. In ArdwIck. the 
1910 municipal contests had seen the Liberals coming bottom of the poll beh~nd bot~ Conserv~tl\ es 
and Labour and in St Lukes the independent campaigner J. R. Clynes standmg agamst the LIberal 
Chairman of the Watch Committee (Thewlis) on a platform of anti-police corruption caused some 
anxiety. 
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h· 226 ac levements. The MP A seems to have rendered valuable assistance to the ward 
associations particularly in organising meetings in the month preceding the municipal 
elections.227 
The results of the 1911 elections saw the Conservatives losing 3 seats, 2 to Labour 
and 1 to the Liberals, Labour having fielded 12 candidates and secured the return of 6 
(see appendix figs 104-131). Altogether, the Liberals fielded 15 candidates (9 of 
which were elected) and there had been just one contest in which the progressives 
faced each other. This suggests that during this period at least, the MP A might have 
been influential in averting progressive conflict. The overall composition of the city 
council now stood at 70 Conservatives, 43 Liberals and 17 Labour representatives. 
The following year there were contests in just 17 of the 34 wards and a relatively high 
number of uncontested returns. Two wards stand out in particular. In Harpurhey, a 
three-cornered fight saw Labour push the Liberals into third place and in Ardwick 
also the Liberals finished bottom, obtaining just 14% of the vote (see appendix figs 
137 and 132).228 Clearly, attempts to avoid conflict had broken down in this part of 
the city and unsurprisingly the consequence of a split in the progressive vote was 
simply to gift the seat to the Conservatives. There appeared to be increasing Labour 
strength in some parts of the city at the expense of the Liberals. In some working-
class wards Labour had clearly become the major anti-Tory party but the party still 
found it difficult to beat the Conservatives in these wards. As we have seen, it is clear 
that Labour was strongest in Bradford, Gorton North and Openshaw for the reasons 
already outlined (for the 1911 results see appendix figs. 106, 112 and 124). 
A feature of the municipal elections in Manchester before 1914 was a decreasing 
numbers of contests each year. The last year of peace saw just 19 seats contested.229 
226 Municipal Progressive Association Executive Committee Minutes, 31 st July 1911. It was later 
acknowledged, however, that there had been a lack of interest amongst the retiring 'progressive' 
members in assisting these meetings although the MP A remained convinced these could serve to 
promote greater interest in municipal politics generally and also strengthen the position of the Liberal 
councillors. Municipal Progressive Association Minutes, 29th February 1912. 
227 Ibid. 
228 In Harpurhey the Conservativ.es won with 44%. of the vote, La~ou: came se~o~d with
o 
31 % and the 
Liberals last with 24%; in ArdwIck the ConservatIves secured a SIgnIficant majorIty (29 0 of the \ ote 
cast) over the second-placed Labour candidate (who obtained 28% of the vote). 
229 A record number of wards (15) were uncontested. The overall result saw the Liberals gaining 2 seats 
(Blackley and Moston and St Michaels) and Labour lost one. Note. however, that the Liberals lo~t 
Didsbury and Moss Side East. 
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The Liberals contested 12 seats and won 6. 1913 appears to have been a year of some 
Liberal recovery in Manchester. Notably, the Liberals managed to win a three-
cornered contest in Blackley and Moston (see appendix fig. 150).230 The Manchester 
Guardian claimed that the progressive forces were making gains against the 
Conservatives across the city as a whole (i.e. not an inconsiderable achievement after 
seven years in government). Labour stood in just six wards (with 8 candidates) 4 of 
which were returned. Two of these were returning members (in Gorton North and 
Openshaw) whilst the other two (in Longsight and Gorton South) were new members 
(see appendix figs. 153, 160, 155 and 154). The progressive forces in 1913 therefore 
had achieved a good strike rate when one considers the small number of candidates 
and the overall results. 
Exclusive focus upon municipal representation might suggest that Labour remained 
peripheral to the city's municipal politics. Yet, this was certainly not the case. On the 
contrary, analysis of the Manchester city council's monthly meetings illustrates that 
the new Labour group, albeit small in number, had a significant impact on the 
character of municipal debate. As in other parts of the country, one of the key issues 
the Labour group campaigned upon throughout the period was that of wages, 
especially those of municipal employees. In Manchester the Labour group and its 
leader Tom Fox in particular, proved to be remarkably capable advocates of issues 
including wage capping, standardisation and right to work. 1909 arguably marked a 
turning point in the role of the Labour members on the city council. From this point 
onwards, Labour members' regular interventions within the council debates not only 
brought the issue of wages to the council agenda but they managed to win a number 
231 I I' of key votes on the question. In February 1909, for examp e, a proposa to Instruct 
all the council's committees to refrain from any wage increases for a year was 
. . 232 A hid' successfully defeated after Labour InterventIOn. mont ater a propose Increase 
in salaries was also defeated and on this occasion it was reported that the majority 
.c. , 233 L b ' . t" th against was so large 'no-one asked lor a count. a ours In erjectIOns on 0 er 
labour issues also received surprisingly positive responses. Later in 1909, for 
230 The Liberals won with 5% majority over the second placed Conservative \vhilst Labour came third 
obtaining 27% of the vote. 
231 Manchester Guardian, 8th August 1909. 
232 On this occasion the Labour groups Joseph Billam won the argument in support of wage increases 
and the council voted 54 to 28 against limiting wages. Manchester Guardian, 4t F~bruary 1909. 
233 Manchester Guardian . ..J.th March 1909. 
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example, James Johnston's (Labour) proposal that a committee be established to 
consider an eight hour day and forty hour week for all corporation workers was 
agreed by 53 to 18 votes.234 The Labour group clearly benefited on these occasions 
from the support of Liberal members as well as a number of Conservatives, especially 
those representing working-class wards. Nonetheless, it had been the Labour group 
which had taken the lead on the issue. Throughout 1910, during which there had been 
a series of mass demonstrations across the city, it is noticeable that the Labour group 
became increasingly critical of the city council's inaction with regards to the question 
of unemployment. Owing to its refusal to appeal for public funds, the Distress 
Committee in particular was accused of failing to deal with the problem. 
Unsurprisingly, the issue was taken up strongly by the Labour group on the city 
council. Partly as a result of Labour's intervention, the Manchester City Council 
embarked upon a series of initiatives to relieve unemployment. As can be seen, 
analysis of the Labour Party within the City Council suggests that from about 1909 
the group clearly began to assert itself as a distinctive and capable force. 
Unsurprisingly, the group tended to focus on issues such as wages and unemployment 
yet since these were all issues with an immediate relevance they allowed the fledgling 
Labour group to make its presence felt. Yet, it might be suggested that this presence 
remained very much within the council chamber, i.e. less among the electorate. By 
focusing so much attention to the question municipal wages the perception that 
Labour existed as a sectional party with an interest which did not essentially extend 
beyond trade unionism might have simply been reinforced. This did not sit 
comfortably with the fact that in some parts of Manchester the greater majority of 
electors were not members of trade union. 
Examination of council politics in Manchester prior to the outbreak of war also proves 
illustrative in relation to determining the extent to which there existed a 'progressive 
alliance' at the municipal level. Despite no formal alliance between the parties, 
analysis of voting patterns of the Liberal and Labour groups at the monthly meetings 
suggests that after 1906 there clearly developed a 'progressive bloc' insofar as the 
parties regularly voted together. The parties shared similar aims and objectives on 
social reform so, united, the progressive forces could pose a threat to the 
234 Manchester Guardian, 5th September 1909. 
11.+ 
Conservative's domination of the council chamber. Of course, one implication of this, 
however, was that it might have disadvantaged Labour in the sense that it made it 
difficult for the party to present a distinct appeal and separate identity. Whilst the 
Labour Party was becoming more assertive and intent on widening its municipal role, 
both the electorate and the established parties might have continued to regard it as 
little more than a pressure group and adjunct of the Liberal Party. 
Conclusions: Municipal Politics in Manchester, 1906-1914. 
For some historians electoral developments in municipal politics before 1914 provide 
evidence of an identifiable Labour advance.235 McHugh contends that Labour made 
'smooth progress' in Manchester before 1914 and the party's 'popularity and 'rise' 
(admittedly concentrated in the working-class districts of the city) was already 
'cemented' by that point; post-war success was thus founded upon an advance made 
before the outbreak of war?36 Other writers, however, contend that there is little 
evidence to support the view that the Labour Party was significantly advancing at the 
municipal level before 1914.237 Analysis of voting patterns in Manchester's municipal 
contests between 1906 and 1913 provide a valuable insight into the strength of the 
respective parties. The evidence in Manchester does not appear to suggest an 
imminent advance for the Labour Party. Where Labour faced both Conservative and 
Liberal opponents its performance was generally poor and in areas of the city where 
popular Conservatism remained strong it experienced difficulties in establishing itself 
on the municipal landscape. Of the 16 contests (from a total of 167) which saw both 
Liberal and Labour candidates at the municipal elections before 1914, Labour 
managed to outpoll the Liberals on 7 occasions but the party was able to win just 
232 See R. McKibbin, Evolution of the Labour Party, p. 85; M.G. Sheppard and J. L. Halstead, 
'Labour's Municipal Election Performance in Provincial England and Wales, 1900-1913', Bulletin of 
the Society of the Study for Labour History (1979) and K. Laybourn and J. Reynolds, Liberalism and 
the Rise of Labour (London, 1984). 
236 See D. McHugh, 'The Labour Party in Manchester and Salford before the First World War: A Case 
of Unequal Development', Manchester Region History Review, 14 (2000), pp. 15-23 and 'Labour, the 
Liberals and the Progressive Alliance', Northern History, 2002, 39 (1) pp. 93-108. McHugh's account 
of Labour's 'onward march' in Manchester, however, appears unconvincing and he provides little 
evidence to support the assertion that the party's position was really 'cemented' by 1914 although he 
shows how Labour's position there was slightly better than in neighbouring Salford. 
237 See C. Cook, Labour and the Downfall of the Liberal Party 1906-1914 in A. Sked and C. Cook, 
Crisis and Controrersl', p. 58; T. Adams, 'Liberals, Labour and the First World War'; A. W. Purdue, 
'Liberal and Labour p'arties in North East Politics'; M. Pugh, 'Yorkshire and the New Liberalism' and 
D. Tanner, Political Change, pp. 157-158,275-278 and 300-303. 
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twice.238 Progressive conflict simply served to gift the seats to the Conservatives. Of 
the 13 wards which saw multi-party contests involving Conservatives against Liberal 
and Labour opponents, the Conservatives were returned in ten. This was a striking 
reminder of the necessity of progressive co-operation at the municipal level. 
It could be suggested that the number of candidates put forward is in itself an 
indicator of party strength or at least ambition. While the number of Labour 
candidates did increase after 1909 (when the party fielded 9 candidates) this had fallen 
back to just 5 in 1913. This represented a negligible improvement on the 7 of 1906. It 
could be argued that fewer candidates reflected a more selective targeting of wards, 
although if this was the case the tactic was not necessarily successful. The position of 
the Labour Party in Manchester's municipal politics appears to have been fragile to 
say the least. Equally, however, the Liberals also appear to have been in a somewhat 
precarious position. Whilst the Liberal share of the municipal vote remained relatively 
stable the party suffered increasing numbers of defeats in areas where it had 
previously been successful; in Withington, Exchange and Rusholme for example (see 
appendix figs. 13, 37 and 97). Analysis of Liberal versus Conservative contests, 
however, shows that often the vote could be extremely close (see appendix figs. 37, 
50, 59, 85 and 11 for example). 
Given the spatial character of party support it is unsurprising that the local Liberal 
Federation appeared anxious to establish some form of municipal entente (similar to 
the Progressive Alliance at the parliamentary level) in Manchester. In 1911 this 
became enshrined within the context of the Municipal Progressive Association. The 
evidence suggests, however, that the MP A never induced any significant results in 
relation to progressive co-operation in respect to policy formation and the Manchester 
Liberals themselves admitted that the general response to the initiative had been 
d· ., 239 Isappomtmg. 
In relation to the geographical distribution of party support, as we have seen. the 
Labour Party was advancing in the 'better' working-class districts to the east of the 
238 These were Harpurhey in 1907 and New Cross in 1910. Note that this figure excludes Gorton South 
in 1909 where three seats were available and both a Labour and Liberal candidate were returned. 
239 Municipal Progressive Association Minutes, 19th February 1912. 
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city such as Gorton, Openshaw and Bradford (the Bye-Law category in T. H. Marr's 
study)24o whilst Liberalism continued to prosper in the more affluent middle-class 
suburbs such as Withington, Didsbury, All Saints and St. Clements and the socially 
mixed wards (Cheetham, Newton Heath and Moss Side East). Longsight might be 
seen as a particular victory for the MP A. The Conservatives had won the seat easily 
between 1907 and 1910 (in the context of four successive three-cornered contests all 
of which had seen the Liberals outperforming Labour). Yet, in 1911 the Liberals 
withdrew in favour of Labour and thereafter the gap became progressively narrower 
with the Labour Party eventually capturing the seat in 1913. 
The Conservatives appear to have been particularly strong in the working-class wards 
concentrated in the centre and the north of the city (Medlock Street, New Cross, Miles 
Platting, St. John's and Ardwick) and, in fact, appear to have been becoming stronger 
in some districts. Altogether, it seems that the respective parties had developed in 
such a way that their appeal was spatial but in relation to the overall composition of 
the Manchester City Council there is little evidence that any great transformation was 
imminent. Even in districts where the Labour Party might have appeared to have been 
making some headway development remained tentative; for example, the LRC had 
won Ardwick as early as 1904 and again in 1906 but had thereafter only been able to 
win there once between 1907 and 1913 (in 1911). 
In Manchester, overall control of the city council remained a distant prospect for 
Labour; as has been seen, the new party's electoral advance was extremely tentative. 
Yet this ought not to be taken to imply that the Labour Party's impact upon municipal 
politics was altogether limited. On the contrary, despite possessing just 16 elected 
councillors on the Manchester City Council (less than an eighth of its total 
membership) the Labour group was not of peripheral significance. Analysis of council 
proceedings before 1914 reveals that the new Labour group asserted itself in a 
confident and positive manner. The party itself believed that the value of its municipal 
representatives remained to be fully appreciated (largely because the results were 'not 
immediately visible to the public eye' .241 Nonetheless, the group persisted and "more 
240 See T. H. Marr, Housing Conditions in Manchester and Salford (Manchester, 1904). 
241 See, Manchester and Salford Labour Representation Committee Annual Report, 1911. 
than held their own in the debates' ?42 The period after 1911 in particular saw a 
growing number of labour disputes within Manchester and the subject of wages and 
conditions of work were of great significance. The Labour members took the lead on 
these questions. One councillor in particular (William Phillips) stands out. Phillips put 
forward a large number of motions; in May 1912 he led the opposition to the Shop 
Hours Act successfully winning recognised rates for municipal painters. The 
following year he obtained improvements in relation to wage rates for municipal 
workers including engineers and other kindred trades.243 He courted controversy 
largely owing to the language he used (it was often somewhat provocative to say the 
least) and the appearance of representatives like him served to politicise the council 
chamber in a way that had never previously been the case. 244 From this point, a 
frequent criticism of Labour began to emerge; that the party represented too narrow a 
sectional interest. Some even claimed that the Labour members were effectively 'paid 
agitators' seeking municipal representation in order only to 'advocate an increase in 
wages' .245 Whilst pronounced hostility towards Labour was rare before 1914 it 
nonetheless illustrates some of the difficulties faced by the new organisation. Another 
obstacle in the way of Labour's progress in municipal politics during the earlier stages 
of its development was in connection to the party's limited representation on the 
council committees. Effectively, the council committees were where much of the 
critical work took place and Labour's (as yet) poor representation limited the party's 
ability to exert an influence on policy.246 Even so, the Labour representatives on the 
city council had played a critical role in improving the conditions of many workers. 
Despite on occasion determined opposition within the council chamber Labour 
amendments were regularly decisive in securing improvements. The central Labour 
Party in Manchester itself believed that 'no section of workers had benefited more by 
Labour representation' than the municipal workers. At the same time, however, it was 
242 This was the view of the Manchester LRC (cited in ibid.) and is supported by the present study. 
243 See Manchester Guardian, 2nd May 1912 and 7th March 1913. 
244 Even the Labour group's leader, Tom Fox, openly condemned Phillips making the point that he was 
not a trade unionist. It is clear that there existed some degree of disunity within the Labour group's 
ranks between the traditional trade unionists and the more recently elected ILP members. 
245 See a particularly heated debate in December 1912 which centred on whether skilled employees 
such as engineers (amongst others) ought to be paid higher than the standard rate .. Labour's.respons~ to 
accusations of them representing only sectional interest was to accus~ the establIshed partIes of bem.g 
'the paid advocates of the property owners'. Manchester Guardian, 5 December 1912. TeIlmgly. thIS 
meeting saw Labour's largest defeat to date; Labour's amendment was lost by 73 to 23 votes. see also 
report in Manchester Guardian, 9th January 1913. 
246 Manchester Central Labour Party, Annual Report. 1911. 
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recognised that 'no other unions gave less support to the party than those who are 
largely employed by the corporation' .247 Whilst it was perhaps inevitable that the 
early Labour councillors would concern themselves with municipal wages and such 
like (the municipal corporation after-all was one of the major employers in the city) 
such focus might prove to be a double-edged sword however since it might serve to 
reinforce the notion that Labour was, indeed, simply representative of a sectional 
interest. 
Some historians have suggested that progressive co-operation at the municipal level 
lends support to the view that the Progressive Alliance (more generally) remained 
strong up to 1914. This study of Manchester suggests that the politics of the 
Progressive Alliance at the municipal level was complicated. Whilst the local Liberal 
Federation remained eager to reach an understanding with Labour at the municipal 
level (in terms of policy) it appears that Labour remained generally unresponsive to 
such overtures. If anything, the Labour Party appeared most independent in the 
council chamber and (to a slightly lesser extent) at the municipal elections. It was in 
municipal politics that a drive for truly independent labour representation was most 
pronounced although it is wise not to exaggerate the point. With regards to the 
municipal elections, it could be suggested that Labour 'progressives' faced the same 
problem as the MPA, in that with such a huge number of seats to 'police', it was 
perhaps inevitable that some .of the local parties would ignore party advice and stand a 
candidate in their wards rather than make way for the Liberals (even if the Liberals 
were better positioned in the ward than Labour). Clearly, there were some seats, 
noticeably Harpurhey, where all parties appeared absolutely determined to fight 
almost every year?48 Ultimately, however, whilst the numbers of three-cornered 
contests might have increased slightly in the years just before the outbreak of war, 
they still remained the exception to the rule. The evidence suggests that there clearly 
remained many wards where both parties (Liberal and Labour) appeared to have been 
prepared to stand aside and give their progressive ally a free-run against the 
Conservatives. Before 1914, therefore, contests between Liberals and Conservatives 
247 See Manchester Central Labour Party Annual Report, 1914. 
248 Note that the MPA intimated that it would 'give full support to any candidate the Harpurhey Liberal 
Association may adopt', suggesting that, here, at least, the MP A did not intend to intervene in order to 
I A ·· M' 20th J d ')nd achieve progressive unity, see Municipa Progressive ssocwtlOn Inute, anuary an -
February 1913. 
and Labour and Conservatives were far more common than those between the Liberal 
and Labour parties.249 
The extent to which the MPA reflected actual Liberal-Labour alliance within the 
council chamber is more problematic and we need exercise caution not to over-state 
progressive 'co-operation' in this respect. Whilst the odd 'moderate' Labour 
councillor (such as John Sutton) might have put in an occasional appearance at MPA 
. 2-0 
meetmgs, these were few and far between.) The Labour group on the council 
appeared to be deeply committed to their own organisations, whether these were 
political such as the ILP or their respective trade unions. On the council the Labour 
members focused principally on the practical aspects of municipal representation, i.e. 
improving the lives of their working-class constituents, most particularly the 
municipal employees and there were many areas on which the two progressive parties 
could agree although there was never a formal 'alliance' as such. In relation to 
electoral politics the evidence in Manchester suggests that, tacitly at least, the politics 
of the Progressive Alliance remained more or less intact on the eve of the First World 
War. 
2.6: Conclusions: Electoral Politics and Party Support in Manchester, 1906-1914 
Tanner suggests that Labour's electoral development before 1914 was fragmented and 
largely dependent upon Liberal acquiescence.2SI In his view the Labour Party's early 
progress was highly concentrated; in areas with significant trade union membership, 
and even in these areas there was not always an identifiable swing to Labour at this 
stage?S2 In Manchester, Labour's support was indeed heavily concentrated in the 
north-east and east of the city; areas where trade union organisation was strong which 
benefited Labour's organisation substantially. Elsewhere, politics in poorer districts of 
Manchester remained dominated by either deeply-embedded popular Conservatism or 
249 For an alternative view on this see D. McHugh, 'The Labour Party in Manchester and Salford before 
the First World War: A Case of Unequal Development', Manchester Region History RevieH', 14 
(2000). . . 
250 The only Labour councillor in Manchester who appears to have taken any mterest m the MP A \\3S 
the moderate Lib-Laber John Sutton. 
251 D. Tanner, Political Change, pp. 317-337, see also D. Tanner, 'The Parliamentary Electoral System, 
the Fourth Reform Act and the Rise of Labour in England and Wales', Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Research, 56, 1983 and also D. Tanner, 'Class Voting and Radical Politics: The Liberal and 
Labour Parties, 1910-1931' in 1. Lawrence and M. Taylor (eds), Party, State and Society. 
252 D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 398. 
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by Liberalism and there appeared little evidence in either municipal or parliamentary 
politics that these traditional loyalties were about to change. In his study of the 
Labour Party in Manchester after 1918 McHugh argues that Labour's popUlarity and 
'rise' (which he admits was concentrated in the working-class districts of the city) was 
'cemented' by 1914 and post-war success was founded upon progress made prior to 
this?53 Indeed, the Labour Party had made significant electoral progress in 
Manchester at the parliamentary level before 1914, but this had been facilitated by a 
considerable degree of Liberal acquiescence and, as this study shows, Labour in 
Manchester was exceptionally similar to the Liberals in respect to policy and 
ideology. Ultimately, Labour's wider progress appeared painfully slow and little 
evidence exists to suggest the emergence of a powerful and distinct Labour appeal on 
the basis of policy. This examination of Manchester confirms the view that Labour's 
advance was by no means assured before 1914 and at best the party's prospects 
appeared tenuous. Claims that the seeds of future Labour growth were well in place 
before 1914 appear to rest on slim foundations when one considers electoral politics 
and political change in Manchester before 1914. When Labour did challenge the 
Liberal Party it tended to fare badly. Its position in the more unionised parts of the 
city seems to have been more secure in the years before the outbreak of war, but only 
slightly; as analysis of Clynes' position illustrates, Labour continued to face deeply-
entrenched popular working-class Conservatism in this type of district. 
Tanner's work in particular contends that the Liberal and Labour parties remained 
committed to the Progressive Alliance on the eve of war in 1914. Other historians, 
however, have sought to emphasise that there appeared to exist irreconcilable 
differences by that stage?54 This study illustrates how, in Manchester, there were 
clearly a number of occasions when relations broke down before 1914 yet such 
instances should not necessarily be perceived as indicative of a wider and more 
serious collapse of the Progressive Alliance though it is important to recognise that 
the longer-term durability of progressive co-operation remains more of an open 
question. 
253 See D. McHugh, 'Labour, the Liberals and the Progressive Alliance', Northern History, 2002, 39 (I) 
pp.93-108. . .. . 
254 However Tanner later suggests that Labour was unlikely to be happy to remam the JUnIor partner In 
the Progressive Alliance and 'beneath the surface attempted to gradually expand its base and to replace 
its progressive ally', see D. Tanner, Political Change. p. 345. 
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As this study illustrates, it is unwise to exaggerate the penneation of New Liberalism 
in Manchester. Apart from exceptions such as Arthur Haworth and C. T. Needham. 
Manchester's Liberal parliamentary candidates before 1914 campaigned 
overwhelmingly on a traditional, some might suggest, mundane political platfonn. 
Most continued, somewhat dogmatically, to focus principally on the question of Free 
Trade at the expense of virtually all other issues. Early twentieth century Liberalism 
did not possess a dynamic edge in Manchester as it might have begun to in other 
areas. When compared to Stoke-on-Trent (which will be discussed below), 
Manchester Liberalism was markedly less radical and dynamic prior to 1914. In 
Manchester it appears that the Liberal Party was beginning to lose its radical edge 
even before the outbreak of war. This is not to suggest that the party was losing 
ideological momentum to Labour; far from it, the Labour Party locally appeared to be 
as moderate as the Liberals. Instead, the Liberal Party in Manchester seems simply to 
have become too embroiled with the issue of defeating Tariff Refonn and the majority 
of the party's candidates appeared to lack the dynamism we would associate with 
New Liberalism and a city with such a glorious Liberal past?55 On the eve of war, 
Liberalism in Manchester remained electorally significant but it did not appear 
ideologically vibrant; the extent to which it would be able to deal with future 
challenges will be discussed below. 
Detailed evaluation of the electoral campaigns in Manchester before 1914 highlights 
how local specificity remained critically important during the Edwardian period. As 
analysis of election campaigns illustrates, in Manchester, the traditional Liberal issue 
of Free Trade remained central to the party's electoral platfonn and the impact of the 
New Liberalism appears to have been limited to a relatively small number of 
candidates. This provides little support to a number of historian's contentions that the 
period prior to 1914 heralded an altogether new era for Liberalism on the basis of the 
penneation of a new Liberal radicalism. 
255 Historians such as Moore have emphasised the progressivism of the Liberal Party ~ M,anchester 
d · the last two decades of the nineteenth century and stressed how Manchester Itself came to urmg . . 
symbolise much of the New Liberalism of the next century, see 1. R. Moore, TransjormatlOn. 
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Chapter 3: Constituency Politics in Stoke-on-Trent, 1906-191-' 
3.1: Political Context and the Emergence of a Progressive Alliance! 
Before 1880 the Potteries had been an undivided constituency with two members. 
Sometimes two Liberals had been returned, on other occasions a Liberal and a 
Conservative, although the area appeared more Liberal than Conservative. With 
redistribution in 1880, Hanley and Burslem were formed into one constituency under 
the title of Hanley Parliamentary Borough and a separate seat was created for the 
nearby town of Stoke-upon-Trent (hereafter referred to as Stoke). Stoke was 
subsequently captured by the Liberals for three successive general elections (1885, 
1886 and 1892) and at a by-election in between (in 1890). On all occasions the Liberal 
vote had been high; in percentage terms 63%, 61 %, 59% and 62%.2 In 1895 the seat 
was won by a Liberal Unionist on a narrow majority (of 2.4%). In Hanley, all four 
general elections saw the return of a Liberal (four were contested, 1886 was unopposed) 
and like Stoke, the Liberal vote had been high (69%, 59%, 52%).3 In consequence of 
the Boer War, as across the country, the area saw a Unionist landslide in 1900 and for 
the first time since redistribution both seats returned Unionists. The Unionist majorities 
were small however; 2% in Stoke and 5.2% in Hanley. 
An effect of the 1900 general election (as elsewhere) was that it prompted the Liberals 
to reassess their position in the district. At this time organised labour was also 
beginning to examine its position. This primarily entailed the miners considering the 
viability of an independent challenge although the Liberals had already begun to 
consider the feasibility of a formal 'progressive' coalition with labour, believing the 
potential electoral appeal of such an alliance would be extremely significant. From this 
period a distinct Lib-Labism in North Staffordshire had started to develop and from it 
emerged a particularly distinctive type of Lib-Lab representative. 
I For examination of the 'creation' of the national 'progressive alliance' (the 1903 Lib-Lab pact) see F. 
Bealey, 'Negotiations between the Liberal Party and Labour Representation Committee befo~e the 
General Election of 1906', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research (1956) and for the workmg of 
the pact see also F. Bealey and H. Pelling, Labour and Politics; A History of the Labour RepresentatlO!1 
Committee (London, 1958) pp. 298-299. . ' 
2 The majorities (in percentages) were 26.2%, 21.8%, 17.4% and 23.8%. FIgures from F, \\. S. Craig, 
British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885-1918, p. 196 and p. 118. 
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Initially, the Liberal Party had to deal with inevitable dissenters: those for whom 
accommodation with the labour interest implied a belief that the party might be taken 
over by socialists. Despite some misgivings, however, in April 1902 a representative 
meeting of local Liberal and Labour forces was convened in Stoke to determine the 
'advisability of fighting the seat on labour and progressive lines ... providing a suitable 
candidate [were to be] forthcoming. 4 One month later, the decision was taken to adopt 
John Ward as a prospective parliamentary candidate. Ward had an interesting political 
past; he had been a member of the SDF in Battersea during the 1880s, became chairman 
of the Battersea branch of the Gas Workers' Union and in the same year had also been 
involved in the creation of the Navvies, Bricklayers', Labourers' and General 
Labourers' Union. From this point, however, he had adopted a more Liberal stance and 
had become active in the National Democratic League (becoming the organisation's 
chairman in 1902).5 Ward arrived in Stoke in early 1902 with the hope of obtaining the 
LRC nomination there. Crucially, he made explicit efforts to obtain an electoral 
agreement with the Liberals in the area. This situation antagonised some elements 
within the local Labour movement although the relative weakness of the LRC in Stoke 
essentially meant they were unable to mount effective opposition to his candidature. 6 
For the radical wing of the Stoke Liberals, Ward represented an ideal candidate; a 
progressive who, it was believed, could help sustain, if not strengthen even, the Liberal 
position in the area. Some local Liberals, however, clearly believed the position to be 
untenable; moreover, they believed the seat could in any case be held by the Liberal 
Party alone, without Labour support. In July 1902 a meeting of the North Staffordshire 
Liberal Association resolved to adopt a Liberal candidate in opposition to Ward.7 It was 
hoped the prospective candidate would be Alfred Billson (a leading light of North 
Staffordshire Liberalism). Billson was Gladstonian in outlook although he did appear 
anxious to promote a policy of social reform and considered an accommodation with 
the working class interest as essential. Billson needed extra time to consider his position, 
3 The majorities were 38.2, 18.6 (in 1892), and 2.6% (1895): The Lib~ral vote had held up better in Stoke 
than in Hanley although the Liberals narrowly lost the seat In Stoke In 1895. 
4StafJordshire Sentinel, 3rd May 1902.. ' 
5S
ee 
J. M. Bellamy and 1. Saville, Dictionary of Labour BIOgraphy, VolA (London, 1977),.p. 19.). The 
National Democratic Federation had been fonned in 1900 in an attempt. to promote umty betw:~n 
radicals and trade unionists. In 1903 it attempted to affiliate to the LRC but thiS was refused because ot Its 
(alleged) Liberal ties, see also Labour Leader, 9th August 1902. 
6 See Staffordshire Sentint'/, 3rd May 1902. 
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however, and in January the following year he decided to decline the invitation to 
contest the constituency on the grounds that local unity was more important. 8 It seems 
possible that the national party applied pressure on the Staffordshire Liberals to allow 
Ward a free-run. By the beginning of 1903, therefore, some form of 'progressiYe 
alliance' had been established in Stoke, although the degree to which it was purely 
ideologically motivated or entirely supported by the Liberals in the town remained 
uncertain. At the local level an accommodation of the Labour interest may have 
allowed the Liberal Party to secure its long-term electoral position; it could enhance its 
image as a party committed to representing the working class interest and it could also 
help the party improve its local organisation. 
Whilst Hanley was not an exclusively mining constituency, the miners formed the most 
powerful bloc within the town's politics and shaped its development more so than any 
other single group. The North Staffordshire miners represented a moderate force and 
were unlikely to be at the forefront of demands for radical political change. Gregory 
cites the miners in this district as the 'laggards' of the wider movement away from 
Liberal patronage.9 So, conflict between Liberals and Labour in Hanley was less likely. 
Furthermore, the potters (the predominant occupational group in the town) also 
remained loyal to Liberalism. Io 
As part of Gladstone's overhaul of the party organisation in the summer of 1903 the 
local Liberal organisations were re-structured culminating in the inauguration of the 
North Staffordshire Liberal Federation. This marked the end ofa long period with fairly 
inadequate organisation in the area. Improved organisation possibly also served to 
encourage a more united front for the Liberals and Labour. From Labour's perspective 
this was more eager than some might have expected. Many Labour supporters it seems 
welcomed further ties with the Liberal Party: some even believing a pursuit of 
independent labour representation was an entirely inappropriate route. II A shared 
7 Staffordshire Sentinel, 14th July 1902. 
8 Staffordshire Sentinel, 13th October 1906. 
9 See R. Gregory, Miners and British Politics, pp. 168-173. 
10 See H. Pelling, Social Geography of British Elections, 1885-1910 (London, 1967). pp. 270-274 and R. 
Whipp, Patterns of Labour: Work and Social Change in the Pottery Industry (London, 19~0). p. 181. 
II For example, in 1904, the President of the North Staffordshire Trad~s a~d Labour ~ouncil (John Welsh) 
suggested his organisation should disaffiliate from the LRC. More Significantly thiS proposal was only 
defeated by 24 votes to 16; see Staffordshire Advertiser, 4th December 1904. 
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interest in similar issues helped the process of co-operation between the Liberals and 
Labour in the locality. By 1906 some of the earlier tensions had disappeared and an 
impression of Liberal-Labour unity was thus presented to electors. Crucially, issues as 
they now emerged further encouraged a unified Liberal-Labour political outlook. The 
Boer War especially united advanced Liberals and Labour. Certainly, a section of the 
local Labour movement did not favour co-operation with the Liberals and the local ILP 
branches contained elements hostile to any involvement with Liberalism. The greater 
proportion of the Labour movement continued to support the idea of a 'progressive 
alliance' . 
Another aspect which served to underpin working-class loyalty to the Liberal Party in 
North Staffordshire was the predominance of religious nonconformity. At the tum of 
the century nonconformists, with very few exceptions, voted for the Liberal Party 
virtually as an article of faith. Without a nonconformist revival, the post 1900 
resurgence of Liberalism would have been far less pronounced. Nonconformity alone 
did not account for the 1906 landslide but it went a long way in determining the 
character and extent of it. In an area such as North Staffordshire where nonconformity 
was exceptionally strong amongst the working class so too, one might assume, would 
be the Liberal revival that, in part, it created. Religious feeling in North Staffordshire 
continued to remain strong and, as will be seen, politicians remained mindful of this 
fact for some time. 
Nonconformity was also fundamental to the development and character of Labour 
politics in North Staffordshire. In the first instance, courting the nonconformist interest 
was imperative if Labour was to advance in an area where nonconformity and 
Liberalism were so entrenched. However, the relationship between nonconformity and 
Labour politics was an organic one. The chapels had already become the springboard 
for a generation of trade union activists and became the connecting point between 
Liberalism and trade unionism and then (conversely) between Liberalism and Labour. 
Virtually all Labour's early representatives in North Staffordshire were acti\'e 
nonconformists (usually staunch Methodists) and their religion informed their politics 
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as much as their class or occupation did. 12 Experience as lay preachers gave trade union 
activists invaluable experience on the public platform; it also encouraged a strong 
relationship with the local Liberal elite. 
In Stoke-on-Trent (as elsewhere) Liberals locally were extremely anxious to improve 
on the party's electoral position and from the outset the 1906 general election campaign 
was conducted amidst an air of tangible optimism. In spite of the earlier wrangle over 
his candidature, John Ward had managed to secure the Liberal-Labour nomination in 
Stoke and in the neighbouring constituency of Hanley, Enoch Edwards (president of the 
Miners' Federation of Great Britain) stood again as a Liberal-Labour candidate. 
Edwards had been a working miner until he had been injured in an accident in the early 
1870s after which he had embarked upon a career as a trade union organiser. In 1878 he 
had become treasurer of the North Staffordshire Miners' Federation and eight years 
later he took over as president. In 1904 he became president of the national Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain. His career in local politics had begun in 1886 when he had 
been elected to the Burslem Town Council, becoming Alderman nine years later (he 
also served as Mayor during 1899). I3 Throughout his political life Edwards remained a 
moderate Lib-Laber and no doubt this was deeply connected to his staunch Primitive 
Methodism. Edwards had first been put forward as a prospective miner's candidate in 
1892 for Newcastle-Under-Lyme but the local Liberal Association had refused to 
endorse him and he subsequently withdrew. 14 In 1900 he had been adopted as a 
MFGB-Liberal candidate in Hanley but had encountered some hostility owing to his 
opposition to the Boer War. IS In 1906 the Liberals agreed to support Ward and Edwards 
on the condition that the Labour organisations would assist Liberal campaigns in 
Newcastle-under-Lyme, North-West Staffordshire and Leek. 16 Edwards and Ward 
received substantial assistance from the North Staffordshire Trades' and Labour 
Council (the council's chairman, H. Emery, acted as vice-president of Edwards's 
12 Smith argues the contention that there was 'more Methodism than Marxism' in early Labour politics is 
rather misguided and, in fact, Methodism had much less of a role than is commonly assumed, see Smith, 
Religion and the Rise of Labour (Keele, 1993), p.166-167. In this region, .however, Methodism was 
fundamental to early Labour politics. Such high profile Labour representatIves as Albert Stanley. for 
example, continued to preach at the Bethesda Chapel, see Staffordshire A dvertiser, 7th March 1908. 
13 Biographical details cited in 1. M. Bellamy and 1. Saville, Dictionary of Labour Biograp/~,·. Volume 3 
(London, 1976), pp.l 09-111. 
14 See R. Gregory, Miners and British Politics, p. 168. . 
15 The Liberals had initially believed that it would be more appropriate for Ed\\ards to stand III North 
West Staffordshire since there were more miners in that area but Edwards had refused, ibid p.168. 
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election committee). That both Edwards and Ward's campaigns represented the 
combined forces of Liberalism and Labour was reflected by the formation of a joint 
Liberal-Labour election committee for the duration of the contest. 17 
As already mentioned, after 1895 the Potteries can be viewed as a solidly Liberal area: 
of the four general elections from 1885, Hanley had only returned a Conservative once 
(in the abnormal circumstances of 1900) while in Stoke five elections (including a 
by-election) had seen Unionists returned twice (although with extremely narrow 
majorities). Yet, it would be unwise to perceive Conservatism as of peripheral 
importance. There existed significant pockets of Conservative support in the area: one 
reflection of the strength of Conservatism was membership of the Primrose League for 
example. Whilst membership of the league was never especially large in North 
Staffordshire, as Pugh identifies, all the Potteries seats reveal some Primrose League 
strength. Hanley, Stoke and Fenton all had very active habitations. Of course, here, 
popular Conservatism was virtually exclusively working-class. 18 Given the very 
limited amount of information available about popular Conservatism in the Potteries it 
is difficult to make an accurate assessment about its wider influence. However, 
throughout the period studied here it appears that popular working-class Conservatism 
was well organised as reports on, for example, the Unionist Workingmen's Association 
testify. 
3.2: The 1906 General Election in Stoke-on-Trent 
As across the country the Liberal-Labour campaigns focused upon the principal themes 
of Free Trade, Chinese Slavery, Trade Union legislation (in particular the Miners' Bill) 
and demands for amendment of the Workers' Compensation Act. Alongside these 
aspects, the two Liberal-Labour candidates focused attention to a number of social 
issues such as old age pensions and education. 
Throughout the contest the central plank of Edwards's campaign was the issue of Free 
Trade although he did consider a small number of other issues such as pensions and 
16 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 15t and 16th January 1906. 
17 Staffordshire Sentinel, 21 st December 1905. 
18 See M. Pugh, The Tories and the People (Oxford, 1985) p. 118. 
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unemployment. 19 Edwards argued that pauperism had increased substantially during 
the period of the late government and he told voters that whilst the ConservatiYe 
administration had been able to find £250 million for war in South Africa 'men who had 
been good citizens were facing the prospect of the workhouse' .20 He declared: 'if the 
highest in the land did not believe it below their dignity to accept a pension why 
shouldn't the working man?,21 Edwards conducted a more traditional Liberal campaign 
than Ward. Furthermore, he made a point of avoiding all discussion of his own trade 
during the campaign and in general devoted little attention to labour questions. Ward 
offered far more detailed consideration of a much wider number of issues. 
In Stoke, John Ward conducted an impressive campaign and addressed a much wider 
array of issues than any other candidate across the two localities considered within the 
present study. For no obvious reason, the local press chose to refer to him simply as the 
Labour candidate although it was made clear that he was endorsed by and received the 
active support of the local Liberals.22 Ward did adopt a more discernibly 'Labour' 
stance than Edwards, however, articulating his arguments in more decisively 
anti-capitalist/anti-Tory language and he attacked his opponent much more directly. In 
considering the increasingly precarious economic position of the working man, for 
instance, he told one meeting how 'the friends of the Tories; the capitalists, the clergy 
and the brewers [had] taken the cream of the extra taxation raised by the hard labour of 
the working man'. 23 Edwards never used this sort of language. Throughout the 
campaign, Ward reiterated how the constituency's Unionist member had 'always voted 
against the interests of the workers' in parliament. 24 He told electors how Coghill 
'instead of representing [this] purely working-class constituency .... had never had any 
25 h h .. sympathy with the working man' and he even went so far as to suggest t at t e sIttmg 
19 Staffordshire Sentinel, 2nd, 4th, 16th January 1906. 
20 Staffordshire Sentinel, 2nd January 1906. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Throughout the campaign prominent local Liberals regularly suppo~ed .Ward on his electio? platforms. 
The Liberal candidate for Leek, R Pearce, for example, gave Ward slgmficant support as dId the local 
Liberal agent H Leese. 
23 Staffordshire Sentinel, 2nd January 1906. 
24 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 4th J~nuary 1906. . . , . 
25 On labour questions in general It appears that the slttmg me~ber s record \\ as some~hat ou~ of step 
with the character of the constituency; he had voted agamst the Shop Hours BIlL agams,t the 
consideration of the wages for post office employees, had contributed to the .d~feat of the RaJ\way 
Accidents Prevention Bill and had declared that he supported the Taff Vale deCISIon, see Staffordshire 
Sentinel, 6th January 1906. 
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member appeared 'peculiarly hostile to all labour proposals' in the House of Commons 
and thus (he argued) it was 'very illogical for Tory working men to support such a 
candidate; in fact it was absolutely inconsistent' .26 Another subject which provided 
Ward with ammunition against his opponent was the issue of Ireland. The constituency 
contained a sizable Irish population. 27 Coghill had allegedly accused the Irish of 
'disloyal, treacherous and treasonable behaviour' ?8 Ward went so far as to contend that 
his opponent's hostility towards Ireland reached 'almost a mania' .29 Another issue he 
focused considerable attention to was education, asserting that the late government had 
had 'no mandate to interfere with the national education system ... [they had] foisted 
voluntary schools upon the public funds without giving the people proportionate 
control over the management of [the] schools [and] the Education Act was not a 
solution to the problems [because it simply] gave privileges to certain sects [whilst 
placing] the cost of sectarian teaching upon the public funds'. 30 Ward appeared 
particularly passionate about this particular issue and throughout the campaign 
reiterated how he firmly believed that all state-aided institutions should be under 
absolute public control. He also objected strongly to religious tests for teachers. This 
was an issue likely to strike a chord with the nonconformist Liberal supporters in the 
constituency and was likely to reinforce their endorsement for him. It could, however, 
have potentially alienated him from the Catholic Irish and Anglicans however. Ward 
also gave considerable attention to the subject of Chinese Slavery in South Africa and 
he even went so far as to suggest 'war had only been waged to secure cheap labour' and 
that the 'real object of importing Chinese labour was to keep out trade unions. ,31 He 
also told voters that if such cruelty had been introduced in 'one part of the Empire there 
was no reason why it shouldn't be introduced at home' and he remained fervent in 
insisting that 'the principle must be fought and the stain in South Africa wiped from the 
British flag' .32 
26 By which he meant that it was inconsistent for a man to pay into a trade union then vote for s~meone 
who believed it acceptable that the 'great capitalist monopolies' could take the money the umon had 
accumulated for benevolent purposes away. . 
27 According to one Nationalist leader, the Irish in the area forme~ ~ 'compa~t and nu~erous' commumty 
in the constituency, cited in H. Pelling, Social Geography ofBrltlsh ElectlOns 188)-1910 (London and 
New York), p. 271. 
28 Staffordshire Sentinel, 2nd January 1906. .. 
29 Coghill had also voted against his party in opposing the Insh Land BIll. 
30 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 2nd January 1906. 
31 Ibid. 
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Edwards and Ward both adopted a strong defence of Free Trade although it played less 
of a central theme for Ward than it did for Edwards. Ward made the simple though 
nonetheless effective point that under Chamberlain's Tariff Reform proposals just 
because employers might get higher prices for their goods it did not necessarily follow 
that they would consequently pay higher wages.33 It should be noted, however. that the 
Tariff Reform issue never dominated the political debate in North Staffordshire to the 
extent which it did elsewhere. As noted earlier, in Manchester, Liberal and Labour 
candidates adopted the Free Trade v Protection debate as an essential plank of policy 
(aimed at securing the working class vote as much as retaining traditional middle-class 
support). In Stoke-on-Trent, as has been seen, whilst the progressive candidates 
declared themselves Free-Traders, they never made the issue a key plank of their 
platforms although, conversely, throughout the period studied here, every single one of 
the Unionist candidates declared themselves to be out-and-out Tariff Reformers 
arguing their case from the perspective that a degree of tariff protection would be of 
especial benefit to the pottery industry. It was widely perceived that British pottery was 
increasingly coming under threat from Germany and Austria and the Staffordshire 
pottery manufacturers in particular were vocal in their support for fiscal reform. 34 
Throughout the pre-war period, however, the pottery unions remained unflinching in 
their commitment to Free Trade (seemingly unmoved by their employer's 
arguments). 35 
From the outset of the 1906 contest, the Unionist candidate (and sitting member) for 
Hanley (A.H. Heath)36 was at pains to stress how he objected to (what he called) 'the 
cursed bugbear of class' being introduced into this election. He told his audiences 
'labour would be of little use without capital' and it was unfair for people to be 
'scornful towards the capitalist'. He defended policy in South Africa declaring that 'the 
Chinese in the Transvaal were living as happily as the volunteers .. .it [was] a lie to call 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Whipp notes, however, that the Staffordshire fIrms often went to ex~eme lengths t? exaggerat~ the 
threat posed by foreign trade; even when Staffordshire exports .were eVIdently expandmg they ~lalmed 
the industry was 'in peril'. Essentially, this was a ploy to us~ m aspects such as wage ~argammg and 
demands for improvements in working conditions; see R. WhIPP, Patterns 0/ Labour, p . .)8. 
35 See Staffordshire Advertiser, 20th January 1906. . 
36 A. H. Heath was an Ironmaster and Colliery Proprietor and had unsuccessfully contested Hanley m 
1892 and 1895. He won the seat in 1900; see Who's Who o/British Members o/Parliament, Volume 2, p. 
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it slavery ' .37 Heath expressed his belief that the Education Act was ' a useful and wise 
measure ' and that he regretted the actions of the nonconformist churches because he 
believed their grievance was less than they were claiming it to be. Heath very largely 
avoided the question of Tariff Reform. When questioned on the issue he dec lared 
himself 'distinctly a supporter of Balfour' and stated that he thought government ought 
to be given the 'fullest opportunity to negotiate with foreign countries for a better tariff 
system' .38 He argued that he could not see ' why the doors of this country were open to 
others to make their markets but [they] closed their doors to us . .. binding the colonies 
together in commercial union was worthy of consideration [because] industries were 
crippled by the unfair competition to which they were exposed' .39 So, in effect, despite 
attempting to avoid the issue Heath still managed unwittingly to present himself as a 
Tariff Reformer (especially since any utterances on the subject were inevitably widely 
discussed within the Liberal press). In relation to Ireland and Temperance the only 
thing he would say was that he believed the late administration had passed ' good and 
useful measures ' and, when questioned, declared himself in favour of a ' modified' 
franchise reform for women 'who did not have a man to represent them' . 40 
The 1906 General Election in Stoke-on-Trent: Results and Analysis 
Fig. 1 Stoke (Turnout 84.80/0) 
.', -I/~~ 
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15.1 % swing Conservative to Liberal-Labour 
37 See Staffordshire Advertiser, 2nd January 1906 . 
:;s Ibid . 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid . 
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Fig. 2 Hanley (Turnout 83.40/0) 
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The 1906 general election in Stoke-on-Trent dramatically overturned the Unionist 
majorities of 1900 in both the Stoke and Hanley divisions.41 In Stoke (see fig. ]) 101m 
Ward was returned with a majority of 3,372 (28.2% of the vote) and in Hanley, 
Edwards was returned with a very large majority of 4,896 (36.4%). Both results set new 
records for the respective constituencies. More importantly, they demonstrated that the 
Liberal-Labour Progressive Alliance could produce astonishing results . For the 
foreseeable future, at least, the election helped to secure Liberal and Labour allegiance 
to the politics of progressive co-operation in the area. The immediate post -1906 period 
in Stoke-on-Trent was one of renewed energy and optimism amongst both local Li beral 
and Labour forces. For the Liberals, the 1906 general election had demonstrated that 
electoral accommodation with Labour could work extremely effectively. This was 
reinforced the following year with the election of a Liberal-Labour candidate, Albert 
Stanley, at the North-West Staffordshire by-election.42 
4 1 The 1900 general election had never been an accurate representation of party strength given that there 
had only been one issue, the Boer War and the Liberals had been defeated mass ively on th at. 
42 The by-election in North-West Staffordshire in July 1907 sa\v the Liberal-Labour candidate. Alben 
Stanley, returned with 59.4% of the vote (a majority of 18.8%)). Like the general election. th e by-election 
demonstrated the usefulness of co-operation in a constituency where the miner formed a Igndi ant 
proportion of the electorate. 
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3.3: The 1910 General Elections in Stoke-on-Trent 
January 1910 
Edwards and Ward stood again as Liberal-Labour candidates in the general election of 
January 1910. Because of the affiliation of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain to 
the Labour Party Edwards was now expected (and required) to contest Hanley as an 
official (and straightforward) Labour candidate. This changed the political situation 
from 1906 and some of the Hanley Liberals became increasingly concerned as to their 
own position. In October 1909, for example, a section of the local Liberal Association 
expressed concern about Edwards's candidature in light of the new circumstances:B 
This did not amount to anything however; given Edwards's considerable personal 
popularity and local political support it was unlikely any opposition was likely to 
succeed.44 Tellingly, it was only after Edwards had secured local Liberal support that 
the local Trades and Labour Council consented to giving him their backing.45 
In Stoke, John Ward encountered more pronounced opposition to his nomination yet 
not from the Liberals but from the local Labour Party. This connected primarily to the 
fact that Ward had refused to sign the Labour Party constitution.46 But like Edwards, 
Ward by that time had established a degree of popularity in the constituency which in a 
way ensured that any formal opposition to him was likely to encounter difficulties. So, 
as four years earlier, at the beginning of 1910 the impression was one of 'progressive' 
harmony in both Stoke and Hanley. Behind the scenes, however, there had been some 
noticeable disquiet about both candidates amongst certain local Liberals and Labour 
activists.47 
The Unionists adopted two candidates new to the area. These were George Rittner in 
Hanley and David Kyd in Stoke. Both were London barristers and from the beginning 
of the campaign both determined that Tariff Reform, with particular reference to its 
43See Staffordshire Advertiser, 30th October 1909. 
44Ibid. 
45 Staffordshire Advertiser, 20th November 1909. 
46 Edwards had also initially declined to sign the Labour constitution though his refusal generated less 
debate; for local Labour opposition to Ward, see Staffordshire A dvertiser, 8th Ja~uary 1 ~ 1 O. 
47 The issue of Ward's commitment to the Labour Party remained a controversIal subject even as the 
campaign progressed; at one meeting, for example, he was asked by a member of the audience whether 
he would sign the party 'ticket in order to be under the control of the La~our Pa~y branch a.s Edwards and 
Stanley had done' to which he replied 'I will not ... if I go to represent thIS constItuency 1 \\'III be bound by 
no one but the electors who sent me'; see Staffordshire Advertiser, 15th January 1910. 
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benefits for the pottery industry, would constitute the major thrust of their platforms.48 
The recent budget also provided the Unionists with another critical line of attack. In 
contrast to previous contests the January 1910 general election saw the Unionists 
fighting noticeably aggressive campaigns. Their justification for this approach rested 
on an assumption that they were defending the state against what they deemed the road 
towards Socialism. Crucially, however, the leading pottery unions remained 
fundamentally opposed to any measure of Tariff Reform. 49 It could be suggested, 
therefore, that Unionist organisers had taken something of a gamble in adopting this 
strategy. 
As across the country Liberal-Labour candidates had determined to focus more or less 
exclusively on the constitutional question. Ward related his objection to the Lords' 
actions on the basic premise that 'parliament had to provide for social responsibilities' 
most particularly pensions and he insisted the present government had determined that 
'the veterans of industry who had assisted to procure the wealth of the community 
should no longer have only the paupers' dole and the workhouse to look forward to in 
their declining years' .50 For Ward, the people had to decide whether the finances of the 
country should be 'levied, controlled and expended by their representatives [or by those 
who] stood for their own interests, power, privilege and nothing else.' 51 He went further 
in arguing that in a 'democratically elected country ... the industrial community [had] no 
place for idle Lordlings in it anyway'. 52 Edwards, like Ward, focused primarily on the 
Lords also. He told voters that the second chamber was 'out of harmony with the 
general tenor and tone of things as they now existed,53 and he elaborated in outlining 
how the 'great principle driving the budget of Lloyd George was that taxes should be 
put on those who had money and plenty of it and given to people who had very little' .54 
He also gave considerable attention to the land question declaring that 'at last they had 
found a man brave enough to tackle this question'. 55 He was referring to Lloyd George 
48StafJordshire Advertiser, 8th January 1910. 
49 StafJordshire Advertiser, 15th January 1910. 
50 See StafJordshire Sentinel, 3 rd January 1910. 
51 Ibid. 
52StafJordshire Advertiser, 8th January, 1910. 
53 For Edwards on the constitutional question see StafJordshire Sentinel, 17th January 1910 
54 See StafJordshire Sentinel, 6th January 1910. .. . 
55 Edwards was evidently a great admirer of Lloyd George and he spoke about hIm regularly In hIS 
speeches suggesting that he very much remained a Liberal at heart. In contrast, \\lard never mentioned 
him (or any other Liberals) at all. 
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of course. Throughout the campaign Edwards received considerable support from a 
number of Hanley's prominent Liberals and yet tellingly no significant Labour Party 
speakers came to support him. Elaborating upon their endorsement of Edwards 
, 
eminent local Liberals such as Sydney Malkin and Dr. Rowley-Moody cited his 
background as the prime reason voters ought to support him. As Rowley-Moody said 
'there was a great deal of social legislation to be passed [and the country] needed men 
like Edwards with his knowledge of the workers in parliament' .56 Adopting a 'Liberal' 
platform, alongside the Lords and the Land question, Edwards also focused 
considerable attention to the fiscal question arguing that Tariff Reform would 
inevitably mean taxing the food of the people (as he had done in 1906). He also spoke at 
length about unemployment, labour exchanges and the necessity for a scheme of 
national insurance. 
The Unionist candidate in Hanley, George Rittner, declared himself a strong supporter 
of Tariff Reform (more so than the party's candidate had done in 1906) and like many 
Unionist candidates throughout the period endured a difficult campaign. 57 Rittner 
attempted to counter the suggestion that Tariff Reform would lead to increased food 
prices by claiming such measures would 'do away with every single tax on food 
supplies which come from the colonies ... which are large enough to supply everything 
we need'. 58 He went on to suggest that it was 'better to be dependent upon these than 
upon the whim and caprice of either one or a combination of foreign powers'. 59 
Throughout the contest he referred to the Labour Party as 'absolutely socialistic' and he 
took an equally aggressive attitude towards contemporary Liberalism, declaring, for 
example, that 'by being a Liberal today a man has to be a Home Ruler, Free Trader, a 
Socialist and opposed to religious education in schools'. 60 He asked one audience 
whether any 'thinking man could be in favour of a Godless education and revolutionary 
Socialism' .61 It is interesting that as early as this, some Unionist candidates in the area 
were already beginning to articulate such ferocious anti-Labour sentiments (indeed, as 
well as anti-Liberal since they classed them as being one and the same thing). In the 
56 Ibid. . d d. . 
57 Many of his meetings were noticeable for an identifiable element of dissent i.e. boomg an IsruptlOns. 
58 See Staffordshire Advertiser, 8th January 1910. 
59 Ibid. 
60 See Staffordshire Advertiser, 15t January 1910. 
61 Ibid. 
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context of 1910, however, Enoch Edwards probably did not appear to be much of a 
'revolutionary socialist' and it was highly unlikely the 'Socialist bogey' would haye 
much of an impact in an area where the former miners' leader had achieved near 
cult-like status. 
In Stoke, the Unionist candidate, David Kyd, was another strong advocate of Tariff 
Reform. He argued such a change would 'protect the home market, secure the colonial 
market and so benefit the working classes' .62 Besides Tariff Reform, K yd also focused 
significant attention to question of the navy, claiming only a Unionist government 
would ensure Britain's naval supremacy.63 Both Unionist candidates argued the pottery 
trade would benefit from a system of tariff protection; the basic contention being that 
markets were getting smaller, trade in the district was declining and inevitably 
unemployment would increase. 64 The candidates pointed to Joseph Chamberlain's 
assertion (which he had issued in a statement on Tariff Reform) that all the 'different 
branches of the pottery trade would succeed by the adoption of a new policy' .65 The 
determination of the Unionists to recapture seats in the district was evidenced by 
Balfour's appearance at the Victoria Hall to a capacity audience of over 4,000. Balfour 
in fact began his campaign in Hanley and his speech represented the first ever delivered 
by a leader of the Conservative Party in the area. It was reported that over 18,000 
people had applied for tickets and that the audience was predominantly working-class. 
Balfour's visit had primarily been organised by the North Staffordshire Unionist 
Workingmen's Federation.66 Balfour stated that 'never before [had] the ideals of the 
two great parties [been] so fundamentally diverged'. He articulated the view that 
Britain had to be prepared for war but the major issue of the present was 'Tariff Reform 
or Socialism'. 67 The Unionists appeared dismayed at the position taken by the Pottery 
Union officials; Rittner, for example, declared himself completely perplexed since he 
assumed 'every trade unionist, if he is consistent, ought to be a Tariff Reformer 
[because] the very object of trade unionism is to protect your labour and it is perfectly 
62 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 6th January 1910. . ... 
63 He outlined a long list of facts about how the navy had been neglected under the LIberal admInIstratIOn, 
see ibid. . . th 
64 See Rittner's figures on the declining exports of pottery, Staffordshire Advertiser, S January 1910 
65 Staffordshire Advertiser, 15th January 19lO. . . th 
66 This organisation was reported to have a membership of over 5,000, see Staffordshire Ad.-crtlser, S 
January 19lO. h 
67 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 6th January 1910 and Staffordshire Advt'rriser st January 1910. 
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useless to protect your labour if you do not protect the outcome of your labour,.68 
Ultimately, as analysis of the election campaigns in Stoke-on-Trent illustrates, it 
appears that workers in the pottery industry mistrusted the policy of Tariff Refonn so 
this issue in particular may not have helped the Conservatives in the area in the way 
either candidates or the party managers perhaps anticipated. 
The January 1910 General Election: Results and Analysis 
Fig. 3 Hanley (Turnout 87.1 %) 
• Labour 
• Conservative 
4.3% swing from Liberal-Labour to Conservative 
Fig. 4 Stoke (Turnout 88.8%) 
43% 
57% 
6.70/0 swing Liberal-Labour to Conservative 
68 S/{?f(ordshire Advertiser, 15th January 1910. 
~ Liberal-Labour 
• Conservative 
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The January 1910 general election results in Stoke and Hanley were viewed as a 
vindication of the legitimacy of recent Government legislation by both the Liberals and 
Labour. Enoch Edwards was returned in Hanley with a majority of 27.8% of the vote 
(see fig. 3).69 This had dropped by 8.6% therefore on the last election. 7o In Stoke, John 
Ward won with a majority of 14.8% of the vote (see fig. 4) representing a decrease of 
13.4%.71 The results represented a major disappointment for the advocates of 
Protectionism, confirming that the Tariff Reform movement had not gained ground in 
this part of the county and while the Liberal-Labour vote had declined in both 
constituencies, it had done so only marginally. In Hanley, the miners support for their 
leader would have undoubtedly contributed to sustaining the Labour vote. As the 
Staffordshire Advertiser observed, Enoch Edwards wielded an 'influence which [was] 
hardly surpassed in [any other] mining constituency". 72 It is essential to recognise the 
critical role of individuals in the politics of this period and, arguably, historians have 
often overlooked this aspect,73 but we ought to remember that the miners only 
constituted about 20% of the voting strength of the constituency at most, therefore, this 
factor alone does not suffice in explaining political loyalty in these sorts of areas. 
Whilst individual politicians undoubtedly could have a significant impact on the 
electoral history of a constituency, context remained significant. Both Edwards and 
Ward had polled exceedingly well in 1906 because (like Liberal and Labour candidates 
across the whole country) issues had given them a considerable advantage. Their defeat 
had been virtually unimaginable. Furthermore, as has been seen, they had been elected 
essentially on a Liberal platform. By 1910, the political context and the impact of the 
issues which had played such a critical role in 1906 had started to change and their 
positions might begin to change accordingly. As it was, however, the results of the 1910 
(January) general election in Stoke-on-Trent saw another great victory for the 
combined forces of Liberalism and Labour. 
69 Election figures from F. W. S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885-1918 (Dartmouth, 
1989), p. 118 and p. 196. 
70 The turnout rate was 87.1 % compared to 83.4% in 1906. 
71 The turnout rate was 88.8%. In 1906 it had been 84.8%. 
72 Staffordshire Advertiser, 22nd January 1910. The same newspaper also suggested that ~ significa,nt 
reason the miners voted in such large numbers for Edwards was because 'as a class they dId not sufter 
from foreign competition to their industry'. 
73 McKibbin, for example, pays limited attention to the role of individuals in Labour's early developme~t. 
This is understandable given that his is more of an organisational hist0I?' of the Labour Pm:) s 
development; nonetheless, the importance of individuals was paramount and m many cases determmed 
the political fortunes of the movement in this early period. 
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For Labour as an independent organisation the January 1910 General Election did little 
to improve its position in the North Staffordshire Potteries. Whilst Stoke and Hanlev 
were technically represented by Labour members, as we can see, in reality both Ward 
and Edwards remained loyal to their Liberal roots and (practically) both had been 
elected on a Liberal platform with Liberal support. So long as Labour representation 
continued in the way that it did (dominated by trade union sponsored members who 
remained politically as well as culturally Liberal), areas such as Stoke-on-Trent were 
likely to remain unfruitful ground for a potential independent Labour advance. As has 
been highlighted, within these localities the Labour candidates relied heavily upon 
Liberal organisation, finance and (critically) popular support. This was underpinned by 
a cult of local personality and (significantly) religious identification. Furthermore, as 
Labour Party organisation remained weak in the area, it seems unlikely that effective 
alternatives to Lib-Labism could emerge in the immediate future. Labour's 
development as a truly independent force would remain fragmented to say the least. 
Whilst the Labour Party may have offered a class-based appeal, in many ways so did 
the Liberals; this was based on a radical policy programme heightened by class-based 
rhetoric hostile to aristocratic wealth and privilege and, as we can see, this Liberal 
approach appeared to have a pronounced resonance in areas such as industrial North 
Staffordshire. 
December 1910 General Election 
Throughout 1910 John Ward continued to encounter opposition to his candidature from 
amongst the local Labour membership. In response to this, in May 1910 he took the 
unusual step of establishing his own constituency organisation. Supported by local 
labour organisations and the Liberals he aimed to counter official Labour opposition to 
him. He also suggested this was an attempt to counter the 'menace of Socialism'. 7.t 
During the December general election in 1910 Ward once again focused his campaign 
on what he determined to be the 'irresponsible' behaviour of the House of Lords who he 
declared 'represented only their land, their class and the monopolies of the fe\v ... the 
I ?,75 A · f:C' only question [was] who should rule; the peers or the peop e. gam, 0 lenng a more 
comprehensive programme than Edwards, Ward discussed pensions, insurance. 
housing, land taxation, nationalisation, popular control of education and the right to 
74 See Staffordshire AdvCl"tiser, l~th May 1910. 
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work. 76 Edwards on the other hand concentrated on the Osborne judgement, the Lords, 
Free Trade, Home Rule and electoral reform. 77 It is important to recognise how 
Edwards clearly perceived himself to be a trade union representative first, followed by 
party connections; he always sought to express how he was selected unanimously by all 
of the progressive forces in the parliamentary borough; trade unions, the Labour Party 
and the Liberals. As a representative of one of the largest unions in the country, 
inevitably, Edwards argued strongly that unions should be allowed to use their funds as 
they thought best. He argued that the Osborne decision would seriously impair labour 
representation in parliament and thus make it harder for the wishes of working men to 
be carried out. Edwards concluded that, as trade unionists, this represented the most 
important question ever before them. 78 Wrigley suggests that while the Osborne 
judgement did not have such a significant impact in terms of the 1910 general election, 
it did have a major effect on Labour politics in the sense that, like TaffVale, it served to 
encourage trade unions to look more concertedly towards the Labour Party. 79 
The Unionist candidate in Hanley (as in the earlier contest) was Rittner. In Stoke 
Samuel Joyce-Thomas replaced Kyd who had retired owing to business commitments. 
Like Rittner, Joyce-Thomas was a strong Tariff Reformer. Both Unionists attempted to 
divert attention to the fiscal question despite the Liberals' efforts to keep it focused on 
the constitutional issue. Where the Unionists did discuss the constitutional question 
their campaign rested upon a basic assertion that politics at present effectively 
amounted to party dictatorship and that a strong upper house was imperative to 
'safeguard the will of the people' .80 A joint election address issued on behalf of all the 
Unionist candidates in North Staffordshire urged 'the moderate man' to 'believe in the 
voice of the people more than a particular party.' 81 The address outlined how the 
Unionists were determined to reform the House of Lords and increase democratic 
75 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 2nd December 1910. 
76 See Ward election advertisement in ibid. 
77 See Edwards's election address, Staffordshire Sentinel, 2nd December 1910; note that this address was 
published jointly with those of Ward, Wedgwood, Stanley and Pearce presumably in an effort to cut 
election costs. 
78 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 29th November 1910. 
79 See C. Wrigley, 'Labour and the Trade Unions' in K. D. Brown, The First Labour Party. p. 1'+7. 
80 Staffordshire Sentinel, 2nd December 1910 
81 Ibid. 
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participation by submitting important matters to public referendum82 . They reiterated a 
fundamental opposition to Irish Home Rule and how their party were pledged to fight 
for the supremacy of the British navy and to extend the provisions of the Workmen' s 
Compensation Act and, of course, the central plank of the Unionist programme, as Vie 
have seen, remained the commitment to Tariff Reform which (they contended) would 
give the people better food, housing, clothing and transfer tax to goods manufactured 
abroad and dumped into England to the detriment of the British worker,.83 
The December 1910 General Election: Results and Analysis 
Fig. 5 Hanley (Turnout 78.6%) 
0.30/0 swing Conservative to Labour 
• Labour 
• Conservative 
82 The aroued thi s meant the public would be consulted on single i ss u~ s which were of con id e ra bl ~ 
. tY b In portl"ay in o themselves as ul tra-democrat ic it was hoped th l would contra t gteatl ) 10 the Impor ance. b . 
'sectional' interests of the LIbera ls and Labour. . nd " 
8.1 See joint Unioni st election address, Staffo rdshire Sentfllel, 2 Decembel 191 0. 
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Fig. 6 Stoke (Turnout 80.3%) 
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The results of the December 1910 general election saw Enoch Edwards returned with a 
majority of28.4% of the vote (see fig. 5) which represented an increase of 0.6% on the 
January election. This suggests that Edwards ' s electoral support was remarkably so lid. 
In Stoke, John Ward was returned again with a majority of 16.4% of the vote (see fi g. 6) 
representing an increase of l.6% on the last election. Like Edwards this suggests that 
Ward ' s core vote was strong. No doubt the Unionists ' failure to divert attention away 
from the constitutional question and to Tariff Reform had played a critical role in their 
defeat in both elections. In December, as analysis of the campaigns illustrate, the 
Unionist candidates appeared more aggressive but were still unable to influence 
electors ' allegiances. For Labour, the period after 1906 and up to 1911 did little to 
change the basic position of the movement in the area. Whilst technicall y both seats 
were now represented by Labour Party members, close scrutiny of Ward ' s and Edwards 
speeches in all three general election campaigns suggests that neither perceived 
themselves to be primarily representatives of that organisation. They saw themselves as 
' Labour' members but not Labour Party members . In their mind, the two things were 
very different. Ultimately, even by 1911 , Labour politics in the area remained 
dominated by trade unionists with pronounced Liberal sympathies. Onl y a dramatic 
upheaval of some kind was likely to change this. 
I ·D 
3.4: The 1912 Hanley By-Election 
Political Context 
The 1910 general elections had suggested a degree of stability in the 'progressive' vote 
and the potential durability of the Progressive Alliance in Stoke-on-Trent. \Vhilst 
relations between the Liberal and Labour organisations might have been in a sense 
lukewarm on occasions (as illustrated above) the outward image, at least, was one of 
progressive unity. The area remained one where traditions of co-operation bet\veen 
Liberalism and organised labour appeared to be particularly strong. After 1910 this 
changed dramatically. Some sections of the local Labour movement began to express 
concern that Edwards was not effectively providing a distinct enough Labour position. 
Furthermore, North Staffordshire had been pinpointed by Labour Party headquarters as 
being in need of dramatic improvement and reorganisation. 84 The Executive 
Committee of the Labour Party made attempts to encourage the local Labour movement 
to establish a more sophisticated organisation: the first step of which would be in 
connection with canvassing work. The central party recognised the difficulties its local 
organisations faced in places like Hanley which were represented by miners' MPS.85 It 
was appreciated that in these sorts of constituencies little enthusiasm could be raised for 
the development of independent Labour organisation; either from the representatives 
themselves, the local Trades Councilor activists. Although the Labour Party clearly 
recognised seats such as these were in need of urgent attention, the extent to which the 
national party could change these circumstances remained limited. Neither did it seem 
that change was likely to emerge from the local labour movement itself firstly because 
of the influence of the miners and secondly because the potters also remained 
conservative in their approach to independent labour politics. 
After 1910 the Liberal-Labour relationship in the area began to fragment. Famously, 
this came to a head in July 1912 when Hanley's sitting member Enoch Edwards died 
and the seat thus became vacant. The ensuing debate as to which party had the greater 
claim to the seat made the Hanley by-election one of the most famous and controversial 
of the immediate pre-war period. It could be said that Hanley was perhaps one of the 
most significant by-elections in Britain before 1914. The by-election represented a 
84 See Labour Party Executive Committee Minutes, 2nd July 1912. 
85This view also emeraes very strongly from Ramsay MacDonald; see Labour Leader, 18
th 
July 1912. 
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critical test of the Progressive Alliance in an area where the Liberal-Labour alliance had 
appeared to have offered so much potential as an electoral strategy and approach to 
politics. The importance of this election was not simply local. Petter suggests that the 
Hanley by-election threatened to damage the workings of the national Lib-Lab pact in a 
way no other election had ever done.86 The by-election generated significant national 
interest on the basis that it seemed to demonstrate an increasingly fraught relationship 
between the 'progressive' parties. 
As we have seen, Edwards's exact political identity remained ambiguous up to his 
death in July 1912 although he clearly remained more of a Liberal than a straight 
Labour man despite his background as the leader of one of the country's great unions. 87 
By the time of his death, Edwards had become a tremendously prominent and popular 
political figure in the North Staffordshire Potteries. In some ways his party affiliation 
may have been bedside the point. By 1912, many of Hanley's electors might have 
concluded that party was not in actual fact a prime consideration. Or, rather, they 
continued to perceive him as simply a Liberal- trade unionist whatever the official tag 
now attached to him. 
In light of Edwards's personal politics and the fact that he had always been elected with 
substantial Liberal assistance the Liberals considered Hanley to be a Liberal seat. It was 
perhaps inevitable that the debate which ensued over the adoption of candidates was 
protracted to say the least. Historians have often considered events surrounding the 
Hanley by-election as a critical turning point in the politics of British Labour. 88 The 
experience clearly demonstrated to Labour that in some localities the party had become 
unhealthily reliant upon the Liberals. Equally worrying, in these sorts of areas it 
appeared virtually impossible to find suitable candidates from the local movement; i.e. 
86 M. Petter, 'Progressive Alliance', p. 52. 
87 Gregory suggests that Edwards and Stanley were in fact 'bitterly hostile' towards the Labour .Pa~ 
even in the years following affiliation, see R Gregory, The Miners in Britis~ Politics, ~. 170. ~cKI~bm, 
however, suggests that Edwards was, in fact, not as committed to the LIberals as. IS often Ima~med 
especially when compared to some of his colleagues. McKibbin sugges.ts that as pr~sldent of the M.me:s 
Federation he had handled relations with the Labour Party with exceptIOnal goodwill; see R. McKIbbm 
Evolution, p. 54. Indeed, it ought to be stressed that Edwards had become increasingly criti~al of the 
Liberal administration most particularly on the issue of unemployment; a matter he belIeved the 
government had not addressed sufficiently, see Staffords~ire Adver~iser, 30th October 1910. J \\ ould 
suggest that analysis of Edwards's 1910 general electIOn campaIgns demonstrates his increasing 
radicalism. 
88 See M. Petter, 'Progressive Alliance'; R. McKibbin, Emlution and H. Pelling, Social Gl.'ography. 
1.+5 
ones equipped and inclined to promote a distinctive and independent enough Labour 
appeal. Furthermore, the political culture of these areas was such that voters simply did 
not possess a clear concept of the difference between the Liberal and Labour parties; to 
all intents and purposes they were one and the same thing. 'Progressivism' meant 
anything that was not the Tories. Contemporary issues (and the party attitudes on these) 
further heightened perceptions that Labour and the Liberals represented essentially one 
and the same interest. The Labour Party consequently faced considerable difficulties in 
this sort of environment. The realisation of the realities of the Progressive Alliance 
could in itself prove a defining moment in Labour's development. It alerted the party to 
the problematic nature of electoral entaglements with the Liberals. This served to 
encourage a more assertive policy of independence. This might not have immediate 
effect but it could serve the organisation well in the future. But even in an immediate 
sense a Liberal-Labour split could have dramatic effects on the political situation in 
many other parts of the country (especially areas where Liberal-Labour agreements 
existed). Whilst undoubtedly Labour's prospects remained poor when challenging both 
Liberals and Unionists, Labour intervention, however, could cause tremendous 
problems for the Liberals.89 
The situation was clear for the Hanley Liberals; Edwards had been elected with Liberal 
organisation and (they assumed) Liberal support, although funds had primarily been 
provided by the Miners' Federation.9o The Liberals drew Labour's attention to the 
arrangement made (and put into effect) six years earlier which had seen the Liberals 
supporting Labour candidates in Hanley and Stoke in return for Labour support of 
Liberal candidates in Leek and Newcastle. It was inevitable perhaps that the Liberals 
took the first steps towards adopting a candidate. On 28th June the Hanley Liberal Six 
Hundred met to consider the nomination of a candidate. Their first choice was the 
President of the local Liberal Council, Dr. Rowley-Moody who accepted that his name 
89 This is reflected by the fact that after 1911 by-elections involving t~e Labour Part~ were responsible 
for the greater proportion of losses for the Liberals than .they been prevIOusly. The p~n.od 1906-191? ~ad 
seen 17% of all seats lost having involved Labour candIdates whereas after 1911 thIS mcreased to.)6 0 .• 
see M. Petter, 'Progressive Alliance', p. 51. . 
90 The Midlands Miners Federation continued to contribute £200 per year to the LIberal: for the upke.ep 
ofthe Hanley constituency right up to the time of the by-election, see R. Gregory, The Mmers anJ Bnllsh 
Politics, p. 171. 1.+6 
be put forward as a prospective candidate (albeit apparently reluctantly). 91 In 
conjunction with this, the local Liberal and Labour Association were summoned to 
meet three days later in order to formally adopt Moody.92 In the intervening time. 
however, Rowley- Moody ruled himself out, claiming that he was too upset about the 
death of his close friend (Enoch Edwards) to continue with his candidature.93 This left 
the Liberals with no obvious candidate to contest the seat.94 Whilst a number of people 
locally had intimated they would be prepared to stand, the Hanley Liberal Association 
made it clear that they only wanted 'an out and out radical .... someone who would unite 
the two sections of the progressive forces' .95 This suggests the Hanley Liberals had 
concluded that only a radical could appeal to both Labour and Liberal supporters. 
Conveniently for the Hanley Liberals the national headquarters had already taken the 
matter in hand and had arranged for Robert Outhwaite (a young radical land reformer) 
to go to Hanley with a view to addressing a meeting of the Hanley Liberal and Labour 
forces on 15t July.96 The essential context of that meeting, of course, was that the 
assembled group were convening (in their understanding) to adopt Dr. Rowley-Moody, 
so it must have come as something of a shock to be met with a new candidate. 
Outhwaithe was widely reported to have delivered a highly impressive speech and 
appeared to be on the verge of adoption when one of the Labour representatives (Joseph 
Lovatt, secretary of the Potters' Union), asked that in the light of the changed 
circumstances the meeting be adjourned for two days to allow the Labour 
representatives to consider the situation.97 The local Labour organisation was meeting 
91 The following account is taken from a detailed report after the by-election by the secretary of the 
Midland Liberal Federation; see Midland Liberal Federation Minutes, 31 51 July 1912. 
92 This organisation consisted of about 400 Liberals and 200 Labour representatives. 
93Staffordshire Sentinel, July 5th, 1912. 
94 Although there was some discussion of the possibility of Sydney Malkin, the former Lord Mayor of 
Burslem who had considerable local influence as a possible Liberal candidate; see Staffordshire , 
Advertiser, July 29th, 1912. 
95 Staffordshire Advertiser, July 6th, 1912. It seems that the Hanley Liberals did attempt to secure a local 
candidate and only after that had proved unfruitful negotiated with the party headquarters. The 
suggestion that Outhwaite was imposed upon the local Association appears withou~ foun.dati.on. 
96 Robert Outhwaite had previously contested seats in Birmingham and Sussex. HIS major Interest was 
land reform and it has been suggested that at that time he was on the verge of joining the Labour Pal1y. 
see R. McKibbin, Evolution, p. 55. 
97 Joseph Lovatt had been a member of the Hanley LRC since its formatio.n .in July 1906. H is union, 
however, had only recently affiliated to the national Labour Party (1912). It .IS Important to n?te that the 
Labour movement in North Staffordshire continued to remain fragmented nght up to 191..+ {It was only 
during that year for instance that the all the local Labour organisations ~ha~~ed their name to the North 
Staffordshire Labour Party; see R. Whipp, Patterns of Labour, p. 188 .. It IS .cntIca~ ~o re.member, ho\".ner, 
that it was a potter's official who requested time for Labour to consId~r ItS pOSItIOn I.e. not the millers. 
This fact seems to oet overlooked in assessment of the Hanley by-electIOn. 
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the following evening so it was also suggested by the chainnan that Outhwaite be 
invited to address the Labour group in order for them to 'have the opportunity of 
considering whether he would be a suitable candidate from their point of view". 
Rowley-Moody responded that 'one day would be cheap' ifit meant they could achieve 
unity and at the same time the Labour representatives intimated they would do all they 
could to ensure Outhwaite be enabled to address their meeting 98 It would appear from 
this context that both the Hanley Liberals and Labour remained anxious the by-election 
be contested as a united 'progressive' force. Such optimism proved to be short-lived 
however. The following morning news from the Labour headquarters was received 
stating that Outhwaite would not be welcome to address that evening's meeting in 
Hanley and that he would not be supported as a candidate. Ultimately, the Labour 
Party's position was that it would oppose any candidate who was not willing to accept 
the Labour whip in Parliament and so would instruct the North Staffordshire Miners 
Federation to find a candidate of their own if the Liberals refused to withdraw 
Outhwaite.99 Thus developed an acute crisis between the Liberal and Labour parties 
and the prospect of a three cornered contest in Hanley. The situation was further 
exacerbated a few days later when Labour's national executive issued a statement 
stating that it 'regarded Hanley as a Labour seat [and] in the event of a three cornered 
fight would withdraw its members from the House of Commons during the election [so] 
that the full force of the party may be behind the candidate'. 100 Ramsay MacDonald 
articulated his party's position clearly when he claimed that 'the Liberals are the 
aggressors [and] if they will not allow us to retain our present number in Parliament we 
must act accordingly.' 101 Labour's candidate would be selected by the North 
Staffordshire Miners' Federation. 102 Two days later the NSMF adopted their President 
since 1888, Samuel Finney, as Labour candidate. Like Enoch Edwards, Finney's 
political outlook was overwhelmingly Liberal, underpinned by the fact that he was also 
98StajJordshire Advertiser, July 6th, 1912. 
99 Outhwaite was officially adopted by the Hanley Liberal Association at 10 O'clock that evening (2nd 
July). 
100 The Times, 3rd July 1912. The following day (4th July) Arthur Henderson announced that the Lab?ur 
Party would contest Crewe. Since this was a seat w?ere Labo~ ~ad. an extremely poo.r r~cord such actl~n 
could only be perceived by the Liberal Party as dehbera~ely vmdIctIVe (an act ofretahatlO~ over ~anl~)). 
As it turned out Crewe proved to be disastrous for the LIberals. The party lost the seat by Just 6.9. 0 01 the 
vote. Labour intervention undoubtedly cost the Liberals the seat (which the party had won in 8 out of the 
9 previous general elections since 1885). 
101 StajJordshire Advertiser, July 6th, 1912. . 
102This was because the miners union paid for the candIdate. 
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a staunch Primitive Methodist. It was generally believed that Finney would gain the 
support of the Labour section of the Liberal-Labour Six Hundred and from a wide 
section of the local community but he was possibly not the sort of candidate Labour 
headquarters may have had in mind. 
Finney had been a close associate and friend of Edwards and it was assumed he would 
benefit from this association. But the Liberal Party remained adamant that Hanley was 
by right a Liberal seat and continued to refuse to withdraw Outhwaite, arguing that 
Edwards had sat as a Liberal until 1909 and had been returned on the basis of Liberal 
organisation. Furthermore, as the Liberal Chief Whip commented 'Hanley had always 
been regarded as a Liberal seat and so would be fought against all comers' .103 Clearly, 
there existed a strong determination amongst Liberals locally and nationally that 
Hanley should be fought at all costs; especially since (as they perceived it) present 
causes were just too great 'to allow a mere caucus to dominate the choice of a great 
constituency' .104 The Liberals might have felt encouraged also by the fact that a number 
of prominent local Labour activists even appeared to support the assertion that the seat 
should be fought by a Liberal candidate with Labour acquiescence on the premise that 
'the great cause of progress had always been dear to Edwards's heart [and that] must go 
forward'. 105 Much has been written about the Hanley by-election although most 
accounts have offered inadequate conclusions in relation to how the crisis actually 
unfolded. It appears quite straightforward however; the national Labour Party 
determined they did not wish to support Outhwaite as a Liberal-Labour candidate and 
so decided to pursue an independent challenge. 
The Hanley Liberals were clearly enormously pleased that they had secured a man with 
'a great policy that he had made his own' .106 As one Liberal member asserted, the 
Hanley Liberals had not wanted' some Whig in the division but a man with tried service 
and brilliant abilities' and it was generally believed that Outhwaite was at that time 'the 
103Staffordshire Sentinel,. July 3rd, 1912. 
104 See Hemmerde at Outhwaite's adoption meeting, Staffordshire Sentinel, .+th July 1912. 
!O5 See opening meeting of the Liberal campaign at the Victoria Hall at which a numb~r of Labour 
members were present. Joseph Lovatt and Miles Harper- Parker went so far .as ,to state. public!: that the: 
thought it 'a great pity the Labour Party had bee~ unable to accept ?uthwaJte s candidature. Both had 
been present at the speech delivered ~Y Outh.walte: few day~ earlier and were reported to ha\ e been 
enormously impressed, see Staffordshire Sentinel, 4 July 191.:... 
106 See Grimwade at Outhwaite'S adoption meeting, Staffordshire Sentinel, .+th July 1912. 
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ablest politician outside parliament' .107 Equally important, Outhwaite had an admirable 
record in fighting for trade unionism. He had played a critical role in developing trade 
unionism amongst the miners in South Africa. 108 Altogether, as one Liberal expressed, 
it seemed that he had come before them 'at the very time they needed someone like 
him' .109 Outhwaite came to Hanley with the support of the highest echelons of the 
Liberal Party. Tanner suggests Lloyd George himself had determined the land 
reformers should challenge a number of by-elections during the summer of 1912 in an 
attempt to demonstrate the 'electoral popularity' of land reform and attempt to recover 
some of the ground lost over the Insurance Act. 11 0 
The 1912 Hanley By-Election Campaign 
Outhwaite had intimated to the Hanley Liberals that he wished to conduct his campaign 
exclusively on the one issue of land reform and this he did. 111 Informing the Hanley 
electors that he intended to 'strike a blow for the emancipation of the people from the 
land monopoly' Outhwaite contended that land reform would 'shake the whole system 
of privilege to the foundation' and he continued [what] 'rightfully belonged to the 
people; the Liberals were going to take back for the peopledI2 It is important to 
remember that at this time the Liberal Party had not yet formulated a definite policy on 
the land issue and it remained a question of continuing investigation. Outhwaite, 
however, had already conducted two previous campaigns on the issue and was well 
versed in presenting the case for land reform. In Hanley, Outhwaite argued that at 
present the enormous revenue received in ground rents contributed nothing to the local 
rates. If the law changed to ensure a contribution through the taxation of land values, a 
district such as the Potteries would see significant changes. There would be an increase 
in trade because land would be used more productively. Ultimately, the suggestion was 
107 See Hemmerde on Outhwaite, Staffordshire Sentinel, 4th July 1912. 
108 Ibid. This was an aspect which might have been significant in endearing him to many in the 
constituency and the local press went to great lengths in reiterating his background in this respect yet it is 
often overlooked in many assessments ofthe by-election. In many ways, therefore, he was even more of 
an ideal candidate for the locality; a Liberal with a good record of assisting trade unionism. 
109 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 4th July 1912. ., 
110 See Tanner, Political Change, p. 66; Tanner suggests that a number of progressIves and the ChIef 
Whip were opposed to this. . . . 
111 For detailed analysis of the land issue in British politics dunng thIS penod see, I. Packe~, L/?yd 
George, Liberalism and the Land: The Land Issue and Party Politics. J906-J9U (Royal HIstorIcal 
Society, Woodbridge, 2001). 
112 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 6th July 191~. 
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that land refonn would help alleviate unemployment. I 13 
In contrast to Outhwaite's single issue campaign, the Unionist candidate, as in 1910 
, 
Rittner, addressed a wide variety of issues; Tariff Refonn, Irish Home Rule, the House 
of Lords, the Insurance Bill, the franchise and the navy. Only to a very limited extent 
did he focus attention to proposed land refonn and (inevitably) he also had another 
powerful line of attack in the topic of the current Liberal-Labour debacle. At his 
opening meeting Rittner contended that the immediate priority of the Unionists was to 
'check a government that was rapidly ruining the country [and] carry out their own 
constructive policy of Tariff Refonn,.114 Unless there was an adoption of imperial 
preference there would never be any significant increase in the rates of wages for the 
working man. Furthennore, labour needed to protest strongly against aliens. He 
suggested the Liberal land policy was simply an attempt to 'catch votes' and avoided 
becoming too embroiled in the subject itself, other than contending that the Unionists' 
land policy would see government purchasing land from the landlords and then get 
unemployed people working on it. The basic idea was to make land more productive in 
order to make food cheaper (rather than importing so much). Effectively, this seemed to 
amount to land nationalisation. 115 
The Labour candidate, Samuel Finney, found it difficult to offer anything distinctive; 
his moderate and lacklustre campaign contrasted greatly with the apparent militancy of 
his platfonn speakers and even more so compared to the impassioned, intelligent and 
radical campaign of his Liberal opponent. I 16 Finney appeared to be out of his depth and 
113 This is a very brief summary of Outhwaite's major arguments in relation to land refonn and the 
impact such would have on the local area. The subject was immensely complex and some of Outhwaite's 
speeches were enormously detailed. The essence of his argument throughout the campaign, however, 
remained that land reform provided a simple means to emancipate the people; it would attack the 
privileges oflandlords (which was a class issue as much as anything else) and it would have significant 
social and economic benefits. For detailed coverage of Outhwaite's election speeches see subsequent 
press coverage in Staffordshire Sentinel and Staffordshire Advertiser, 6th July- 14th July 1912. 
114 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 3rd July 1912. 
115 Outhwaite responded by saying this was simply impossible. 
116 Throughout the contest an array of Labour leaders came to the constituency in support of Finney 
including (to name just a few) Keir Hardie, George Lansbury, Ramsay MacDonald, John Hodge. John 
Sutton, Will Crooks, Stephen Walsh, Albert Stanley and J. R. Clynes. In reality, it was only these who 
actually discussed policy at all. Finney simply tended to focus on his party's greater claim to the seat and 
his own (equally great) claim as a Staffordshire man and a miner. It should be noted also that the visiting 
speakers offered a more distinctly socialistic a~proach. Arguably, this mi~t not have ~at comfortably 
with the moderate Liberal culture of the constItuency although whether thIS made a dIfference tl) the 
overall result remains an open question. 
151 
paid too much attention (at the expense of discussion of actual issues) to accusing the 
Liberals of aggression and attempting to steal a Labour seat. Once the by-election 
campaign had begun that was simply beside the point. He did attempt to consider the 
land issue, which he contended was 'the most practicable policy at present' 117 although 
he was unable to elaborate on the subject in the same way as Outhwaite. It ought to be 
remembered perhaps that, fundamentally, Labour's appeal in areas such as Hanley was 
based principally upon practical issues and it was from such a perspective that men like 
as Finney approached politics. Detailed examination of questions such as land reform 
was simply not what they were about or what they could comfortably handle. Finney 
was widely perceived to have been a weak candidate. Indeed, whilst he certainly did 
appear to be out of his depth in many ways, this judgement was a little unkind. He 
simply did not approach politics in the same way as politicians such as Outhwaite. 
In terms of Liberal organisation it appears to have been slow in getting started. Arthur 
Nicholson (Secretary of the Midland Liberal Federation) reported that when he first 
visited the division (at Outhwaite's request) he found 'things in great confusion' and so 
had had to take 'drastic steps' .118 These steps included the deployment of a team of 
eleven experienced agents in the division, each of whom was allocated a specific 
function (meetings, literature, removals etc). As Nicholson reported 'for nine days a 
tremendous pressure was kept up ... although the task was great since we had to make 
an organisation as we went along'. Nicholson concluded, however, the Liberal 
campaign 'completely beat the Labour Party' .119 
II7 HIt ted that he would pursue the same policy in respect to mining royalties and, when 
e a so a. . . .' th . 9 ') 
. d tated that he was in favour ofland natlOnahsatlOn' see Staffordshire Sentinel, 6 Jul) I L. questlOne ,s SI'
118 Midland Liberal Federation ;\finlltes, 31 July 1912. 
119 Midland Liberal Federation Minutes, 31 sl July 1912. 
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The 1912 Hanley By-Election: Analysis 
Fig. 7 Hanley (Turnout 85.1 %) 
12% 
46% 0 Liberal 
• Conservative 
• Labour 
Seat uncontested by Liberals in 1910 
The 1912 by-election saw the first ever three-way contest in the history of the 
parliamentary borough of Hanley. The result was widely perceived as likely to have a 
much wider impact on politics across the country. As things turned out, Outhwaite was 
returned but with a much narrower majority than Edwards had enjoyed. The turnout 
rate reflected the interest the by-election had generated; at 85% percent only one 
previous election had ever surpassed it. 120 Outhwaite won with a relatively small 
majority; 4.6% of the vote (see fig. 7). Edwards ' s majority in December 1910 had been 
28.4%. For the Conservatives the result seemed to suggest that (like other recent 
by-elections), in Rittner's words, the Liberals 'weren't as strong as they thought they 
were' .121 But the fact remained that the Liberal Party had still managed to win the seat 
despite determined opposition. Moreover, Outhwaite, and therefore the party, had 
staked all on the land question. Not all Liberals may have been entirely convinced thi s 
offered the best strategy; even at this time single issue campaigns were very rare. 
Outhwaite (and no doubt the Liberal leadership, especially Lloyd George) believed the 
Liberal Government had been given a mandate on land refonn. Locally, it reaffirmed 
for the Liberals that Hanley was a Liberal seat. Outhwaite himself, however, asked that 
no animosity towards Labour be shown in spite of what had happened. Yet, given the 
evident bitterness felt by the Labour Party the chances of relations ever being the same 
again seemed remote . Liberal organisers were clearly much aware of thi s fact. Arthur 
120 The turnout rate in December 1910 had been 78.6%. The by-electi on had therefore een an increa e of 
6.5%. 
12 1 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 15 th Ju ly 19 12. 
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Nicholson declared that whilst it was a 'great thing to win Hanley and so strengthen the 
position of the Chief Whip in dealing with Labour it must be confessed that such 
struggles would be fraught with the utmost danger to progressive politics' .122 Across 
the Liberal press there was also evident unease about the action the party had taken in 
Hanley. Some even blamed their own leadership whilst others simply called for 
restraint from the parties on both sides. 123 
Tanner suggests that the experience of Hanley did not necessarily mean the Liberal 
Party had abandoned the Progressive Alliance though it did reflect that the leadership 
(in particular Lloyd George) recognised that the Liberals had to 'stay ahead of the field' 
in order to keep the Labour Party in check. He comments that this was simply how the 
Progressive Alliance worked: by 'informal displays of strength rather than discussion 
and agreement'. 124 That this was the case is indisputable yet equally it has to be 
recognised that it created potential problems; as Hanley demonstrated, even if the 
Liberals managed to hold on to a seat under such circumstances their majority could 
become extremely precarious and equally, as Tanner himself recognises, another 
outcome was that it could push the Liberals into adopting even more radical policies 
and that could be very dangerous politically. 125 
For the Labour Party the result of the 1912 by-election was hugely disappointing, not 
just because the party had lost but, as the Labour Leader bemoaned, because it had lost 
'so decisively,.126 Labour had come third and had obtained just 1,694 votes (11.8% of 
the total) in contrast to the Liberals 6,647 (46.4%). This did not bode well for the 
prospects of independent Labour representation in the area. More immediately, given 
the national attention the election had received, neither was it likely to be helpful for 
Labour propaganda more generally. The Labour Party's bitterness over the by-election 
was clearly reflected by Ramsay MacDonald when he stated categorically that 'Hanley 
[would be] the most expensive victory Liberalism has had within this generation' and 
he continued to state that 'Labour is not going to accept its present strength as its final 
122 Midland Liberal Federation Minutes, 31 sl July 1912. 
123 See Liberal Magazine, August 1912, for example, which appeared to blame the Liberal Party for 
creating the situation and Petter, Progressive Alliance, p. 53. 
124 D. Tarmer, Political Change, pp. 66-67. 
125 Ibid, p. 67. 
126 Labour Leader, 18th July 1912. 
strength ... the convenience of no party is going to deter us'. 127 Yet as the Labour 
Leader suggested the result could have been interpreted as a blessing in disguise 
because it revealed that 'Liberalism was the enemy of organised Labour.' Amongst the 
miners particularly, the Labour Leader believed it would 'mean the death-blow of 
Liberal-Labourism as a national force'. 128 The Times also viewed the contest as 
signalling a significant departure in politics (although from a slightly different 
perspective) when it reflected 'maybe in the growing intractability of the Labour Party 
we are witnessing the beginning of the end of the coalition' .129 In his study of the 
miners and British politics, Gregory concludes that with the Hanley by-election 
'Lib-Lab politics in the Midlands came to an end in a welter of bitter recrimination' .130 
For Labour, as much as the by-election highlighted the dangers of too close an 
association with the Liberals it also served to demonstrate the party's poor organisation 
in the area. No attempts had ever been made by the respective 'labour' organisations to 
organise a genuine Labour Party in the district (despite the insistence of the central 
organisation that such work ought to be undertaken as a matter of urgency). 13 I The 
party had repeatedly urged the Staffordshire Miners' Federation to withdraw the 
financial assistance they gave to the local Liberal Associations. 132 Yet the Federation 
had repeatedly refused to change its position. The national party viewed this as a 
deliberate attempt to suppress independent Labour activity in the political arena in the 
region. Consequently, during the campaign the Labour candidate found hardly any 
effective organisation behind him and equally limited public support. Assessing the 
political situation after the by-election the Labour press concluded that where 
independent politics was not valued by the public and labour organisations, a week's 
campaign was understandably unlikely to win a majority of votes. 133 Many believed the 
choice of Labour candidate in itself was partially to blame for the poor vote. Finney was 
127 Ramsay MacDonald quoted in McKibbin, Evolution, p. 62. During the campaign Ramsay MacDonald 
had been ferociously critical of the Liberals action; when he threatened to withdraw his members from 
parliament, for example, he declared that any Liberal efforts to prevent Labour's expansion was 'little 
short ofa declaration of war', see The Times, 9th July 1912. 
128 Labour Leader, 18th July 1912. 
129 The Times, 17th July 1912. 
130 R. Gregory, Miners and British Politics, p. 172. 
131 Another reflection of the weakness of independent Labour politics in the area was that there was not a 
local branch of the ILP until 1912. 
132 Clearly, the Staffordshire Miners Federation had remained loyal to the Libe~al Party and lukewa~m ?n 
the question of independent labour representation. This had been reflected In .1909. whe? the dIstrIct 
voted aaainst affiliation to the Labour party and were subsequently forced to fall mto hne WIth the rest of 
b th 
the country: see Labour Leader, 18 July 1912. 
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widely perceived to have failed to present a class appeal distinct enough to differentiate 
himself from the Liberals. As the Labour Leader reported 'the sad truth has to be 
admitted [that] Outhwaite voiced the protest of the working classes against exploitation 
more insistently than the Labour candidate and [his speeches] breathed more of the 
spirit of revolt than the utterances of Finney. ,134 It was contended that responsibility for 
such a poor candidate lay ultimately with the local rank and file, who should have 
chosen someone who reflected the 'militant spirit which moves the factory, workshop 
and mine' 135 more effectively. Of course, the Labour Leader would have naturally 
taken this position, but even so, at this particular election Finney was undoubtedly a 
weak candidate and a stark contrast to the intellect and vigour of Outhwaite (arguably 
one of the country's most capable exponents ofland reform). The Staffordshire Sentinel 
also acknowledged the choice of candidate had probably had a major effect on the 
result.136 The newspaper contended that had Myles Harper-Parker or Robert Smillie 
been adopted they could have conducted more vigorous campaigns. This remains 
speculative though and even if the Labour Party had adopted a more energetic and 
dynamic candidate it remains an open question whether the result would have been 
dramatically different. 
As has been seen, the established political culture in Hanley was such that demands for 
independent labour representation met with remarkably limited enthusiasm. This 
presented a significant obstacle for any immediate development of the Labour Party in 
similar seats. 137 To some extent, the experience of the 1912 by-election encouraged the 
miners to reassess their relationship with the Liberal Party. Just a few weeks after the 
by-election the Miners' Federation decided to 'cease financing a local Liberal-Labour 
alliance and take immediate steps to set up machinery for the formation of a Labour 
Association for political purposes' .138 As opposed to simply feeling defeated by the 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 The choice of Labour candidate had been left to the miners since it was that union which had paid 
most of Edwards's expenses. 
137 After the miners had transferred allegiance to the Labour Party in 1909 the national executive had 
been attempting to set up separate Labour organisations in all the mining constituencies. Hanley was 
probably not uncommon in respect to poor (independent) organi~ati?n. . . 
138 See R. Gregory, Miners and British Politics, p. 173. McKIbbm sugge~ts that ~hanges wlthm the 
leadership of the Miner's Federation also served to encourage greater enthusIasm. fo~ mdepend~nt labour 
representation and a desire to 'pnt pressure on its affiliate unions'; see R. McKlbbm, EvolullOl/. p. 26. 
156 
experience, Gregory suggests the miners in their anger determined to fight again and do 
better. 139 Ultimately, the by-election prompted a significant change of attitude amongst 
the miners' leaders and this would have national significance. 140 It may be suggested 
that this had come a bit late in the day. Labour would continue to face difficulties in 
attempting to compete with a re-energised and radicalised Liberal Party which had 
proven it could attract significant support amongst the working classes. In areas such as 
Hanley, this was underpinned by deeply embedded attitudes towards trade unionism 
and its relationship with Liberalism. So although it may be the case that the union's 
leadership had become detached from official Liberalism (encourage by instances such 
as Hanley) we should not automatically presume that the wider membership itself 
switched allegiance from the Liberals at the same time and at the same rate. 
An essential factor underpinning the strength of the Liberal vote in Hanley was the 
numerical strength of the pottery workers although this aspect tends to receive little 
attention by historians. It is important to recognise that, of a total electorate of 17,000, 
only about 2,500 at most were miners. 141 Hanley was not first and foremost a miners' 
seat despite the fact that the borough's former member had led the mighty Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain. The greater proportion of electors in the constituency was 
employed in the pottery industry and arguably the potter's role in determining the result 
of the by-election was as great, if not greater, than the miners. A number of aspects 
about the potters are important to remember. First, trade unionism remained relatively 
weak: in 1912 just 16% of the total workforce of 50,000 belonged to trade unions. 142 
Furthermore, Bernstein suggests that the ILP had made some progress among the younger generation of 
miner's leaders: see G. L. Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal Politics, (Boston and London, 1986), p.74. 
139 Gregory, Miners and British Politics, p. 173. In October 1912 the executive of the (national) Miners 
Federation instructed its affiliated unions to establish 'political Labour Parties in all constituencies they 
controlled' and locality rule was abolished as it was believed this prevented good candidates being 
chosen', cited in McKibbin, Evolution, p. 27. 
140 That the miners began to identify more strongly with the Labour Party after 1912 was something 
which was likely to have significant national implications. Before 1914 the pictures appeared mixed. 
Whilst in some instances Liberals continued to support Miners Federation candidates and the Progressive 
Alliance remained electorally successful (Chesterfield) in others (such as North East Derbyshire) the 
coalition broke down and the seats were gifted to the Unionists, see M. Petter, 'Progressive Alliance' (on 
Chesterfield), pp. 54-56. 
141 Figures cited in Labour Leader, 18th July 1912. . 
142 See F. Burchill and R. Ross, History o/the Potters' Union (Hanley. 1977), p. 163. It was not untIl 
1917 that all the different branches of the pottery industry were organised in to one union (and renamed 
the National Society of Pottery Workers). It was from this point that membership started to increase 
dramatically (especially amongst female workers). Furthermore, before 191-l many Pottery owners 
remained hostile to union activity on their works instead preferring to maintain direct contact with their 
workforce. Even as late as 1920 only around 30% of firms recognised the Potters' Union; see R. \\hipp. 
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Secondly, allegiance to Liberalism remained extremely strong for a number of 
reasons.
143 
There is a long held belief that industrial relations in the trade remained 
relatively harmonious and class conflict appeared minimal. This inhibited the growth of 
class consciousness and, in turn, influenced political allegiances in a way that continued 
to favour the Liberals but proved detrimental to concepts of independent Labour 
representation. 144 It is wise not to exaggerate these points, however, and assume that the 
potters were entirely reluctant to express dissatisfaction about various issues. Questions 
such as unemployment, poverty and industry specific conditions saw the potters 
engaged in various forms of protest during the period. Unemployment in particular saw 
union leaders such as Joseph Lovatt adopting a strong anti-government position 
although, as Whipp suggests, the potters perhaps 'did not feel oppressed' in the same 
way as other workers. 145 Like the miners, many of the pottery union leaders continued 
to have close connections with the Liberal Party 146 as did many of the pottery 
manufacturers (although these chose not to stand as parliamentary candidates before 
1918). Altogether, the potters' loyalty to the Liberal Party remained strong before 1914 
and this served particularly to sustain the Liberal vote during this period. It is essential 
not to overlook the influence of the pottery workforce but bear this in mind when 
considering political change after the war. 
The 1912 by-election in Hanley demonstrated that in areas in which there had 
developed a strong Liberal-Labour alliance, augmented by a close relationship between 
local trade unionism, in this case miners, and the Liberal Associations combined with 
strong support from other workers, a distinctive political culture had been created. This 
was underpinned by the predominance of religious non-conformity. A practical 
'The Art of Good Management, Managerial Control of Work in the British Pottery Industry, 1900-1925', 
International Review a/SOCial History, 14,3 (1984), pp. 381-82. 
143 This has been acknowledged by a number of historians, see for example, Pelling, Social Geography, 
P,E- 270-274, but is rarely considered in c~nnection to th~ result of the 191; by-election. 
14 See Staffordshire Advertiser, 11th AprIl 1908 and 16 January ~909-6 February 1~09. In 1912, .for 
example, when the Potters International Conference was held m Hanley a resolutIOn condemnmg 
capitalism and militarism was passed; see The Times, 27th July 1912. . 
145 See R. Whipp, Patterns a/Labour, p. 176-177. Whipp suggests one aspect of thIS was tha~ the potters 
came into regular contact with people from the wealthier classes. P~ople suc.h as Rel~, Mood~, 
Shufflebothom (all Liberals incidentally) helped the unions with vanous medical questIOns. ThIS 
'modified the potter's class awareness' and Whipp cites various other ways in which the potters 
interacted with their 'superiors' (socially for example); see R. Whipp, Patterns of Labour. p. 177. 
Compared to other groups such as the miners it seems that the potters were poss.ibly less ~onscious of 
class. This may have also been compounded by the fact that the mdustry was so hIghly stratified. 
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consequence of the Progressive Alliance was that in some areas Labour had been 
painfully slow to develop their own organisations and unable to form a distinct identity 
and appeal. In localities such as Hanley, where popular working-class Liberalism 
remained extremely strong, the ability of the fledgling Labour Party to permeate the 
dominance of Liberalism was likely to remain limited for some time. The potential 
durability of a Progressive Alliance based upon a shared ideological approach, policies 
and a mutual electoral agreement appears to have had a limited shelf life. From very 
early on in the history of the Progressive Alliance, the degree of commitment to it was 
always open to question. For both parties, their own interests always came first. The 
Liberals may have been happy to allow Labour to make some headway but only on their 
terms; not at their own expense. The Hanley by-election was complicated and in a way 
both sides were right; Edwards had been a Labour MP but in his heart he had always 
remained a Liberal. He was emblematic of the political culture of the area at that 
particular time. Hanley illustrates how the nature of the Progressive Alliance was 
inherently complex. Additionally, there always remained the basic fact that for Labour 
the demand for greater representation persisted as the most important single issue. Any 
perceived attempt by the Liberals to limit Labour's expansion was always going to be 
viewed as an act of aggression and (in itself) threatened the whole concept of a 
'Progressive Alliance'. Experiences such as the Hanley by-election could simply serve 
to reinforce Labour's belief that the Liberals were the enemy in the same way that the 
Unionists were and so sour relations considerably. These experiences could contribute 
towards the development of a much more distinctly Labour approach and reaffirm that 
only true independence offered a viable alternative to co-operation with other parties. 147 
Alternatively, episodes such as the Hanley by-election might reinforce the belief that 
co-operation was the best path because, divided, both parties could be severely 
disadvantaged. This did not happen in the case of Hanley and the Liberals had managed 
to win but only just; the majority had declined massively and the seat could be 
vulnerable in the future if circumstances were less favourable than at the by-election. 
As we have seen, the Liberals had been hugely advantaged by the sheer ability of their 
candidate and the comparative weakness of Labour's candidate. This might not 
146 The leader of the Ovenmens' union, Thomas Edwards, for example, had a strong connection to the 
Liberal Party up to his death in 1911; see R. Whipp, Patterns of Labour, p. 181. . 
147 The extent of Labour's commitment to the Progressive Alliance was always to questIOn. Some 
historians have even suggested that only the Liberals ever really displayed any genuine fondness for it. 
see, for example, M Petter, 'Progressive Alliance'. p. 45. 
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necessarily always have been the case. 
The 1912 Hanley By-Election in the National Perspective 
How should we view the Hanley by-election in the national perspective? Between 
December 1910 and August 1914 Labour fought in twelve by-elections. The party's 
performance in three-cornered contests was exceedingly poor. Wilson suggests that, in 
fact, it was 'abysmal' .148 The Labour Party failed to capture a single seat from either the 
Liberals or Conservatives. That Labour fared badly in a by-election (Hanley) was not 
unusual. 149 Labour intervention, however, could cause serious problems for the 
Liberals. Losses during the period in South Lanarkshire, Leith, South West Bethnal, 
Crewe and Oldham all demonstrated this. A breakdown of the Progressive Alliance 
could be potentially disastrous for the Liberals, although at the same time, as McKibbin 
recognises, the last thing the Labour leadership wanted was a 'political free-for-all' 
which would 'ruin the chances of the Labour Party and return the Conservatives'. I 50 
There were many other by-elections where the situation was not so dissimilar from 
Hanley where co-operation had disintegrated resulting in direct confrontation. The 
results (like Hanley) always saw Labour coming bottom of the poll.151 
The Liberals clearly had no intention of abdicating local autonomy to the Labour Party 
despite the existence of electoral agreements. This was illustrated by the events of the 
Hanley by-election in 1912. Liberalism in the Potteries was able to unite on 'Liberal' 
issues (on this occasion land reform) and the electoral appeal of popular Liberalism (the 
fundamental basis of which was nonconformity) remained strong. If these issues began 
to lessen in prominence, however, the Liberal Party might see this unity decline. But as 
things stood suggestions that the post 1906 Liberal revival was held together only by 
issues appear to hold little truth. Liberalism remained deeply entrenched within the 
political culture and in this context Labour (as an independent entity) would find it 
extremely difficult to make significant progress. 
148 T. Wilson, Downfall, p. 17. McKibbin offers a rather different interpretation of Labour's by election 
perfonnance. He suggests that the seats Lab~ur lo~t (inclu?ing , H~nley ,one :;sumes) we~e 
unrepresentative because these were ar~as wher~ LI?-LabISm remamed umquel) str~~~ ,and Lab~ur ,s 
organisation remained virtually non eXIstent whIlst m the others Labour made some slomficant gams , 
see R. McKibbin, Evolution, p. 82. 
149 R. Douglas, History of the Liberal Party, p. 89. 
150 R. McKibbin, Em/ution, p. 56. 
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3.5: Municipal Politics in Stoke-on-Trent Before 1914 
Owing to a number of reasons, including methodological complications in the analysis 
of pre-Federation municipal politics, the following section evaluating developments in 
municipal politics in Stoke-on-Trent is necessarily brief. Nonetheless it aims to provide 
an overview of some of the key features of this aspect before the outbreak of the First 
World War. Even when compared to other localities, evaluation of Stoke-on-Trent 
reveals a highly non-partisan context to municipal politics; party politics was of only 
minor importance. Analysis of municipal politics in Stoke-on-Trent prior to 1914 
reveals very little (if any) party line adopted either within the monthly council meetings 
or during the municipal elections. There existed little in the way of heated party debate 
on issues. Prior to 1910 the only issue of local importance (and debate) was that of the 
proposed federation of the six towns and this was never in essence a party issue, it 
remained more of an inter-town debate. 152 Burslem, or as it perceived itself; the 
'mother of the Potteries' remained hostile to federation although in the end was forced 
to capitulate. Despite the general non-partisan tone of municipal politics, however, the 
arrival of the Labour Party had an impact on the municipal politics of the area though, 
as in Manchester (as elsewhere) evaluation of Stoke-on-Trent illustrates the fragmented 
nature of Labour's progress in this respect before the outbreak of the First World War. 
From its inception the Labour Party sought to obtain representation on the respective 
town councils (before 1910) and the Stoke-on-Trent federated Borough Council 
thereafter. In 1906, 10 Labour (or Socialist) candidates contested seats at the municipal 
elections in Hanley and Stoke yet all were heavily defeated. The same was the case the 
following year although 1907 did see the election of a prominent local pottery union 
leader, Joseph Lovatt, to the Hanley Town Council. In 1908 Labour stood 2 candidates 
in Hanley (W. H. Jackson and T. H. Whittingham). Significantly, Whittingham 
(standing under the auspices of the SDF) stood against a prominent local Liberal 
(Leonard Grimwade) who reacted angrily to being opposed. Grimwade argued that his 
opponent was a 'militant and dangerous socialist' and one of his platform speakers told 
151 M. Petter, 'Progressive Alliance'. For other by-elections during the immediate pre-war period see R. 
Douglas, 'Labour in Decline' in~. D. Brown, ~ss~'s in An~i-Lab~ur Hist~'}·, pp. l05~1.25. 
152 The rationale behind federatIOn was that (m VIew of mcreasmg foreIgn competitIOn) the pottery 
manufacturers wished to improve efficiency within the industry by standardising wages and conditions 
which would be easier with the federation ofthe six towns. Naturally, civil pride underpinned opposition 
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one election meeting how Philip Snowden was a 'futile destructive statesman' and 
accused Labour of inciting riots over the issue of unemployment. 153 In response, 
Whittington argued that a strong Labour presence on the municipal council was 
essential for the 'social emancipation' of the workers. 154 Both the Labour candidates in 
Hanley were returned suggesting that, in this part of the six towns at least, Labour's 
prospects appeared positive. The fact that Whittingham had been victorious against 
such a well-known Liberal was significant. Of course, economic context was likely to 
have been of considerable significance in determining these results. The 1908 elections 
resulted in the composition of the town councils (combined) as including 44 
Conservative, 30 Liberal, 20 Labour and 10 Independent representatives. 155 In 1910 
the newly federated borough council saw contests in 11 wards. The Labour Party was 
unsuccessful in Longton although this was compensated by a gain in Burslem where 
another organiser of the potters' union was elected (Jabez Booth). It should be noted 
that even in the wards where Labour was not able to capture the seat, the party was able 
to perform respectably. 156 The years immediately preceding the outbreak of war saw a 
remarkably low number of seats contested for the federated Stoke-on-Trent Council; 
between 1911 and 1913 these were just 4,3 and 6 respectively.157 The 1913 contests 
saw Labour gain one seat (in Burslem) so by the eve of war in 1914 the Stoke-on-Trent 
Town Council comprised of 48 Conservatives, 35 Liberals and 21 Labour members. 
Although there are some difficulties in assessing municipal politics in Stoke-on-Trent 
before 1914 in that none of the established parties appeared to campaign on an 
especially distinct party line (or adopt a partisan policy the council) it is possible to 
make some observations about political developments at this level. On occasions there 
arose evident tension between Labour and the Liberals but these occurred when the 
Liberals were challenged by the more overt political wing of the Labour movement (the 
SDF or ILP). There were few of these but nonetheless the reaction of the Liberals 
to the proposal though Burslem was also aggrieved by the fact that the importance of the railway and 
commerce in Stoke and Hanley was already undermining its own influence within the Potteries. 
153 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 26th October 1908 and Staffordshire Sentinel, 30th October 1908. 1908 had 
seen a number oflarge rallies across Stoke-on-Trent in sup~ort o~the campaign to get t~e Right .to Wor~ 
Bill passed; see for example, Staffordshire Advertiser, 11 Apnl 1908 and Staffordshire Sentinel, 28 
September 1908. 
151 See ibid. 
155 Note that apart from the recent additions to the council (Jackson and Whittingham) the greater number 
of the Labour group remained staunch Lib-Labers. 
156 In Hanlev. for example. Labour lost by just 13 votes. 
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illustrates that while they were perfectly content to support Lib-Labers such as Enoch 
Edwards they were less supportive of people such as Jackson and Whittingham (as 
mentioned above). Especially because (as it turned out) given the right context they 
could actually successfully challenge even the most well-established local Liberal. 
3.6: Electoral Politics in Stoke-on-Trent, 1906-1914: Conclusions 
Analysis of Stoke-on-Trent illustrates the apparent limitations of the policy of an 
electoral alliance between the Liberal and Labour parties. For Liberals in the area, 
co-operation essentially meant a coalition with organised labour, principally the 
miners' union; it did not mean an acceptance of a national programmatic Labour Party. 
As has been seen, the Liberal Party in Stoke-on-Trent viewed such an arrangement as a 
natural development of an already strong Liberal-trade union relationship; it was not an 
admission of support for the idea of independent labour representation in itself. In 
Stoke-on-Trent, as this study shows, the relationship between the Liberal Party and the 
miners (and pottery workers also) was critical to political developments and prior to the 
outbreak of war in 1914 that alliance appeared to be remain strong. The Labour Party 
faced an uphill task in supplanting the Liberals as a 'natural' ally of the local workforce 
and under existing conditions an imminent advance of the Labour Party appeared 
unlikely. This is not to suggest, however, that the Labour Party was likely to remain 
content with its current position or that any future growth was impossible. An 
immediate consequence of the 1912 by-election was that it brought the trade 
union-Liberal coalition crashing down and from that point the miners' union in 
particular adopted a markedly different attitude towards their former allies. Meanwhile, 
the Labour Party no longer seemed to consider the advantages of a Progressive Alliance 
worth the price demanded. Given the historical strength of Liberal-Labour relations in 
industrial North Staffordshire this represented a significant shift in the politics of the 
area. 
The experience of Stoke-on-Trent before 1914 suggests that an inevitable rise of 
Labour appears to have been unlikely in the foreseeable future. A major aspect of 
McKibbin's argument in Evolution of the Labour Party was that party loyalty was 
increasingly conditioned by class. Stoke-on-Trent was an area that \\as 
\57 In 1911 and 1912 Labour contested no seats. 
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overwhelmingly working-class yet the evidence suggests that class had not become the 
overriding determinant of political allegiance. Traditional loyalties remained extremely 
strong. 
Detailed analysis of electoral politics in Stoke-on-Trent before 1914 shows how local 
political culture, the personal appeal of particular candidates and the actual election 
campaigns all had a critical impact on determining political fortunes during the 
Edwardian period. In this part of industrial Britain, popular working-class Liberalism, 
underpinned by the predominance of religious nonconformity, retained considerable 
influence. As we have seen, the political culture of the area had evolved in such a way 
that Liberalism developed an extremely close relationship with organised labour 
(primarily with the miners) creating what became known subsequently as 'Lib-Labism'. 
An immediate consequence of this was that it impeded the development of support for 
truly independent Labour representation. This was strikingly demonstrated in 1912 
during the Hanley by-election when Samuel Finney fought the contest almost entirely 
on his infinitely greater claim to the seat as a miner and local man, and yet failed to 
convince the majority of Hanley's electors. In the immediate sense, Labour's claim that 
the working-classes could only viably be represented by members of their own class 
appears to have been largely ineffective in these sorts of areas. This presented Labour 
with a significant dilemma: while the party clearly wished to assert its independence 
and distinctiveness, there were risks associated with going too far down such a path. 
Ultimately it is difficult to predict the future standing of the parties had the outbreak of 
war not intervened; as McKibbin so astutely stated, the Edwardian political system 
'was in many ways provisional and all three English parties found themselves in 
territory over which they had only loose control' .158 
158 R. McKibbin, Parties and People, p. 7. 
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Chapter 4: Political Change in Manchester 1918-1922 
4.1: The 1918 General Election in Manchester 
Although the Liberals had lost seats in by-elections between 1910 and 1914 in 
Manchester, it seems unwise to suggest that the party was in a state of near collapse or 
inevitable 'decline' as some historians have suggested. Labour, on the other hand, 
appeared to have made only tentative progress and a natural advance for the party 
seemed by no means guaranteed. The post-war re-alignment of electoral politics in 
Britain was dramatic. In both localities examined here the position of the two 
left-of-centre parties was very largely reversed. Some historians have placed 
considerable emphasis on sociological change contending that this was fundamental in 
influencing political realignment in the aftermath of the First World War. l Whilst 
sociological change cannot be discounted, and few would claim it had no impact at all, 
this alone does not suffice in explaining political change from 1918. The following 
section examines electoral politics and political change in Manchester in the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War, focusing upon the general elections of 1918 and 1922 
and two by-elections which took place in the intervening period. Detailed examination 
of these contests reveals that issues, policy and personalities ought to be recognised as a 
fundamental aspect in determining party fortunes during this critical period in British 
political history. The appeal, forcefulness and immediate relevance of a party's 
programme plus the candidates' abilities in the presentation of policy was of critical 
importance in changing voter allegiance.2 
The 1918 general election resulted in the Liberal Party losing all of its parliamentary 
representation in Manchester although this was not because the party's unity had 
completely disintegrated or its organisation had been entirely smashed. In Manchester 
the Liberals were not decimated by wartime events; neither was a Labour advance 
immediately inevitable, the party found it difficult to maintain electoral stability in the 
years immediately following 1918. This presents a significant contrast to 
I See for example, R. McKibbin, Evolution; K. Laybourn and J. Reynolds, Liberalism and the Rise of 
Labour and H. Pelling, Origins. 
2 Many historians pay inadequate attention to the role of individual candidates in politi.cal.developme~t. 
One exception, however, is Howell who identifies the role of candidates as of crucial Importance In 
Labour's growing electoral support after 1918; see D. Howell, ,\/acdonald's People: Labour h/l'l1tities 
and Crisis. 19L1-1931 (Oxford, 2002). 
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Stoke-on-Trent where, as we will see later, the Labour Party established a strong hold 
on parliamentary politics early in the immediate post-war period. But e\'en there, as in 
Manchester, the 1923 general election demonstrated that the Liberal Party could still 
capture parliamentary seats despite persistent difficulties and against determined 
opposition. The following section explores the potential explanations for these 
advances, setbacks and regional variations in the post-war period. 
The Context of the 1918 General Election in Manchester: Timing, the 'Coupon' 
and the Electorate3 
After by-election losses for the Liberals during 1912 the position of the parties in 
Manchester was evenly split: the Conservatives, Labour and Liberals each possessed 
two parliamentary seats in the city. The Liberals held Manchester North and South-
West, the Conservatives North-West and South Manchester and the Labour Party East 
and North-East Manchester. After the boundary changes of 1918 Manchester was now 
comprised of ten parliamentary constituencies. The Labour Party's strategy in 1918 
was to concentrate on seats already held but the extent of their ambitions were clear and 
reflected by an increase in the total number of candidates put forward. Labour decided 
to contest five seats in 1918, a slight increase in ambition within the city although this 
was in the context of the four additional seats. The Conservatives were also determined 
to improve upon their pre-war position in Manchester and contested nine seats4 while 
the Liberal Party contested only six. 
From the beginning of the 1918 general election the Liberals argued strongly against 
the timing of the contest: William Royle, Chairman of the MLF's General Committee 
declared how he regarded an election at that time as 'disastrous in the present divided 
opinion as to the leadership of the party'. 5 Officers of the MLF had even sent 
deputations to Lloyd George and Asquith declaring a strong objection to an immediate 
appeal being 'forced upon the country' because it would be 'against the national and 
allied interest and the armed forces would be unable to exercise their vote under 
3 For detailed analysis of the wartime spilt and the way in which this impacted upon the Liberal Part: 
(nationally) to fight the 1918 general election see T. Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War (Cambridge, 1986) 
pp.408-423. .... 
4 This includes Gorton where the ConservatIve candIdate was not offiCIally sanctIOned and ran as an 
independent Conservative. 
5 See Ma/lchester Liberal Federation Miscellaneous Letters, July 11th 1918. 
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conditions of full information and mature judgement'. 6 Liberal hostility to the calling 
of an election continued throughout the campaign and centred on issues of 
manipulation (i.e. timing the election in order to guarantee a Coalition victory) and the 
morality of excluding a significant proportion of servicemen. Tanner suggests that 
Liberal objections to an immediate appeal to the country were largely based upon the 
fact that the party's organisation was unprepared.7 He contends that the Liberals had 
been hoping for reunion and an immediate election came as a major shock. On top of 
the Liberal Party's own internal troubles, the boundary changes required the 
reorganisation of constituency associations which put them under considerable 
pressure.8 Party records in Manchester and the Midlands, however, suggest that an 
election was widely anticipated for quite some time before the armistice.9 As early as 
February 1918 the MLF had begun to formulate plans for a forthcoming general 
election and in Manchester there is nothing to suggest that the party's organisation had 
completely broken down when faced with these problems. Certainly the MLF's 
finances had been significantly depleted although this appears to have been in hand and 
in the process of being rectified. 10 We should also remember that these difficulties 
confronted all of the parties, not just the Liberals. 
Consideration of the operation of the 'coupon' provides an essential context of the 1918 
general election. Whether a candidate claimed to be in receipt of the 'coupon' 
undoubtedly determined many political fortunes. Officially, as the Manchester 
Guardian reported, the policy of the government was that it would only support 
candidates if they declared themselves 'an out-and-out supporter of the Coalition ... 
[thus a Liberal candidate would] not be supported by the government unless he [was] an 
avowed supporter of Lloyd George.' 11 Wherever a Liberal candidate had refused to 
6Manchester Guardian, 15th November, 1918. 
7 D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 404. 
8 Boundary changes presented some constituencies with tremendous difficulties and regional officials 
had clearly experienced problems in assisting all of the associations within their area, see, for example, 
report by secretary of the Midland Liberal Federation, Midland Liberal ~ederation Minutes; 21 st ~~rch 
1919. In Manchester it seems the MLF's organisation responded effectIvely to a fast movmg polItIcal 
situation, for example, the MLF began registration work as soon as the new register was published in 
1918' see Manchester Liberal Federation Minutes, 3rd June 1918. 
9 See 'Manchester Liberal Federation Minutes, 20th February 1918, 4th March 1918 and 14th October 1918. 
see also Midland Liberal Federation Minutes, 21 5t March 1919. 
10 See Manchester Liberal Federation Finance Committee Minutes, 4th September 1914. 31 st January 
1915 and 21 st July 1918. 
II Manchester Guardian, 15th November, 1918. 
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give complete support to the Coalition Government, endorsement would be given to 
another (usually Conservative) candidate. This meant Liberal candidates were expected 
to give absolute and unconditional support to the Lloyd George administration; implicit 
or half-hearted support was insufficient. In Manchester, as elsewhere, in seats occupied 
by Liberal members the coupon was awarded to their Unionist opponents. Many 
Liberals were placed in an impossible position; whilst most did not wish to be perceived 
as anti-government, they could not bring themselves to pledge unconditional support to 
Lloyd George if it might mean betraying their fundamental Liberal principles at some 
point. In a way, the Liberals in Manchester contributed to their own electoral downfall 
because they believed their Liberalism too sacred to risk. 
The position of the Labour Party was more clearly defined. The decision to withdraw 
from the Coalition Government marked the beginning of the complete independence of 
the Labour Party although it should be noted that Labour itself was not completely 
united on the issue of the party's withdrawal from the Coalition. In Manchester, J. R. 
Clynes even risked expulsion from his party because he initially refused to resign his 
cabinet position. Clynes believed that an immediate withdrawal could handicap Labour 
candidates because it might 'stamp them out as men who had severed themselves from 
the national service'.12 In the end, however, he was forced to resign his ministerial 
position. 
Although not directly hostile to the prime minister himself, the Liberals in Manchester 
remained lukewarm to say the least. The Manchester Guardian argued that the 
Coalition took 'the heart out of politics and [definitely] ought not to continue beyond 
the occasion of national emergency such as a war,.13 The same newspaper also pointed 
out that, in any case, coalitions never possessed any 'real bond of unity' and were 
simply 'artificial' combinations of parties. The MLF, however, adopted a pragmatic 
approach resolving to impartially support candidates selected by the general councils of 
the respective parliamentary divisions of the city whether the candidates were 
C 1··, t 14 oa ItlOlllsts or no . 
12 Manchester Guardian, 15th November, 1918. 
13 Manchester Guardian, 16th November, 1918. 
14 See Manchester Liberal Federation Minutes, November 1918. This policy was supported by AsqUith: 
local federations could decide themselves whether they chose free Liberals or Coalition Liberals. 
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The Liberal parliamentary candidates in Manchester in 1918 were all prominent local 
party officials; C.T. Needham, Tom Stott, Philip Oliver, Arthur Haworth, Walter 
Butterworth and G. F. Burditt. It was initially assumed that Coalition endorsement 
would be given to three of these (Stott, Needham and Oliver) and that Needham would 
be given an unopposed return by the withdrawal of the Unionist candidate in Hulme. 
All of the Liberal candidates claimed some degree of support for the government yet the 
exact extent of their support varied enormously. Butterworth, Burditt and Haworth, for 
example, made it clear they could only support the Coalition as long it did not impinge 
upon their fundamental Liberal principles. In a letter to the MLF, Burditt declared that 
he 'found it impossible to give an unqualified pledge of support because doing so would 
mean sacrificing freedom; one of the dearest principles of Liberalism' 15 He also 
intimated how deeply unhappy he was that there had been no mention of Free Trade in 
any of the statements to emerge from the Coalition: throughout the campaign he 
described himself as a Liberal Free Trader. At one of his meetings Butterworth also told 
his audience he was' a Liberal without prefix or suffix' .16 Of all the Manchester Liberal 
candidates in 1918 Butterworth was the most openly hostile towards the Coalition; he 
told one meeting that he felt the Coalition was primarily a 'cunning device of party 
politicians who wanted to grasp power for another five years.' 17 Generally speaking, 
however, it would have been difficult for electors to accurately identify the official 
government candidates from the candidate's admissions alone. 
An aspect of the 1918 general election which caused widespread dissatisfaction was the 
position of absentee voters who remained on war service. In Manchester, the estimated 
total number of absentee voters was in the region of 65,000 to 70,00018 with the average 
number per constituency more than 6,000; in some, Hulme and Platting for example, 
the figures were as high as 9,000 and 10,000.19 Whilst registration officers expressed 
optimism that ballot papers could reach overseas voters in time, doubts quickly arose as 
to the reliability of such optimism. The mechanism by which the army authorities had 
to operate the voting procedure was hugely complex. Three days after the calling of the 
15Burditt reported in the Manchester Guardian, 22nd November, 1918. 
16 See Manchester Guardian and Manchester Evening News, 23 rd November 1918. 
17 Ibid. 
18Figure cited in Manchester Guardian, 22nd November, 1918, see also article 'reaching the soldiers: 
Manchester's experience', Manchester Guardian, 27th November 1918. 
19 Manchester Guardian, 27th November, 1918. 
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election the army was required to supply registration officers with the latest addresses 
of soldiers formally resident in the area. In Manchester, as in other parts of the country. 
this simply could not be done in time so the town clerk was forced to postpone giving 
the lists to the party agents until the 20th November, much later than was usual. It was 
largely assumed that as much as half the city's electorate would effectively be 
disenfranchised because the precise addresses of men in the field were simply 
unavailable. Only 400 of the 5,000 to 6,000 proxy voters were retumed.2o Of the 9,180 
absent voters in Hulme, a current (general) location was known for 7,357 although 
nearly 2,000 of these remained untraceable; this meant that a fifth of the electorate was 
effectively disenfranchised. It was also estimated that about 1,500 more would not 
receive papers because the addresses which had been provided were woefully 
inadequate. 21 The situation was similar across the city and indeed across the country. 
The 1918 General Election Campaign in Manchester 
The 1918 general election saw contests in nine of the ten Manchester constituencies. 
There were three-cornered contests in Blackley, Rusholme and Hulme where Labour 
candidates fought both Liberals and Conservatives. Two constituencies (Hulme and 
Gorton) saw unofficial Labour candidates while the remainder saw straight fights 
between the Liberals and Conservatives (Moss Side, Exchange and Withington) or 
Labour and Conservatives (Clayton and Ardwick). 
Three-Cornered or Multi-Party Contests 
In Blackley the Liberal candidate, Philip Oliver, was a young Barrister22 who had been 
secretary of the county Red Cross during the war and had devoted most of his time to 
that cause. His Unionist opponent, Harold Briggs, was a local manufacturer with a 
presence in the constituency whilst Labour's A. E. Townend was an employee of the 
postal service. Oliver began his campaign by declaring himself as a firm supporter of 
the Coalition, albeit a qualified one in that he was unable to 'give a definite pledge for 
an indefinite period,.23 In an unusual approach to the situation he told voters that "the 
more Liberals supported [the prime minister] the more Liberal and democratic his 
20Proxy voters included men serving in Egypt, Macedonia and other distant fronts and those in the navy. 
21 Manchester Guardian, November 27th 1918. 
22 Details from Manchester City News, 16th November 1918. 
~3 See Manchester Guardian, 2ih November 1918. 
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programme would be' so he would support the Coalition 'until it cut across some vital 
principles of Liberalism,?4 Later on in the campaign, however~ Oliver appeared much 
more cautious declaring that he was standing first as a Liberal and then as a supporter of 
the Coalition. He spoke at length on foreign policy suggesting that Britain oUght to 
adopt a firmer stance with regards Turkey which he said had been a 'terrible oppressor'; 
it was Britain's duty to see that justice was done for the Armenians 'many of whom had 
been massacred'. 25 He elaborated extensively on the land question claiming that if 
necessary it should be purchased compulsorily in order to develop proper housing 
schemes?6 Although the Conservative Harold Briggs went to great lengths to claim that 
he had 'great respect' for Labour, he could not perceive how anyone could vote for 
'pacifists at the present time' and presented himself throughout as an especially strong 
supporter of the Coalition.27 
In Rusholme the Conservative candidate, R. B. Stoker, had been elected unopposed for 
South Manchester the previous March after the division's sitting member (Philip 
Glazebrook) had been killed on active service. Stoker was a local Conservative 
heavyweight, a Director of Manchester Liners Ltd, President of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce as well as a Director of the Ship Canal Company; he was a 
staunch protectionist. The Liberal candidate, Walter Butterworth was likewise a 
respected local Liberal official, well-known for his social and educational work and as 
Chairman of the Art Committee of the city council. Interned in Germany since the 
outbreak of hostilities, he had been released earlier in 1918. Labour's candidate, Mrs 
Pethick-Lawrence, was a long-time women's activist. From the beginning of the 
campaign Stoker tried to distinguish himself from his 'pacifist friends' and adopted a 
hard-line towards the peace settlement.28 He attempted in particular to capitalise on his 
Liberal opponent's personal position during the war. Butterworth had been interned at 
Ruhleben and the Conservatives suggested publicly throughout that his experience had 
amounted to nothing more than an extended holiday, a point which he might have 
unwittingly reinforced by asserting that he had been treated very well and had spent his 
time improving his German. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Manchester Guardian, 3rd December 1918. 
26 See Manchester Guardian, 6th December 1918. 
27 See Manchester City News, 7th December 1918. 
28 See Manchester Guardian, 16th November 1918. 
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Of all Manchester's Liberal candidates, Walter Butterworth adopted the most overtly 
independent stance in 1918 making it clear that he would not stand as a supporter of the 
Coalition. He adopted a fierce line against the timing of the election telling one 
audience that 'the present election in which three million men could not take part could 
not [be seen] as a proper expression of national opinion' .29 He argued that significant 
social reform would be unlikely to materialise given the reactionaries the prime 
minister was associating with. The greatest concern for the Liberal Party in Rusholme 
was a potential split in the 'progressive' vote and Butterworth himself intimated that 
had he not been in the field at the time he would not have contested the seat. 30 Labour's 
candidate, Mrs Pethick Lawrence, was the first woman to stand in a parliamentary 
contest in Manchester and was one of the few candidates who attempted to address a 
wider range of issues including war-related issues such as separation allowances, 
pensions for dependents31 and broader questions such as health, insurance, education 
and leisure.32 
Hulme saw another multi-party contest, Conservative, Liberal, (independent) Labour 
and an independent. The Liberal candidate, C. T. Needham, had been member for 
South-West Manchester from January 1910 until its re-organisation. 33 Another 
prominent Liberal activist he was an iron and steel merchant, director of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce, Ship Canal Company, Manchester and District Banking 
Company and governor of the university. The Unionist candidate Major NaIl was 
another Manchester businessman, director of a local transport firm. He had served in 
Egypt and at Gallipoli during the war and was the only candidate in Manchester in 1918 
who chose to wear his military uniform on the election platforms. The (unofficial) 
Labour candidate Alfred Hilton was secretary of the Carters Union. There was also an 
independent (George Milner) for the National Federation of Discharged Soldiers and 
Sailors (hereafter NFDSS) Needham had been offered the Coalition ticket and Bonar 
Law had allegedly even appealed to Nall to stand down. Both refused these requests 
although Needham was still widely reported as the 'officially accepted' Coalition 
29 Manchester Guardian, 22nd November 1918. 
30 Manchester Guardian, 5th December 1918. 
31 Manchester Evening News, 2nd December 1918. 
32 Manchester Evening News, 26th November 1918. 
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candidate. During the 1918 contest Needham was ill and therefore prevented from 
taking any active part in his campaign. Effectively run by way of letters to the press and 
with the help of the party workers in his constituency, little can be ascertained in 
relation to his policy agenda though a number of well-known local businessmen spoke 
on Needham's behalf, largely on the basis of Free Trade. These included Conservative 
heavyweights such as Tootal Broadhurst who proclaimed Needham 'the best 
commercial representative' Manchester had ever had?4 Needham's opponent, Major 
Nall, tried to make some capital out of Needham's stance on the Maurice debate and 
throughout the campaign focused principally upon the 'meting out of justice to the 
Kaiser and the fullest reparation by Germany' alongside Tariff Reform.35 
In Gorton, a three-way contest saw Labour's former Minister of Pensions, John Hodge, 
challenged by a Conservative, H. White, and a Socialist Labour Party candidate, J. T 
Murphy. There had been some confusion over Hodge's candidature. Earlier in the year 
the Gorton Trades Council had decided to replace Hodge with J. Binns of the engineers 
union. The national executive refused to sanction this however and Hodge was 
consequently nominated, helped no doubt by his withdrawal from the Coalition. 36 
Throughout the campaign Hodge focused attention principally on the position of 
workers and post-war reconstruction, calling in particular for workers to have a greater 
share in the management of industry. It was widely assumed that Hodge's work as 
Minister of Pensions would give him a tremendous advantage especially amongst 
female voters, the wives and mothers of men who had fought. 37 
Liberal v Conservative/ Coalition Contests 
Two of Manchester's three straight fights between Liberals and Conservatives were 
conducted in predominantly middle-class suburbs (Moss Side and Withington). The 
third was fought in the commercial heartland of the city, Exchange. Here the Liberals 
put up one of the city's most senior Liberals Arthur Haworth, who had represented 
Manchester South- West for eleven years. Chairman of the Royal Exchange, he was 
33 The new constituency of Hulme included the old South-West division (Medlock Street and St. 
Georae's) with the addition of Moss Side West. It was thus comprised of two 'slum' wards (Medlock Stree~ and St George's) and the suburban ward of Moss Side West. 
34 See Manchester Guardian, December 10th 1918. 
35 See Manchester City News, 11 th December 1918. 
36 R. McKibbin, Evolution, p. 107. 
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also President of the MLF. His Unionist opponent John Randles had sat for Manchester 
North-West since capturing the seat at a by-election in 1912. Like Haworth, he was also 
a well known local businessman. Both candidates, therefore, had been sitting members 
at the dissolution. Free Trade remained the only issue of importance in Exchange and 
Haworth told electors that it was 'not an eternal commandment written on tables of 
stone but. .. a wise commercial arrangement that has stood the test of peace and the 
strain of war, leading us into prosperity in peace and saving us from disaster in war: 38 
Many notable men involved in the cotton trade came to support Haworth. Randles' 
campaign was more nationalistic and anti-Free Trade than anywhere else in Manchester. 
Appealing to electors solely in the 'national interest' , he advised his former constituents 
to 'support the Coalition and drop the clap-trap of Free Trade' .39 He told one meeting 
that they had a choice between 'Lloyd George and himself or Haworth and Asquith' .40 
In Moss Side, the Liberal manufacturer Tom Stott faced the Conservative Gerald Hurst, 
a Barrister and law lecturer at Manchester University who had only just returned from 
active service. Stott declared himself a supporter of the Coalition and claimed it would 
be impossible to carry on the affairs of the nation at present by means of party 
government. He addressed a wide range of issues (housing, pensions, employment, 
health and land) and gave considerable attention to issues such as likely unemployment 
as a result of demobilisation. His opponent, however, focused exclusively on the war 
and enlisted the platform support of officers who had served under him. Having initially 
taken a strong pro-conscription stance, he later changed his position after it became 
apparent that this was deeply unpopular with his audiences, though he continued to 
adopt an extremely hard line in respect to conscientious objectors;41 under pressure, 
Stott had to deny that he supported their immediate release.42 
Another largely middle-class suburban constituency and one which Labour had again 
chosen not to contest was Withington. A straightforward fight, the Liberals adopted a 
local businessman, G. F. Burditt, and the Conservatives a bank manager, R. A. D. 
37 Manchester Guardian, 11th December 1918. 
38 See Manchester Guardian, 30th November 1918. 
39 See Manchester Citv News, 4th December 1918. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Manchester Guardian, 13th December 1918. 
42 See ibid. 
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Carter. 43 Like Butterworth in Rusholme, Burditt adopted a strongly independent stance 
throughout the campaign arguing that it was impossible for him to give 'any coalition 
an unqualified pledge'; although (so he stated) he had been offered Coalition 
endorsement he had chosen to decline it. Burditt focused significant attention upon the 
case for the establishment of a league of nations and spoke at length of his absolute 
objection to conscription. He emphasised the need of a 'just peace ... not a policy of 
vengeance and hatred' .44 His Conservative opponent adopted a somewhat odd position 
as a self-declared anti -democrat, expressing throughout the campaign his dislike for 
democracy because it 'encouraged the lazy and ignorant to organise riots and 
revolutions' .45 
Labour v Conservative Contests 
The remaining two constituencies III Manchester were contested by Labour and 
Conservative candidates. Clayton included the greater part of the former Manchester 
East constituency and was largely a working-class district including many railway 
employees and miners. Labour's John Sutton had represented Manchester East since 
January 1910 and was expected to retain his (reconstituted) seat in 1918.46 As the 
Manchester City News reported, Sutton was widely recognised as a 'Labour leader of 
undoubted ability and independence' .47 His Conservative opponent Edward Hopkinson, 
a director of an engineering firm in the district and son of a former Lord Mayor of the 
city, was known for his social work in the area. Perceived to be a strong candidate for 
the Conservatives, there was some intimation that his candidature had not been 
supported from party headquarters in London48 and he had certainly not been given 
Coalition endorsement. Sutton was extremely critical of the Coalition Government and 
the timing of the general election, declaring that he was not going to be 'muzzled or 
committed to the Prime Minister'. 49 In terms of issues Sutton focused attention on 
various aspects of post-war reconstruction (housing, education and other social reform) 
43 There had been discussion of a Labour candidate (H. M. Richardson from the National Union of 
Journalists) although nothing came of this, see Manchester Evening News, 23rd November 1918. 
44 See Manchester Guardian, 22nd November 1918. 
45 See Manchester Guardian, 11 th December 1918. 
46 The new parliamentary division of Clayton included a large part of the old Manchester East 
constituency including Bradford and Beswick and now also incorporated Newton Heath (which had 
previously been in the old Manchester North-East division). It thus comprised a combination of the 
'better' working-class districts (such as Bradford) and the more socially mixed Newton Heath. 
47 Manchester Ci!1' News, 10th December 1918. 
48 Mallchester Ci0' News, 12th December 1918. 
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though he spent most of the campaign condemning the election and the Coalition. 
Throughout the campaign the local Liberal Association issued various statements in 
support of his candidature. 50 
Labour's candidate in Ardwick, Thomas Lowth, (a member of the city council and 
General Secretary of the General Workers Union), focused exclusively on aspects of 
post-war reconstruction affecting workers, particularly wages and conditions including 
the proposal of a maximum eight hour day. He argued that a 'state unemployment 
scheme was not wanted by working classes [but] state employment' though he 
contended that ' there was no trusting a Coalition Government to do anything for the 
worker' .51 He argued for combined industrial and political effort, citing a recent victory 
by the railwaymen in securing an eight hour day as evidence of what could be achieved, 
and arguing similar improvements could be obtained for the whole of the working class 
if there was a significant increase in the number of Labour representatives. He told 
voters not to expect anything from the Coalition Government because it could simply 
not be trusted. 52 Lowth was opposed by both Manchester Conservative Councillor 
Augustine Hailwood (a large employer in the area) and a candidate from the National 
Party (Lieutenant Colonel H. M. Stephenson). 
Inevitably, all candidates were forced to discuss their personal roles during the war. 
Haworth, who had commanded the first Volunteer Battalion of the Cheshire Regiment, 
and Tom Stott, a member of the Cheshire Volunteer Regiment, were both anxious to 
stress this in an attempt to counter suggestions they had not played their part during the 
war. Although none of the Labour candidates had seen active service since most were 
above the recruitment age, they too were anxious to reiterate their roles in recruitment, 
relief committees and such like. At the local level this no doubt increased perceptions of 
the party's respectability even though their leadership included a number of high profile 
pacifists. 
As has been shown the 1918 general election campaign saw policy proposals and issues 
49 See, for example, Manchester Guardian, 28 th and 29th November 1918. 
50 See Manchester Guardian, 14th December 1918. 
51 See Manchester Guardian, 7th December 1918. 
52 See Manchester Guardian, 7th December 1918. 
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focused on questions of the peace, post-war reconstruction and the timing of the 
election itself. In some constituencies the Liberal candidates appeared more 
progressive than in others and Conservatives differed in their moderation. Labour stood 
out, however, as the party with an ' entirely independent standpoint ' and concentrated 
on future aims. 53 As one Liberal organiser candidly stated after the election, the ' fact 
[was] that the Labour manifesto commanded the assent of Liberal [supporters]' whilst 
the Liberals appeal 'fell absolutely flat because it never had any opportunity of getting 
home to the minds of the people,.54 Timing had also been critical ; the same Liberal 
official believed 'the programme was tight when it came, but it had come too late ,.55 
The critical topic of debate between Unionists and Liberals tended to be the 
continuation of the Coalition but as the campaign progressed the Conservatives began 
to adopt a much harsher approach to the peace settlement. Liberal candidates rarely 
engaged the Tories on this issue but gave prominence to the need to establish a league 
of nations. In Manchester, the evidence suggests that the Labour candidates remained 
focused on issues affecting the working-classes, avoiding becoming too embroiled in 
debates concerning either the peace settlement or the continuation of the Coalition. 
The 1918 General Election in Manchester: Results and Analysis56 
Three-Cornered Contests 
Fig. 1 Rusholme (Turnout 62.9%) 
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53 See Manchester C ity News, 14th December 19 18 . .' " . > / ;t 
54 See the secretary' s report on the 191 8 general electIon, M Idland LIberal Federatl oll M lI7l1l eS, _I 
March 191 9. 
55 Ibid . 
56 Swing cannot be ca lculated fo r the 19 18 Genera l Electi on due to boundary changes 
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Fig. 2 Hulme (Turnout 52.90/0) 
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Liberal v. Conservative/Coalition Contests 
Fig. 5 Moss Side (Turnout 50%) 
Fig. 6 Withington (Turnout 61 %) 
Fig. 7 Exchange (Turnout 51 %) 
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Labour v. Conservative Contests 
Fig. 8 Clayton (Turnout 57.5%) 
Fig. 9 Ardwick (Turnout 47.9%) 
• Conservative 
• Labour 
48% • Coalition Conservative 
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o National Party 
Compared to previous contests, the 1918 general election saw considerable apathy 
amongst electors; as the Manchester Guardian reported, audiences were ' small and 
spiritless ' and it was estimated that no more than about an eighth of the total electorate 
had actually even heard a speech. 57 This was in marked contrast to previous elections in 
the city which had always seen large and enthusiastic audiences at all the respective 
meetings. 58 Another noticeable feature in Manchester was that local candidates 
predominated: of the 22 candidates who stood in 1918 only one, Sir 1. Randles in 
Exchange, did not come from the area. 
57 Man chester Guardian, 121h December 19 18. 
58 Many men still remained abroad and outbreak of influenza may also have contributed to a decline in 
numbers of people attending politica l meetings in 19 18. 
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The results represented an overwhelming victory for the Coalition and a bitter 
disappointment for the city's Liberals. Across Manchester, the Unionist candidates 
received more than half the total votes polled, obtaining an overall vote of91.968 from 
a total of 161,703. The total Labour and Liberal votes (with seven and six candidates 
respectively) amounted to 35,452 and 28,854. In Manchester, as across the country, 
Lloyd George had swept the board principally on the basis of his status as war leader in 
a 'most unscrupulous exploitation of a bewildered and excited public'. 59 Of 
Manchester's 10 seats, eight returned Unionists; the remaining two returned Labour 
members including Clynes who was unopposed. Four candidates in Manchester had 
received official Coalition endorsement, three Conservatives (Randles, Stoker and 
Hailwood in Exchange, Rusholme and Ardwick) and just the one Liberal (Needham in 
Hulme) who had repudiated it. The officially-endorsed Coalitionists were returned with 
65%, 70% and 48% of the vote (see figs. 1, 7 and 9) representing winning margins of 
46%, 40% and 17%. The coupon had clearly contributed to the scale of these victories 
although in Withington, Blackley, Clayton and Moss Side 'un-couponed' 
Conservatives also won with significant majorities, 39%, 30%, 23% and 30% (see figs. 
6, 3, 8 and 5). In Hulme (see fig. 2) where Needham had been offered the coupon but 
had declined it, the Conservative also won with a majority of 25%.60 The Conservative 
triumph in Manchester cannot be solely attributed to the operation of the coupon. The 
significant swing to the Conservatives included districts of traditional Liberal strength, 
the former Manchester North, South and South-West constituencies. Across the 
country the swing to the Conservatives (irrespective of the operation of the coupon) 
was enormous. No doubt the coupon forced voters to make a decision about which 
candidates they determined to be 'patriotic' and 'official' and those perceivably 
'unpatriotic' and 'anti-government'. The coupon damaged the Liberals prospects 
because it forced them to declare publicly their opposition to Lloyd George's Coalition. 
As analysis of the 1918 general election campaign in Manchester shows, Liberal 
candidates varied significantly in their willingness to 'support' the Coalition: Needham, 
Stott and Oliver seemed prepared to give greater support than Butterworth, Burditt and 
Haworth who all made it clear they were 'free Liberals opposed to caucus dictation'. 61 
59 G. D. H. Cole, History o/the Labour Party Since 1914 (New York, 1969) p. 85. 
60 Election details from F.W.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, pp. 184-194. 
61 See A/a/lchester Guardian, 30th December 1918. 
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A low turnout of 55% across the city reflected the prevalent mood of apathy and 
disinterest. Less than a fifth of the armed service electorate had voted and it was 
reported that a proportion of these had in fact spoilt their ballot papers, some even 
writing 'demobilise us first' on them. To some this fact represented a stark indication of 
how those in the armed services felt about this untimely 'snatch' election. Analysis of 
the Liberal and Labour vote in the constituencies where they faced each other helps 
shed valuable light on the comparative levels of support of the respective parties. Of the 
three-cornered contests, Rusholme and Hulme (see figs. 1 and 2) saw the Liberals 
out-poll Labour opponents. Given the suburban character of these divisions this is 
unsurprising. If anything Labour's result in Rusholme was very impressive; for a 
female candidate with practically no permanent organisation against a prominent local 
Liberal, Labour's first attempt at contesting the seat saw the party perform respectably. 
Perhaps this serves to demonstrate just how badly the Liberals had performed in 
Manchester in 1918. This was part of the city which might rightly have been considered 
natural Liberal heartland yet the party only just managed to out-poll Labour and the 
Conservatives won with a winning margin of nearly 46%. The Liberals did better in 
Hulme where Needham obtained nearly 30% of the total vote but he was still nearly 
25% behind the winning non-couponed Conservative; the (independent) Labour 
candidate, with no preparation or formal organisation, obtained nearly 3000 votes (13% 
of the total). Although it contained identifiable slum areas Hulme was a socially mixed 
constituency and, owing to the boundary changes, it is difficult to compare the 1918 
result with previous elections. Ultimately, although the 1918 general election saw the 
Liberals out-poll Labour by nearly 2.5 to 1, future prospects for a Labour challenge in 
this seat did not appear altogether dismal. Furthermore, should an official Labour 
candidate with greater preparation and organisation contest the seat, untold damage 
could be done to Liberal prospects even if Labour could not win. In Blackley (see fig. 3) 
the Liberal and Labour vote was more or less equally divided, 20% and 25% 
respectively. One of the most significant features of the 1918 general election in 
Manchester was that the Liberal versus Labour contests took place in areas previously 
considered natural Liberal territory. Though Labour possessed no real prospects of 
capturing these seats imminently, the party's intervention would seriously undermine 
the Liberal Party's chances of overtaking the Conservatives in these constituencies. 
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The 1918 General Election in the National Perspective 
The 1918 general election recorded one of the most sweeping electoral victories in 
British politics. Undoubtedly, Liberal organisers expected to fare badly but the scale of 
the Coalition's victory was unforeseen. Under-stating the position somewhat the 
Liberal Magazine concluded that 'the situation created for the party [was] one of 
delicacy and difficulty.,62 The Manchester Guardian believed the outcome was the 
result of 'a widespread desire on the part of the electorate to give the Coalition 
Government an opportunity of concluding peace and of carrying out the work of 
demobilisation [and] a wave of Conservatism prompted by the political events. ,63 The 
Manchester Guardian bitterly despised how the results had been achieved by 'seizing 
upon a moment of confusion and excitement' and had served to tum 'representative 
institutions into something of a mockery'. 64 Observers immediately attempted to 
consider why Liberal candidates had performed so badly. One newspaper reported that 
'rightly or wrongly, it had come to be assumed that the Liberals did not desire such 
drastic measures [in respect of the peace settlement] and that they might display a 
tender sentiment towards a still ruthless and arrogant enemy' .65 For many electors it 
seems all Liberal candidates were perceived to be 'soft' on Germany. Another factor 
which in all probability served to underpin the scale of the Conservative victory was the 
female vote. Initially it was reported that the new female electors appeared apathetic 
and 'difficult to move' although, as one Liberal official observed afterwards, once they 
did engage with the election 'whatever class they belonged to they gave in bulk an 
anti-German vote' .66 Furthermore, neither can the exceptional personal appeal of the 
Prime Minister be under-estimated. As the Manchester City News concluded the 
election was 'a personal triumph for Lloyd George who has a magnetism that few 
possess and who inspires faith and commands support' .67 Another local newspaper, 
however, was less generous in its (bitter and sarcastic) assessment that electors had 
voted simply for 'the legend of the man who had saved England, Europe and 
. ·1· . , 68 ClVl lsatlOn . 
62 Liberal Magazine, December 1918. 
63 Manchester Guardian, 30th December 1918. 
64Ibid. 
65Manchester City News, 14th January 1919. 
66 See Midland Liberal Federation report evaluating the 1918 general election, Midland Liberal 
Federation Minutes, 21 st March 1919. 
67 Manchester Citv NeH's. 4th January 1919. 
68 Oldham Chronicl('. 4th January 1919. 
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Although the 1918 general election was undoubtedly a disaster for the Liberal Party in 
that the party lost all of its parliamentary seats in Manchester, there was not a complete 
collapse of its electoral base. No candidates lost their deposits and the percentage of the 
vote obtained by Liberal candidates ranged from 20% to 35% which, although 
extremely low compared to previous contests, was easily explained by the political 
situation. The local organisation had not fallen apart and despite a slight deterioration in 
party unity, the party split was hardly severe compared to elsewhere. The political 
situation before and during the 1918 general election did not in itself fatally undermine 
the Liberal Party in Manchester even though defeat was deeper than anything the party 
had encountered previously. Organised Liberalism would face monumental difficulties 
over the coming years and party managers locally and nationally clearly recognised this 
fact. They did not believe, however, that Liberalism had been wounded forever because, 
as one local newspaper articulated, 'it would be rash in the last degree to take the 1918 
general election as providing any trustworthy criteria as to the relationships of parties to 
the electorate' .69 That would only become apparent in subsequent elections. 
Clarke suggests that the main premises underpinning the Liberal vote in 1910 had by 
1918 been destroyed and new voters simply acquired new habits of voting. 70 1918 itself, 
however, more fundamentally represented triumph for the forces of reaction; 
anti-Coalition candidates fared badly across the board and the Liberals were uniquely 
disadvantaged in consequence of both issues and the political situation. Labour 
performed only marginally better than before the outbreak of war although in some 
areas such as Stoke-on-Trent (which will be examined below) the party made a 
significant leap forward. Furthermore, as Tanner asserts, focus on the performance of 
the Asquithian Liberals underestimates the real level of Liberal support and decline can 
more accurately be determined to have developed from there. 71 The Progressive 
Alliance collapsed, the Liberal Party remained disunited and Labour moved in to claim 
its Liberal political inheritance. The present study lends support to this assertion as will 
be seen in subsequent analysis, though it is important to establish at this juncture that 
the 1918 general election did not entirely decimate the Liberal Party. Douglas makes 
the simple (though effective) point that there were still very many people across the 
69 Oldham Chronicle, 4th January 1919. 
70 P. Clarke, Lancashire, p. 395. 
71 D. Tanner, Political Change, p . .+16. 
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country who still considered themselves to be Liberals and who 'had not even begun to 
think of transferring their allegiance elsewhere'. 72 Furthermore, the Labour Party 
performed badly in 1918; its parliamentary position had only marginally improved and 
despite a vast increase in the number of candidates its representation changed little, 
remaining overwhelmingly trade unionist (the ILP had performed extremely badly in 
1918 for obvious reasons).73 In Manchester, the local Labour Party bemoaned that the 
working-classes had 'failed to be radicalised by the experience of war' .74 The 1918 
general election witnessed no immediate transfer of allegiance from Liberalism to 
Labour in Manchester or across the country as a whole. It might have appeared like any 
other Khaki election, albeit one in which one of the participants had entered particularly 
divided and the results had been especially bad. 
4.2: The Rusholme By-Election, September 1919 
In September 1919 voters in Manchester were given an opportunity to express their 
opinion of the Coalition Government when the Rusholme seat became vacant following 
the death of its sitting Conservative member. The by-election was immediately 
perceived to represent a key test of public opinion towards the Lloyd George 
administration and its record over the past nine months. It would also provide an 
indicator of the respective positions of the two progressive parties. The Rusholme 
Liberal Association indicated that they intended to contest the seat claiming that the 
former constituency of South Manchester had always been a Liberal seat and their 
claim to stand was infinitely greater than that of the Labour Party's. Before the 
campaign had formally begun the Liberal press adopted a firm stance against Labour 
intervention. The Manchester Guardian's position was that at a number of recent 
by-elections Labour candidates had been 'ungrudgingly' assisted by the Liberal Party 
and so on this occasion Labour ought to demonstrate the same' cordial co-operation and 
not force a triangular contest'. 75 In any case, the Manchester Guardian contended, 
forcing a three-cornered contest would only serve to strengthen the Coalition since it 
would simply' gift' the seat to the Conservatives and thus strengthen the Government's 
present 'misguided policies'. 76 The newspaper suggested that there ought to be an 
72 R. Douglas, History of the Liberal Party, p. 131. 
73 G. D. H. Cole, History of the Labour Party. p. 84. 
74 See Manchester Labour Party Annual Report, 1918. 
75 Manchester Guardian, 6th September 1919. 
76 Ibid. 
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'agreement on a reasonable allocation of seats based on the character of each 
constituency' 77 and in such an allocation Rusholme would be viewed as a Liberal seat. 
The actions of Labour on this occasion, it was believed, could be taken as an 'index of 
its sincerity' , i.e. it would indicate whether the Labour Party placed the present dangers 
of the country before or after party considerations.78 It became clear, however. that the 
Labour Party was resolute in its bid to contest Rusholme although interestingly Labour 
had intimated that a Liberal candidate would only be supported if that person 
disassociated himself from Asquith.79 This was unlikely to happen and Labour formally 
declared that the party had adopted a candidate. 
Robert Dunstan was emblematic of a new breed of Labour candidates who emerged 
after 1918. A doctor and qualified barrister, he represented the intellectual side of his 
party; he had not come via the unions 80 and in fact had only recently converted to the 
ILP having previously been a Liberal parliamentary candidate. In 1918 Dunstan had 
contested a seat in Birmingham for Labour but had been unsuccessful. During the war 
he had been a Lieutenant in the Royal Army Medical Corps and it was at this time that 
he converted to the Labour Party. Throughout the by-election campaign he intimated 
that if he was returned he would not give up his medical career claiming that the 'great 
emancipation which [was] to come would not come from professional politicians'. 81 
Dunstan had no connections with Manchester and it was reported that some within the 
local movement were reluctant to support him since they favoured a local candidate.82 
The Manchester Guardian reported how endorsement from the central party was 
unusually slow; suggesting that opposition to his candidature was not purely local. The 
central executive of the Labour Party did give Dunstan full support however, and the 
leadership threw their weight behind him throughout the campaign. 
After his controversial adoption Dunstan declared how he had been aware that the 
Liberals already had a candidate in place but he contended that his intervention was 
justified on the grounds that there would be issues upon which he and his Liberal 
77 Manchester Guardian, 6th September 1919. 
78 See ibid. 
79 See Manchester Guardian, 9th September, 1919. This suggests that the Labour Party may not ha \C 
stood a candidate if an 'acceptable' Liberal was put forward though this appears hard to believe. 
80 Dunstan was, however, a member of the National Union of General Workers. 
81 Manchester Guardian, 12th September 1919. 
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opponent would disagree and, additionally, it was essential that the Labour Party 
'establish a strong parliamentary position ... if it was going to realise its aim of seeing a 
Labour government come into existence' at this critical juncture. 83 
The Liberal candidate also came from the radical wing of his party. Like many radical 
Liberals during this period, W. M. Pringle had studied at Glasgow University. A 
barrister, he had been MP for North-West Lanark between January 1910 and December 
1918.84 Pringle had a reputation as being fiercely independent and had been vocal on a 
number of issues during the war. He had made a strong impression on the Manchester 
Liberals during the NLF meeting the previous year when he delivered a speech 
condemning the Coalition Government. At forty-five, he was still young yet he came 
with a wealth of political experience.85 
The Rusholme By-Election Campaign 
The Rusholme by-election began officially on 11 th September 1919 yet it did so without 
a Conservative or Coalition candidate in the field and neither did it appear that the 
Conservatives were in any particular hurry to adopt one; as the Manchester Guardian 
suggested, they might have been content simply to watch the 'opening blows of the 
battle delivered between the two candidates already declared' .86 It was more likely, 
however, that the local Conservatives experienced difficulties in securing a suitable 
candidate. A number of Manchester's most prominent Conservatives had allegedly 
been approached but had declined.87 Eventually, the Conservatives secured Captain 
John Thorpe, a barrister also who served during the war and had been mentioned in 
despatches. 88 Unlike either the Liberal or Labour candidates, Thorpe had no political 
credentials whatsoever. Inevitably this prompted the local Liberal press to suggest that 
his candidature served to illustrate that the Conservatives had failed utterly in the 'quest 
for an influential Manchester man' although it seemed to escape the notice of the 
82 See Manchester Guardian, 10th September 1919. 
83 See Manchester Guardian, lOth September 1919. 
84 M. Stenton and S. Lees, Who's Who 0/ British Members 0/ Parliament, Volume 2, p. 288. 
85 Pringle had fought four previous general election campaigns and had played a key role in the 
establishment of the Federation of Discharged Soldiers and Sailors. 
86 Manchester Guardian, 12th September 1919. 
87 These included E. F. Stockton (President of the Chamber of Commerce), Sir Percy Woodhouse 
(Chairman of the Manchester Conservative Association and the city's current Lord Mayor, Alderman 
Kay). 
88 M. Stenton and S. Lees, Who's Whoa/British Members a/Parliament, Volume 3,1919-1945, pp. 356. 
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Manchester Guardian that neither the Liberal Party nor Labour had secured an 
influential Manchester man. Unusually for the city, therefore, the Rusholme 
by-election was contested by three candidates all unknown as local politicians although 
it was likely this by-election in particular would focus more on contemporary national 
issues than might usually be the case than on the local status of the individual 
candidates. 
From the beginning of the by-election the Liberal candidate made no attempt to hide his 
radicalism. Pringle's principal policy was that of a capital levy which he claimed was 
the only workable means by which to tackle the current economic crisis. Alongside the 
capital levy he ferociously condemned Britain's campaign in Russia, the deteriorating 
situation in Ireland and advocated the immediate nationalisation of all key industries 
and the complete abolition of conscription. 
Pringle's basic argument with regards to a capital levy was that rather than relying on 
Germany to pay reparations 'the people of Britain would have to meet their own 
financialliabilities,89 and he highlighted how expenditure exceeded revenue by more 
than £2 million every day and, although some savings might be obtained from greater 
economy in Whitehall, more had to be done. Pringle argued that the solution did not lie 
in the shape of Chamberlain's proposals (which was just a continuation of a policy of 
borrowing) but in something completely different, a levy on capital. He admitted such a 
policy might cause 'inconvenience in an immediate sense' but it was the best means of 
dealing with the financial crisis in the long-term. At this time some Liberals were 
anxious to present themselves as pioneers of the Capital Levy but the extent of support 
across the whole of the party was unclear. In Manchester there were clearly differences 
of opinion in relation to the policy. During the by-election the Chairman of the MLF, 
Arthur Haworth, was at odds with the candidate over the issue arguing that such a 
proposal was 'unsound even if practical'. 90 In response, Pringle suggested that the 
policy was an essential part of the MLF programme which had been drawn up by a 
representative meeting of all the city's Associations by an overwhelming majority; the 
policy had been adopted in other parts of the country and he refused to remove it from 
89 For Pringle's position on the capital levy see, Manchester Guardian, 12th September 1919 and 25 th 
September 1919. 
90 Manchester Guardian, 26th September 1919. 
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his campaign whether Haworth liked it or not. 
Pringle adopted an equally radical line in relation to the Irish question, claiming that the 
people there were 'held down by military rule [and] their allegiance maintained and 
order preserved by 70,000 troops'. 91 Dominion status as incorporated in the 
Government of Ireland Act was probably the best workable solution but in relation to 
Ulster, allegiance could be determined on a county by county basis. Pringle vigorously 
supported the nationalisation of all key industries claiming that nationalisation was 'the 
only safeguard for the community' 92 as was the taxation of land values. In one 
powerful speech he drew voters' attention to the government's failure to fulfil the 
promises of the previous year: in nine months, he declared, peace had not been made 
(there were still twenty three ongoing wars), the Kaiser remained untried, the promised 
indemnity had not materialised, conscription had been prolonged, the daily expenditure 
exceeded the daily revenue by a catastrophic amount, trade remained hampered by 
restrictions, the country was sinking into bankruptcy, industry was unsettled and 
Ireland was sinking into deeper anarchy.93 In his last election address Pringle delivered 
another very powerful speech focusing on the government's policy in Russia. Apart 
from the obvious sacrifice of British soldiers, he argued that intervention in Russia 
represented a complete waste of money: it had cost over £100million to date.94 He also 
accused the government of lying about casualties, stating that more British troops had 
been killed in Russia than had ever been officially admitted and that the Secretary of 
State for War had lied to the House of Commons in claiming men who went to Russia 
had gone there (overwhelmingly) as volunteers. Pringle argued that a more accurate 
figure was around 10% and that the rest had gone against their will. Ultimately, he 
argued, 'the government had no right to put the life of a single British soldier in peril 
except where the interests of the country were at stake' and that was not the case in 
Russia. Throughout the contest some of the local Liberal rank and file appeared 
uncomfortable with Pringle's policy platform and it was even reported that some of his 
audiences had begun to ask him if he really was a Liberal; he maintained that he was a 
Liberal advocating a Liberal programme. 
91 Ibid. 
9~ See Manchester Guardian, 17th and 20th September 1919. 
93 See Manchester Guardian, 22nd September 1919. 
94 See Manchester Guardian, 7tll October 1919. 
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Robert Dunstan was as radical a candidate for the Labour Party as Pringle was for the 
Liberals. From the beginning of the campaign, he declared that he was not fighting 
Rusholme for 'purposes of propaganda' and like his opponent focused principally on 
the Coalition Government's foreign policy, particularly in Russia. He appealed for an 
immediate end to hostilities and resumption of trade with Russia telling voters that if 
that issue was resolved others would follow: conscription would come to an end, the 
country would not need to maintain armaments and the economic crisis would begin to 
ease. He was a strong supporter of Free Trade and an even greater advocate of land 
taxation.95 Like his Liberal opponent, Dunstan also spoke strongly for the necessity of a 
capital levy. He also paid considerable attention to the issue of profiteering claiming 
that this was just one aspect of an 'embedded corruption in political life'; only the 
Labour Party, he suggested, 'had no profiteers, no secret funds and no rich men' .96 In 
relation to the housing situation he argued there should be a national system and public 
funds ought not to be placed in the hands of private landlords. Throughout the 
campaign Dunstan made explicit attacks upon the Liberal Party and argued that his 
opponent was 'dressing himself up in Labour garments' and it was only in response to 
public pressure (and expediency) that he had adopted such a programme. Dunstan 
stated how he believed both established parties had been discredited during and after 
the war but the Liberal Party in particular had had its day; he told voters how (like many 
others) he had left the Liberal Party because he had been 'disgusted at the conduct of 
Liberal Ministers in relation to secret foreign policy'. 97 He acknowledged that it 
appeared men such as Pringle were indeed creating 'a new programme and a new party' 
but that in itself was 'recognition that the Liberalism of the past had failed [and that] the 
Liberal Party in its despair [was] trying to cover up its past by adopting Labour's 
programme,.98 Why then (he asked) did men such as his opponent not join the Labour 
Party? Of course, for many Liberals it was Labour who had, in fact, stolen their clothes. 
Given that Pringle and Dunstan had adopted virtually identical positions on foreign 
policy, conscription, land taxation, nationalisation and (crucially) a proposed capital 
levy, progressively minded voters would only be able to make a decision based upon 
95 He suggested that taxation from land values ought to be pledged for the maintenance of disabled 
soldiers and their dependents; Dunstan placed considerable emphasis on justice for ex-servicemen 
throughout the campaign, see Manchester Guardian 25th September 1919. 
96 Manchester Guardian, 25th September 1919. 
97 Manchester Guardian, 1 i h Segtember 1919. 
98 See Manchester Guardian, 20 I September 1919. 
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which party was best placed to bring about such change. 
The Conservative candidate advocated few concrete policies, simply focusing his 
campaign on the contention that the Coalition comprised the 'best men in politics' and 
ought to be given time to make good the promises of 1918 alongside a more general 
argument that if nationalisation were to be implemented it would lead to certain 
revolution. Thorpe asked voters to give Lloyd George the opportunity 'to show what he 
could do as a peace prime minister,99 although he made it clear that he 'reserved the 
right to criticise the government as a Conservative and Unionist' .100 The Manchester 
Guardian was clearly infuriated by what it perceived to be a 'vagueness and 
complacency' of the Conservative campaign. Indeed, Thorpe's campaign appeared to 
lack focus until the intervention of a railway strike provided it with some. 101 Although 
he condemned Britain's overseas obligations and sought a resolution to the problems in 
Ireland he ignored issues such as Free Trade, a League of Nations and industrial 
organisation altogether. As the campaign progressed, Thorpe seems to have resorted to 
personal attacks on his opponents, particularly upon the Liberal candidate; he told one 
meeting 'when Pringle [was] fighting in London for a review of the Exceptions Act 
most other men of military age were fighting in the trenches' .102 Thorpe attacked the 
proposal of a capital levy as a confiscation which would 'empty the purses of those who 
[had] a few war savings certificates' although he avoided becoming too embroiled in 
the issue. 103 The traditional Manchester issue of Free-Trade v. Protection hardly 
appeared at all as a significant issue for the main party candidates. Interestingly, Pringle 
did not mention it in any of his election speeches. 
The 1919 railway workers strike happened suddenly during the last week of the 
by-election campaign, and took all the candidates by surprise. The attitude of the 
candidates on the strike varied and it almost certainly made some impact on the 
performance of the parties at this by-election although perhaps not as great as some 
were subsequently to claim. The occurrence of a national strike in the later stages 
99 See Manchester Guardian, 19th September 1919. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Manchester Guardian, 22nd September 1919. 
102 Manchester Guardian, 7th October 1919. To be fair to Thorpe he was pushed by the questioner on this 
occasion, yet, nonetheless, such sentiments probably had their effect all the same. 
103 See Manchester Guardian, 29th September 1919. 
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undoubtedly aided Thorpe's ailing campaign and the electioneering value of a national 
railway stoppage inevitably allowed Thorpe to make an appeal for public support for 
the government at a time of 'national emergency'; he portrayed the strike as an 
organised attack on the constitution declaring that 'forces of unrest must be dealt with 
severely'. 104 In relation to the Labour Party the Manchester Guardian believed there 
emerged an 'appreciation of the part played by organised Labour in the negotiations' so 
this only served to make the anarchist cries of the Conservatives appear ridiculous. This 
benefited the Labour candidate in the election; Pringle stated he was in favour of a 
standardisation of wages across the whole industry and against a return to the low 
wages of the pre-war years but beyond this he was accused of appearing somewhat 
impartial and slightly noncommittal in his attitude. This seems a little unfair however, 
since examination of Pringle's statements on the subject suggest a considerable degree 
of sympathy with the cause of the railway workers; in one speech he described it 
'intolerable' that railway workers had to supplement their 'miserable pittance by tips 
from the general public'. Perhaps suggesting that the strikers be prepared to end their 
action and negotiate while the government listen to their arguments105gave too great an 
impression of impartiality, however, such impressions may have been reinforced by 
Pringle's suggestion that 'only reactionaries and revolutionaries' wished the strike to 
continue and his contention that a strike in one of the great essential services was 'an act 
of war [because] it put the community under a form of blockade'. 106 
During 1919, by-election results across the country were showing 'every sign of 
instability of public opinion' (as the Manchester Guardian expressed), though 
ultimately the newspaper concluded that' a public willing to wound might [however] be 
unwilling to slay' .107 Nonetheless, by-election losses for the Coalition represented clear 
condemnation of the government's policies and by the autumn of 1919 results were 
becoming ever more sensational. Newspapers such as the Manchester Guardian 
believed these provided evidence that the electorate was 'throwing off the momentary 
104 See Manchester Evening News, 30th September 1919. 
105 Pringle argued that impartial tribunals ought to be used especially at such time as the present .when 
industries remained under state control because it meant effectively that the Government was actll1g as 
'judge in their own cases', Manchester Guardian, 30th September 1919. 
106 See Manchester Guardian, 30th September 1919. 
107 Manchester Guardian, 12'h September 1919. 
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madness' of the previous year's general election. 108 
The 1919 Rusholme By-Election: Result and Analysis 
Fig. 10 (Turnout 67.5%) 
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The Rusholme by-election in September 1919 saw the Conservatives managing to hold 
the seat though with a substantially reduced majority; the party won with 45 .7% of the 
vote, a majority of 14.5% over the second-placed Labour candidate (see fig. 10). The 
turnout was low for the post-war period and it is likely that some Liberal voters 
abstained. 109 The striking feature of the result was the advance made by the Labour 
Party, which had doubled its vote compared to the 1918 general election and managed 
to out-poll the Liberals by 12%. Given that Rusholme was traditionally Liberal territory 
(suburban and largely middle-class) this represented an astonishing result for Labour. 
This was an area of the city where Labour had no established organisation and no 
preparation had been undertaken before the contest. For the Liberals the result was 
disastrous. The Rusholme by-election proved a striking reminder that the Progressive 
Alliance in Manchester had been well and truly repudiated by the Labour Party and the 
result was unlikely to change their mind. Ironically though, it illustrated the necessity of 
progressive co-operation: the combined progressive vote amounted to just over 50%, 
4.60/0 more than the winning Conservative. Had there been just one progressive 
108 See Manchester Guardian, 13th September 19 19. 
109 The turnout at the by-election was 67.5% compared to 62 .9% in 1918 (the constituency had the 
highest turnout of any Manchester seat at that elect ion). The 19 19 by-election represented a low turnout 
when compared to mos t post-war contes ts (in the 1922 general election it increased by 1000) . 
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candidate the Conservative would not have been returned. 
The impact of the railway strike no doubt strengthened the Conservative vote 
considerably although there were a number of other factors which might have gone 
against Labour and the Liberals. As we have seen, whilst the Liberal candidate's 
radicalism was applauded by some, others evidently thought him a little too radical and 
there seemed some uncertainty in relation to how far the Liberals as a party went with 
him, especially concerning the capital levy. 110 It was believed that Pringle's 
(perceivably) impartial attitude towards the railway strike might also have weakened 
his campaign but as mentioned already this was slightly unfair as he had demonstrated 
considerable empathy for the railway workers; it might have been unfortunate for him 
to suggest the strikers consider negotiation. More importantly though, the strike 
diverted attention away from the issues which both the Liberal and Labour candidates 
believed would be decisive and upon which they had placed almost all of their attention, 
the capital levy, British intervention in Russia and the situation in Ireland. Furthermore, 
widely-publicised debate within the Liberals over Pringle's support of a capital levy 
was probably unhelpful. As the Manchester Guardian concluded 'the spectacle of not 
only members of the party ... but of the president of the local organisation criticising the 
programme on which the party had invited the candidate to fight' created a disastrous 
impression. The Labour Party on the other hand demonstrated considerable party unity 
and no-one ever publicly questioned aspects of party policy or the policy as advocated 
by candidates in a parliamentary election. III Pringle believed that the election had 
taken place at a time of 'abnormal conditions' and he did not believe it demonstrated 
anything about the real balance of the parties in the constituency or in the wider country 
for that matter. He also suggested that the railway strike 'completely nullified the 
election as a test of public opinion on political issues' because many voters who would 
have voted against the government believed they should rally to the government during 
what they perceived to be a time of crisis. 1 12 At the same time, Pringle also suggested, a 
very large number of Liberal trade unionists believed the 'whole principle of trade 
unionism was at stake so felt obliged to support the Labour candidate'. Like Pringle, 
Dunstan believed that had it not been for the railway strike, Thorpe would not have won 
110 Manchester Guardian, 21 sl October 1919. 
111 Ibid. 
112 See Manchester Guardian, 8th October 1919. 
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although he believed the result still represented a significant blow for the government 
because Labour had doubled its vote in what was a socially-mixed constituency. That 
meant that a sizable proportion of electors had supported the party's position on issues 
such as the capital levy, the taxation of land values, nationalisation and 
self-determination in Ireland as well as the Russian question. I 13 Inevitably, Thorpe 
viewed his victory as a vote of confidence in the Coalition Government and he believed 
policies such as nationalisation and the capital levy had aided his position 
considerably. 114 
F or the local Liberal press, the implications of the result were very clear: given that the 
Liberal and Labour candidates had virtually identical programmes there had 'probably 
never been an election in which the vote [of the two parties] could be more justly 
lumped together as the sum of progressive strength' .115 For the Liberals the by-election 
served to illustrate the futility and consequences of three-cornered contests, and 
demonstrated the effects of an obsolete electoral system. The Liberals began to 
calculate that without electoral reform the position of their party was likely to remain 
difficult if not ultimately impossible in some places. For Labour, however, the result 
justified the decision to stand. Analysis of the Rusholme by-election demonstrates 
Labour's ambition and shows how far the party had come in terms of policy but it also 
highlights the continuing difficulties the Liberal Party faced. In a reversal of the 
pre-war political situation it now appeared that the Liberals were dependent upon the 
acquiescence of Labour. 
4.3: The Clayton By-Election in Manchester (February 1922) 
An early significance of the Clayton by-election in Manchester was that it signalled the 
prospect of a Liberal re-union in the city and although this did not occur at this stage the 
experience possibly ensured that an eventual re-union was likely. The Coalition 
Liberals' current position was difficult since organisation remained weak and 
Manchester's Conservatives appeared unwilling to surrender seats in their favour. 
Whilst there appeared a desire amongst Coalition Liberals to stand a candidate in the 
113 See Manchester Guardian, 21 st October 1919. 
114 See ibid. 
115 See Manchester Guardian, 21 st October 1919. 
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by-election the organisation's headquarters were unwilling to sanction one and the 
by-election consequently saw a straight fight between the Conservatives and Labour. 
The Labour Party's candidate John Sutton had represented the Manchester East 
constituency from January 1910 but been unsuccessful in the newly constituted 
constituency of Clayton in 1918. From the beginning of the contest, Sutton fought a 
determined campaign focusing attention primarily on the failure of the Coalition 
Government to carry through the promises which it had made in 1918. His programme 
had a wide appeal and was likely to appeal to Liberal supporters in particular. More 
than any other issue Sutton appealed to voters on education, condemning the recent 
Fisher Education Act as a 'betrayal of the national interests' and promising to oppose 
'any attempt to rob a child to pay for the war' .116 In an interview with the Manchester 
Guardian he launched a particularly ferocious attack on the proposals of the Geddes 
Committee (published that day) declaring that it was an outrage that the Government 
was 'robbing the children of the war dead,.117 
The publication of the Geddes Report came at an opportune time for the Labour Party 
and it possibly gave the party an enormous advantage. 118 Labour had strongly 
supported the need to protect education and pensions and the report was perceived to 
represent an attack on both. By citing the 'children of the war dead' Sutton no doubt 
struck a chord with many of the division's residents and his defence of education might 
also have appealed particularly to women. Given there were fifteen thousand female 
voters in the constituency it was unsurprising that he made strenuous efforts to appeal to 
them on these issues. 119 Another benefit under threat was pensions and, like education, 
Sutton stressed his fundamental opposition to any cuts. 120 Housing was also a concern 
as it had been suggested that houses built by the local authorities ought now to be sold 
off. Sutton argued that it was morally wrong to sell off public housing and that tenants, 
many of whom were ex-servicemen, could be evicted before replacements were 
built. 121 Inevitably the question of the current economic crisis, unemployment in 
116 See Manchester Guardian, 3rd February 1922. 
117 Manchester Guardian, 4th February 1922. 
118 The Geddes Report proposed to exclude children under the age of six from school .. 
119 As most candidates did after 1918 Sutton addressed a number offemale only meetIngs where he dealt 
with aspects considered to especially affect them. 
120 The Geddes Committee proposed a 5 shilling (a week) reduction in pensions. 
121 Manchester Guardian, 14th February 1922. 
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particular, assumed a significant amount of attention during the by-election. 122 A 
manifesto in support of Sutton outlined how Britain was 'sinking beneath its burden of 
debt' while ministers were 'squandering money in support of frantic military 
adventures in support of reactionary policies abroad'. 123 Sutton used his final election 
speeches to argue that unemployment and a flawed foreign policy were intrinsically 
related. He told voters how unemployment was and would continue to be a problem that 
would overshadow all others and it was all 'down to the discreditable incompetence of 
the Coalition Government'. 124 There needed to be an immediate restoration of 
European trade (including Russia and Germany) and a restoration of Free Trade, which 
he stated was essential for the region given that the condition of industry in the region 
was 'determined by international relationships more than anywhere in the country' .125 
In contrast to the Coalition's flawed foreign policy the Labour Party, Sutton argued, 
advocated a policy of peace; interference in Russia and other countries had already cost 
£200 million. He suggested this could have built 200,000 new houses and he told voters 
the government 'had never been in earnest with their cry of building "homes fit for 
heroes to live in" and he argued that those who spoke of military pacts were 'traitors to 
the uncounted dead'. 126 Sutton defined his programme clearly and directly and 
successfully forced the campaign on to the record of the Coalition after the Armistice. 
He told voters that he simply wanted to 'do his best for those who had suffered by the 
war'. Interestingly, he chose to avoid the issue of national is at ion saying that it was 'not 
an immediate issue' .127 A need to deal with critical issues such as unemployment, 
education, pensions, housing and the inadequacy of the peace treaties gave Labour 
momentum from the very beginning of the by-election and the publication of the 
Geddes Report perhaps reinforced Sutton's contention that the Coalition was 'unfit to 
govern'. 
Essentially, economic, political and social context, a small number of issues, good 
organisation and the performance of the candidate himself ensured that the Labour 
122 It was reported that unemployment levels in the division were high; 500 colli~rs had been out of~ork 
since the miner's lock-out and many others, especially in engineering, were either totally or partially 
unemployed, Manchester Ev~ning New, 7th February 1922. 
123 Manchester Guardian, 13 February 1922. 
1~4 Manchester Guardian, 16th February 1922. 
125 See Manchester Guardian, 3rd February 1922. 
126 See Manchester Guardian, 16th February 1922. 
127 Ibid. 
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Party was likely to perform very well at the Clayton by-election. Sutton was very likely 
to secure the support of many Liberal supporters. He was a Free Trader. a strong 
advocate of the taxation of land values and a League of Nations. The only policy area 
where there might have been a difference of opinion with the Liberals (though not all of 
them) related to nationalisation although he mostly avoided that issue. The Manchester 
Guardian concluded that Labour's alternative amounted to 'not only a keen criticism of 
the Government but a forward policy' and that Sutton had effectively articulated a 
'Liberal programme that was easy to support' .128 The Liberal press possibly played a 
critical role in reassuring Liberal voters: throughout the contest the Manchester 
Guardian strongly urged its readers to vote for Sutton pointing out how the by-election 
presented a 'decisive opportunity to condemn the government' .129 
Throughout the by-election, the Conservative candidate W. H. Flanagan never 
concealed the fact that he would only be willing to support the Coalition 'so long as his 
party continued to do so' .130 As the campaign proceeded, however, his allegiance to his 
party began to appear tenuous and by the end of it he had started to sound more like an 
anti-government candidate. Tellingly, perhaps, he received no support from the 
Conservative Party leadership, having to rely on a few of Manchester's sitting MPs for 
support. Throughout the contest he played up his credentials as a local managing 
director and employer. In terms of economic policy Flanagan stressed a need for 
economy and an improvement in industrial relations. Co-operation between capital and 
labour formed the basis of his campaign yet he caused controversy when he appeared to 
suggest favouring the use of the military in industrial disputes. 131 The Liberal press 
reported that he had been a strong Protectionist up to 1920 but he was now claiming to 
be a Free Trader. In terms of foreign policy Flanagan initially took a very different 
position than his Labour opponent, declaring that he would 'wholeheartedly' support an 
alliance with France although he later modified this by saying he actually would wish 
little more than an entente. He believed Germany was attempting to evade her 
responsibilities but his position on this also changed as the campaign progressed; by 
polling day he appeared to be demanding a total revision of indemnities and even spoke 
128 Manchester Guardian, 18th February 1922. 
129 Ibid. 
130 See Manchester Guardian, 8th February 1922. 
131 Somewhat astonished, the Manchester Guardian claimed that this amounted to 'firing a shot over 
open sights into his working-class audience', see Manchester Guardian. i h February 1922. 
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enthusiastically about the League of Nations. 
Flanagan did not always cope well on the election platform and hi s speeches appeared 
abstract and vague. He failed to develop his points and regularly had difficulties in 
answering questions effectively. At one meeting, for example, he admitted to agreeing 
with an audience member's argument that the Coalition had failed to honour the 
promises made to servicemen in 1918. 132 He appeared to be the very antithesis of 
Sutton's polished, accessible and intelligent platform style. Some saw this as an 
endearing, albeit eccentric, aspect of his character but given the prevailing climate of 
hardship in the division it began to be perceived as rather inappropriate. 133 
The 1922 Clayton By-Election: Result and Analysis 
Fig. 11 (Turnout 73.7%) 
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The Clayton by-election resulted in a significant victory for the Labour Party. Sutton 
won the seat with a majority of just over 3,500, 14.2% of the total vote . At 74% the 
turnout was significantly higher than in 1918. Sutton claimed the result represented ' a 
blow against the Lloyd George Government and any candidate who had any lingering 
attachment to it ' but it also suggested public approval of the policy of the Labour Party 
particularly on education. He also stated that he believed hi s advocacy of 
m Manchester Guardian, 15 th February 1922. 
m The Manchester Guardian appeared to be completely perp lexed by Flanagan and even went 0 far a 
to report that ' hi s mind [was] almost too remote for the common traffic of politics' , ee /l/ol/clieslc'r 
Guardian report , 1 ath February 1922. 
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'reconstructing Europe as the only way of reconstructing England' had been especially 
well received and he said electors now 'understood more fully how international affairs 
impacted upon them' than in 1918 and that there had been a pronounced anti-militarism 
amongst electors. 134 It is probable that Sutton had received a large proportion of the 
Liberal vote; the Liberals had urged supporters to get solidly behind Sutton and it had 
been easy on this occasion as Sutton had advocated a very 'Liberal' programme. He had 
avoided the issue of nationalisation focusing in particular on education and foreign 
policy and his platform talents shone in contrast to his inept opponent. For the Liberal 
press, the Clayton by-election appeared to demonstrate why unity was essential for the 
progressive parties; had there been a Liberal candidate the seat might have been lost and 
that would have been disastrous. The Manchester Guardian reiterated how it believed 
the 'future of Labour and Liberalism', as the by-election illustrated, was absolutely 
dependent upon some sort of 'accord' .135 Yet the same newspaper recognised that 
difficulty lay with the local associations and while there was 'plenty of goodwill on the 
Liberal side [there was] a good deal less on the part of Labour' .136 
Analysis of the Clayton by-election illustrates two important aspects of political change 
in Britain in the aftermath of the First World War. Evaluation of the election campaign 
demonstrates how the Labour Party came in to claim its 'Liberal' inheritance. As we 
have seen, John Sutton had articulated an exceptionally 'Liberal' programme focused 
principally upon the failures of the Coalition government: on issues such as education, 
housing, unemployment, pensions alongside foreign policy and as an individual he was 
a remarkably capable advocate of the Labour Party's (in his words) 'forward looking' 
programme. The impact of particular candidates (such as Sutton) and the sheer 
forcefulness of their campaigns were arguably of critical importance to changing 
political allegiance in the aftermath of the First World War. Whilst post-war socio-
economic and political issues were increasingly national (as an emphasis on, for 
example, foreign policy illustrates), the way the respective candidates articulated their 
condemnation of the record of the Coalition and the way they advocated their own 
party's programme ought to be recognised as of being enormously significant. This 
suggests that in many ways the Labour Party created its own expansion, as Tanner 
134 See Manchester Guardian, 20th February 1922. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Manchester Guardian, 20th February, 1922. 
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expressed, 'by learning to represent people's needs' .137 The national political situation 
created a more favourable environment for Labour but the mobilisation of voter 
disillusionment into actual support for the party and, ultimately, firm political 
allegiance was achieved not least because of the ability of candidates such as John 
Sutton within the local context. 
4.4: The 1922 General Election in Manchester 
Political Context 
Less than two weeks after the Carlton Club meeting the two sections of the Liberal 
Party in Manchester announced a complete reunion of the party in the city and on 2nd 
November the united party launched its general election campaign with a large 
demonstration in the Free Trade Hall. A number of points are important to recognise 
with regards to Liberal reunion in Manchester however. The Coalition Liberals never 
appeared to be as strong a force as in other parts of the country. In part, this was because 
the local Conservatives after 1918 had never been enthusiastic supporters of the 
Coalition. Some Conservative candidates in 1918 had chosen to refute the endorsement 
they had received from the Coalition; one Conservative candidate had run against and 
defeated a couponed Liberal in Hulme. Furthermore, for Manchester's Liberals there 
was, of course, that article of faith uniting them all: Free Trade. The return of a 
potentially Protectionist-inclined Conservative administration was a reason in itself to 
prompt the two sections of the party to overcome any differences. 
Practically, Liberal reunion meant that Liberal activists who had been either officially 
or unofficially identified with Lloyd George simply returned to the local Liberal 
Associations. In terms of voters the Manchester Guardian estimated that around 75% 
of those Liberals who had given their allegiance to the Coalition would now be fully 
behind Liberal candidates in their constituencies although no estimate was made with 
nkn 138 C 1·· L·b I regards to total numbers since this was presumably u own. oa ltIon 1 era s 
who wished to remain a distinct entity faced considerable difficulties, not least in terms 
of organisation. 
137 See D. Tanner, 'Class Voting and Radical Politics', p. 106. 
138 Manchester Guardian 3rd November 1922 
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From the beginning of the 1922 general election campaign the reunited Liberal Party in 
Manchester appeared optimistic that some of the ground lost four years earlier could be 
recaptured. Party workers suggested voters were supporting the Liberals because they 
'did not know how far back the Conservatives would go and how far forward Labour 
may go' 139 and organisers were reportedly taken aback by the size of audiences who 
'flocked to obscure schoolrooms' to hear the Liberal candidates speak. The Liberal 
press evidently felt that reunion had given the party a new lease of life in the city and 
predicted a Liberal resurgence. 140 
Whilst there was some variation between the Conservative candidates on fiscal policy 
none of them openly supported Tariff Reform and three even declared themselves as 
out-and-out Free Traders (in Exchange, Blackley and Platting). Unsurprisingly, the 
Liberal press viewed this as an election 'charade' and advised voters not to trust 
them. 141 The Conservative Party in Manchester was determined to sustain its current 
electoral position as it was across the country and this was reflected by the candidates 
the party had secured. In Exchange, Sir Edwin Stockton represented a local 
heavyweight. A well known cotton manufacturer, he had recently been President of the 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce, was a Director of the Manchester Ship Canal, 
Governor of Manchester University and member of the Cotton Control Board. In 
Rusholme, Platting, Blackley and Moss Side the Conservatives were possibly basing 
their hopes on a split vote. In all of the constituencies the Conservatives attempted to 
secure former Coalition Liberal support, some more overtly than others. In Blackley, 
for instance, Harold Briggs defined himself as 'a Conservative of progressive thought' 
and appealed directly to National Liberals who believed in 'stability, economy and 
unity' .142 The only Conservative not to court the National Liberal vote was T. Watts in 
Withington who reportedly went as far as putting up 'crude' and critical cartoons of the 
former prime minister' .143 In the poorer parts of divisions such as Exchange and Hulme 
the Conservatives tended to focus on the familiar aspect of cheep beer and the local 
Liberal press inevitably condemned such tactics as crass and simply a ploy to 'catch 
votes' despite admitting that such appeals were likely to be effective in these areas. 
139 Ibid, 2nd November 1922. 
140 Manchester Guardian, 4th November 1922. 
141 Manchester Guardian, 2nd November 1922. 
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As we have seen, after 1918 the Labour Party was not prepared to countenance any 
form of co-operation with their former Liberal allies although the Liberal press in 
Manchester believed this owed more to the party's national leadership than it reflected 
the overall attitude of the local constituency organisation.144 Whether this was true or 
not, it certainly appeared too late for local agreements to be reached other than where 
the local Labour Party remained ill equipped to stand candidates. Admittedly, some 
Labour activists might have believed co-operation with the Liberal Party was useful for 
short-term development yet most determined it would severely disadvantage the 
movement in the longer-term. This is a critical point: after 1906 the Labour Party's 
priority had been short-term objectives; it was, after-all, a young organisation 
embarking upon its first tentative steps. After 1918 the situation was very different. 
Within this context, short term expedients such as entangling alliances with the Liberals 
did not equate with the party's aims and objectives. 
The 1922 general election in Manchester saw four three-cornered contests, three 
straight fights between Labour and the Conservatives and three contests between 
Liberals and Conservatives. Labour (officially) stood in opposition to Liberals in three 
seats. The situation in Manchester might be taken to support the assertion that 
co-operation between the two left-of-centre parties had completely broken down and 
indeed it did not suggest a spirit of progressive harmony. However, there is another way 
to interpret the political situation in Manchester. Effectively, the Liberal Party was 
given a free run in three constituencies (Withington, Hulme and Exchange). These were 
all parts of the city where the Liberals might expect to perform well. It seems curious 
that Labour chose not to contest these seats in 1922. Likewise, the seats where Labour 
was given a free run against Conservatives were also in districts where that party had 
established a strong presence and would perceive to constitute its 'natural' territory 
(Clayton, Ardwick and Gorton). It seems that even though the Progressive Alliance had 
broken down at the national level, in Manchester there remained a sort of recognition 
that party interests remained best served if the left-of-centre parties were given a free 
run in their attempts to capture the anti-Conservative vote in districts identified as their 
'natural territory'. The Liberals were cautious not to spin political fantasies around the 
concept of an alliance with Labour anymore and the Labour Party might have sought to 
1~~ Manchester Guardian, 3rd November 1922. 
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reiterate its independence. The result was the same however: six of the city's ten seats 
saw no intra-left fight. In Manchester, the politics of the Progressive Alliance continued 
even if it was unconscious and unspoken; the parties continued to selectively target 
seats avoiding direct confrontation with each other as far as possible. The situation in 
the three constituencies where the Liberal and Labour parties did face each other was 
more complicated. Rusholme ought to have been considered a Liberal seat and the 
Liberals evidently viewed it this way; Platting was more of a Labour seat than it was 
ever likely to be considered Liberal. 145 Both parties might logically lay claim to 
Blackley. Examination of three-cornered contests in 1922 illustrates a great deal in 
relation to the positions adopted by the respective parties in terms of selectivity in 
contesting parliamentary constituencies. 
Three-Cornered Contests 
Rusholme had been won by the Conservatives at the by-election in 1919 largely , though 
not exclusively, on the basis of the national railway strike. In 1922, the Liberal Party 
opted for a more moderate candidate, E. F. M. Sutton, although the Labour candidate 
Albert Wood remained in the same radical vein as his predecessor. Like Dunstan at the 
by-election, Albert Wood was a successful barrister and was tremendously adept at 
articulating his points. From the outset he conducted a vigorous and intelligent 
campaign focusing more or less exclusively on unemployment and the late 
government's inability to tackle economic crisis effectively. His campaign slogan was 
'peace, security and humanity' and he declared he wished to eradicate the 'ghost of 
insecurity' by creating a 'revolution in the minds [of the people] so they might see the 
justice of what the Labour Party advocated' .146 Wood was highly critical of the former 
prime minister who he claimed was responsible for the 'present chaos' and he told 
voters that the forces of privilege and monopoly would unite again; throughout the 
campaign he stressed (what he called) the inequality of sacrifice made by the 
working-classes during the war and how that sacrifice now appeared to have been in 
vain. 147 Wood did not solely blame the government, however, so much as the wider 
community as a whole; in one powerful speech he told his audience how 'people's 
emotions were generous when they thought Belgium was being wiped out. .. but [they 
145 Plattina had never become a safe Labour seat. The strength of Conservatism remained high. 
/:> th 
146 See A/ollc/7csll!!" Guardian, 5 November 1922. 
1~7 Ibid. 
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were] slow to act now when eight million people were starving at home'.148 In relation 
to the Capital Levy Wood claimed there was nothing confiscatory about it, asking 
voters to consider whether it would have been used if the war had necessitated it. He 
suggested that the present economic emergency and its attendant suffering did require it. 
In another highly emotive speech he declared how 'something radically different must 
occur if life is to be worth living' .149 Altogether, Wood represented a powerful orator 
and remained focused on the one issue he had determined to fight the campaign upon, 
the Capital Levy. 
Rusholme's sitting member, John Thorpe, had been a strong supporter of the Coalition 
and, in stark contrast to his opponents throughout the 1922 campaign, continued to 
reiterate his admiration for Lloyd George. In contrast to his by-election campaign three 
years earlier, Thorpe adopted an aggressive anti-Labour stance; he told one audience 
they should support 'anyone in order to defeat the Labour Party' which he said was 'the 
real enemy' of the nation. 150 He was ferociously hostile to the Capital Levy claiming 
such a policy would destroy the national wealth and the empire and represented the 
'most fatal, unfair and unworkable proposition ever put forward in English political 
life' .151 For good measure he added that were Labour to obtain power it would also 
mean the end of Christianity. 152 In relation to Free Trade he declared it to be simply a 
'business proposition' and refused to outline his position any further. 153 The 
Conservative campaign in Rusholme was highly negative and understandably this 
antagonised the Liberal press. The Manchester Guardian, for example, described 
Thorpe as 'the most naIve of the candidates' and concluded 'politics to him [was] just a 
jolly game ... a thing of high spirits and laughing assurances' .154 
The Liberal candidate (E. F. M. Sutton) was also regarded as a particularly strong 
candidate. He was a well known local businessman and had been a member of the 
Manchester City Council for some time. Sutton focused attention on a wider range of 
148 Manchester Guardian, 5th November 1922. 
149 Manchester Guardian, 7th November 1922. 
150 Manchester City News, 5th November 1922. 
151 Manchester Guardian, 8th November 1922. 
152 Manchester Guardian, 13th November 1922. 
153 The Manchester Guardian went so far as to write that Thorpe basically saw Free Trade as a 'dull affair 
for the theorists of the Chamber of Commerce' , locally, the Liberals were evidently unimpressed with his 
stance on the subject. 
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issues than most of the other Liberal candidates in 1922 although he was inevitably 
forced to focus attention on fiscal policy, accusing the sitting member of 'not daring to 
stand on a Manchester platform and advocate Protection' .155 Unusually for a Liberal 
candidate in 1922 Sutton went to considerable lengths to condemn the Capital Levy 
referring to it as 'a mad idea' which would inflict 'more harm on the working man than 
on the man it taxed because the economy would be affected so adversely' .156 Sutton 
claimed a restoration of Free Trade and addressing reparations would alleviate 
problems such as the housing crisis and unemployment. 
Another three-cornered contest which attracted a significant amount of attention during 
the 1922 election campaign was that of Platting where it was believed that the sitting 
member J. R. Clynes faced his most challenging contest to date. It was even believed 
that Clynes might lose his seat. Interest was no doubt heightened by the fact that for the 
first time since 1900 the seat was also being contested by the Liberal Party. Inevitably, 
Clynes focused most attention on the late government's record in respect of social 
reconstruction and the economic crisis. 157 He staunchly defended Labour's policy of 
the Capital Levy issuing an array of literature examining the proposal. Clynes told his 
constituents that 'those who had not £5,000 could breathe freedom ... [it] was only 
intended to target excess'; the excess of fortunes made largely on the back of the war. I58 
Clynes fiercely condemned the Coalition telling voters that the country 'did not have 
government but a callous desertion of it' and the people were 'entitled to more than just 
general talk about tranquillity.' 159 He believed his party faced considerable difficulties, 
however, because since Labour had grown in strength, their opponents were resorting 
to 'desperate attempts' to 'scare electors' by suggesting the party sought 'discontent'. 
This was erroneous, he claimed, because the Labour Party simply desired 'justice for 
those who did most to help the country during the war [but who were presently] treated 
the worst' .160 Like all of the Labour candidates considered within the present study. a 
154 Manchester Guardian, 13th November 1922. 
155 Manchester Guardian, 8th November 1922. 
156 Manchester Evening News, 8th November 1922. 
157 Similar to Labour candidates across the country, Clynes focused most attention on how the promises 
of the late government in respect to housing and treatment for ex-servicemen had ~ot be~~ kept; he told 
one meeting that 'those who had sacrificed and suffered for the war' had seen theIr pOSItIOn get worse. 
Manchester Evening, i h November 1922. 
158 Manchester Guardian, 14th November 1922. 
159 See Manchester Guardian, 7th November 1922. 
160 Ibid. 
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feature of the 1922 election was how they strongly articulated inequality of sacrifice 
during the war and an abject inequality of the burden afterwards. 
The Liberal candidate in Platting, W. Ramage, had been adopted a year earlier and had 
already undertaken a significant extent of constituency work. It was reported that he 
had canvassed in excess of over 25,000 of the 35,000 electors in the division and 
altogether approximately 50,000 election addresses had been circulated. 161 This 
suggests that the Liberal Association had already determined to make a very serious bid 
for the seat. Ramage chose to focus attention principally on the hardship endured by 
ex-servicemen. He told voters 'those crushed by the war should be the first charge upon 
the revenue'. 162 The Conservative candidate in Platting, Frank Hodge, promoted 
himself as a Free Trader and represented the moderate wing of his party. He argued the 
army should be kept at as Iowa force as conducive to national safety, opposed 
reductions in war pensions and spoke at length about the need to protect trade union 
powers.163 Hodge repeatedly stated how he wished to see an end to 'class-war' and he 
emphatically avoided pursuing an aggressively anti-Labour position. Neither Hodge 
nor Ramage addressed the capital levy in detail. 
The other three-cornered contest in Blackley saw the same three candidates as in 1918; 
all were well known in the area. In 1918 the Conservatives had won the seat with a 
majority of nearly 2,000 and it was generally believed that the sitting member, W. J. H. 
Briggs, had been a conscientious representative. Like Hodge in Platting, Briggs was a 
moderate Conservative who referred to himself as a 'progressive' Conservative and he 
focused attention primarily on ex-soldiers, pensions and unemployment. He avoided 
becoming embroiled in a debate over the Capital Levy despite the fact that his opponent 
had made it a central plank of his campaign. Labour's candidate, A. E. Towend, 
focused his campaign principally on the housing question and the Capital Levy. He 
argued that the housing crisis amounted to a 'betrayal of the people' telling voters this 
alone should 'leave them with no alternative but to vote for the Labour Party:16-l 
Townend asserted there was no better alternative but to accept the proposed Capital 
161 Manchester Guardian, 10th November 1922 and The Times, 2nd November 1922. 
162 See Manchester Guardian, 9th November 1922. 
163 See Manchester City News, 7th November 1922 and Manchester Guardian. 5th November 1922. 
164 See Manchester Guardian, 5th November 1922. 
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Levy if the necessary social reforms were to be financed; in response to what he called 
'adverse press coverage' on the issue, he argued that if the country was ever going "to 
get out of the morass of financial stagnation' it had to impose taxation on those who 
could still pay. Like most other Labour candidates in 1922 he related the issue 
specifically to an inequality of sacrifice during the war and a disproportionate burden at 
present. 165 More so than in other constituencies both Conservative and Labour 
candidates in Blackley focused the greater part of their campaigns on social policy and 
effectively there was little to distinguish between them. Neither Townend nor Briggs 
paid any attention at all to the fiscal question. The Liberal candidate P. Oliver, however, 
focused significant attention on Free Trade arguing that since Liberal representation in 
Lancashire remained low the region had practically been forgotten and Free Trade, so 
vital to the trade of the district, had been severely undermined. 166 Oliver asserted it was 
on the principle of Free Trade alone that voters should return Liberal candidates. 167 He 
did, however, address other aspects such as education, housing, medical services and 
pensions for ex-soldiers.168 
Labour v Conservative Contests 
Three of Manchester's constituencies saw straight fights between the Labour and 
Conservative Parties. In Clayton John Sutton told voters Bonar Law's policy of 
'tranquility' meant 'sitting down in a comfortable chair, folding one's arms and doing 
nothing at all' whilst in the country 'the people were practically at starvation point' 
concluding that 'the country must not trust these people again' .169 In a particularly 
powerful speech he argued that 'a working man who voted for an employer against a 
candidate selected by his own class was a traitor to his own cause' . 170 The opponent he 
had faced at the earlier by-election, W. H. Flanagan, proceeded in the same manner he 
had on that occasion: he had virtually no programme although this time he adopted a 
165 See Manchester Guardian, 10th November 1922 for example. Townend offered a staunch defence of 
the Capital Levy primarily on the basis that the working-classes 'rallied to the country when .the.ir 
services were conscripted for the purposes of war' and so the least others could do now was aSSIst m 
relieving the financial burden for those suffering incalculable suffering. 
166 Manchester Guardian, 8th November 1922. 
167 Ibid. 
168 He argued that economy was not the best policy, rather, educating the people was pointing out that 
whilst it cost £12.4s.4d per year to educate a child it cost £390 to educate a soldier at Sandhurst and he 
also argued economy could be effected by withdrawing from overseas expeditions such as Mesopotamia. 
See Manchester Guardian, 8th and 9th November 1922. 
169 See Manchester Evening News, 7th November 1922. 
170 Manchester Guardian, 9th November 1922. 
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more vigorous anti-Labour platform. In Gorton the former Minister of Pensions, John 
Hodge, faced determined opposition although he made a vigorous effort to fight for his 
seat. Unlike some of Manchester's other Labour candidates Hodge concentrated 
virtually exclusively upon the Capital Levy and, as he perceived, the injustices of the 
war. He asked electors why 'when manhood had been conscripted was capital allowed 
to escape'. 171 Hodge urged voters not to be misled by 'wild statements that Labour 
sought to destroy the country' because its intention was, in fact, to 'save it'. 172 
Unsurprisingly, Hodge also devoted considerable attention to pensions and the 
treatment of former soldiers, their dependents and the families of those who had not 
come back. He stated that he would oppose any attempt to abolish the Pensions 
Ministry or cut down the pensions of ex-servicemen. Given that Hodge placed so much 
emphasis on the Capital Levy it was inevitable that his Conservative opponent, W. 
Heap, based his campaign primarily around a strong condemnation of it and he told one 
meeting that with the Capital Levy the Labour Party had been brought to 'the level of 
the Communist Party' .173 
Liberal v Conservative Contests 
The remaining three Manchester constituencies (Exchange, Hulme and Withington) 
saw straight Conservative v. Liberal contests. Manchester's most famous parliamentary 
constituency, Exchange (formally North-West) had a fluctuating electoral history and it 
was thought the 1922 general election here would be one of the closest across the city. 
The Conservatives had selected a local heavyweight as their candidate Sir Edwin 
Stockton, an extremely well-known local businessman though more crucially one ofthe 
Conservative's greatest advocates of Free Trade. The inevitable argument of the 
Liberals was, as always, that their candidate, Sir A. W. Barton would be a more 
effective Free Trader because the Conservatives would never be converted as a party to 
the principle of Free Trade. 174 The Liberals also attempted to make capital out of the 
fact that Stockton had been a member of the Protectionist Board of the Manchester 
Chamber of Commerce after the Free Traders had been ousted. Stockton responded that 
this merely demonstrated the Liberals were clutching at straws. 
171 See Manchester Evening News, 9th November 1922. 
172 See Manchester Evening News 9th November 1922. 
173 See Manchester City News, 9th November 1922. 
174 Manchester Guardian, 5th November 1922. 
209 
The suburban constituency of Withington represented one of the Liberal Party's 
strongest hopes of regaining a foothold in the city's parliamentary representation. The 
electoral history of the area was strongly Liberal and the party's candidate in 1922, 
Ernest Simon, was a significant asset for the party here; he was one of the party's 
leading lights in Manchester and as outgoing Lord Mayor at the time had a strong 
public profile. Simon focused on the two key issues, housing and unemployment. He 
argued that the whole community 'must accept responsibility for ensuring every willing 
worker was given either work or proper maintenance and he stated that 'a larger policy 
was needed in respect of housing' 175 and he told voters all the Conservatives had 
declared on the issue was that 'they would see what they could do' .176 The sitting 
Conservative member for Withington, R.A.D. Carter, who had been returned with a 
substantial majority in 1918 (69% of vote), had retired in 1922 so a new candidate, Dr. 
T. Watts, contested the seat. Watts appeared to have adopted a very simple appeal, 
much to the indignation of the Liberal press: cheap beer. Adding further insult to injury, 
he also declared himself to be a strong supporter of Free Trade. 
According to the Manchester Guardian, Hulme was believed to be an unfertile territory 
for the Liberals, as it contended 'the man who goes there to preach an enlightened 
Liberalism needs a good deal of courage [because it was not easy] to tum the eyes of 
people of such a neighbourhood from the immediate prospect of cakes and ale' .177 
Beyond this however, even the Manchester Guardian was forced to concede that the 
sitting Conservative member, Major Joseph NaIl, was one of the Conservative's most 
capable representatives in the city. Like Hodge and Briggs, NaIl was on the left of his 
party and his campaign focused on an exceptionally wide range of issues. He spoke at 
length about the need to maintain ex-servicemen, the extension of the Rent Restrictions 
Act, maintenance for the unemployed and about issues such as education and 
housing. l78 NaIl declared himself in favour of Imperial Preference although he did not 
dwell too much on this aspect. A notable feature of NaIl's campaign was his evident 
distaste for what he termed the 'mud-slinging' style of politics which he said was 
'submerging the real issues' . Throughout the 1922 general election campaign he clearly 
175 See Manchester Guardian, 10th November 1922. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Manchester Guardian, 15th November 1922. 
178 See Manchester Guardian, 5th November 1922. 
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avoided anti-Labour sentiments. 179 Of course there was not a Labour candidate in 
Hulme but even so one might expect that the Conservatives might have attempted to 
make some capital out of a general anti-left feeling but the sitting member here simply 
chose not to. The Liberal candidate in Hulme, Walter Davies, was a well known local 
Liberal and treasurer of the MLF. His principal focus throughout the campaign was the 
failure of the Coalition Government primarily in respect of economic aspects such as 
Germany's ability to pay reparations at the current rate,180 the decline in trade with 
Russia and the reduction in trade within the Lancashire district. Davies told voters his 
opponent's policy of Protection was itself largely responsible for the present scale of 
unemployment in the region; NaIl himself avoided the issue so ultimately Davies was 
never able to divert attention onto it. An obvious problem for the Liberal Party here 
was that it was impossible to appear particularly socially progressive compared to the 
Conservatives because the sitting Conservative MP already was. It was impossible to 
portray the Conservatives here as unflinching or reactionary. 
The 1922 general election saw the Liberal Party reunited in Manchester and outwardly 
at least the party appeared re-energised and expectations of a recovery were high but, as 
we have seen, the greater number of the Liberal candidates adopted conservative 
platforms and this contrasted greatly with the intensity of the Labour candidates' 
campaigns. On top of this, the Liberals remained beset with weak national leadership 
and the continued party split nationally. 
179 Throughout the campaign NaIl was highly critical of his Liberal opponent. In the main this was 
because NaIl had taken great offence that the Liberal had told a meeting that his opponent had only been 
elected in 1918 because he was 'in Khaki with his arm in a sling', see Manchester Guardian 9
th 
November 1922. 
180 He said reparation debts ought to be written off. 
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The 1922 General Election Results in Manchester: Results and Analysis 
Three-Cornered Contests 
Fig. 12 Rusholme (Turnout 77 .8%) 
48% • Conservative 
o Liberal 
• Labour 
12% swing Coalition Conservative to Liberal 
Fig. 13 Platting (Turnout 81.8%) 
6% 
46% 
Seat unopposed in 1918 
48% • Labour 
• Conservative 
o Liberal 
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Fig. 14 Blackley (Turnout 81.4%) 
43% 
30% 
5.65% swing Conservative to Liberal 
Fig. 15 Moss Side (Turnout 70.4%) 
20% 
• Conservative 
o Liberal 
• Labour 
• Conservative 
o Liberal 
51 % Labour/Co-op 
9.95% swing Conservative to Liberal 
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Liberal v. Conservative Contests 
Fig. 16 Withington (Turnout 77.40/0) 
49% 
51% 
17.8% swing Conservative to Liberal 
Fig. 17 Hulme (Turnout 70.1 %) 
43% 
57% 
8.2% swing Conservative to Liberal 
• Conservative 
o Liberal 
• Conservative 
o Liberal 
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Fig. 18 Exchange (Turnout 6l.20/0) 
42% 
58% 
• Conservative 
o Liberal 
12% swing Coalition Conservative to Liberal 
Labour v. Conservative Contests 
Fig. 19 Clayton (Turnout 82.90/0) 
50% 50% 
7.1 % swing Labour to Conservative 
• Conservative 
• Labour 
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Fig. 20 Ardwick (Turnout 7l.4%) 
48% 
• Labour 
52% 
• Conservative 
10.65% swing Coalition Conservative to Labour 
Fig. 21 Gorton (Turnout 79%) 
46% 
• Labour 
• Conservative 
54% 
17.15% swing Labour to Conservative 
Analysis of the 1922 General Election Results in Manchester 
The 1922 general election resulted in no resurgence for the Liberal Party in Manchester 
although close analysis of the results reveals that the Liberal Party had not been 
decimated. Evaluation of the Liberals performance in 1922 reveals a number of factors. 
In straight fights against the Conservatives the Liberals polled well ; the party managed 
to obtain 49%, 43% and 420/0 in Withington, Hulme and Exchange respectively (see fig. 
16, 17 and 18). Given the continuing difficulties the party faced at the national level, the 
Liberal ' s performance in these constituencies could be perceived as impress ive 
although Exchange probably represented a great di sappointment. In the three-cornered 
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contests the picture was more mixed. Whilst the Liberals managed to outpoll Labour in 
three of the four triangular fights, the margins between the two were extremely low (see 
figs. 12 and 14). In Moss Side where the margin was much greater (see fig. 15) this was 
against an unofficial Labour candidate who had had no organisation of any kind in the 
division. In Platting the Liberal poll at 6% was terrible (see fig. 13). The 1922 general 
election suggested that party support continued to be spatial but more significantly that 
where progressive co-operation broke down the results were disastrous. Although 
speculative, had the Liberals been allowed a free-run in Rusholme and Blackley the 
party would have been returning two MPs for Manchester and would have lost Moss 
Side by just a fraction (l %). The collapse of the Progressive Alliance meant that the 
political outlook for the Liberals in Manchester appeared uncertain yet it did not look 
altogether secure for the Labour Party either. 
Nationally, the most significant feature of the 1922 general election was the advance 
made by the Labour Party. In Manchester, as this analysis illustrates, there was no 
Labour breakthrough, in fact the results were hugely disappointing for the party. From 
seven candidates across the Manchester constituencies Labour secured the return of just 
three including J. R. Clynes and John Hodge, both of these only just managing to hold 
on to their seats (see fig. 13 and 21). There was just one new seat captured (in Ardwick) 
although the party's overall position did not improve owing to the loss of Clayton (see 
fig. 20) which John Sutton had captured earlier in the year at the by-election. This 
represented a particularly bitter loss for Labour since the Conservatives slipped in on 
just 11 votes. Furthermore, of the four constituencies in which there were 
three-cornered contests, three, Blackley, Moss Side and Rusholme, (see figs. 14, 15 and 
12), saw Labour placed below the Liberals. Although, as we have seen, the margins 
between the Liberals and Labour were low (3.1%, 0.1% and 9%) and given the 
complexion of these constituencies (two were virtually middle-class suburbia and the 
other was socially mixed) it could be contended that Labour had polled well. Yet 
overall, the 1922 general election saw the Labour Party in Manchester at a standstill. 
Whilst Ardwick had seen a swing of 10.65% from the Conservatives to Labour. 
Clayton and Gorton had seen swings against Labour of7.1% and 17.15%. As will be 
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seen, this contrasted greatly with other parts of the country.I8I If anything, the 1922 
general election served to demonstrate the necessity of progressive co-operation in 
Manchester yet this appeared to be an unlikely prospect given the Labour Party's new 
ambition and determination to fight elections as an independent force. 
Parliamentary Elections 1918-1922: Conclusions 
Tanner asserts that during the First World War the Liberal left had become both 
politically and ideologically weaker than it had ever been before; Liberalism was 
consequently thrown back to its traditional support base. Since Labour now appeared as 
a more practical alternative the New Liberal ideas which had made the party so 
successful before the war were effectively redundant. 182 Furthermore Lloyd George, 
who had provided the Liberal radicals of the pre-war era with a charisma and ability 
unsurpassed in British history, continued to remain outside the party. This made a bad 
situation considerably worse. Ultimately, as this study illustrates, despite some Liberal 
candidates articulating radical and progressive policy programmes, generally speaking 
the party's candidates could be perceived as virtually on the 'right' of politics or, at 
least, not essentially on the 'progressive left'. As is well established, many Liberal 
radicals (such as Outhwaite who will be discussed below) had concluded that after 1918 
the Labour Party offered a more viable expression of the Liberal principles believed to 
have been ruthlessly abandoned by the Coalition Government. 
Analysis of the parliamentary election campaigns between 1918 and 1922 in 
Manchester suggests that, apart from a few exceptions, Liberal candidates did not 
appear dynamic and progressive in the same way that their Labour counterparts did. 
Overwhelmingly, Liberal candidates fell back on the traditional, though by that time 
slightly dated, issue of Free Trade. The greater proportion of Liberal candidates in 
Manchester appeared to focus on Free Trade at the expense of virtually all other issues. 
On the occasions where progressive Liberal candidates did adopt a more dynamic and 
advanced programme they encountered (very public) resistance from within the local 
Liberal movement. 183 Manchester Liberalism was simply not as progressive as the 
181 In the Hanley constituency of Stoke-on-Trent the swing to Labour was 10.9% (similar therefore to 
Ardwick in Manchester) although this was in the context of a previously high Labour poll in 1918. 
182 See D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 383 and pp. 377-380. 
183 It seems Liberal supporters were at variance as to what they wanted from their party. Whilst some 
seem to have been enthusiastic supporters of radical change, others it seems desired a more moderate 
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Manchester Guardian might have liked to believe it was, or at least it was not 
progressive when it most needed to be, within the context of the parliamentary 
elections. 
4.5: Municipal politics in Manchester after 1918 
As we have seen, the Labour Party's electoral progress III municipal politics in 
Manchester had been fragmented prior to 1914. After 1918, the political situation 
changed dramatically. As in many other areas of the country, the war had taken its toll 
on the Liberal organisation in Manchester and one might assume that this may have 
hindered the party's abilities to fight the first municipal contests after the war. 184 Prior 
to the 1919 elections the Manchester Progressive Union (hereafter MPU) had made an 
urgent appeal to its members for financial assistance and it was reported that the request 
had been met with a tremendous response. The new circumstances in 1919 still 
represented a challenge not least because the re-organisation of the ward boundaries 
necessitated the party organisations readjust to these. An indication of Labour's 
ambition was reflected in the number of candidates the party fielded in the 1919 
municipal elections in Manchester for a total of37 available seats: 19 (compared to 8 in 
1913) while the Liberals and Conservatives stood 8 and 32 candidates respectively.I8S 
The dominant issues of the 1919 municipal campaigns in Manchester were housing and 
the controversial subject of profiteering. As the Manchester City News commented, 
these were two issues which the city's councillors 'had chosen to avoid for so long but 
could avoid no longer' 186 and it was generally perceived that the Labour candidates in 
particular would gain most from the prominence of these two issues. Since Labour's 
position on the council had been peripheral before the outbreak of war, the party could 
platform. This, it could be suggested, represented a fundamental problem for post-war Liberalism; there 
was simply no uniformity of approach and this contrasted greatly with the unity of approach 
demonstrated by the Labour Party after 1918. 
184 The Manchester Liberal Federation attained a significant degree of financial stability. This had been 
achieved by increasing revenue alongside a more stringent allocation of funds to the associations. The 
MLF even managed to maintain its reserve account (a fund kept aside for emergencies), see Manchester 
Liberal Federation Minutes, 26th February 1919. 
185 Note that 7 candidates stood as 'progressives'. These have not been calculated into the Liberal total 
since it remains uncertain who most of these were. Examination of the records shows that only t\\/O 
(Walter Davies in Chorlton and E. F. M. Sutton in Rusholrne) had in any way been connected to the 
Liberal Party in a significant capacity (both of who won). 
186 See Manchester City News, 1st November 1919; the Manchester City lVews was quite right in 
suggesting the city council had 'avoided' the issue; no investment had been directed to new building for 
years and four years of standstill during the war had made the situation critical. 
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therefore not be held accountable for previous failures to deal with such problems. 
Furthermore, as the council records show, these issues (most notably housing) had 
constituted a key plank of the Labour councillors' agenda before 1914. The Labour 
group had at least attempted to address these issues before the war and so could not be 
perceived as campaigning upon them at the present merely for reasons of political 
expediency. 
The 1919 municipal contests in Manchester resulted in a significant advance for Labour: 
the party's candidates were returned in 11 seats taking its total representation on the 
council to 31. Conservatives were returned in 9 seats (their overall representation 
dropping from 55 to 38) and the Liberals were successful in 2 seats (from 5 
candidates).187 In an apparent spirit of progressive co-operation (or simply a reflection 
of the Liberal's inability to contest a greater numbers of seats) there were just 3 
three-cornered contests in the 1919 municipal elections; Blackley and Moston saw the 
Labour Party outpoll the Liberals while in Levenshulme the Liberals outpolled Labour 
although the margins were small (see appendix figs. 171, 184 and 180). For the 
Manchester City News, Labour's large poll in the 1919 municipal elections suggested 
that the public 'was in sympathy with the party's aims' and 'dissatisfied with existing 
conditions' namely in relation to housing and social conditions. 188 The same newspaper 
also reflected that it was perhaps 'inevitable under the circumstances that Labour 
should pitch its strength against the parties which had been [up to that point] principally 
associated with local government'. 189 All the parties had campaigned on social 
reconstruction and one can only assume that in the working-class wards especially 
electors voted for the party they trusted most and blamed the least in relation to 
perceived past failures on such issues. 
The critical question in 1920 was the extent to which the Labour Party would be able to 
hold onto gains made the previous year. Maintaining the momentum from the previous 
year the Labour Party fielded 21 candidates while the Liberals ran 13 (standing on a 
'Liberal and MPU' label). The Conservatives stood 21 for the 29 available seats. The 
1921 municipal elections saw a record number of contests in which the Liberal and 
187 The remaining seats were won by independents, progressives and one co-operative. 
188 Manchester City News, 8th November 1919. 
189 Ibid. 
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Labour parties faced each other (9 in total) reflecting that at this level the Progressive 
Alliance had clearly come to an abrupt end. The results of the 1920 elections saw the 
Liberals and Conservatives return 7 and 13 candidates respectively. Relative to the 
number of seats contested, therefore, the Liberals performed exceptionally well. 
Admittedly, the Liberals had been successful in their traditional heartlands (All Saints', 
Cheetham, Moss Side West, Rusholme and Withington); nonetheless, the elections 
proved that the Liberal Party was not to be discounted as a municipal force. Labour on 
the other hand suffered a significant setback with the party managing to win in just 5 
wards (Beswick, Gorton South, Miles Platting, Openshaw and St Michael's) and, as we 
have seen, these were all areas where the party already had a solid electoral base. More 
particularly, where the Labour Party was challenged by both Liberals and 
Conservatives it performed very badly. Of the 9 triangular contests, only 3 (Harpurhey, 
Moss Side East and S1. Georges) saw Labour able to poll more than the Liberals (see 
appendix figs. 204, 209 and 217). Where Labour was challenged by only Conservative 
opposition (in 10 of the wards it stood) the party did slightly better, winning in 5 
including areas such as Beswick, Openshaw and Miles Platting (see appendix figs. 195, 
214 and 208)190 although it performed very badly against Conservatives in areas such 
as Newton Heath, Longsight and Medlock Street (see appendix figs. 213, 206 and 
207).191 
1921 saw another large number of contests at the municipal elections (33 in total for the 
same number of seats). Just three candidates ran as Liberals while 9 stood as 
'Progressives'. Some of the latter included well-known local Liberal activists (and 
existing council members) so effectively the total number of 'Liberals' may be seen to 
have totalled 12 (the same as the previous year). Labour and the Conservatives ran 16 
and 29 candidates respectively. The contests resulted in the return of22 Conservatives, 
5 Labour, 4 Progressives and 2 independents. The Labour Party had performed well in 
the areas where it was already well established; Beswick, Bradford and Gorton South 
(see appendix figs. 224, 226 and 235) though did badly elsewhere (see appendix figs. 
225 and 227 for example). In contrast to the previous year, the 1921 municipal elections 
190 Beswick and Openshaw were both 'better' working-class wards and highly unionised while Miles 
Platting was more mixed (including some slum areas). . .. 
191 Newton Heath and Longsight were both mixed wards while Medlock Street contamed sIgmficant 
slum areas. 
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saw just two contests where the Liberals and Labour faced each other; in a straight fight 
in Newton Heath and a triangular contest in St. Mark's; in the former the Liberal won 
with a large majority (see appendix fig. 245) and in the latter Labour was returned while 
the Liberals came bottom of the poll (see appendix fig. 253). The results were mixed for 
the Liberals; the party performed well in its suburban heartlands, Didsbury and 
Rusholme for example (see appendix figs. 232 and 247) but poorly in more mixed areas 
such as Crumps all , Collyhurst and Longsight (see appendix figs. 231, 230 and 238). 
Exchange represented a particular disappointment for the Liberals where the party' s 
candidate polled 34% less than the winning Conservative (see appendix fig. 233). 
Whilst the 1922 municipal elections were perceived to have greater significance 
because of the parliamentary contests, the occurrence of the general election meant that 
only a relatively small number of wards were contested, 23 in all. Despite increased 
pressure on the organisation because of the general election Labour was still able to run 
a large number of candidates in the municipal contests, 19 in total, just one less than the 
Conservatives. The Liberals, no longer using the label progressive, ran only 6 
candidates and managed to return 2 (in Chorlton-cum-Hardy and Rusholme). Of the 3 
wards where the Liberals and Labour faced each other, Collegiate Church saw the 
Liberals push Labour into third place, a split vote in Miles Platting allowed the 
Conservative to win and in Moston in a straight fight Labour won with a substantial 
majority (see appendix figs. 260, 265 and 268). Altogether, 10 of Labour's 19 
candidates were returned which represented a great success yet the results left the party 
with a net loss on the council of 4. The overall position of the council consequently 
stood at 75 Conservative, 27 LiberallProgressive, 25 Labour and 13 independents; the 
Conservative majority was roughly what it had been in 1920. 
Council Politics in Manchester after 1918 
The 1919 municipal elections represented a watershed in Labour's position within local 
government in England and, as we have seen, in Manchester. The party was now in a 
better position to have a significant impact upon municipal politics than it had ever been. 
Yet as Labour's position changed so too did the attitudes of the established parties. 
Prior to 1914, Labour's councillors had largely been moderate Lib-Lab types. This had 
begun to change but, generally speaking, few of the Labour Party's municipal 
representatives were out-and-out socialists. Moreover, they were generally recei\'ed 
positively by the established parties; there never existed what one might define as an 
anti-Labour agenda. After 1918 this changed dramatically. One of the key features of 
the immediate post-war period was how Labour's municipal representatives became 
more assertive and political; likewise, the attitude of the established parties, 
particularly the Conservatives, became noticeably hostile. Municipal politics after 1918 
became increasingly politicised and this may have, in turn, had wider electoral 
implications. Although the following section focusing upon council politics in 
Manchester after 1919 is necessarily brief, it hopes to provide an insight into the impact 
a larger influx of Labour members had upon the Manchester City Council. A key 
question, of course, is how the new (larger) Labour group attempted to assert its 
influence in municipal policy formation and what (perceivably) the electoral 
implications of this were. It will consider Labour's role in the formation of municipal 
policy on the two critical issues of the period, unemployment and social welfare reform 
within the context of the 'municipal economy' debate. 
A significant problem for the Labour Party before 1914 had been low representation on 
the council committees192 and immediately after the 1919 contests the Labour group 
were anxious to address this issue. 193 They argued that the council ought 'to take 
cognisance of their new position and accept the Labour victories at the polls.' 194 The 
request, however, was ignored. The Manchester Guardian in particular became 
strongly supportive of the Labour Party's claims in relation to committee representation. 
In March 1920, for example, the newspaper bemoaned the fact that whilst Labour may 
have done very well at the polls, this 'could not guarantee the party an effective voice in 
the city's affairs which its numbers might warrant,.195 The same report also claimed 
that it was widely known that the Conservatives within the council considered the 
Labour members as being of 'inferior status.' This was quite possibly the case although 
there also were some specific reasons underpinning objections to a strong Labour 
192 Arguably, it was within the council committees that much of the critical work (and policy formation) 
took place. 
193 Cahill suggests that because ofthe committee system, even as a minority party, Labour was affo~ded a 
greater degree of influence in policy formation than its numbers justified, see M. Cahill, 'Labour m the 
Municipalities' in K. D. Brown, (ed), The ~irst La~our Party,. p. 97. In Manc~ester,. however, even after 
1919 Labour's representation on the councIl commIttees remamed low and thIS contmued to be an aspect 
of dissatisfaction for the party. 
194 Manchester Guardian, 4th December 1919. 
presence on the committees, most notably the question of impartiality. This was 
illustrated by the Conservative Alderman Bowes when he argued that because 'of their 
politics they [were] debarred from performing certain governmental functions ... as 
trade unionists, they could not be expected to hold the balance evenly between the city 
and its workpeople where dealings with corporation employees were concerned' .196 
Yet clearly the attitude of the Conservatives was influenced by prejudice as much as 
anything else. The Manchester Guardian reflected this when it reported (at the same 
meeting) how 'almost every amendment emanating from the Labour benches was 
negated by a solid Conservative vote' .197 Although Labour received the support of 
some Liberals this was rarely enough to ensure the adoption of Labour amendments or 
proposals. 198 Clearly, obtaining a sizable foothold in the municipal representation of the 
city was one thing, but being able to exercise influence in the decision making process 
thereafter was a different matter. Nonetheless, the Labour group did make its presence 
felt in the only way it could, within the context of the council's monthly meetings. 
Inevitably perhaps, the group focused its attention on aspects such as unemployment, 
housing and general issues of social welfare. 
Analysis of policy on unemployment helps to shed light on party ideology and 
influence at the municipal level during the immediate post-war period. An early 
(though very striking) indication of mounting economic crisis in Manchester occurred 
in March 1919 when an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 unemployed men gathered outside 
the city's town hall in an attempt to alert the council to their plight and, of course, to 
request it consider possible assistance especially in the interests of demobilised ex-
servicemen and munitions workers. 199 Securing a meeting with the Lord Mayor, one 
demonstrator (local Labour activist Annie Lee) described conditions in Openshaw as 
on the verge of disaster; hundreds were on the verge of pneumonia, she reported, 
because they could not afford to buy coal and she also highlighted how nearly 60,000 
women across the city were unemployed. Another member of the deputation told the 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid. 
198 The Aldennanic bench was also influential in swinging the council against Labour resolutions on 
many occasions. . ~ . 
199 It was estimated that about ten thousand of these were ex-serVIcemen, see Manchester Guardwn, 6th 
March 1919. 
Lord Mayor how, in his opinion, the city was 'on the verge of catastrophe' .200 Within 
the council chamber, unsurprisingly, the issue received immediate attention in terms of 
discussion but only after the intervention of Labour members did it appear that more 
resolute action was to be undertaken. On the initiative of the Labour group's leadeL 
Tom Fox, the City Council voted in favour of establishing a special committee to report 
on schemes of public utility to be put in place by the council's departments. 201 
Furthermore, after protests by Labour's Councillor Davy it was agreed to pass a 
resolution to the government urging steps be taken to accelerate normal working 
conditions by the decontrolling of industry. Davy especially had been exceptional vocal 
on insisting there be no delay in the council's actions, as he argued 'these men were 
victims of the Great War and are entitled to be maintained'. 202Unlike other areas such 
as Salford, Manchester had been slow in creating general schemes of relief work. On 
the recommendations of the special committee on unemployment from 1921 the 
council had begun a range of relief schemes employing over 2000 men and the Lord 
Mayor's Fund had raised over £11,000, from which £500 a week was estimated to 
provide for over 500 families.203 
The question of 'municipal economy' had long been a feature of the politics of local 
government but with increasing economic uncertainty the issue attained an even greater 
significance after 1919. This presented difficulties for the municipal authorities since 
whilst much work needed to be undertaken in connection to social improvements 
(housing, education, child welfare, health, not to mention unemployment relief work), 
the question of 'economy' meant such schemes became increasingly controversial. 
Economy became the central focus of council politics after 1919 and it was extremely 
politically divisive. The parties were eager to present themselves as upholders of 
'municipal economy' and, equally, anxious to label their opponents as 'wasters'. The 
electoral appeal of the economy 'cry' could be perceived as one which would inevitably 
disadvantage the Labour Party (given its focus on the absolute necessity of welfare 
improvements) yet examination of the municipal debates in Manchester reveals that 
this might not necessarily have been so straightforward. The Labour group was as 
200 Manchester Guardian, 6th March 1919. 
201 Ibid. 
2l1::> Ibid. 
203 See Manchester Guardian, 22nd October 1921. 
anxious as its opponents to use the 'economy cry' but from a very different perspective 
and, arguably, the anti-Labour-anti-waste strategy of some of the party's opponents 
may not have reaped the rewards expected.204 As we will see below, on the many 
occasions when Manchester City Council's Labour members argued against the 
economy 'lobby' they did so by questioning the established notion of what 'economy' 
meant. In defending various welfare provisions, they argued that 'true economy' could 
only be effective with improved health, education and the general well being of the 
people (children in particular). This can be seen, although it was not necessarily 
articulated as such, as a national efficiency argument as much as by humanitarian 
concerns. 
In Manchester, proposals to increase expenditure on various essential social provisions 
were regularly met with determined opposition from members of the council who 
deemed it an inopportune time to embark upon 'idealistic schemes' .205 Inevitably, the 
progressives on the council objected strongly to cuts in social provision for the sake of 
so-called 'economy' arguing that, irrespective of the basic humanitarian grounds, poor 
health and education of the workers was, in any case, more expensive in the long-term 
than the expenditure invested in the present. Even the issue of child welfare proved 
divisive within the council chamber. In March 1921, for example, a proposed extension 
of child welfare centres across the city saw the Public Health Committee forced to 
abandon its attempts to substantially reduce costs after opposition from Labour and 
Liberal councillors?06 In a heated debate the combined forces of the 'progressives' 
maintained that the centres were an essential part of the drive to reduce infant mortality 
which remained very high and they were well used and thus evidently useful. The 
following month's meeting was again dominated by the question of economy after the 
Chairman of the Finance Committee moved a motion that no new schemes (at all) be 
initiated or existing ones extended. Two Labour members, Alderman Jackson and 
Councillor Mellor, led opposition to the motion. Mellor suggested that if the Finance 
Committee 'needed new revenue it only needed to look to land values for the 
204 It could be suggested that this is similar to the way anti-Labour propaganda in the form of Bolshevik 
accusations in 1922 back-fired. 
205 See speech opposing proposals to build houses by the Conservative councillor James Johnson, 
Manchester Guardian, 2nd July 1921. 
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answer' . 207 The meeting saw a particularly heated debate though ultimately the 
Labour-led opposition was successful by 49 to 33 votes, leading the Manchester 
Guardian to declare a 'significant victory for the council's progressive forces in 
relation to the "economy" debate' .208 
Later in 1921 economy speeches became an even more dominant feature of the monthly 
council meetings particularly in the months preceding the November elections. The 
Labour Party appeared anxious to be seen as mindful of a need for economy though 
from a different perspective. Whilst Labour argued the council ought not to cut 
essential social services, there were areas where appropriate savings could be made 
they argued. In the September meeting, for example, the Labour group claimed, 
amongst other things, that some surveyors employed by the Housing Department were 
surplus to requirements and a drain on expenditure, the reservoir begun 14 years earlier 
in Heaton Park was increasingly expensive and the £60,000 a year the corporation spent 
on stationary could be dramatically cut. 209 At the following month's meeting a 
Conservative attempt to reduce expenditure on the provision of massage sessions for 
children with rickets was overcome by combined Labour and Liberal forces who 
argued 'expense should not stand in the way of a chance of a cure' .210 Examination of 
the Manchester city Council records suggests that the economy versus child welfare 
debate was one those demanding 'economy' were unable to win though the key point 
remains that, more often than not, it was only after Labour led opposition to cuts that 
such plans were abandoned. 
Another aspect which generated considerable debate was the question of official's pay 
and on a number of occasions the Labour group successfully led opposition to large 
increases in municipal salaries. In December 1921, for example, when the question of 
the newly appointed Town Clerk's salary came up for discussion it proved to be 
extremely divisive. Labour's Councillor Cundiff moved that the proposed salary be 
206 The proposal not to proceed with extending the schemes was defeated by 67 to 25 votes and i~ a 
highly unusual move the Manchester Guardian published the names of the 'ConservatIve 
irreconcilables' who had voted against the schemes, see Manchester Guardian, 3rd March 1921. 
207 Manchester Guardian, 7th April 1921. 
208 Manchester Guardian, 7th Afril 1921. 
209 See Manchester Guardian, 6 September 1921. 
210See speech by (Liberal) Councillor Charles Godbert speaking in support of maintaining the sessions in 
MO/1L'hester Guardian, 6th October 19:21. 
227 
reduced by £250 claiming that electors' at the municipal elections had 'expressed their 
feelings on the subject of economy'. The three parties remained split, however; some 
asked what difference £250 would make while others believed to contemplate paying a 
lower salary to its Town Clerk than other municipalities would be terribly embarrassing 
for Manchester. Cundiff stood his ground however, arguing that it was 'a question of 
setting an example ... at a time when there existed so much hardship it was 
inappropriate to be handing out enormous salaries to officials'. 211 A compromise was 
finally reached when the new Town Clerk himself offered to accept the reduction. 
Whether this would have been the case without Labour's objections remains an open 
question, but the episode, again, illustrates how the Labour members were anxious to 
demonstrate concern for what they perceived to be unnecessary municipal expenditure. 
A year later, the city's chief water engineer was also denied a salary increase after a 
resolution moved by Labour Councillor Hague. Despite objections on the grounds that 
this particular official had saved the corporation £200,000 by overcoming technical 
difficulties and the fact that other corporations paid their engineers much more, the 
council supported Sutton's argument (by 54 to 51 votes) that 'whilst [there were] 
hundreds of schoolchildren to feed and thousands of men starving [it was] not playing 
the game to advance already large salaries' .212 Interestingly, it was noted by the press 
that on this occasion a number of Conservatives had voted with the Labour group (and 
Liberals). 
This analysis includes just a small sample of the many examples one finds in the 
municipal proceedings and how the enlarged Labour group contributed to the council's 
debates and subsequent policy in Manchester. It illustrates that after 1919 the Labour 
group had clearly grown in confidence and become a dynamic force on the city council 
despite persistent difficulties such as low committee representation and sizable 
opposition to its position on many aspects. The electoral significance of this can only be 
speculative although it is possible to suggest that, for some voters at least, Labour's 
practical contribution to safeguarding certain social provisions and active role in policy 
on aspects such as unemployment may have served to consolidate their allegiance to the 
party. Furthermore, in wards where Liberal supporters no longer had the choice of a 
Liberal candidate, the fact that the Labour group on the council was refomlist and 
211 See Manchester Guardian, 3rd December 1921. 
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progressive may have underpinned their support. Analysis of the council records in 
Manchester suggests that there existed a considerable extent of progressive 
co-operation and there appears to have been little in the way of a significant anti -Labour 
cleavage within the council. Additionally, neither does analysis of the municipal 
elections after 1919 demonstrate the emergence of a formal alliance between the 
Liberals and Conservatives. 
4.6: Political Change in Manchester 1918-1922: Conclusions 
As in many other areas across the country, the First World War had a significant impact 
on the Liberal Party in Manchester. The party lost all of its parliamentary representation 
in the city in the 1918 general election and saw its share of the vote plummet. Despite 
this, it would be unwise to determine that the Liberals in Manchester had been entirely 
decimated by the experience of war. Furthermore, as this study shows, there was no 
immediate transference of allegiance from the Liberals to Labour. In two of the three 
triangular contests in 1918 the Liberals were able to outpoll Labour opponents. In 
Manchester, as indeed nationally, Labour's performance in the 1918 general election 
was disappointing; the party's position had barely improved at all. But, of course, the 
'coupon' election had been conducted amidst highly unusual, even chaotic 
circumstances and the extent to which the results in fact reflected actual party support 
was questionable. Subsequent elections would prove more illustrative. 
Some historians have suggested that during the early 1920s the Labour Party did best 
where it was more concerned with practical working class interests as opposed to 
industrial struggle.213 Detailed analysis of the two by-elections and the 1922 general 
election in Manchester shows how Labour candidates after 1918 focused their attention 
on questions such as greater justice in relation to the burden of war, education and 
housing alongside policy on unemployment and industrial organisation. In many 
respects, Labour's policy programme from 1918 reflected traditional Liberal concerns. 
Tanner has suggested that these were 'moral issues [which] built upon pre-war 
campaigns for economic justice'. 214 Examination of post-war electoral politics in 
Manchester lends support to this assertion; the Labour candidates' impassioned 
212 Ibid. 
m See, for example, M. Savage, Dynamics, pp. 194-199. 
214 D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 351. 
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advocacy of (concrete) proposals such as a capital levy and education, housing and 
unemployment, may have ensured a growing proportion of electors perceived Labour 
(as opposed to the Liberals) as representing the best medium for reform. As this study 
shows, the impact of particular candidates, their campaigns and party organisation were 
all critical to electoral realignment in the post-war period. Candidates such as John 
Sutton in 1922 fought determined campaigns and proved to be capable advocates on 
policy. The overriding sentiment for them was that the war ought not to have been 
fought in vain and as the Clayton by-election result demonstrated, the result was that it 
contributed to propelling Labour forward as the principle party of the industrial 
working -classes. 
Nationally, the most significant feature of the 1922 general election was the advance 
made by the Labour Party. Manchester, however, saw no such breakthrough; in fact the 
results were hugely disappointing. From seven candidates across the ten Manchester 
constituencies, Labour secured the return of just three; two of these saw the sitting MPs 
Clynes and Hodge only just managing to retain their seats. Just one new seat was 
captured although the Labour Party's overall representation did not change owing to the 
loss of another. Furthermore, of the four constituencies in which there were 
three-cornered contests, three saw the Labour Party placed below the Liberals. The 
1922 general election saw the Labour Party in Manchester at a standstill. On the other 
hand, the re-united Liberal Party in Manchester had a renewed sense of confidence and 
optimism. This did not manifest in electoral success however, although given that the 
party remained lumbered with weak national leadership and continued division, the 
Liberals performed well in Manchester. Future prospects remained uncertain, not least 
because strategic co-operation with Labour was clearly no longer a possibility. 
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Chapter 5: Electoral Re-alignment in Stoke-on-Trent, 1918-1922 
5.1: The 1918 General Election in Stoke-on-Trent 
Political Context 
Studies such as those by McKibbin, Tanner and Petter have all provided some 
assessment of Stoke-on-Trent although this has focused on the period prior to 1914, 
largely due to the national significance of the 1912 by-election because of the 
implications this had for national politics. 1 No study has examined constituency 
politics in the area after the First World War. Analysis of political change in Stoke-
on-Trent after 1918, however, provides a valuable insight into political re-alignment 
after the upheaval of war. As we have seen, before 1914, industrial North 
Staffordshire was an area deeply impregnated with popular working-class Liberalism 
and there appeared little prospect of an imminent Labour breakthrough. The 1918 
general election, however, saw a significant advance for Labour in the area and this 
was consolidated in 1922 by which time the party held two of the three parliamentary 
seats (the other being held by an independent Labour member). The Liberal Party, on 
the other hand, had suffered an astonishing reversal in political fortune. 
At the national level the immediate post-war period saw Labour became a more 
serious political force whilst the Liberals became a seriously diminished opposition. 
The Progressive Alliance collapsed completely and in some areas Liberal unity 
disappeared. We should be cautious though not to exaggerate Labour's immediate 
post-war advance. In many areas there was no immediate transfer of support from 
Liberal to Labour; political realignment was, uneven, fragmented and subject to 
regional variation. Analysis of Manchester illustrates that the 1918 general election 
did not produce an electoral breakthrough for the Labour Party and neither had the 
Liberal Party seen its electoral base collapse completely (even though it had lost all 
seats in the city). Of the two localities examined in this study it was in Stoke-on-Trent 
(the area which had appeared most secure for Liberalism before the war) that 
Labour's post-war advance was immediate and most pronounced. In the light of 
analysis of the period before 1914, post-war developments in Stoke-on-Trent appear 
startling. The striking feature of the 1918 general election in Stoke-on-Trent was the 
remarkable swing to Labour. This represented a significant transformation of political 
I See R. McKibbin, Evolution; D. Tanner, Political Change and M. Petter, 'Progressive Alliance'. 
allegiance and it set the tone of the politics in the region for the next century. Few 
areas saw such absolute destruction of the Liberals between 1918 and 1922 as did 
Stoke-on-Trent and yet this was an area which had previously been one of the party's 
heartlands. 
The 1918 General Election: Candidates, Electors and Controversies 
In consequence of boundary changes in 1918 Stoke-on-Trent now had three seats in 
Parliament; Hanley, Burslem and Stoke.2 In 1918 the Stoke division was uncontested 
since all parties agreed to unanimously nominate the sitting Liberal-Labour member 
John Ward who remained on active service in Siberia. The following assessment of 
the 1918 general election, therefore, considers the contested seats of Hanley and 
Burslem. As discussed in analysis of Manchester in 1918, the operation of the 
'coupon' saw the Asquithian Liberals as being deemed suspect in their political 
loyalties and· thus they rarely received official Coalition endorsement. In both 
contested seats in Stoke-on-Trent the Liberal candidates fell under this ban. 
In Hanley the 1918 general election was contested by four candidates; these were an 
independent Liberal (Leonard Grimwade), a Coalition! National Democratic Party 
(hereafter NDP) candidate (James Seddon), the sitting Liberal member who was 
refused re-adoption by his party (Robert Outhwaite) and a Labour candidate (Myles 
Harper-Parker). With no Unionist candidate, the contest amounted to an intra-left 
fight although strictly speaking Seddon was not a straightforward 'left' candidate. The 
Liberal radical Robert Outhwaite had been returned at the by-election six years 
earlier. His vocal criticism of various aspects associated with the war, however, had 
not endeared him to either the local Liberal Association or the local press and in 1918 
he was (effectively) de-selected. The Liberal Association had requested that he stand 
down but he refused to do so. After some persuasion, one of the area's prominent 
pottery manufacturers, Leonard Grimwade, was adopted as the officially sanctioned 
Liberal candidate. Significantly, the Hanley Liberal Association had struggled to 
secure a candidate. In Hanley the Liberals appear to have been unprepared for an 
election at this time and Grimwade had literally been adopted just days before the 
beginning of the campaign. He later claimed that he had been urged to stand by an 
2 The new constituencies were arranged as follows: Stoke now comprised of Stoke. Fenton and 
Longton, Hanley included fragments of Basford and the old Stoke parliamentary borough and Burslem 
comprised of the towns of Burslem and Tunstall (which was formally part ofNe\\castle). 
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'array of local interests' including the free churches, temperance organisations, 
manufacturers, as well as the Liberal Association. From the beginning of the contest 
Grimwade asserted that he was an 'enthusiastic supporter of Lloyd George' and 
would support the Coalition although he was anxious to stress that he did not believe 
the next government would be a very long one.3 With the appearance of the coupon, 
however, Grimwade adopted a more combative approach and openly criticised the 
Coalition and its tactics although he seemed anxious not to place the blame directly 
upon the Prime Minister. 4 
The most controversial of Hanley'S candidates in 1918 was the NDP/Coalitionist 
J ames Seddon. Seddon had an interesting background for a Coalitionist with 
predominantly Conservative support. Having been a trade union organiser he had 
previously sat as a Labour member for the Newton constituency in Cheshire between 
1906 and December 1910. He had briefly been president of the T.U.C (in 1914) and 
by 1918 had become an active organiser for the British Workers' League. Douglas 
suggests that a number of NDP candidates were put forward with the primary aim of 
unseating Liberal or Labour MPs whose attitude towards the war had been viewed as 
unacceptable by the government.s Given Outhwaite's high profile role in condemning 
many aspects of the war, this may have constituted a key reason for Seddon's 
candidacy in Hanley. The Labour Party candidate, Myles Harper-Parker, was an 
exceptionally well-known local Labour activist. He had been a miner, was Secretary 
to the National Organisation of Enginemen and Firemen and was an alderman on the 
Stoke-on-Trent Council. 
The new constituency of Burslem saw a slightly more conventional contest with three 
candidates; an independent Liberal (Sir R. W. Essex), a Coalition Conservative 
(Sampson Walker) and a Labour candidate (Samuel Finney). R.W. Essex described 
himself as a 'Coalitionist with a Liberal bias' pledging 'wholehearted support' for the 
government. He advocated a policy of 'fusion' between the parties and took an 
exceptionally strong line in relation to how to deal with Germany going so far as 
arguing for the immediate expulsion of all Germans from Britain. Essex had 
previously been MP for Cirencester until defeated in January 1910 and had then 
3 Staffordshire Sentinel, 19th November, 1918 . 
.j Ibid. 
5 R. Douglas, History o/the Liberal Party. p.119. 
represented Stafford until its re-organisation III 1918. The couponed 
Coalition/Conservative (Walker) had been hopeful of standing in Hanley but had been 
adopted for Burslem with the appearance of James Seddon. Walker had been a 
councillor on Stoke-on-Trent Borough Council since 1910. Throughout the 1918 
campaign he assumed a distinctly anti-Labour stance. The Labour candidate, Samuel 
Finney, was perceived to be a strong candidate, the local press reporting he came 
before electors with 'tremendous personal esteem,.6 Finney had formerly been 
President of the North Staffordshire Miners' Federation and had an impressive 
background in municipal politics (councillor and alderman); he was a prominent 
Primitive Methodist (serving as a local lay preacher) and was a well-known 
temperance man. He had unsuccessfully contested Hanley in 1912 at the by-election 
but had later become MP for N orth-West Staffordshire upon the death of the Albert 
Stanley in January 1916. Finney was emblematic of industrial North Staffordshire's 
Lib-Lab tradition; tellingly, the Staffordshire Sentinel asserted Finney had been 
'brought up a Liberal and has been a life-long Liberal but is now a member of the 
Labour party,.7 
The 1912 Hanley by-election had exposed the Labour Party's weakness in the area 
prompting the national leadership to focus more vigorously upon these kinds of 
constituencies. For Labour to advance the party had to improve its position in the 
industrial heartlands of Great Britain. In relation to organisation, the 1918 general 
election marked a significant turning point for the Labour Party (nationally and 
locally). At the time, it was repeatedly stated how Labour 'threw more vigour' into 
the election than any other party.8 It was equally recognised that the now substantially 
larger trade union movement also strengthened Labour's position considerably in 
respect to organisation.9 The extent of the Labour Party's ambitions in 1918 was 
clear; nationally the party put up 388 candidates compared to just 56 in December 
1910. It also possessed a manifesto that demanded attention. For all these reasons the 
junior partner in the pre-war Progressive Alliance appeared a more serious political 
force. In Stoke-on-Trent (as across the country) Labour entered the 1918 general 
6 Staffordshire Advertiser, 5th December 1918. 
7 Staffordshire Sentinel, 4th December, 1918. 
8 The Times, 9th December, 1918. 
9 During the war trade union membership had doubled from ~ million to 8 million. 
election in a very different position than it had done in 1912 at the by-election and the 
outcome reflected this. 
Like their counterparts in Manchester, from the beginning of the contest all the 
(independent) Liberal and Labour candidates were united in their fervent opposition to 
the timing of the election, viewing it as something forced upon the country, not to 
mention undemocratic because of the inability of soldiers and sailors to participate. Io 
Tanner's suggestion that objections to an immediate appeal were based on the party 
organisations being unprepared appears to be a somewhat clinical assessment. I I 
Certainly, Liberal organisation in some constituencies (and this was the case in Stoke-
on-Trent) was not as sharp as it had been previously.12 Primarily this was due to an 
absence of party workers (in particular agents). 13 However, objections to the timing of 
the election in Stoke-on-Trent (like Manchester) rested more on genuine anger at the 
perceived manipulation of the electorate by the Coalition rather than considerations in 
connection with party organisation. Simply, as one of the Labour candidates 
expressed, the general view was that the government ought to have 'waited for the 
lads to come back' . 14 
At the time, it was suggested by the Liberal press that more than anything else two 
factors determined the results in 1918; a candidate's war record and Lloyd George's 
leadership. IS Indeed, where a candidate had been an out-and-out objector to the war or 
vocal in opposition to certain aspects associated with it, their chances of being 
returned were remote. A striking feature of the 1918 general election in both the 
contested constituencies in Stoke-on-Trent, however, was the remarkably restrained 
manner in which the general election was conducted. There appeared to be a marked 
absence of the intense patriotic fervour one imagines to have been present in 1918. 
10 As in Manchester, the number of absent voters in Stoke-on-Trent was very high; it was estimated that 
in Burslem 1,200 voters out of a total of 6,200 were missing and in Hanley the figure was even greater 
at 3,000 (out of 7,000). A percentage of these were either missing or killed. Whilst the receiving officer 
declared that every effort was being made to reach absent voters this was obviously going to be 
extremely difficult. Figures cited in Staffordshire Advertiser, 4th December 1918. 
11 See D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 404. 
12 As earlier analysis of the 1912 by-election illustrated, however, it appears that organisation had never 
been a particular strength of the Liberal Party in North Staffordshire. On that occasion the regional 
federation was forced to intervene in an attempt to sort it out, see Midland Liberal Federation Minutes, 
31 st July 1912. 
13 See Midland Liberal Federation Mil1utes, 21 st March 1919. 
14 See speech by Myles Harper- Parker, Staffordshire Sentinel, i h December, 1918. 
15 See Manchester Guardian, 14th December 1918. 
The idea that voters were only interested in revenge and overwhelmed with a sense of 
nationalism is not born out by detailed analysis of the press coverage of the election 
campaign in this area. The debate on the terms of the peace settlement appeared more 
restrained and rational than one might expect. Excepting the Coalitionists, all other 
candidates remained at pains to stress the need for a fair and just peace. 16 As one 
Labour candidate proclaimed, 'obtaining a just peace does not mean the imposing on 
the defeated enemy the payment of a large indemnity,.17 Rather, he outlined, what 
was needed was a 'clean peace which would leave no germ of hatred, revenge or 
vindictiveness out of which could grow a future war' .18 Unsurprisingly the 
independent Liberals were also arIXious to express their desire for a rational peace 
settlement suggesting also that future peace could only be secured by the 
establishment of a league of nations. On these issues there was little to separate the 
Liberals and Labour parties. In Stoke-on-Trent (apart from the two Coalition 
candidates) all others adopted an extremely moderate attitude in relation to the peace 
settlement. More importantly, it seems many electors appeared to support them on this 
aspect. Certainly, as will be seen, a percentage of the voters in Hanley clearly 
supported a harsh peace settlement and, in the end, went with the candidate who 
promised the most in this respect, but the fact remains that the majority were more 
supportive with the views of the outspoken Liberal Robert Outhwaite (who will be 
discussed below) than the Staffordshire Sentinel would have liked to have admitted. 
Ultimately, the effects of the British electoral system distorted the electoral realities. 
Given the Coalition landslide in 1918 it would not be hard to conclude that public 
opinion was overwhelmingly and only interested in revenge and retribution and 
national studies have shown that this became a more pronounced feature as the 
19 h h . campaign progressed. In both Stoke-on-Trent and Mane ester, owever, It appears 
that there existed a substantial extent of public opinion which ran counter to this. 
16 Un surprisingly the Coalition candidate in Hanley repeatedly stated Gennany should pay 'to the 
utmost farthing for their crimes against humanity', Staffordshire Sentinel, 29th November, 1918. 
17 See Myles Harper-Parker speech, Staffordshire Sentinel, 11 th December 1918. 
18 Ibid. 
19 As the campaign progressed (on the advice of party managers) Lloyd George and his supporters 
began to adopt an increasingly hard-line approach to ~he peace settle~ent since it was reported (b: 
candidates) that this seemed to be what electors deSIred; see T. WIlson, Downfall, p. -Wand R. 
Douglas, History of the Liberal Party, p. 119. 
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The 1918 General Election Campaign in Hanley 
Few constituencies in 1918 had a sitting member as vocal in his opposition to the 
conduct of the war as did Hanley. Robert Outhwaite was not in a strict sense an out-
and-out pacifist but he had taken an increasingly critical stance on various aspects 
associated with the conduct of war notably conscription,20 soldiers' pay, army 
punishments and the timing and nature of the peace. Outhwaite had voted against the 
introduction of conscription in 1916, had led a parliamentary agitation for an increase 
in service pay and had been extremely vocal on the barbarity of certain army 
punishments such as 'crucifixion' ?1 He had been particularly forceful in his 
questioning of the Secretary of State on the issue of a negotiated peace throughout the 
summer of 1918.22 Given the general climate in November 1918 it was inevitable 
there would be some disquiet over his stance on the war. This came primarily from 
the local press, however, which mounted a hostile counterattack against him arguing 
that he had brought shame and dishonour to the town and had made Hanley notorious. 
The Staffordshire Sentinel refused to report his meetings claiming that it was 
precluded from printing a large part of his speeches under the terms of the Defence of 
the Realm Act and, in any case, the newspaper had already 'explained, discussed and 
refuted' his views.23 The Staffordshire Sentinel claimed that Outhwaite was 
attempting to 'camouflage his weird misreading of history', that he was a 'casual 
political wanderer with no party behind him' and concluded that his views were 
'hostile to the national interest' .24 Outhwaite responded by contending that he had 
been 'misrepresented and slandered for four and a half years.' He claimed his 
supporters were being intimidated and threatened and at one point he even threatened 
to sue the newspaper. 25 
The Staffordshire Sentinel reported just one of Outhwaite's election meetings yet this 
provides enough detail to allow us to appreciate the considerable forcefulness of his 
20 Outhwaite claimed conscription had been introduced to 'fetter the masses'. For a full account of 
Outhwaite's views on the war see R. L. Outhwaite, The Land or Revolution (London, 1917). pp. 105-
114 which provides an astonishing condemnation of the war and aspects associated with it. It. is likely 
that this book alone (besides his speeches in the House of Commons) served to antagonIse some 
quarters (notably the press) in Hanley. 
21 Outhwaite argued that the pay of British soldiers should be brought in line with those of Australians 
and that it should also be back-dated. The money, he suggested, could be raised by land taxation. 
22 See Outhwaite's interjections in the House of Commons, January 4th, 5th, 12th, February 29 th , March 
7th, 14th, 15th and 31 st 1916, Hansard. Millbanksystems. com/people/mr. robert. outhwaite/1916. 
23 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 12th December 1918. 
2.1 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
arguments. In an astonishingly powerful (and brave) speech to an audience of over 
4,000 people at Hanley's main hall, Outhwaite mounted a robust attack on the 
Government's foreign policy. If the country 'surrendered to everything that was 
basest', he forecast, it would only lead to the 'enslavement of the German people and 
lead to a war of revenge in twenty years,?6 For Outhwaite, the choice was clear: 'a 
peace of revenge' or 'a peace that would last'. He told his constituents that he 
believed the coming government would be the 'most militaristic ever'. One point he 
made in particular was that British forces had never enlisted to be sent to Russia 'to 
protect the property of the capitalists'. Referring to his own constituency, Outhwaite 
declared it 'a mass of seething misery' exacerbated by the 'inhumanity of the state 
towards those who had served that state' and concluded by warning that 'whilst our 
men went to make the sacrifice of their lives for the extension of freedom and, as they 
thought, to support human rights ... behind their back you are creating conditions 
which means they will not come back to greater liberty ... you are permitting to be 
forged the chains of their enslavement and servitude,.27 The Victoria Hall audience 
was reported to have 'applauded very loudly' and there was not a single sign of 
dissent; had there been without doubt the Staffordshire Sentinel would have happily 
reported it in order to underpin the newspaper's attitude to Hanley's sitting member. It 
is worth noting that in his book The Land or Revolution (published the previous year) 
Outhwaite had written at length about the future he envisaged for returning soldiers; 
their fate, he argued, would be 'to take off the khaki to march in the ranks of the 
unemployed' .28 
Unsurprisingly, throughout the campaign, the Coalition candidate, James Seddon, was 
anxious to stress that he had received 'the letter' from Lloyd George in contrast to his 
opponents who had not.29 This served to provoke his opponents, especially the Liberal 
Grimwade who contended that Seddon was posing under 'false colours' and should 
stand down.3o Seddon was highly critical of the Labour Party, arguing that social 
26 All quotes are taken from Outhwaite's sole reported speech, Staffordshire Sentinel, 12th December, 
1918. 
27 Staffordshire Sentinel, 12th December 1918. 
28 R. L. Outhwaite, The Land or Revolution (Londo~, 1917)tit 17. . ' 
19 Seddon's receipt of the coupon was made publIc on 28 November, 1918. The LIberal Gnmwade 
vented his annoyance throughout the early stages of the contest in connection to this matter because he 
claimed he had already received a letter from Lloyd George wishing him success. 
30 Seddon even argued that Grimwade would split the vote allowing Outhwaite in and should retire 
from the contest on these grounds alone. Needless to say. the local Liberals viewed this as an 
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reform was 'not the prerogative of Labour' and that the party's claim to represent the 
workers was wholly inaccurate.31 He declared that were the Labour Party to obtain 
power there would be revolution like in Russia and he went even further by attacking 
his Labour opponent (Myles Harper-Parker) as a man backed by 'conscientious 
objectors and pacifists'; ifit were up to the Labour Party, he claimed, Germany would 
'get off scot- free'?2 He spent much of the rest of the campaign eulogising the 
'greatest man in European politics,33 and talking about hanging the Kaiser. In 
response to his critics' accusations of opportunism, Seddon declared that 'during the 
Armageddon old political distinctions had been submerged in this great sea of 
blood' .34 Overall, as we can see, Seddon spent little time discussing actual policy, i.e. 
post-war reconstruction or social reform but was forced to defend his own position 
and play the patriotic card.35 
The (officially sanctioned) Liberal candidate; Leonard Grimwade, conducted a 
focused campaign on the basis of 'a potter for the potteries' declaring that he would 
be a representative of local interests as opposed to party interests and he asserted 
change was needed in order to 'make Stoke-on-Trent a great commercial centre' .36 
Grimwade adopted a traditional Liberal platform advocating Irish Home Rule, land 
reform, education and issues affecting trade (transport in particular). With regards to 
the urgency of social reform, he said that as a recruiting officer he had 'been struck by 
the number of low category men,?7 Ultimately, however, the independent Liberal's 
principal appeal was based upon his position as a leading pottery manufacturer. In 
outrageous propOSItIOn especially considering the fact that Seddon had appeared from nowhere, 
uninvited in the constituency. 
31 Seddon argued that out of four and a half million trade unionists only two million were nominally 
affiliated to the Labour Party and therefore, even on their own figures, they could not claim to be 
speaking for more than fifty percent of organised workers. 
32 Staffordshire Sentinel, 29th November, 1918. 
33 Staffordshire Sentinel, 12th December, 1918. 
34 Staffordshire Sentinel, 11 th December, 1918. . . . 
35 Besides the question of the coupon, Seddon faced regular taunts from the other candIdates III relatIon 
to the party he represented; no-one, they pointed out, had ever heard of the National Democ:atic Party. 
Throughout the campaign he was viewed as a 'joke' candidate but no doubt both the Llber~ls and 
Labour recognised that since he was able to claim official Coalition endorsement, he \vas very like 1: to 
do considerable harm to their own chances. 
36 The export trade of the local pottery industry amounted to somewhere in the region of £3.000,000 
per annum and it was generall~ re~ognised that this could be substantially increased, not least by 
improved railways and canal navigatIOn. 
37 Ibid. 
response, the Labour Party's speakers stated that, indeed, they too wanted a 'potter for 
the potteries ... but not from that class' .38 
The 1918 General Election Campaign in Burslem 
Burslem witnessed a more conventional contest, a triangular fight between Liberal, 
Labour and Unionist. Here too there was anger amongst Liberals that the coupon had 
been given to the Unionist candidate. Like Seddon, Burslem's officially endorsed 
Coalitionist (Walker) claimed that party politics had 'had their day' and what was 
needed now was 'fusion of the best brains in the country' and 'mutual co-operation' 
to enable 'great social improvements' to be made. He told voters that coalition offered 
a 'new conception of Government,39 although he made little attempt to outline in 
detail what he thought these great improvements would entail and spent most of the 
campaign attempting to discredit the Liberal Association, claiming they had selected 
Outhwaite in 1912 and so were responsible for him now. It is clear this tactic was not 
always well received by his audiences, some of whom it was reported frequently 
shouted 'talk about politics' back to him.4o Like Seddon, Walker also spent some time 
outlining his fears about the Labour Party; he argued that whilst he felt the local 
Labour candidates were 'sincere and honest men' he believed that the pacifists within 
the Labour Party had tried to 'weaken resolve during the war, discredit the forces 
... and were making excuses for the enemy' .41 He also declared that he believed 
Labour's policy programme to be one which 'promoted war between the classes,.42 
In contrast to the Coalition candidate's vagueness in respect of policy, the Labour 
candidates in Hanley and Burslem articulated a practical programme of reform and 
reconstruction focusing attention on issues of immediate concern such as 
demobilisation and adequate allowances for returned soldiers and their dependents. 
Aspects of Finney's programme also included improvement of housing, the lowering 
of the pension age to sixty, complete equality for the sexes, complete nationalisation 
of all key industries43 , abolition of D.O.R.A. and the abolition of conscription. These 
38 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 11th December 1918. 
39 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 7th December 1918. 
40 See Staffordshire Advertiser, 7th December 1918. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 This included mines, railways, minerals, oils, munitions, waterways as well as the nationisation of 
the land. 
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things he told voters were 'more important than hanging the Kaiser,.44 He also 
proposed Home Rule 'all round' and the establishment of a league of nations.45 
Finney asserted that he did not believe the government had 'put forward anything of a 
definite character' .46 He also fiercely condemned the government for the timing of the 
election, more so than any other candidate in Stoke-on-Trent in 1918; at one meeting, 
for example, he told his audience that the government 'wanted to blindfold folk and 
lead them to forget by holding a general election' .47 Finney was exceedingly critical 
of the 'coupon'; he told one meeting that whilst the 'government could trust the 
people to fight and pay taxes; they could not be trusted to select their own 
candidates' .48 He condemned continued press censorship which he argued was just an 
attempt to exclude the masses, as he articulated; 'the working-classes were very 
important when something had to be done (the war) but they were not quite so 
important when they were no longer needed' .49 Like most Labour candidates in 1918, 
Finney made a direct appeal to discharged soldiers (not that there would have been 
that many of them in the constituency).so During and after the 1912 by-election 
Samuel Finney had been widely and publicly criticised, ridiculed even, as a weak and 
ineffective candidate who had been out of his depth in relation to policy. Even within 
his party many had held this view. In 1918, however, (excepting Outhwaite) Finney 
was arguably Stoke-on-Trent's most outstanding critic of the Lloyd George Coalition 
and a powerful advocate of post-war re-construction. 
As in Hanley, the Liberal candidate in Burslem, Sir Walter Essex, defined himself as 
'a sturdy supporter of the Coalition,s1 although he added that he was 'mortified to see 
more [of it] pass under Conservative domination'. Whilst he believed there should be 
cross party co-operation until the peace was signed, he remained a fierce critic of the 
way the election was being conducted saying that it 'had been sprung in such a way 
44 Staffordshire Sentinel, 13 th December, 1918. G. D. H. Cole remembers how audiences at meetings he 
had spoken at responded well to his 'demonstrations of the absurdity of slogans such as Hang the 
Kaiser'; see G. D. H. Cole, History o/the Labour Party From 1914 (New York, 1969), p. 85. 
45 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 29th November, 1918. 
46 Staffordshire Sentinel, 3rd December, 1918. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Staffordshire Sentinel, 13 th December, 1918. 
~9 Staffordshire Sentinel, 3rd December, 1918. 
50 See Labour advertisements, Staffordshire Sentinel, 7th December, 1918. 
51Dec1aring this as the beginning of the campaign, be became increasingly hostile towards the 
Coalition, however, especially in connection to the coupon, see Staffordshire Sentinel, 11 th December 
1918. 
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that the soldier was practically disenfranchised' ,52 He went so far as to say that the 
election was 'an attempted invasion of the right of the people to free choice,.53 
Interestingly, Sir Walter Essex was the only candidate in Stoke-on-Trent to make any 
direct appeal to the newly enfranchised female electors in 1918.54 His meetings 
regularly included female platform speakers who urged women to 'take an active part 
in the political life of the country'; as 'shareholders in the governing of their native 
land' women were told 'the home life of the nation and the health of the people' 
depended on them, 55 The Liberal Association clearly recognised that organising the 
female vote was not going to be an easy task however. As Mrs Rowley Moody (wife 
of the chairman of the local Liberal Council) noted, only about 60 of the party's 
workers in the constituency were women. 56 Given the numbers of female voters and 
limited time, this did not facilitate making the female electors enthusiastic. 57 Though 
it is important to recognise that at the beginning of the contest the party managers did 
not expect women to vote in large numbers so this might partially explain why few 
candidates made direct appeals to the new female electorate. 58 
52 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 5th December, 1918. 
53 Ibid. 
54 In Burslem 11,000 of the total 33,789 voters were women, cited in Staffordshire Advertiser, 12th 
December 1918. 
55 Mrs. A. Rowley- Moody addressed many of Sir Walter Essex's meetings emphasising the need .f~r 
fair treatment of soldiers and allowances for wives and mothers. She was an e~tremel~ outspoken cn~Ic 
of Lloyd George and the Coalition; on one occasion asking 'what was the use m sendmg such dummIes 
to parliament', see Staffordshire Am:'ertiser, 13th.D~ce~ber, 1918.. . . . 
56 There did not exist a women's LIberal AssocIatIOn m the area but thIS was somethmg the part: \\as 
anxious to rectify and in December 1918 the Association outlined plans for the setting up of such an 
organisation. 
57 Staffordshire Sentinel, 13 til December, 1918. 
58 Midland Liberal Federation Afinutes, 19th March 1919. 
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The 1918 General Election in Stoke-on-Trent: Results and Analysis 
Fig. 1 Hanley (Turnout 58.9%) 
7% 
Fig. 2 Burslem (Turnout 56.6%) 
18% 
45% 
II Coalition/National D:lrroc ratic 
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• Labour 
o Independent Liberal 
o Liberal 
• Labour 
• Coalilition Conservative 
o Liberal 
The results of the 1918 general election in Stoke-on-Trent are interesting for many 
reasons. Inevitably, Hanley's sitting member, Robert Outhwaite, was defeated 
although probably not as decisively as the local press might have wished (see fig. 1 ). 59 
In securing nearly three thousand votes (13.6% of the total) Outhwaite had 
demonstrated that there existed a significant degree of dissatisfaction in respect to 
various aspects associated with the conduct of the war. Hanley was captured on a 
minority vote by the NDP/Coalitionist James Seddon reflecting results across the rest 
of the country. 60 \Vhat surprised many was the substantial advance made by the 
Labour Party in Hanley; polling nearly 38% of the popular vote, the Labour candidate 
59 Outhwaite was not alone in having being de-se lected by hi s constituency organ isat ion and 
subsequently defeated of course ; other Liberal ' pac ifi sts ' including C. P. Trevelyan and D. Mason also 
suffered the same fate. 
60 Nati onall y, ten NDP candidates were returned to the House of Commons in 1918. Oll e later defec ted 
to the Labour Party. All were defeated in 1922. 
2-U 
had obtained just 335 votes (1.7% of the total) less than the winning Coalitionist. 
Whilst Outhwaite had come third, worse still was the disastrous performance of the 
official Liberal who only managed to poll little over 70/0 of the vote. The Liberal vote 
had collapsed completely in the constituency. It is likely that Outhwaite took votes 
away from the official Liberal so a more accurate assessment of the total Liberal poll 
was 20.9% which reflects similar results from other localities (such as Manchester 
examined earlier in the present study).61 Nonetheless, compared to previous electoral 
performance, the 1918 general election represented almost annihilation for the 
Liberals in a part of the country generally considered to be one of the party's 
heartlands. Significantly, the total anti-Coalition poll amounted to nearly 60% of the 
vote. Ultimately, despite the election of James Seddon, the Potteries electorate 
remained predominantly left of centre and progressive in outlook. 
The constituency of Burslem saw an even greater advance for Labour (see fig. 1); the 
party captured the seat obtaining nearly 45% of the vote (a majority of 7% over the 
second placed couponed Coalition Conservative). This made Labour's victory in 
Burslem one of the most spectacular results for the party anywhere in the country. As 
historians have noted, the 1918 general election did not, in fact, represent a 
tremendous step forward for Labour representation in the House of Commons. The 
election proved disappointing in fact; just 57 MPs were returned (in the context of a 
greatly increased number of candidates). Labour's success in Burslem was the 
exception to the rule but, nonetheless, in terms of the Potteries, the result changed the 
political landscape forever. 
The Asquithian Liberals faired equally badly in Burslem as they did in Hanley; 
finishing bottom of the poll (obtaining 18% of the vote). Again, the total anti-
Coalition vote was extremely high: at 62%. Comparisons with previous elections are 
difficult given the boundary changes, the reconstitution of the constituencies and the 
exceedingly low turnout, but taking the two constituencies together it hardly needs 
reiterating that the Labour Party had witnessed a remarkable reversal in fortune. As 
we have seen, in 1912 the Labour Party had been unable to make any significant 
inroads in Hanley at all, had no permanent organisation and had suffered a 
61 In Manchester the average Liberal popular vote was about 20% in comparable contests (three or four 
cornered) and went up to 25° 0 where the party faced only Conservative opposition. 
humiliating defeat at the by-election. The town appeared to remain staunchly Liberal 
in both politics and culture. By 1918 the Labour Party had so very nearly won the 
seat. That and a sensational victory in neighbouring Burslem meant that, compared to 
other industrial localities in Britain, Labour's advance in Stoke-on-Trent in the 1918 
general election was more than striking. 
The 1918 General Election in Perspective 
The political situation was extremely confused III 1918; national events and the 
national position of the parties influenced voter perceptions of the respective parties in 
the constituencies. It is arguable that in 1918 there existed a considerably higher 
degree of dissatisfaction with the government's war policies than has generally been 
recognised, especially in relation to the slowness of demobilisation, conscription itself 
and the timing of the general election. This was almost certainly the case in Hanley 
and Burslem when one considers that more electors voted against the Coalition than 
for it. The anti-Coalition vote amounted to 59.6% and 62% respectively.62 As in 
Manchester, the low forces' turnout was significant.63 Returning soldiers were likely 
to have been less persuaded by official propaganda than civilians and potentially held 
more moderate views towards enemy nations. On both these counts, they were likely 
to have voted against the government. 
In assessing the 1918 general election, Arthur Nicholson (secretary of the Midland 
Liberal Federation) concluded that there were some very clear reasons why usually 
loyal Liberals switched to Labour and he identified two factors in particular. First, 
large numbers of Liberals were 'so fiercely anti-Coalition and anti-conscription that 
they voted Labour as the most marked way of expressing that sentiment' and 
secondly, in relation to policy Labour's manifesto 'commanded the general assent of 
Liberals' .64 This implies a significant shift to the left among Liberal supporters. 
Careful consideration of the local evidence in Hanley and Burslem confirms these 
assumptions. Other factors which may have contributed to the Liberal 'holocaust' (as 
62 The total anti-Liberal vote in Burslem amounted to 81.6% and in Hanley (counting Outhwaite as a 
Liberal) this was 79.1 % and the total anti-Labour vote (in Hanley) was 61.3%. 
63 In Manchester less than a fifth of the absent soldier and sailor electors voted. Out of the twenty 
million electors nationwide 3.9 million service voters were sent ballot papers from which only 900,000 
(a quarter) voted. 
64 Midlalld Liberal Federation Minutes, 21 st March 1919. 
The Times called it)65 included the leadership's failure to provide direction. As Turner 
suggests, weak leadership destroyed the Liberal Party's ability to fight an election in 
1918 effectively.66 Asquith's failure to provide direction impacted greatly upon the 
party in the constituencies. It is worthwhile to note here that during the campaign in 
Stoke-on-Trent, neither Liberal candidate made any mention of their leader by name, 
suggesting that the candidates may have been attempting to disassociate themselves 
from the national debacle. In an age of mass communication, however, when electors 
were well aware of what was happening nationally this was virtually impossible. The 
party split and the war had also impacted on local organisation; the routine 
organisation of the party, of course, was severely disrupted by the war.67 The loss of 
party agents and activists placed considerable pressure on the local associations. This 
was the same for all parties, however, and the extent to which it disproportionately 
disadvantaged the Liberals should not be over-stated. After all, the Liberals had 
perfected a highly sophisticated organisation after 1900 and compared to the 
Conservative Party had been pre-eminent in party management on the ground. 
Nonetheless, it does appear that the Liberals in Stoke-on-Trent were more ill-prepared 
to fight a contest in 1918 compared to the party in Manchester. While analysis of 
Stoke-on-Trent does not lend support to the suggestion that Liberal organisation was 
weak to the point of being a disaster, there were clearly some problems. Moreover, 
what is clear is that Labour's organisation had improved considerably and the party 
was prepared for the contest in a way that it appeared the Liberal Party was not.68 It is 
widely recognised how the extent of trade union organisation in a particular 
constituency contributed significantly to Labour's organisational capabilities. In the 
mining districts candidates received considerable financial assistance.69 This needs to 
be born in mind when assessing Labour's advance in 1918 in North Staffordshire. Yet 
the continuity of local leadership and the forcefulness of Labour's evangelicalism 
65 The Times, 30th December 1918. 
66 J. Turner, British Politics and the Great War (London and New Haven, 1992), p. 135. 
67 In part this was also connected to the existence of the party truce. The Secretary of the Midland 
Liberal Federation, for example, was anxious to stress in his post-election report that he had repeatedly 
urged the associations to observe the truce and 'do no party work or not to carry on any propaganda'. 
Given that the election had come as a particular shock to the Liberal Party it was (because of this and 
the split) severely ill placed to fight a campaign effectively, see Midland Liberal Federation A/inllfes. 
21 st March 1919. 
68 The Labour Party had been restructuring its organisation for the fifteen months prior to the election 
and in August 1917 Arthur Henderson had left the government in order to devote his attention to this; 
in particular setting about obtaining large sums from the trade unions. see R. McKibbin, E"o/lltion, pp. 
112- 123. 
69 See R. McKibbin, Em/ution, pp. 156-162. 
(principally connected to policy on post-war reconstruction) were also crucial to the 
party's challenge in 1918. In areas such as Stoke-on-Trent, Labour remained (as it had 
been before 1914) evangelical and propagandist but it possessed a new focus on 
advanced (and relevant) policy which amounted to a powerful appeal. 
Of the many factors (such as abstention and the women's vote) which contributed to 
the poor Liberal poll in 1918 a number of other aspects must be considered. Liberal 
party managers believed a great many of those who had abstained were Liberals who 
did not wish to vote for the Coalition but would not vote against their party. Both the 
contested constituencies in Stoke-on-Trent saw exceptionally low turnouts in 1918 
(56.5% in Burslem and 58.9% in Hanley). Furthermore, it was more or less certain 
that in most areas the women's vote went against the Liberals. As Arthur Nicholson 
observed, 'it is perhaps not too much to say that whatever class they belonged they 
gave in bulk an anti-German vote' and that 'Lloyd George's declarations against 
Germany appealed to a by no means unnatural sentiment in the breasts of mothers, 
wives and daughters smarting under a sense of bereavement, loss and suffering' .70 
Locally, a number of other aspects need to be borne in mind when considering the 
advance made by Labour in 1918 (as indeed later in 1922). The period during the war 
was critical in relation to the politics of the pottery workers (the largest sector in the 
area). The earlier stages of the war had witnessed a number of strikes after which the 
various unions then took the momentous step in voting to establish a political fund. 
Furthermore, an equally significant leap forward had been taken in 1917 when the 
pottery unions (for the first time) combined to form one single organisation (the 
Ceramic and Allied Trade Union). By the end of the war the potters' union claimed a 
total membership of 40,000 (a fivefold increase when compared to 1914.71 
Altogether, whilst the 1918 general election had been a disaster for the Liberal Party 
in Stoke-on-Trent (and across the country) the Liberals believed they would fight 
70 Midland Liberal Federation Minutes, 21 st March 1919. 
71 The immediate post-war period was a critical time for the development of the pottery union and 
many aspects of intense dispute within the industry were settled (because of union intervention) during 
this time, the most important being the abolition of . good from the oven' regulations in 1919. For 
detailed coverage of these aspects see F. Burchill and R. Ross, A History a/the Potters' Union (Hanley, 
1977), pp. 165-169. 
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another day.72 It is essential to recognise this context since it is arguably from this 
point (after 1918) that the splits and schisms within the Liberal Party really took their 
toll in tearing the party apart leaving it a shadow of its former self and from that there 
was no recovery. 
5.2: The 1922 General Election in Stoke-on-Trent 
The political parties in Stoke-on-Trent appear to have been taken by surprise at the 
prospect of an election in 1922 and consequently the constituency organisations were 
slow in their preparation for the contest. 73 As a result of the last general election the 
political situation was as follows: Hanley was held by an Independent-Coalitionist, 
Burslem by the Labour Party and Stoke by an independent Liberal-Labour candidate 
who had been unopposed in 1918 who now described himself as Independent Labour. 
Samuel Finney who had won Burslem for the Labour Party in 1918 had recently 
decided to retire at the forthcoming election, having apparently fallen out with the 
Labour Party. 
The Political Situation: New Alliances, Candidates and Ideology 
The 1922 general election saw a triangular contest in Hanley between a Labour 
candidate, Myles Harper-Parker, an Asquithian Liberal, John Whitehouse,74 and the 
sitting member, James Seddon, who now stood as a straightforward Independent. 
Stoke and Burslem both saw straight fights involving John Ward (Independent 
Labour) and an official Labour Party candidate, local trade unionist John Watts, in the 
former and in the latter between Andrew Maclaren (Labour), and a National Liberal 
candidate, Sydney Malkin, neither of whom had contested the seat previously. None 
of the constituencies saw a Conservative candidate, suggesting that the local party was 
either unable to mount a serious challenge or that they perceived defeating Labour the 
key priority. It is significant that a week after the election had been declared the 
72 It ought to be remembered that there were still 160 Liberals in the House of Commons so the 
Liberals theoretically remained the second party of the state even if a divided one and even though 
Labour formed the single largest party of opposition in the house. 
73 The Labour Party stands out, however, as having undertaken a significant amount of work in both 
Hanley and Burslem, having held regular indoor and outdoor demonstrations for some time. Little had 
been done in Stoke since the party had remained undecided as to whether it would put forward a 
candidate. Staffordshire Sentinel, 23rd October, 1922. 
7~ The relatively young (49 years of age) John Whitehouse represented a significant coup for the 
Hanley Liberals. He had been elected for mid-Lanarkshire in January 1910 and had been a member of 
many departmental committees relating to education or children's' legislation. He went on to become 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Lloyd George from 1913 to 1915. He had been defeated in 1918 
contesting Hamilton. 
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Burslem Conservative and Unionist Association confirmed that they would continue 
to provide assistance to the (adopted) Coalition Liberal candidate.75 The Chairman of 
the Conservatives told the local press that whilst Malkin "had always been progressive 
and a firm believer in trade unionism' he was reassuringly "opposed to an)1hing that 
would destroy the best interests of the country by revolutionary, Communist or 
Socialist methods' .76 For his part, Malkin stated how he "wholeheartedly supported' 
Bonar Law because the country presently "faced a great danger in the Labour Party' 
and so they were 'forced to put their shoulders together,.77 Conservative assistance 
did not go so far as contributing to Malkin's funds, however, and he had to pay his 
own election expenses although he let it be known that he was doing so in order to 
'preserve [his] independence from any wire-pullers.' 78 Throughout the campaign 
Malkin received valuable support from many prominent local Conservatives. The 
local press even began to label him the 'Liberal and Unionist' candidate although he 
never used this term himself. Given Malkin's local prestige it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the local Conservative organisation had decided not to oppose him.79 He was one 
of the district's most prominent pottery manufacturers, president of the local Chamber 
of Commerce and had a long background in the municipal politics of the town 
including serving as Mayor of Burslem (1907-1908) after which he was appointed 
aldennan on Stoke-on-Trent Borough Council. 80 Like the majority of North 
Staffordshire Liberals he was also a well-known and active Methodist. 
Malkin's Labour opponent in Burslem was Andrew Maclaren. At 39 years of age 
Maclaren was far younger than any previous Labour candidate in the district and 
represented a very different type of Labour man. He was fiercely radical compared to 
his predecessors. Born in Glasgow, Maclaren had been educated at the Glasgow 
75 At the time of Sydney Malkin's adoption in December 1921 the local Conservatives pledged their 
support and agreed not to oppose him. Once the national position of the Coalition changed it became 
unclear as to whether this assurance would remain. The Burslem Conservatives waited a week before 
making their intentions known after Sir George Younger had advised the local associations that while 
no arrangement existed nationally the constituencies were free to run candidates against Coalitio~ 
Liberals if they wished. As it turned out, a third of Coalition Liberal seats came under attack from their 
former Coalition allies, see T. Wilson, Downfall, p. 229. 
76 Staffordshire Sentinel, 30th October, 1922. 
77 See ibid. 
78 Staffordshire Sentinel, 7th November, 1922. 
79 Malkin came from a very well known Staffordshire Liberal family; his Uncle being Wilcox Edge 
regarded as the 'grand old man' of north Staffordshire Liberalism (a point often reiterated in the press). 
80 In economic policy Malkin was a totally committed Free Trader and was unlikely to waver on thiS 
but oiven that this was no longer the issue for the Conservatives that it had been historically this did not 
b . 
pose a problem for co-operatIOn. 
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School of Art and had become an engineer. He had initially been a Liberal81 but had 
then joined the ILP and the Union of Democratic Control during the early stages of 
the war.82 Maclaren had been an associate of Hanley's former member Robert 
Outhwaite and the two had much in common; they were both highly critical of the 
war and keen land reformers. From the outset of the campaign, Labour's opponents 
attempted to play the 'red menace' card in an attempt to drum up right wing 
misconceptions of Labour's nationalisation programme. The only candidate in Stoke-
on-Trent not to employ this strategy was the (Asquithian) Liberal, John Whitehouse, 
in Hanley. The tactics, strategy and policies of the respective participants shall now be 
now discussed. 
For the first time in the history of the Stoke parliamentary constituency the 1922 
general election saw an official and entirely independent Labour Party candidate. The 
appearance of an official Labour candidate in opposition to Ward caused considerable 
discontent amongst Stoke's Liberals and Conservatives who had already agreed to co-
operate in their support of Ward's candidature.83 Whilst it could have been the case 
that the Liberals and Conservatives might have anticipated Labour's intervention (so 
underpinning their decision to endorse Ward) lack of evidence makes this difficult to 
say with certainty. 
Ward had been elected in 1906 as a Liberal-Labour member and the Liberals had 
always claimed him as one of their own which was unsurprising given that he had 
always accepted the Liberal whip in parliament. By 1922, Ward had become 
increasingly right-wing, however, so by this stage appeared a more attractive 
alternative to the local Conservatives. During the 1922 campaign he went to 
considerable lengths to attack his Labour opponents who he claimed were extremists 
and revolutionaries. Ward sought desperately to disassociate himself from the Labour 
Party arguing that it was too narrow, not representative of the whole working-class 
and he declared he did not intend to 'sign away his liberty,.84 Ward argued that, for 
81 Maclaren continued to espouse Liberal doctrines, most notably the single tax ideology, albeit now 
within a Labour context. He saw little incompatibility of Labour's programme with more Liberal-based 
ideology such as land reform. 
82 Biographical details from M. Stenton and S. Lees, Who's Who of British Members of Parliament, 
Volume 3 (Sussex and New Jersey, 1979) p. 227. 
83 As in Burslem the Stoke Conservatives waited until the 30th October to announce their support of 
Ward. . th 
84 See Staffordshire Sent mel. 6 November, 1922. 
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him, the war had 'killed party [politics]' and he was 'prepared to help any reasonable 
combination which may evolve to carry out the internal government of the country' .85 
Ward believed that opposition to him had been 'engineered by an extremist section of 
the Labour Party. 86 It was more likely, however, that the local Labour Party had 
grown weary of Ward's Lib-Labism believing they had as much right as anyone to 
contest the seat especially since the party believed they now had the complete support 
of a significant number of the trade unions in the area. In the context of economic 
depression combined with the effects of the miners' strikes of 1920 and 1921 which 
had been almost as disruptive to the pottery workers as they had been to the miners, 
there now emerged a more definable sense of union solidarity in the area and, 
moreover, a recognition of the need for combined political activity. It is also arguable 
that because of industrial hardship the disparity between employer and worker became 
all the more clear; this undoubtedly facilitated a political identity very distinct from 
former Liberal-Labour sentiments. As analysis of Stoke-on-Trent demonstrates, 
throughout the 1922 contest this was evidenced by the language and tone deployed by 
Labour candidates whose speeches were clearly influenced by strong sentiments of 
class injustice. Whatever the reasons: the point remains that the most prominent 
unions in the district; the Miners' Federation and the Pottery Workers' Society, were 
for the first time completely united behind a genuinely independent Labour Party 
candidate. 
The 1922 General Election Campaign in Stoke-on-Trent 
The Labour Party officially launched its campaign on 24th October with a large 
demonstration in Hanley's Victoria Hall and during the same meeting the party's key 
objectives for the forthcoming contest were outlined. The national manifesto Labour's 
Call to the People was issued by the National Executive two days later and received 
considerable attention from both the national and local press. From the beginning of 
the campaign Labour remained anxious to assert itself as a constitutional and 
moderate organisation: Labour's opening meeting in Hanley saw platform speakers 
reiterate how as a party they had always 'fought the battle of constitutionalism and 
had fought extremism in their own ranks .... They were neither communists nor 
revolutionaries and [were] committed to upholding of the authority of the House of 
85 Staffordshire Sentinel, 30th October, 1922. 
86 Staffordshire Sentinel, i h November, 1922. 
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Commons' .87 Harper-Parker claimed that 'to achieve social and economIc 
emancipation workers must look to a party of their own creation' .88 The Labour Party 
represented a 'new idea in politics', he declared, because it 'determined to secure a 
more humanised economic and industrial system' and he added that Labour were 
often accused of living 'in a world of idle dreams' but 'many policies the party had 
stood for over the past 25 years were now accepted planks of the other parties 
platforms today [so] what was in the land of dreams today could clearly come into the 
realm of practical politics tomorrow' .89 
The national Labour Party manifesto generated a considerable degree of discussion. In 
it Labour advocated an extensive programme of social, industrial and economic 
reform and a progressive foreign policy.9o The manifesto's economic proposals were 
likely to be the most controversial. Briefly, the programme made the argument that 
the national debt was a 'dead weight burden' and proposed the creation of a war debt 
redemption fund by a special graduated levy on fortunes exceeding £5,600. The 
manifesto stated that the party would require 'some degree of restitution from the 
fortunes made during the war'. Labour's economic policy amounted to a system of 
taxation whereby the burden would fall according to a person's ability to pay. In the 
context of 1922 this represented radical economic thinking and selling it to certain 
sections of society (the wealthy/middle-classes) would prove difficult. Other aspects 
of economic policy included a proposed super-tax on large incomes above £850 and 
the imposition of death duties on large estates. In relation to unemployment Labour 
promised 'work or maintenance,' i.e. adequate support or employment would be 
provided. This would entail the establishment of a 'large number of programmes of 
necessary and useful public works'. The manifesto advocated a massive programme 
of industrial re-organisation including the complete nationalisation of the nation's key 
industries; coal, railways, transport, iron and steel. In terms of social policy Labour 
emphasised the urgent needs of the nation in relation to health and housing. More 
generous provision of old age pensions was proposed, the complete abolition of the 
poor law and an extensive programme of house building. Another important policy 
87 Staffordshire Sentinel, 25th October, 1922. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Staffordshire Sentinel, 25 th October, 1922. 
90 Th~ Labour Party manifesto details are taken from Staffordshire Sentinel, 26th October 1922 where it 
was printed in full. 
commitment was the party's declared resistance to any attempt to 'cut off or cut 
down' ex-servicemen's pensions. 
The Labour Party Campaign in Stoke-on-Trent 
Reflecting the temper of the national manifesto the central issue for Labour's 
candidates in Stoke-on-Trent in 1922 concerned the record of the Coalition 
government and how it had categorically 'failed the people' and that neither did Bonar 
Law's new administration appear to possess concrete policies. In Stoke-on-Trent, 
Labour's candidates focused upon a variety of issues outlined in the national 
manifesto but made a point of applying them directly to the local conditions. An issue 
of increasing concern for pottery workers was industrial disease (in particular 
pneumoconiosis) and the extent of poor health in the city. As Andrew Maclaren 
observed, death rates "in Stoke-on-Trent were appalling. Tunstall (with only one 
exception) possessed the worst death rate in the country91 and also had a higher infant 
mortality rate than anywhere in the United Kingdom. In one powerful speech 
Maclaren argued that despite the potter 'being a pre-eminent craftsman [he] lived 
under conditions the royal family wouldn't keep dogs under,.92 Another repeated 
theme during the contest was the inequality of the burdens of war; Myles Harper-
Parker in Hanley, for example, reminded one audience of how 'Britain had lost 
746,000 men, 1 million had been wounded and yet 340,000 men had made 
£2,846,000' and the poorer classes were now facing grinding poverty as well as being 
asked to carry a disproportionate burden.93 Throughout the campaign the Labour 
candidates stressed the 'just and equitable' character of the party's economic 
proposals whilst at the same time declaring that there was nothing confiscatory about 
the Capital Levy.94 They repeatedly asked their audiences how many of those present 
had more than £5,000; unsurprisingly the response was always in the negative. John 
Watts in Stoke also connected his Labour politics with his religion, emphasising that 
91 Maclaren pinpointed the death rates of pottery workers as compared to agricultural labourers. At 
aged 45 the death rate for pottery workers was 31.64 compared with 4.22 for agricultural labourers. At 
55 it was 54.15 compared with 19.06. It should be noted that general health remained exceedingly poor 
in this area, Staffordshire Sentinel, 8th November 1922. This was reflected, for example, by the fact that 
pottery workers were even classified as being five years older than they actually w~re for insurance 
purposes, see F. Burchill and R. Ross, A History o/the Potters' Union, p. 150 who pomt out that health 
and safety at this time remained the primary focus of the Potters' Union. 
92 Staffordshire Sentinel, 8th November, 1922. 
93 Staffordshire Sentinel, 7th November 1922. 
94 See Harper-Parker on Capital Levy, Staffordshire Sentinel, i h November, 1922. 
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the principles of economic justice were contained within the New Testament.95 He 
told one audience how 'a man's politics should be his religion and his religion his 
politics' and claimed that the attainment of a just distribution of wealth would lead to 
the 'realisation of the kingdom of God on Earth. ,96 In an area so heavily religious in 
outlook such an approach was potentially persuasive. As we can see, the Labour 
candidates in Stoke-on-Trent repeatedly referred to the inequality of the sacrifices of 
war and the catalogue of broken government promises. A significant amount of the 
Labour candidates' time was inevitably taken up with refuting their opponent's 
accusation of Communist comparisons. The candidates were very quick to assert their 
feelings on such comparisons; Watts was emblematic in declaring such 'not just 
unfair, but below the belt' as he told voters that he had never 'confiscated anyone's 
property or inflicted pain on anyone' but he asked his audience to consider British 
policy towards Russia, which had been a disaster.97 
The Labour Party's candidate in Burslem (Andrew Maclaren) made explicit efforts to 
appeal directly to Liberal supporters in the constituency. As a former Liberal himself 
he agued that only Labour now existed as a viable party of progressive politics; they 
were taking the place of the old Liberal Party.98 Maclaren asked voters whether they 
were going to vote for Bonar Law and his colleagues or a party that actually had a 
programme. Throughout the campaign, interest in Maclaren's meetings become so 
great that people started to pay large sums of money to hear him speak. A significant 
proportion of his supporters were reported as being extremely young.99 
The Liberal Campaign in Stoke-on-Trent 
The two Liberal candidates who stood in Stoke-on-Trent in 1922 came from opposing 
wings of their 'party' and so (unsurprisingly) there were marked political and 
ideological differences between the two. John Whitehouse in Hanley represented the 
radical wing of the Liberal Party and was a noted social reformer with a strong 
political background. loo From the outset of the 1922 general election campaign, 
95 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 4th November, 1922. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 5th November 1922. 
99 Staffordshire Advertiser, i h November 1922. 
100 Whitehouse had been a member of the Home Office Departmental Committee during the 
implementation of the Employment o~ Ch~ldre~ ~ct i~ 1 ~09 and .he had led a successful p~l.iamentary 
aaitation for the improvement of housmg m mmmg dIstrIcts (\\hlch led to a Royal CommISSIOn on the 
~ 
Whitehouse attacked the government's record in respect of social reform. He declared 
himself to be a social reform candidate and 'had no hesitation in regarding himself as 
a labour candidate [because] all [his] public life [he had] represented the labouring 
I ,101 Wh't h 't h" f' c asses . 1 e ouse s s ance on t e maJonty 0 Issues was not dissimilar from the 
Labour position. Whilst he opposed Labour's Capital Levy, he believed in a graduated 
income tax and also in the taxation of land values. The land question, Whitehouse 
argued, was the root of the social problem and he also advocated nationalisation of all 
key industries, in particular the mines and railways. 102 Unemployment, he stated, was 
a scandal and while he had 'no scientific solution to it' he objected to an 'inadequate 
dole' as a solution, especially since there was tremendous work to be done (houses, 
agriculture and public works). In particular Whitehouse sought to emphasise the 
government's broken promises and betrayal in relation to ex-servicemen who were 
'tramping the streets trying to get employment' . I 03 He stated that he would like to see 
the total abolition of the House of Lords I 04 and free secondary and higher education 
for all. In Hanley, therefore, the Liberal and Labour candidates both offered radical 
programmes. 
As we have seen in analysis of both Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent, the Labour Party 
suffered from an inability to distinguish itself from Liberalism in terms of policy and 
ideology prior to 1914. By 1922 this had been reversed and arguably the radical wing 
of the Liberal Party found it increasingly difficult to articulate anything that official 
Labour was not advocating. As Wilson acknowledges, in 1922 many Liberals had 
sought to handle 'the Labour problem' by 'making criticisms [that] did not amount to 
outright denunciation,105 but this simply served to reinforce the fact that Labour, as 
the Liberal Magazine expressed, had 'stolen their thunder' .106 Despite the efforts of 
radical Liberals such as John Whitehouse in Hanley, the Liberal Party nationally, as 
Wilson contends, 'did not present the appearance of an active force for social 
issue). Outside parliament Whitehouse had head of Toynbee HaIl.and had worked e~tensive.ly with t?e 
poor (including in particular the university settlement scheme m Manchester). BIOgraphIcal detaIls 
from Who's Who of British Members of Parliament, volume 2, p. 370. 
101 Staffordshire Sentinel, 1 SI November, 1922. 
102 Staffordshire Sentinel, 31 sl October, 1922. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid, 1 sl November, 1922. 
105 T. Wilson, DOlmfall, p. 232. 
106 Liberal Magazine, November 1922. 
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refonn' .107 As analysis of Manchester has shown, there were simply too few 
candidates like Whitehouse. Furthennore, the Capital Levy and nationalisation gave 
Labour's radicalism a specific and practical economic focus from those on the left of 
the Liberal Party. On this aspect the Liberal and Labour platfonns were clearly 
distinguishable although, as we have seen, candidates such as W. M. Pringle did make 
a capital levy a key plank of his campaign during the 1919 by-election in Manchester. 
Arguably, however, Labour's economic policy struck a greater chord with many 
working-class voters than continued Liberal emphasis on Free-Trade and land reform 
during the 1922 general election. 
In Burslem, the National Liberal, Sydney Malkin, focused virtually exclusively on his 
objections to the Labour Party's programme which he claimed 'aimed to abolish 
capitalism' and 'surrender liberty to bureaucratic control' .108 Malkin argued that 
Labour's programme amounted to 'total confiscation' which, if enacted, would 
eradicate private enterprise and thrift and he also stated that whilst he firmly believed 
in the general principle of trade unionism, he was opposed to 'anything that would 
destroy the best interests of the country by Bolshevik, revolutionary or socialistic 
methods' .109 Malkin constantly reiterated how he believed employers and workers 
'should be friends' and voiced his strong objection to 'disastrous class struggles'. He 
stated that he believed 'wholeheartedly' in Bonar Law's programme although he was 
never able to elaborate on what that constituted. Some of the few issues Malkin did 
address included war pensions (which he said he thought ought to be simplified) and 
the problem of unemployment (which he believed could be alleviated by means of 
schemes of productive work and an extension of unemployment insurance). For much 
of the campaign, however, Malkin was forced to defend his war record and that of his 
sons. 110 The National Liberal campaign in Burslem was largely negative and offered 
little discussion of policy, in great contrast to the (Asquithian) Liberal campaign in the 
neighbouring constituency of Hanley where the candidate advocated a radical 
107 T. Wilson, Downfall, p. 233. 
108 Staffordshire Sentinel, 30th October, 1922. 
109 Staffordshire Sentinel, 6th November, 1922. 
110 Malkin had been a recruiting officer with responsibility for providing names of non-able bodied men 
who were not to be enlisted. Many of these, however, were subsequently called-up and there clearly 
existed an extent of local disquiet in connection to this. His sons had been too ill and too young (he 
stated) to enlist but again, this remained a controversial subject for Malkin during the election 
campaign and he continued to encounter an identifiable degree of hostility, see Staffordshire Sentinel, 
8th November, 1922. Other candidates were very rarely questioned on their war records, including even 
Maclaren who had been a prominent pacifist. 
programme entirely avoiding any form of 'red scare' tactics. These differences 
epitomised Liberal divisions at that time; whilst independent Liberals more often than 
not remained at least in some way progressively minded, the National Liberals 
appeared virtually indistinguishable from the Conservatives. In Burslem, Malkin 
could have easily been a Conservative candidate and no doubt this is why he was 
assured of local Conservative support. This swing to the right amongst the National 
Liberals represented a major stumbling bloc to the reunification of the Liberal Party in 
an immediate sense and one could also suggest that it precipitated (and then 
underpinned) an anti-Labour cleavage during the 1920s within the re-united party; 
neither of which aided the Liberal Party. 
The Independent Campaigns: Seddon and Ward 
Hanley's sitting member, James Seddon, who had captured the seat as a Coalitionist 
in 1918 and now contested the seat as an Independent adopted a similar approach to 
Malkin by focusing virtually exclusively on the 'Labour menace': Seddon told voters 
that the 1922 general election was 'about systems; Labour's system [was] the road to 
destruction [and] if they started with nationalisation they would end with Communism 
and anarchy' .111 Seddon claimed they were 'threatened with revolution and faced the 
threat of confiscation' .112 Few in Hanley, however, possessed much to 'confiscate' 
and such red scare tactics were unlikely to persuade voters that the road to ruin was 
nigh. Seddon endured a difficult campaign in 1922, including the frequent sabotage of 
his election posters1I3 and considerable heckling at his meetings, which he believed 
. d b ak h' . 114 represented an organIse attempt to re up IS meetmgs. 
In Stoke, the sitting member John Ward also fought the contest largely on the 
question of a perceived Socialist threat. lIS Ward claimed he was 'astonished' that he 
III Staffordshire Sentinel, 2nd November, 1922. 
112 Staffordshire Sentinel, 6th November, 1922. 
113 Seddon's election slogan was 'Peace, Economy and Progress' which appeared on most of his 
election posters. This was frequently replaced with graffiti reading 'Party Exchanged Periodically' 
alluding to the fact that Seddon had changed party affiliation on a number of occasions. 
114 Many Coalition Liberals across the country suffered the same fate; Wilson cites one candidate in 
Sheffield, for instance, as being forced to take out a newspaper advert declaring he would 'attempt to 
address electors' illustrating the levels of hostility towards the Coalition Liberals in particular. It is 
curious that the Coalition Conservatives did not appear to suffer in the same way. 
115 Ward regularly referred to his background as a navvy; in his words 'one of the hardest occLlpations 
around' and that he was entitled to attend trade union congresses unlike people sLlch as Maclaren and 
Wcdgwood. He overlooked the fact that he did not actually possess full trade union endorsement in his 
own ~onstituency however. 
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was being opposed by 'a combination of extremists', explaining that in the 'present 
abnormal conditions' he would support 'any group capable of carrying on 
government' .116 He was keen to reiterate how he could have had the official 'Labour 
tag' if he had wished but this would have necessitated joining the party and obeying 
the party whip which he was unprepared to do. Throughout the contest Ward cited his 
experiences in Russia and argued that if Labour's programme was enacted in Britain 
the country would face the same 'anarchy and ruin' as that country.117 Ward's 
organisation appears to have been extremely weak in comparison to his official 
Labour Party opponent. 118 He admitted that he had no money for the huge posters 
such as those appearing on behalf of Watts although he did not seem unduly worried 
because he did not think 'anyone took any notice of them anyway' .119 This was 
possibly a major miscalculation. The 1922 contest was arguably one of the first truly 
modem general election campaigns in British history. No election had ever been 
fought with so much advertising. Nationally, 19 million leaflets had been distributed, 
the Conservative Party alone had put up over 300,000 posters and it was estimated the 
other parties combined had equalled this.12o Liberal headquarters had spent nearly 
£127,000 on the campaign and most of this was allocated to assisting candidates, 
especially those standing in less hopeful regions so as 'to keep the party fighting 
along a national front' .121 As Wilson observes, although the Liberals were not 
expecting to win office, they 'made a determined effort to re-establish themselves as a 
. 1·· 1 ' 122 major po Itlca party . 
The 1922 General Election in Stoke-on-Trent: Summary 
The central issue throughout the 1922 general election in all three of the Stoke-on-
Trent constituencies was the debate surrounding the programme and policies 
advocated by the Labour Party. For Labour this meant arguing for the urgency to 
enact such a programme; for the party's opponents it meant mounting the strongest 
possible objection to it. From the outset, the Labour Party disassociated itself from 
116 Staffordshire Sentinel, 31 st October, 1922. 
117 Staffordshire Sentinel, 4th November 1922. . 
lIS Ward was obviously unhappy at the amount of money the Labour Party was spendmg and even 
made this an issue on his election platforms highlighting how the party had a total fund of £300,000 
(nearly £ 1 000 per candidate); see Staffordshire Sentinel, 4th November 1922. 
119 Ibid. 
120 See T. Wilson, Downfall, p. 237. 
121 Wilson notes that, of the 325 independent Liberal candidates, nearly 200 received financial 
assistance from party headquarters see T. Wilson, Downfall, p. 237. 
122 Ibid. 
extreme socialism presenting itself as a constitutional and reformist political 
organisation. It did this by emphasising the continuity of its ideology. Consequentl y, 
the 'red scare ' in this area failed to make a significant impact in the minds of electors . 
Furthermore, Labour' s candidates hardly appeared to be ' frightening'; a man such as 
Myles Harper-Parker had been known for many years and was perceived to be a 
respectable pillar of the community recognised for political , trade union and religious 
work. 123 
The outcome of the 1922 general election was one which contemporary observers 
found extremely difficult to predict. The Manchester Guardian went so far as to 
depict it as 'the most baffling of modem times ' and ' the don ' t-know-where-we-are 
election' .124 As across the country, in Stoke-on-Trent, polling day saw intense press 
speculation in respect of this most 'baffling' of elections; it was generally considered 
that the sitting member for Stoke, John Ward, would win comfortably, although even 
here the impact of a Labour candidate remained an open question. 
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Fig. 3 Hanley (Turnout 67.4%) 
48% Labour 
o Independent 
o Liberal 
10.9% swing CoalitionJNDP to Labour 
12:1 Whilst Maclaren was an outsider he did have some loca l connection, however, in that he had been 
close to Hanley 's prev ious member Robel1 Outhwaite; see, J. Stewal1. St(1l7dll1g fo,. )IISlIce. A 
Biography of And,.ew Macla,.en ~tP (London, 200 I ), p. 12. 
124 See Mancheste,. GlIa,.dian, 15 November, 1922 
125 F. W . S. Craig. Pa,.liafll el1taty Election Resllits 1918-19-19. pp . 25 1-253 . 
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Fig. 4 Burslem (Turnout 78 .2%) 
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Capturing Hanley represented a major advance for the Labour Party in the area; in 
1912 the party had been humiliated at the by-election (having obtained just over 1] % 
of the vote). Labour's confidence was no doubt strengthened by the fact that the 
miners ' and potters ' trade unions had decided to support independent Labour. ]n his 
report of the election, this was an aspect the Secretary of the Midland Liberal 
Federation pinpointed as being of critical importance in determining the result s in 
many areas in the region . He concluded that the election had 'strikingly illustrated the 
power of the trade unions ' . 126 In particular the Miners Federat ion was identifi ed as 
having been enormousl y influential. In particular, the miners ' union had put out a 
116 Midlal1d Liberal Federation Mil1l1tes , 8111 December 1922 . 
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circular at the last moment urging members to vote for the Labour Party. It was 
believed that this changed the course of the campaign in some constituencies; the 
MLF believed that, in areas where Labour appeared to have no chance at all, they 
'secured victory at the last minute' and even where Labour did not win it pushed them 
into second place, at the expense of Liberal candidates. This was, of course, entirely 
speculative though the fact that the union had strongly urged members to vote for 
Labour candidates no doubt did prove to be a strong influencing factor in many areas. 
In 1918 the Labour Party had failed to capture Hanley although the party had polled 
exceptionally well (38.7% of the vote); just 1.7% (of the vote) less than the winning 
Coalitionist. This had been within the context of a four-way contest in a highly 
unusual election on a low turnout. As will be discussed below, the Labour Party had 
made substantial inroads in municipal politics after 1918 and so it was unsurprising 
that the party entered the 1922 general election with a significant sense of confidence, 
ambition and optimism. The scale of victory in Hanley, however, was remarkable 
suggesting a major re-alignment had taken place in the politics and culture of the 
town; Labour's major 'push' had paid off. 127 Harper-Parker was returned with 48.8% 
of the vote and a margin of 20.1 % over the second placed Independent, the former 
Coalitionist and sitting member James Seddon, (see fig. 3). For Hanley's new 
Member of Parliament, the result demonstrated voters 'confidence in the honesty and 
intentions of the Labour Party' .128 There seems little reason to doubt this reading but 
it needs to be set against the backdrop of severe disappointment over the Coalition 
government's failure to deliver on their promised 'land fit for heroes to live in'. This 
will be fully discussed below. The Labour Party was also especially advantaged in 
Hanley in that the candidate, Myles Harper-Parker, was an extremely well-known 
local figure with a long background in local trade unionism and municipal politics as 
well as in the religious life of the community. Two other factors were reported also to 
have reinforced the swing to Labour: ex-servicemen who the local press believed 
voted en bloc for the party129 and the Catholic electors were also assumed to be 
Labour supporters. 
m It should be noted that nationally Coalition losses were heaviest to Labour; as Wilson illustrates, a 
large proportion of Coalition Liberal holdings (won in 1918) had been in industrial districts, see T. 
Wilson, Downfall. p. 236. 
128 Staffordshire Sentinel, 15th November, 1922. 
129 Staffordshire Sentinc!, 15 th November, 1922. 
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The Labour Party's success in Burslem was equally impressive (see fig. 4). Despite an 
extremely narrow victory (just 0.8% of the vote) the result was significant because it 
suggests that Labour had consolidated its position in the division as a party and was 
now less reliant upon the local personality factor. 130 Andrew MacLaren represented a 
new kind of Labour candidate in this area; throughout the campaign he was never 
afraid to express his radicalism. He had denounced war, militarism and ferociously 
attacked the outgoing government's record; particularly how it had failed to honour its 
promise of a 'land fit for heroes to live in'. The Staffordshire Sentinel did not believe 
Maclaren's victory had anything to do with his stance on the war; 131 rather it simply 
represented 'a general desire on the part of the working classes for a better economic 
position' .132 The local press was clearly a little unimpressed with Burslem' s new 
member, bemoaning how Samuel Finney (MacLaren'S predecessor) had been 'a 
Labour man with a fine old Liberal flavour' and how unfortunate it was that 'he had 
been jockeyed out of the candidature by the extremists' .133 As in Hanley, attention 
was given to Labour's extremely well organised campaign in contrast to the evident 
weakness of the National Liberal campaign. Of course, the effect of the party split 
also impacted upon the Liberal's prospects. It should be remembered, however, that 
Malkin had been given electoral assistance by the local Conservative organisation; on 
the platforms and in terms of votes. Although Malkin never defined himself as such, 
he was perceived to be a National Liberal-Conservative candidate. Clearly, although a 
combined National Liberal-Conservative 'alliance' posed a considerable challenge to 
the Labour Party retaining the Burslem constituency it had not been able to capture 
the seat. Of course, it was probable, if not certain, given Malkin's policy positions, 
that MacLaren would have captured the radical (or at least, non-National) Liberal 
vote. His approach would have appeared very attractive to that section of the party. 
Altogether, considering the previous member's 'Liberal' personal politics and local 
status, Andrew Maclaren's victory in 1922 represented a significant break from the 
130 The seat's previous member, Samuel Finney, enjoyed considerable personal appeal. Yet the change 
of candidate and, as we have seen, a very different style of candidate does not seem to have 
substantially impacted upon the party's fortunes, in fact, Labour had increased its percentage (from 
44.4% in 1918 to 50.4% in 1922) although, of course, this has to be set against the fact that there were 
only two candidates in 1922 whereas there had been three in 1918. . , . 
131 The Staffordshire Sentinel continued to declare the war as 'one of sheer natIOnal defence and, as It 
had in 1918, took a harsh view of any candidate perceived to be of a vaguely pacifist stance. During the 
latter stages of the 1922 contest Maclaren had come under increasing criticism of his attitude to the 
war. 
13::> Staffordshire Sentinel, 15th November, 1922 .. 
m See Staffordshire Sentinel, 15th November 1922. 
town's Lib-Lab past. As previous analysis within the present study has shown, before 
1914, popular working-class Liberalism had remained strong and Labour's 
development as an independent entity had been significantly retarded by this. By 
1922, the experience of war, continued unemployment, fragmenting relations with 
employers and the perceived weakness of present day Liberalism all contributed to a 
very different approach to politics. That said, given the low margin between Labour 
and the National Liberal in Burslem, the Labour Party could not afford to be 
complacent. 
In Stoke, John Ward's personal appeal was perceived to ensure his return yet at nearly 
40%, of the vote (see fig. 5) the size of his (official) Labour opponent's poll surprised 
many. Ward articulated that his return represented a 'victory for sane democracy and 
constitutional government'134 but the figures suggested that many of Stoke's electors 
had become dissatisfied with his style of labour representation and appeared willing to 
support a party with a more definite programme of economic, industrial and social 
reform. Given the relatively limited (established) organisation, the Labour Party in 
Stoke had performed impressively.135 After the poll, Watts claimed that the Labour 
Party 'had had to fight several forces- Tory, Liberal and the Staffordshire Sentinel '. 
He argued that Ward had been 'misleadingly reported as a Labour candidate' 
throughout the election and that the newspaper's coverage of his own campaign had 
been extremely prejudiced. 136 Indeed, careful reading of the Staffordshire Sentinel's 
reporting would lend support to this assertion. Nonetheless, Watts believed the 
election had proved to be extremely useful because at least it 'laid the foundations of a 
working Labour Party in the constituency'; 137 with more time and better organisation 
in the future, the party could and would do better. Indeed, analysis of the 1922 general 
election in Stoke-on-Trent illustrates effectively that when the Labour Party was 
properly established in an area (as Burslem demonstrates) the old-style Lib-Labism of 
the pre-war period was severely challenged and this facilitated a significant re-
alignment in party loyalties. 
134 During his post-declaration speech Ward was booed and was reported to have received a lukewann 
reception. Whether some of these protestors may have been Labour Party activists remains an open 
question. .. 
135 Labour organisation was weaker m Stoke mamly because the party had never contested the seat 
before and had undertaken less work in the constituency before the election. 
136 Watts quoted in the Staffordshire Sentinel, 15 th November, 1922. 
137 Ibid. 
Political Re-alignment in Stoke-on-Trent after 1918: Aspects of Political Change 
Economic conditions have to be seen as a fundamental context to political change in 
the period after the First World War. Immediately after the end of war, trade in the 
pottery industry was buoyant but this was then followed by a sharp decline. As 
Burchill and Ross's work illustrates, the pottery workers suffered enormously during 
the early 1920s primarily as a result of substantial wage reductions 138 and from 1922 
unemployment within the industry was running at around 13.5%.139 From this point 
onwards, unemployment within the pottery industry started to increase well above the 
national average; by 1926 it reached nearly forty percent. 140 It is possible that North 
Staffordshire felt the impact of depression more deeply because the area had been 
relatively stable beforehand although we ought to be cautious not to exaggerate 
economIC prosperity in the Potteries before the war; it was entirely relative of 
course. 141 
The years immediately following 1918 in Britain had seen rising expectations which 
during 1920 and 1921 appeared unlikely to be fulfilled. These years had seen 
unemployment leap to two million142 and the Coalition may have been increasingly 
perceived as a conspiracy between employers and the government against the 
working-classes. The Sankey Report most obviously could have been interpreted in 
this way. The political impact of this was that, by 1922, this had induced a 
defensiveness across the labour movement unsurpassed in recent history. It is not hard 
to imagine why the working-classes in areas such as Stoke-on-Trent might have felt a 
tremendous sense of betrayal in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. The 
1922 general election has to be set against this backdrop of working-class 
disappointment and anger in connection with a number of issues; lack of extensive 
social reform, housing, education, the treatment of ex-servicemen, stagnation of 
industry and the increasingly precarious position of the trade unions (particularly after 
138 See F. Burchill and R. Ross, History of the Potters', p. 171. Another aspect relevant to consider 
when examining the attitude of male pottery workers is that female employment had expanded 
dramatically during the war, see Whipp, Patterns of Labour, ppll0-16. This may have prompted male 
pottery workers to view their position as somewhat less secure than previously and serve to encourage 
more assertive action via, for example, the pottery union. 
139 See R. Whipp, Patterns of Labour, p 171. 
140 F. Burchill and R. Ross, History of the Potters', p. 171. 
141 See F. Burchill and R. Ross, History of the Potters' Union, p . .+3 and p. '+6. Whipp also makes the 
point that it was only because so many women and children worked, that families in the Potteries \\ere 
able to overcome poverty: Stoke-on-Trent had the second largest child employment rate in the country 
(after Lancashire), see R. Whipp, Patterns of Labour, pp. 76-77. 
142 This represented 18°'0 of the insured workforce. 
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the experience of 'black Friday' and the miners' lock-out of the previous year). By the 
end of 1922 Labour probably appeared to be the only party sincere in its commitment 
to address these critical issues. The Labour Party had dramatically improved its 
organisation, was aided by significant union assistance (in Stoke-on-Trent, the 
Potters' Union and the Miners' Federation) and on the platforms the candidates were 
extremely capable advocates of policy which demanded working-class attention. In 
contrast, the Liberal organisation in Stoke-on-Trent was virtually non-existent and the 
party remained split. 143 Even where the Liberals possessed a gifted and radical 
candidate (such as Whitehouse in Hanley) it probably seemed to electors that they had 
just 'stolen' the Labour Party's ideas since it was Labour which was articulating the 
same policy but on a united and national front. 144 Furthermore, in a period of 
mounting economic pressure, as one historian has aptly put it, 'no policy was likely to 
be as electorally effective as an attitude' .145 The Liberals' stance of impartiality 
between employers and workers (reflected by the Liberal candidate's approach in 
Manchester on the issue of the railway strike during the Rusholme by-election) might 
have appeared far too evasive. In part, these factors contributed to the declining 
strength of the Liberal Party in Britain's industrial heartlands (such as Stoke-on-
Trent). The real point of breakthrough for Labour in parliamentary politics, therefore, 
was 1922, not 1918 or even during the war and it was inextricably linked to mounting 
economic crisis and the question of trust as much as it was related to the current 
political situation (which, of course, it was as well). 
The impact of the experience of war upon the political attitudes of both combatants 
and civilian voters is an aspect of critical importance146 although it is not an easily 
discernible one. A number of historians have illustrated how provisions for ex-
servicemen, their wives and dependents were not very generous and this in itself may 
have served to generate considerable dissatisfaction with government and the 
143 Whitehouse (afterwards) admitted that he had 'lacked proper organisation' and he noted that this 
contrasted greatly with his Labour opponent . 
144 Wilson suggests that dissensions within the Liberal Party hindered it from puttmg forward a 
consistent social, economic and industrial programme; see T. Wilson, Downfall, p. 217. 
1.15 M. Puah The Making of Modern British Politics (Oxford, 1985), p. 258. 
146 Given I:> difficulties in reaching the service voters and the subsequent low turnout rate in 1918, it is 
likely to be the case that the significance of changed political allegiance amongst this group was most 
manifest in 1922. 
'6-L. .) 
established parties. 147 The evidence in Stoke-on-Trent supports the contention that 
discontent on these issues must have remained high after the war and most clearly 
manifested itself in 1922 at the general election. Throughout the 1922 election 
campaign in Stoke-on-Trent all parties paid particular attention to addressing the 
concerns of ex-servicemen yet it appears that the Labour candidates most powerfully 
articulated this aspect; the key question was who would the ex-service voters trust 
most? The available evidence suggests that it was the Labour Party. 
It has been suggested that after the First World War age became a key determinant in 
voter allegiance. Again, this appears to be supported by the local evidence. Although 
anecdotal, in Stoke-on-Trent the press repeatedly reported the relative youth of 
Labour supporters (these being either supporters attending meetings or information 
from canvassers). Subsequent studies have concluded that men who had not yet come 
of political age prior to the war were much more likely to have displayed low levels of 
identification with the established parties. 148 The generational factor, as with ex-
servicemen, appears to be slightly under-recognised within the general historiography 
(or, at least has been sidelined by discussions of the emergence of class as the 
principal determinant of voter allegiance). In 1922 the newly enfranchised (including 
women, other older voters and a large proportion of younger voters) formed 60% of 
the total electorate and were perceived by party managers and journalists to be volatile 
because they were 'unattached to any of the great parties.' 149 The established parties 
(though particularly the Conservatives and in 1922 the National Liberals) feared they 
might be especially responsive to Labour's appeals and so it was not only an 
ideological rationale which prompted Labour's opponents to resort to 'red scare' 
tactics. They were mindful of Labour's potential to make gains amongst the young 
and particularly amongst returned soldiers. As Stoke-on-Trent illustrates, the strategy 
spectacularly backfired. Much of Labour's new strength appears to have derived from 
the newly enfranchised. Younger voters, with little established loyalty to one 
particular party were most likely to be influenced by immediate events and, of course, 
147 For examination of aspects relating to the experience of war, conditions and other issues such as 
pensions for dependents and how the working-classes were responsive to these see J. Winter, The War 
and the People (New Haven and London, 1992), pp. 285-304 and D. Englander and 1. Osborne, 'Jack. 
Tommy and Henry Dubb: the Armed Forces and the Working Class', Historical Journal. 21,2 (1978), 
pp. 594-601. 
148 See D. Butler & D. Stokes Political Change in Britain, (London, 1981), p. 77 and Turner's work 
which is discussed below. 
149 See Staffordshire Sentinel. 15th November 1922. 
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those voting for the first time in 1922 had had a traumatic early political education; 
the experience of war, the failure of the Coalition to fulfil the promises of 1918 and 
mounting economic insecurity impacted on the young electorate. Whilst older Liberal 
voters might have remained loyal in their traditional allegiance, younger voters one 
might presume perceived the Labour Party as the only serious opposition to an 
established politics that had failed them. Continuing Liberal division aided this 
process. Childs claims that generational change has to be seen as of critical 
importance in explaining the rise of Labour. 150 Although largely based on anecdotal 
evidence, political change in Stoke-on-Trent appears to support this assertion. 
Given the predominance of religious nonconformity in North Staffordshire it is also 
relevant to consider possible changes of allegiance amongst this group after the First 
World War. Whilst there appears to have been no collapse of nonconformity in the 
aftermath of war, there was an identifiable political realignment of many 
nonconformists to Labour's advantage. Many nonconformists who were keen social 
reformers and had been in opposition to the war transferred to Labour. It should be 
acknowledged, however, that the most significant shift from Liberal to Labour 
amongst nonconformists was amongst the working classes. 151 Thus one can assume 
that in an area such as Stoke-on-Trent which was both largely working-class and 
predominantly non-conformist this shift, alongside political and economic change was 
of some considerable relevance. It is interesting to note that all of Labour's four 
candidates who contested seats in the city in 1918 and 1922 were non-conformists and 
one of them (John Watts in 1922) even went so far as to express his politics almost 
exclusively within the context of his nonconformist conscience. As has been seen, it 
was the Labour Party's candidates who came to embody the political spirit of the 
nonconformist conscience most explicitly.152 The numerical decline of nonconformity 
meant that fewer people were influenced directly by it but we should not overlook the 
fact that many Labour activists continued to present their politics within the context of 
150 See M. Childs, 'Labour Grows up: the Electoral System, Political Generations and British Politics 
1890-1929', Twentieth Century British History, 6, 2, 1995, pp.123-44. 
151 See S. E. Koss, Nonconformity in Modern British Politics p. 234. 
152Catterall suggests that the Free Church leadership became more circumspect and less exclusively 
Liberal after 1918 and this had the effect of lessoning the political profile of nonconformity, see ibid. p. 
670. This may have been the case, but it did not necessarily follow that the fundamental ideological 
basis of radical nonconformity did not persist at the grass roots level, even if it might have been less 
overt. The key point remains that it was most explicitly expressed by the Labour Party and research 
suagests that the process was complete by 1931 when more nonconformists stood as Labour candidates 
th:n as Liberals; see P. Catterall 'Nonconfonnity and the Labour Party', p. 676. 
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a nonconformist outlook. It was possibly in producing radical candidates that 
nonconformity was most significant in the rise of Labour although, as Koss 
concludes, it could equally be argued that 'socialism found greatest acceptance in 
areas where its ethic was reinforced by prevailing religious tradition. 153 Analysis of 
Stoke-on-Trent would tend to lend support to this assertion; the overwhelming 
majority of Labour activists continued to come from Methodist backgrounds and 
some interspersed their politics with their religion applying both to the present context 
of British society. 
As has been shown, analysis of electoral politics in Stoke-on-Trent in the aftermath of 
the First World War reveals that the Labour Party continued to espouse past traditions 
(progressive Liberalism within the context of the nonconformist conscience) yet at the 
same time promising a new social and economic order (to some extent based upon 
Socialist doctrine). This and the forcefulness of its delivery amounted to a powerful 
appeal. As we have seen, whilst national issues became more important, the 
candidates' advocacy of policy at the constituency level and the successful application 
of their programme to local circumstances (together with improvements in local party 
organisation) was of critical importance in ensuring that by 1922 Labour no longer 
existed (essentially) as an adjunct of Liberalism with limited appeal as a truly 
independent entity, but a national party with a positive forward-looking programme 
with one aim: government itself. 
5.3: Municipal Politics in Stoke-on-Trent after 1918 
By 1914 the Stoke-on-Trent Town Council comprised 48 Conservative, 35 Liberal 
and 21 Labour members. With a fifth of the total membership of the council the 
Labour Party had made significant progress in the municipal politics of Stoke-on-
Trent particularly compared to other areas. It should be remembered, however, that 
like their parliamentary counterparts, many of these Labour representatives tended to 
be more Liberal in disposition than truly independently-minded 'Labour' men. As in 
many other parts of the country, prior to the outbreak of war a sizable proportion of 
Labour's municipal representatives had in essence been, as one historian has 
expressed, 'sober earnest Liberalsd54; they were moderates who, in most cases, were 
153 See S. Koss, Nonconformity in Modern British Politics, p. 148. 
154 M. Pugh, Making of Modem British Politics, p. 122. 
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barely distinguishable from the Liberals. Given the predominance of Lib-Labism in 
North Staffordshire it is unsurprising that this was reflected in the municipal politics 
of the area. Before 1910 the only issue of any real debate had been that of the 
federation of the six towns which had never been a party political issue; as has already 
been noted, if anything, examination of the election campaigns and the council 
records suggest a completely non-partisan municipal politics. After 1918 municipal 
politics in Stoke-on-Trent changed dramatically and, as in Manchester, not only did 
Labour's representation change dramatically so did the character of the party's 
municipal representatives. Municipal politics became more clearly divided along 
party lines, ultimately, Lib-Labism disappeared completely. There are many factors 
that facilitated Labour's post-war municipal expansion. Essentially, however, it is 
arguable that Labour's advance was based largely on the fact that the party appeared 
to offer a constructive policy programme which was attentive to voters' needs while at 
the same time the Liberal Party appeared to lack a distinct (and radical) municipal 
programme. After 1918 the Labour Party was better placed to be taken seriously as a 
political force in municipal politics and this is very much apparent when evaluating 
political development in Stoke-on-Trent after 1918. 
Electoral Politics at the Municipal Level in Stoke-on-Trent, 1919-1922 
The 1919 municipal elections marked a major watershed in the position of the Labour 
Party in local government. As in Manchester and many other parts of the country, the 
principal feature of the municipal results in Stoke-on-Trent in the first contests after 
the war was the significant number of seats captured by the Labour Party.ISS From 21 
candidates the Labour Party was successful in 13 wards winning 9 new seats (see 
appendix figs. 278-298). The principal issues of the 1919 contests in Stoke-on-Trent 
were housing, health, revision of the Poor Law and, in particular, the proposed 
municipal purchase of the local tramways (including expansion of the network). The 
Labour candidates claimed that they were 'not merely pledged as individuals' to 
k ~ h· 1· hm ,IS6 D . pursue improvements but 'as a party ... to wor lor t e1r accomp IS ent . unng 
the contests all the Labour candidates campaigned strongly on the necessity of the 
proposed Tramways scheme lS7 whilst their opponents (all standing as Independents) 
155 The turnout was very low; on aggregate below 50% and in one ward it even went as low as a fifth. 
156 Staffordshire Sentinel, 3rd October 1919. . 
157 The main aspect of the debate centred on the financing of the tramway scheme and also techmcal 
issues surrounding it. 
urged against the proposed scheme on the grounds of finance. After the contests the , 
Staffordshire Sentinel believed that Labour had 'gained access to the council 
chamber. ... upon the flowing tide that has swept the country generally' and "had 
h· d" h I I . (. h 158 not mg to 0 WIt oca Issues l.e. t e tramway scheme). Given that this issue had 
been so central to the campaigns, however, the opinion of the Staffordshire Sentinel's 
might be questioned. The 1919 contests saw Labour's representation on the Stoke-on-
Trent Council increase to 38 (out of 104) which represented a net gain of 12.159 The 
party itself believed it 'would now have a powerful influence for the cause of 
progress' on the council. 160 
The extent of the Labour Party's ambitions was apparent the following year (1920) 
when the party stood 16 candidates (for the 17 contested seats) in Stoke-on-Trent. 
Like the previous year the central planks of the Labour candidates' campaigns 
focused on social and economic issues (the poor state of housing, health and 
conditions across the six towns). The party launched a ferocious assault upon a 
perceived failure to address the appalling living conditions in the district; referring to 
conditions in his own ward, one Labour councillor told voters that 'children in such 
places [were] not born into the world but damned into it,.161 The same councillor 
claimed that even though there was considerable discussion of the rates, electors 
should 'contrast them with the infantile death rate' and then make their decision and 
he argued that the Labour group would be prepared to 'challenge anyone who 
advocated the cutting-down of essential services in the borough' .162 As in other areas, 
a feature of the 1920 contests in Stoke-on-Trent was the active role played by the 
recently-formed Ratepayers Association (hereafter RP A) which had emerged as a 
determined attempt to oppose Labour's proposals to increase the role of the municipal 
authority.163 The RP A warned municipal voters against candidates who advocated 
'grandiose and experimental schemes' .164 Of course, across the country, accusations 
158 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 3rd November 1919. . 
159 The overall composition was 66 independent (note there was no other party tag speCified other than 
for Labour candidates! members) and 38 Labour. 
160 See Staffordshire Advertiser, 13th November 1919. 
161 See speech by E. Hobson in Hanley supporting the candidature of ~lowes, Staffordshire Sent.inel, 
29th October 1920. Hobson highlighted how, in his ward of Longton, child death rates were three times 
greater than other wards in the borough and he declared that if the authority did not attempt to prevent 
the death of a child then it was 'guilty of manslaughter'. 
162 Ibid. 
163 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 6th October 1920. 
164 See Staffordshire Advertiser. 6th November 1920. 
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of 'municipal extravagance' and demands for 'municipal economy' became a 
pronounced feature of municipal politics from the early 1920s and Labour' s 
opponents (often united on this issue) warned of how, should Labour gain overall 
control, the party would 'put such mad schemes into practice' .165 The issue of 
'municipal economy' perhaps more than anything else served to polarise municipal 
politics and this was evidently the case in Stoke-on-Trent but the extent to which the 
issue disadvantaged Labour electorally remained to be seen. The results of the 1920 
municipal elections in Stoke-on-Trent saw Labour successful in 5 of the 16 seats the 
party contested (see appendix figs. 299-314). This amounted to a net loss of one 
council seat. The 1920 contests thus represented a check to the Labour Party's 
progress but it was by no means a serious setback. 
The 1921 municipal contests in Stoke-on-Trent were agam dominated by the 
'economy' debate and Labour's opponents adopted an even more vigorous assault 
upon the party municipal policies than had been the case during the previous two 
years. One, for example, told electors that 'the anti-Labour party is the only party 
which has the interests of the whole electorate at heart' and another contended that 
'Labour members lacked independence because they were paid for their services by a 
clique and have an axe to grind' .166 The non-Labour candidates, of course, placed the 
need for 'municipal economy' at the forefront of their programmes. The Labour 
candidates, on the other hand, centred their entire municipal campaign in 1921 on the 
rating and taxation of land values as a means of raising capital to meet municipal 
expenditure. 167 They claimed that changes in the rating and taxation of land values 
would meet the cost of essential services and they also suggested that proper taxation 
of land values would also force vacant land into use and so could contribute towards 
alleviating the present housing crisiS.168 The results of the 1921 municipal elections 
saw the Labour Party capture 6 seats (from 13 candidates) which including unopposed 
returns represented a net gain of 4 seats on the Town Council (see appendix figs. 315-
327).169 A significant feature of the 1921 contests was the return of a number of 
leading officials from the Pottery Workers' Society which now had three 
representatives on the Town Council; its President (W. Aucock), General Secretary 
165 See Staffordshire Advertiser, 7th November 1920. 
166 See speeches by F. W. Dale and W. T. Leason, Staffordshire Advertiser, 27th October 1921. 
167 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 20th October- 1 st November 1921. 
168 See speech by W. H. Beecher, Staffordshire Advertiser, 2ih October 1921. 
169 There were contests in 15 ofthe 26 wards. 
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(S. Clowes) and Financial Secretary (A. Hollins). Aucock obtained the largest 
majority in the 1921 municipal elections in Stoke-on-Trent having obtained 75% of 
the vote (see appendix fig. 317). As elsewhere, the timing of the general election the 
1922 impacted upon the municipal contests in Stoke-on-Trent. In contrast to the 
previous three years the number of contested seats was dramatically reduced although 
the Labour Party still managed to put up 8 candidates in the 14 contested seats. The 
results of the elections saw Labour returned in 4 which (including unopposed returns) 
represented a net loss of 7 seats for the party (see appendix fig. 328-335). 
Trade Unionism, Unemployment and Policy: Aspects of Political Change III 
Municipal Politics in Stoke-on-Trent, 1919-1922 
While Labour remained close to its Liberal traditions (promoting land reform, for 
instance) the party developed policy which proved to be (to use Tanner's expression) 
'relevant and emotive rallying cries' which the wartime experience had made 'just' .170 
Analysis of the municipal elections after 1918 in Stoke-on-Trent reveals that the 
Labour Party advanced most significantly in wards especially dominated by the 
pottery industry (in Burslem, Tunstall and Hanley). A major factor underpinning 
Labour's post-war municipal expansion was that the trade unions had become more 
firmly committed to the concept of independent labour representation than had ever 
been the case previously. In Stoke-on-Trent this was especially apparent. In Stoke-on-
Trent, the attitude of the pottery unions was of critical importance and in marked 
contrast to the period before 1914; the National Society of Pottery Workers (NSPW) 
threw its full weight behind Labour's municipal candidates. Especially important was 
that a number of the union's leaders stood as candidates; Arthur Hollins (Financial 
Secretary of the NSPW), for example, stood in Hanley in 1919 on a platform of 
municipalisation winning with a substantial majority.I7I Hollins had stood against a 
well-known councillor who had been so sure of his victory he did not even hold any 
public meetings claiming that electors 'knowledge of his public work' would be 
enough to ensure his return. As it turned out, this was not the case and Hollins was 
returned with 60.5% of the vote (and a 21 % majority). In relation to the question of 
'municipal economy' the Labour candidates stood their ground, as one of the party's 
candidates made clear; 'whilst conscious of the need for economy we are not prepared 
170 D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 351. 
171 See Staffordshire Sentinel, 3rd October 1919. 
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to sacrifice the health of the people and the lives of the children in the name of 
economy' and as another articulated; 'there is plenty of money .. .it is just not directed 
to the right things' .172 Essentially, as the Labour Party saw the issue, 'true economy 
consisted of the wise spending of money not in the cutting down of expenditure ·173 
and this sentiment was consistently re-iterated. 
Economic context also has to be seen as being of considerable relevance in relation to 
the Labour Party's immediate post-war municipal performance in areas such as Stoke-
on-Trent; where by 1922 over 16,000 of the local population were unemployed and 
another 1,000 on short-time work. I74 As in Manchester, the question of the municipal 
authority's role in attempts to alleviate unemployment became a central feature of 
debate during the early 1920s and (like Manchester) it was without doubt the Labour 
group on the council that appeared most attentive to the urgency of the problem. In 
Stoke-on-Trent the council became exceptionally pro-active in its policy on 
unemployment relief and proceeded to establish a wide range of relief schemes. I75 
Analysis of the council records reveals that overwhelmingly this was in consequence 
of Labour interjection. Given the current economic climate the council's Finance 
Committee urged restraint of expenditure on such schemes but Labour-led opposition 
to abandoning these (as in Manchester) regularly won the argument. I76 
Historians have shown how, across the country, councils with a significant Labour 
composition developed the most extensive schemes of public works and this 
contrasted greatly with the 'growing parsimony imposed by the government'. 177 This 
was clearly the case in Stoke-on-Trent where strategies to address the problem of 
unemployment were, more often than not, solely in consequence of Labour 
intervention. The historian can only guess at the possible electoral impact of this 
172 See speech by W. Aucock, Staffordshire Sentinel, 27th October 1921. 
173 See speech by R. G. Wass in ibid. 
174 Figure cited in Staffordshire Sentinel, 25 th July 1922, see also F. Burchill and R. Ross, A History of 
the Potters' Union, pp. 171- 172. By industry the unemployment figures broke down as follows: 7,864 
(pottery), 1,780 (iron and Steel), 1304 (mining) and 4,801 (other). . . 
I75 For a good evaluation of national and local policy towards unemployment see N. WhItesIde, Bad 
Times: Unemployment in Britain: Unemployment in British Social and Political History (London, 
1991). th th· 
176 See for example, reports of council proceedings, Staffordshire Sentinel, 6 January, 24 AprIl and 
26th May 1921. Throughout the remainder of 1921 and the whole of 1922 many schemes \\ere put in 
effect which provided relief for thousands of men at a cost of £ 162.625. see Staffordshire Sentinel, 27!b 
September 1922 which includes a table outlining the breakdown of these schemes. 
I77 See N. Whiteside, Bad Times. p. 71. 
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aspect, although it is probably true to suggest that Labour's record on the question of 
unemployment did not disadvantage the party (especially in wards where 
unemployment was high and rising). 
5.4: Political Re-alignment in Stoke-on-Trent, 1918-1922: Conclusions 
The 1918 general election recorded one of the most sweeping victories in British 
political history. What astonished most Liberals was the scale of the Coalition's 
victory. As the Liberal Magazine observed 'everyone knew that the Coalition was 
bound to win [but] no one expected that the victory would be so overwhelming and 
complete' .178 The same publication asserted angrily that the result 'was successful 
even beyond the expectations of those who devised it' and (understating the situation 
somewhat) concluded that for the Liberal Party the election created a 'situation of 
delicacy and difficulty' .179 The Manchester Guardian believed that it simply reflected 
'a widespread desire on the part of the electorate to give the government an 
opportunity of concluding peace and carrying out the work of demobilisation [and] a 
wave of Conservatism prompted by political events' .180 Of course, all these 
statements held a considerable degree of truth. Neither could the Lloyd George factor 
be underestimated. Particularly, the prime minister's considerable personal appeal 
helped to secure a sizable percentage of the newly enfranchised female population 
which, given absentee voters, amounted to well over 50% of the vote in most 
constituencies. 181 As Cole aptly expressed, Lloyd George had successfully exploited 
his prestige amongst an 'excited but bewildered public' .182 
The 1918 general election did not see a national electoral breakthrough for Labour; 
the party's parliamentary representation had only marginally advanced on its pre-war 
position. The 1918 general election did, however, see an identifiable change in tenns 
of ambition and a detennination to be seen as an independent political organisation 
with a distinct policy agenda. This was a stark contrast to the period between 1906 
and 1914 when the Labour Party found it virtually impossible to appear as anything 
178 See Liberal Magazine, January 1919. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Manchester Guardian. 30th December, 1918. 
181 Turner claims that the female vote moved against Labour and so the Representation of the People 
act amounted to a 'hindrance' for the party, see Turner. J. 'The Labour Vote and the Franchise after 
1918: An Investigation of the English Evidence' in P. Oiley and O. Hopkin (eds) History and 
Computing, p. 140. 
182 G. O. H. Cole, History) of the Labour Partyfrom 191-1 (New York, 1969), p. 86. 
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other than an adjunct to the Liberals. As we have seen, this had especially been the 
case in areas such as Stoke-on-Trent. The future of the Progressive Alliance had 
appeared uncertain in 1914 but it would be unwise to conclude that it had collapsed 
forever. 
After 1918 besides the obvious political situation, issues changed. Issues such as 
unemployment, organisation of industry, housing, health and pensions became central 
to the political debate. In the process, they replaced the more traditional issues on 
which the Edwardian Liberal revival had largely been based. These issues became 
increasingly relevant to the (expanded) electorate although the Liberal Party simply 
no longer existed in a form voters perceived capable of carrying through such refonn. 
Arguably, in predominantly working-class areas such as Stoke-on-Trent there existed 
significant potential for a major Labour advance on the basis of issues and policy 
alone. Even within the context of the unusual circumstances of the 1918 general 
election, Labour made a significant advance in Stoke-on-Trent. The party had made a 
huge leap forward by winning one of the parliamentary seats (Burslem). The real 
breakthrough, however, came in 1922 when it won another, Hanley; the seat the party 
had felt so cruelly denied a decade earlier. This represented a major departure in the 
politics of the Staffordshire Potteries. There did remain some continuity; in Stoke, the 
old-style Lib-Laber John Ward (now an independent 'Labour' member) could still 
attract enough support to retain his seat (which he did until 1929) but even he was 
significantly challenged when faced with official Labour opposition. 
As across the country, the effect of war on the Liberal Party in Stoke-on-Trent was 
crushing. Before 1914 industrial North Staffordshire remained a stronghold of popular 
working-class Liberalism. It seems particularly poignant that one of the Liberal 
Party's greatest triumphs in Stoke-on-Trent, the Hanley by-election, which had 
returned the upcoming radical Robert Outhwaite, proved also to be one of its last. 
Wilson suggests that in 1922 the Liberals were 'in no position to capture attention by 
the forcefulness or novelty of their programme' .183 Analysis of the election campaigns 
in Stoke-on-Trent after 1918 supports this contention to an extent; in Burslem, as \\e 
can see, the National Liberal appeared somewhat old-fashioned and out of touch 
although in Hanley the Asquithian Liberal was more radical and dynamic. Yet both 
183 T. Wilson, Downfall. p. 226. 
275 
failed to compete with the Labour candidates economic and social refonn programme. 
As analysis of Manchester has already shown, it seems that the Liberals were doomed 
whether they were progressive or not and neither did it appear that the amount of 
work the Liberals put into a constituency campaign made any particular difference to 
the overall result. As the Secretary of the Midland Liberal Federation concluded; the 
1922 general election results illustrated 'very curiously the disparity of reward 
accruing to efforts put in', as he reported, 'some constituencies which had been ably, 
persistently and generously worked failed to produce results while others which were 
poorly organised and worked' did better. 184 
In Stoke-on-Trent, as we have seen, 'red scare' tactics dominated the political debate 
during the 1922 general election but the Labour Party's candidates remained focused 
on their own programme and simply rose above the accusations of Bolshevism levied 
against them. I8S In 1919 the Manchester Guardian had written that the 'socialist 
menace [was a] political bogey by which we decline to be terrified,.186 Three years 
later and it seems the greater proportion of Stoke-on-Trent's electors appeared to be of 
the same mind. Ultimately, the Coalition Government was perceived to have failed 
the British people in its promise to provide 'a land fit for heroes to live in'; Labour's 
assault upon this fact was arguably decisive in securing the party's breakthrough at 
both the parliamentary and municipal level after 1918. 
Analysis of Stoke-on-Trent highlights the fragmenting nature of political change 
during the immediate post-war period. At the parliamentary level 1918 produced no 
total transference of political allegiance from Liberalism to Labour although the signs 
of a Labour advance were exceptionally apparent and the Liberals had perfonned 
particularly badly. By 1922, mounting economic insecurity, continued division within 
the Liberal Party and the policy programme of the Labour Party all contributed to a 
184 Midland Liberal Federation Minutes, 8th December 1922. 
185 It has been suggested that the local press after 1918 became increasingly more partisan and at pains 
to stress the threat of socialism, on this aspect see S. Davies and B. Morley, County and Borough 
Elections in England and Wales 1918-1938: A Comparative Analysis, Volume 2 (Aldershot, 2000). 
The press in Stoke-on-Trent does not appear to have strongly adopted such an approach; on the 
contrary, it appeared to be highly supportive of the growth of the Labour P.arty and had never be.en 
hostile. Admittedly, the Staffordshire Sentinel may have seemed more supportive of the older style Llb-
Labers (and local) Labour men such as Samuel Finney and Myles Harper-Parker than some of the more 
radical (and non local) men such as Maclaren but it. was neve~ o:ertly ~~stile. It ?ught ~o be 
remembered that the Staffordshire Sentinel's ownership and edltonal position remamed Liberal 
throuahout the period under discussion here. 
/:> th 
186 Manchester Guardian, 8 December, 1919. 
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shift in popular political affiliations and these factors set the tone of politics in Stoke-
on-Trent for the remainder of the twentieth century. The Liberal Party was not wiped 
out completely in 1918 and, of course, there were considerable regional variations, as 
evaluation of Manchester demonstrates, however, analysis of Stoke-on-Trent 
illustrates how the 1918 general election inflicted a blow to Liberalism from which it 
never fully recovered. I87 One tends to view the decline of the Liberal Party with a 
large measure of hindsight, however. Had the Liberals been re-united by the 1922 
general election and had the party possessed an advanced policy programme equal to 
that of the Labour Party's, it remains an open question as to whether the disaster of 
the 1918 general election would have turned into the long-term catastrophe which it 
proved to be. 
Analysis of electoral politics and political change in Stoke-on-Trent has illustrated the 
difficulties faced by the Labour Party before the outbreak of war in 1914. Afterwards, 
however, Labour's advance was remarkable. Loyalty to Liberalism across a wide 
section of the electorate in this part of Britain had remained extremely strong before 
1914; local specificity (in particular the predominance of religious nonconformity) 
and the personal appeal of particular candidates was significant and in the aftermath 
of war the transfer of allegiance from Liberalism to Labour was dramatic. As this 
study highlights, explanations for such a political re-alignment must include 
recognition of both socio-economic and political factors. Analysis of the electoral 
campaigns in Stoke-on-Trent from 1918 highlights the central importance of issues 
and policy to Labour's post-war advance. Moreover, it also illustrates that Labour 
candidates' abilities in articulating the party's programme was also critical to the 
mobilisation of support and the creation of new allegiances. As this study 
demonstrates, political events clearly helped the Labour Party expand but, ultimately, 
we ought to recognise that political allegiances were not simply constructed from 
above; they had to be harnessed and built upon. Highly emotive issues such as the 
perceived inequality of sacrifice both during and in the aftermath of war could be used 
to mobilise political support and as this detailed analysis of the electoral campaigns in 
187 It ouaht to be noted that the Liberals did manage to recapture a parliamentary seat in Stoke-on-Trent 
in 1923 t>(Burslem) although this was within the context of an election entirely focused on the F,r~e 
Trade v. Protection issue and which saw the Liberals reinvigorated in various parts of the country. 1 hIS 
would prove to be the last occasion on which the party would win parliame~tary r~presen~ation ~n the 
locality; the seat was recaptured by Andrew Maclaren in 192~ and held untIl 19..f:- at \\ hlch pomt he 
stood as an independent and was defeated by an official Labour candidate. 
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Stoke-on-Trent demonstrates, the Labour Party did this particularly effectively from 
1918. 
27R 
Chapter 6: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Alliance: Conclusion 
The primary objective of this dissertation has been to evaluate electoral politics and 
political change in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent between 1906 and 1922 with 
particular reference to the politics of the Progressive Alliance. A number of historians 
have claimed that the seeds of future Labour growth were already in place before 
1914 making the rise of that party 'inevitable' at the expense of the Liberal Party. 
Heightened class consciousness amongst the industrial working-class, trade union 
expansion and extension of the parliamentary franchise all supposedly ensured 
Labour's 'onward march'. Other factors such as an expanding organisation, continuity 
of leadership and personnel (together with an attractive policy programme) 
underpinned such an advance. Other historians, however, have contended that before 
1914 the Liberal Party remained strong in terms of ideology, organisation and 
electoral appeal. One of the most forceful advocates of the strength of the Edwardian 
Liberal revival (Clarke) argued that the Liberal Party had become the most singularly 
important medium for political change. The period saw the emergence of an advanced 
ideology (the 'New Liberalism'), the Liberal Party's organisation had been 
successfully modernised and, perhaps most significantly, the 'challenge' of Labour 
had been contained. 
In certain respects there is something of value in all these propositions but, ultimately, 
this study of Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent lends support to the view that a natural 
(or inevitable) Labour advance was by no means assured before 1914; at best the new 
party's prospects appeared tenuous. Assertions that future Labour growth was 
'cemented' prior to the outbreak of war need to be viewed cautiously when one 
considers electoral politics in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent between 1906 and 
1914. In Manchester, although the Labour Party held two of the city's six 
parliamentary constituencies there are a number of factors which need to be borne in 
mind. First, Labour's electoral progress at the parliamentary level in Manchester was 
in consequence of a considerable amount of Liberal assistance. This relates not just to 
the obvious point that Labour had been given a free-run in these seats but also to the 
fact that Labour was advantaged by significant Liberal aid during the campaigns and 
that the fledgling party was elected with Liberal votes (i.e. votes from Liberal 
supporters). The character of Labour's representatives was also re\e\'ant in this 
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respect; neither they nor their policies on the platform were likely to 'alienate' Liberal 
supporters. Ultimately, the Labour Party had not achieved its parliamentary 
breakthrough in Manchester entirely on its own accord; it had done so from within the 
framework of the Progressive Alliance. That the Progressive Alliance in Manchester 
carne under some pressure after 1906 is indisputable, as the three-cornered contest in 
the South West constituency and a number of confrontations in municipal elections 
demonstrated. But when the Labour Party did challenge the Liberals it tended to fare 
very badly. Labour's position (even in the seats which it did hold) was precarious to 
say the least. This was largely the result of a deeply-embedded popular Conservatism 
in parts of the city and the fact that some of the issues which had aided Labour in 
1906 (as they had the Liberals) had possibly begun to decline in significance. Weak 
organisation additionally did not help matters. 
Tanner has stressed how Labour's early progress was concentrated in areas with 
relatively high trade union membership and even in these areas there was no uniform 
swing to the Labour Party before 1914.1 Analysis of the Labour Party's electoral 
development before 1914 in Manchester illustrates how Labour's support (within a 
city) could be highly localised. In Manchester Labour progressed in the more solidly 
working-class districts where trade union membership was high but elsewhere (as 
consideration of municipal elections demonstrates) the fledgling party made little 
identifiable progress. McHugh's contention that the Labour Party's inevitable 'march 
forward' in Manchester was 'cemented' prior to the outbreak of war appears 
somewhat misguided? Analysis of municipal electoral development in Manchester 
shows how the respective parties had developed in such a way that their appeal was 
spatial. Labour's support was strongest in the 'better' working-class districts; the 
socially mixed, middle class and business areas remained predominantly Liberal 
whilst the poorest 'slum' parts of the city continued to be dominated by deeply 
embedded popular Conservativism. There was little sign of any imminent 
reconfiguration of this distribution of party support in Manchester. Even in working 
class districts where one could presume that Labour might be able to make some 
advance (such as Ardwick) the party's progress remained tentative to say the least. 
1 See D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 398. 
2 See D. McHugh, 'The Labour Party in Manchester and Salford before the First World War: A Case of 
Unequal Development', Manchester Region History Review, 14 (2000) and D. McHugh, 'Labour, the 
Liberals, and the Progressive Alliance in Manchester, 1900-191-+', Northern History (2002). 
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The experience of Stoke-on-Trent also suggests that an 'inevitable' rise of Labour 
appears to have been unlikely in the foreseeable future. Stoke-on-Trent was an area 
where Lib-Labism remained especially strong prior to 1914. Even after unions such as 
the miners had affiliated to the national Labour Party traditional loyalties retained 
considerable purchase. In the Potteries, there appeared to be relatively little 
enthusiasm for the idea of independent Labour representation. During the Hanley by-
election campaign in 1912 the Labour candidate's sole plank had been that he was 
better placed to represent such an area because he was a miner and a local man but he 
failed to convince electors on these points. Hanley voters had decisively not voted for 
one of their own kind. No doubt this came as a shock to the fledgling Labour Party as 
well as the miners' leadership and it left them in a quandary as to where to go from 
there. It could be suggested that over-concentration on the concept of class-
representation may not have been so effective in an area that perceived popular 
Liberalism as an effective representative of working-class interests. 
In Stoke-on-Trent the relationship between trade UnIOnIsm and the expanSIOn of 
Labour was also more complicated than some interpretations of early twentieth 
century politics have implied. In general, trade union growth could only aid the 
development of the Labour Party, although the extent and speed of political 
realignment across a union's membership could be highly fragmented. While union 
leaders might have increasingly adopted a more explicit stance on independence, there 
was no guarantee that the wider membership would follow, in the process abandoning 
deeply-entrenched party loyalties. Thus in Stoke-on-Trent the miners' union appears 
to have adopted a more distinct Labour appeal but it seems that the greater majority of 
the workforce was less certain. 
Outwardly it might seem that the Liberals were extremely well positioned in both 
Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent. In Manchester, the Liberal Party had rarely had such 
a good electoral position in the city but it is wise to exercise some caution in 
concluding that this fact supports Clarke's interpretation that the period heralded an 
altogether more positive era for Liberalism largely based upon the impact of the 'Ne\\ 
Liberalism'. Analysis of the parliamentary election campaigns illustrates that the 
impact of the New Liberalism in Manchester ought not to be exaggerated. Apart from 
very few exceptions, the Liberal candidates tended to stand on conservatiYe Liberal 
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platforms, focusing upon the issue of Free Trade at the expense of virtually all other 
policy discussion. Of the two localities examined here, it was without doubt Stoke-on-
Trent which saw a more pronounced radicalism on the election platforms (from either 
of the left-of-centre parties). Of course, much of this came down to individual 
candidates and things may have changed but, as it was, Liberalism in Manchester in 
1914 remained electorally significant although it did not appear to be ideologically 
vibrant. This study of the Progressive Alliance in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent has 
focused principally on policy, political mobilisation and organisation and these, of 
course, were all of considerable importance in sustaining party support. Specific 
issues had facilitated the 1906 electoral landslide but once these issues began to loose 
their political effect the Liberal's overall position (before 1914) could have become 
less secure if the local party failed to maintain ideological momentum. On the surface 
it could be interpreted that in Manchester the Liberals did fail to maintain ideological 
vibrancy. Of course, the Liberal's position in Manchester in relation to policy may 
have been tactical. It may have been determined that a more radical stance might not 
be electorally successful in the city. Furthermore, the adoption of too radical an 
approach might have served to alienate the party's traditional supporters which could 
have resulted in depleted finances (because of reduced political support) and so 
impacting detrimentally on the local organisation. The extent to which local policy 
agendas can ever be perceived to be tactical, genuine (i.e. truly ideologically 
motivated) or a combination of both is, of course, always a matter of some 
speculation. But, given that some candidates did adopt a more radical approach it 
seems unlikely that there existed a completely uniform party line on policy; it seems 
that candidates were left to determine themselves the key issues upon which they 
would base their campaigns. Whatever the case, however, in relation to motivations 
behind policy formation, the fact remains that Liberalism in Manchester remained 
noticeably traditional. This presents some difficulty for historians who have largely 
based their conclusions on the post-1906 Liberal revival (and long-term viability of 
the Liberal Party) as being intrinsically related to the successful permeation and 
appeal of the 'New Liberalism'. 
In Stoke-on-Trent, the Hanley by-election in 1912 could be perceived as evidence that 
the Liberals had successfully out-manoeuvred Labour ideologically as well as 
politically. Some historians have claimed that the Labour Party possessed little in the 
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way of a distinctive policy programme.3 In Stoke-on-Trent, the 1912 by-election 
could perhaps be perceived as evidence that politically advanced Liberalism had 
'contained' Labour although there are a number of problems with this. First, it cannot 
be said for certain that the election had been won exclusively on the issue of land 
reform. This is difficult to fully ascertain. Secondly, it is impossible to say that there 
was ever a conscious attempt to 'contain' Labour (using policy as a means to this 
end). Indeed, the Liberal Party had taken a significant gamble at this by-election and, 
in any case, the radicalism of the candidate did not necessarily reflect the radicalism 
of the wider membership although it ought to be pointed out that there were few 
objections locally over Outhwaite's candidature. Nonetheless, the Liberal membership 
remained mixed and some were more progressive than others. This is what gave the 
Liberal Party a broad appeal before 1914. During the Hanley by-election in 1912 
Outhwaite's presentation of land reform might have struck a chord with sentiments of 
resentment towards the 'idle' classes and so there may have been a powerful appeal in 
this sense but an appeal of advanced policy still needs to be viewed within the wider 
context. The 1912 result reflected traditional allegiances, not in essence new ones 
encouraged exclusively by a radicalised policy although the latter could consolidate 
the former (which in Stoke-on-Trent it probably did). 
Implicit in the view that the Liberals outmanoeuvred Labour in terms of ideology is 
the suggestion that Labour's activists for the large part were poor on policy, certainly 
when contrasted to many of their Liberal counterparts. Admittedly, while Labour's 
candidate in Hanley in 1912 (Samuel Finney) had clearly been out of his depth on 
policy other Labour representatives in the area had become exceptionally capable 
advocates of a radical policy programme. John Ward proved to be a remarkably 
sophisticated speaker on policy from the very beginning of his career in Stoke-on-
Trent and even moderate Lib-Labers like Enoch Edwards by 1910 had developed their 
approach to policy over just a few years. More importantly, it could be suggested (and 
this study strongly supports this) that the emerging radicalism of the pre-war years 
prepared the ground for the more pronounced radicalism of the Labour Party after 
1918 (within the movement itself and in relation to its support base). 
3 Pugh illustrates Liberal and Labour similarity in policy; see M. Pugh. 'Yorkshire and the New 
Liberalism', pp. 01151-1154. 
A number of historians have claimed that consideration of by-election performance 
provides further evidence of Liberal weakness before 1914.4 Detailed analysis of the 
four by-elections which took place in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent between 1908 
and 1912 provides little support for this assertion. The first by-election (in Manchester 
North West) saw Winston Churchill narrowly losing his seat. Given the symbolic 
nature of defeat in this particular constituency the result might have been perceived to 
represent a disaster for the Liberal Party. But in reality the result did not represent 
such a huge reversal in fortune for the Liberals. Admittedly, Churchill's Conservative 
opponent conducted a broad and intelligent campaign and he astutely avoided the 
subject of Tariff Reform but the most likely reason why the Liberals lost the seat was 
simply that electors had reverted back to their traditional allegiances. The party had 
won the seat in 1906 more or less on the single issue of Free Trade. It would have 
been more surprising had the Liberals managed to hold it in 1908. In fact one could 
suggest that the Liberals performed well; the party managed to secure 47% of the vote 
(only a fraction below the winning Conservative) and yet this was a constituency that 
had previously been considered virtually unwinnable (the Liberals had not even 
contested it in either of the 1885 or 1900 general elections). Manchester North-West 
had become a marginal seat as the two general elections of 1910 testified (the Liberals 
were returned in each but with slim majorities (obtaining 47% and 48% of the vote). 
Poor Liberal by-election performance could also be determined by adverse public 
reaction to policy or legislation. The two by-elections in Manchester during 1912 
represented classic protest votes. The loss of two parliamentary seats in the city 
during 1912 was clearly unfortunate for the Liberal Party yet it would be unwise to 
perceive these losses as evidence of a wider long-term decline. As this study 
illustrates, these two by-election losses were explainable by reference to policy. The 
flagship Liberal policy of National Insurance was critical to the outcome of both. In 
South Manchester the clerks and warehousemen strongly objected to the measure 
since the majority were already in their own insurance schemes while in Manchester 
North West the commercial and business sector opposed it because of a perceived 
adverse effect on the industry. The Conservatives obtained a significant electoral 
advantage from the widespread unpopularity surrounding the Insurance Act and, of 
~ See R. McKibbin, Evolution, pp. 82-87. 
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course, they themselves aided this by conducting an aggressive propaganda campaign 
against the measure. The Home Rule question also played some part in the results of 
these by-elections. In North-West Manchester especially the Unionist candidate 
argued that Home Rule for Ireland would lead to the disintegration of the nation, 
weaken the empire and have a devastating impact upon trade. No doubt such 
sentiments also had their effect. In neither of the by-elections had the Unionist 
candidate made Tariff Reform a key plank of their campaigns; in fact they had 
virtually avoided it altogether. For the Unionists, the experience of by-elections like 
these could have served to reinforce the logic that it was wise to adopt a low-key 
approach to the Tariff Reform issue during elections in areas such as Manchester. 
This in itself may have had significant consequences for the Liberals since it had been 
largely on the Tariff Reform issue that the party had managed to secure seats such as 
Manchester North-West in 1906. 
There is another way to interpret the Liberal's by-election losses in Manchester during 
1912 however. Closer analysis reveals that, in spite of adverse public reaction to the 
Insurance Act and the inevitable impact of the Home Rule question, the Liberal vote 
had, in fact, held together fairly well. In Manchester South the Liberals polled just 4% 
less than the winning Conservative while in the North-West division this figure was 
8% (suggesting that the commercial sector was more hostile to the recent legislation 
than other groups but also a reflection of some probable anti-Irish sentiment in the 
district).5 Both these constituencies had always had an erratic electoral history; party 
loyalty could never be taken for granted and the Liberal Party itself was appreciative 
of this fact although the party did not appear to be unduly concerned by the by-
election losses believing the outcomes to have been the result of widespread public 
misunderstanding of recent legislation. The by-elections in Manchester demonstrate 
the fine line the Liberal Party was treading in its introduction of advanced policy but 
there is no reason to believe, as some historians suggest, that poor by-election 
performance during the period was indicative of a more serious (and long-tenn) 
deterioration in Liberal fortunes. This study suggests that by-election losses 
5 This was on a relatively low turnout of 81.9%. The turnout rate in Manchester South was slightly 
higher at 84%. 
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represented 'temporary trouble' as opposed to anything more serious.6 Moreover, in 
consequence of such by-election defeats the Liberals re-doubled their efforts to 
recapture these seats. This was evidenced in Manchester by the MLF securing the 
candidature of Sir John Simon for the North-West division for the next general 
election. Despite being appreciative of the specific reasons for the loss of seats at by-
elections, the Liberals were in no sense complacent about future prospects and 
recognised that the party had to work hard to improve its position in the marginal 
constituencies. 
Some historians have made the logical point that the Progressive Alliance was bound 
to fail if the Labour Party insisted on encroaching further than the Liberals were 
willing to concede; 7 both Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent illustrate this particularly 
effectively. As analysis of these localities shows, the Progressive Alliance did not 
always run smoothly and appears to have been fragile in both Manchester and Stoke-
on-Trent; the consequences in the former proved to be disastrous for both parties since 
the breakdown of unity gifted a parliamentary seat to the Conservatives (by a mere 
1.4% of the votes cast). While in Hanley the Liberals managed to retain the seat 
though with a substantially reduced majority. Yet, arguably, the Progressive Alliance 
had always stood on insecure foundations. The extent to which the Labour Party was 
entirely committed to the idea of electoral 'alliance' with the Liberals always needs to 
be viewed with a certain amount of caution. Whilst L. T. Hobhouse in 1910 might 
confidently have written that the Progressive Alliance had produced a 'broader and 
deeper movement in which the clearer minds recognise below the difference of party 
names there is a unity of purpose,g in reality the politics of the Progressive Alliance 
were complicated. As early as 1905, Keir Hardie had had no problem in declaring that 
Labour was 'prepared to fight a Liberal or a Tory government on behalf of the 
workers' and Henderson intimated that 'if we have a few years of a Liberal 
government and they do no better than the Tories we will say tum them both out,.9 Of 
course, Hardie and Henderson were bound to express such sentiments, but the fact 
6 This was a term used by the Manchester Evening News in its post-results assessment of the 1912 
Manchester North-West by-election; see Manchester Evening News, 9th August 1912. . 
7 See M. Petter, 'The Progressive Alliance' and G. Bernstein, 'Liberalism and the Progressive 
Alliance'. 
8 L. T Hobhouse, Liberalism (London, 2009 edition). p. 226. 
9 Hardie comment cited in Manchester Guardian, 6th December 1905 and Henderson quoted III 
Manchester Guardian, 14th November 1905. 
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remains; for how long the Labour Party would be prepared to continue to exist as the 
junior partner within the Progressive Alliance remains an open question. Equally, for 
the Liberals, as Tanner comments, alliance with Labour was ultimately meant to 
reinforce their position. Io If it failed to do so, the concept of a Progressive Alliance 
might start to appear altogether less appealing for the Liberals. 
Experiences such as the Hanley by-election in 1912 and Manchester South-West in 
the January 1910 general election can be interpreted in different ways. In Hanley 
especially the Liberal-Labour alliance had broken down in a particularly explosive 
manner and recriminations on both sides were an immediate consequence. This might 
lead one to assume that the Progressive Alliance was, to all intents and purposes, over 
for ever, yet such an experience could alternatively serve to reinforce the necessity of 
progressive co-operation. A paradoxical outcome may have been that, in the longer-
term, experiences such as these might have served to strengthen the Progressive 
Alliance since the result emphasised to Labour that independent politics offered little, 
if any, prospect of success (at least for the foreseeable future). Although the Labour 
Party was inevitably disappointed by (as they perceived it) their 'treatment' at the 
hands of the Liberals, in reality, the result provided the party with little alternative 
other than to co-operate with the Liberals in the future, if they wished to secure the 
election of parliamentary representatives in these sorts of areas. Furthermore, given 
that it might have been concluded that electors appeared to favour progressive 
candidates, the Labour ranks might have simply had to accept the electoral reality i.e. 
that an appeal exclusively based upon the notion of independent Labour politics (class 
representation) had very limited popular support. Ultimately, Labour needed Liberal 
acquiescence more than visa versa. 
Some historians have suggested that progressive co-operation at the municipal level 
supports the assertion that the Progressive Alliance remained strong on the eve of 
war. II In Manchester, while the local Liberal Federation remained anxious 
(enthusiastic even) to reach an understanding with its progressive ally it appears that 
the local Labour Party remained generally unresponsive to such overtures. Within the 
10 D. Tanner Political Change, p. 130. The emphasis is mine. 
II Tanner (~ost notably) adopts this position; see D. Tanner, Political Change, pp. 15'+-15:'. 224-225 
and pp. 303-304. 
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council the Labour group adopted a concerted stance of independence strongly 
asserting their distinctiveness. In terms of electoral politics, however, despite there 
being a very slight increase in the numbers of three-cornered contests in the years just 
before the First World War they remained the exception to the rule. In Manchester, 
therefore, the Progressive Alliance remained seemingly intact; at the municipal level, 
there were wards that both parties contested on a regular basis, but there were clearly 
more wards where the parties appeared prepared to stand aside and give their 
progressive ally a free-run against the Conservatives. Before 1914, contests between 
Liberals and Conservatives and Labour and Conservatives were far more common 
than those between the Liberal and Labour parties. 
Other studies have highlighted the complexities of the progressive co-operation at the 
local level. Both Petter and Bernstein's evaluations of the Progressive Alliance depict 
a 'fragile alliance' and limited conviction on the part of the Liberals to maintain the 
policy.12 Bernstein suggests that especially at the municipal level Labour candidates 
were more inclined to stand as out-and-out socialists and sought to stress their 
distinctiveness from the Liberals. 13 He concludes that this was bound to impact on the 
long-term viability of the Progressive Alliance. It is essential, however, to recognise, 
that, as McKibbin suggests, the Progressive Alliance was not 'based upon a long-term 
programmatic affinity' .14 Historians have perhaps expected too much from the 
Progressive Alliance. It is probably unrealistic to expect the Progressive Alliance to 
have manifested in an entirely uniform approach to policy. The evidence In 
Manchester suggests that, indeed, there existed some pronounced differences of 
emphasis in respect to policy and that at the municipal level many Labour candidates 
articulated a more distinctly 'Labour' agenda. But we ought not to perceive this as 
absolute evidence that the Progressive Alliance was likely to collapse. Whilst it had 
been specific political issues that created the Progressive Alliance it was political 
pragmatism which now held it together. 
Analysis of Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent before the First World War appears to 
reflect a pattern illustrated by many other regional studies; \\"here Liberalism was 
12 See M. Petter, 'Progressive Alliance' and G. Bernstein, 'Liberalism and the Progressive Alliancc', 
13 See G. Bernstein, 'Liberalism and the Progressive Alliance', p. 637. 
14 R. McKibbin, Parties and People, p. 3, 
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electorally strong and embedded within the political culture the Liberal Party 
appeared reluctant to 'hand over' seats to the Labour Party. This posed obvious 
problems for the viability of the Progressive Alliance. Had there been a general 
election in either 1914 or 1915 it was likely that the Labour Party would have 
contested an increased number of seats. Some of these were bound to have been in 
constituencies which were held by the Liberal Party. The consequences of the fall of 
the Progressive Alliance within a peacetime context may have become apparent at 
such an election. The likely outcome remains purely speculative but it goes without 
saying that it would have led potentially to a major reconfiguration of British politics. 
It may be that since it was in neither party's interest to see a split progressive vote the 
respective organisers would be inclined to resolve matters by amicable agreement, i.e. 
re-establish a Progressive Alliance. Whatever the case one thing was clear, as 
McKibbin has recently suggested; the viability of Edwardian politics was entirely 
dependent upon the survival of the Progressive Alliance. IS 
In his study of North-East politics Purdue shows how an electoral pact between the 
Liberals and Labour worked imperfectly and Pugh also illustrates how in Yorkshire 
the Liberal Party continued to be extremely successful in the context of a 
predominantly working-class electorate. 16 As in Stoke-on-Trent and parts of 
Manchester, Liberalism remained deeply entrenched within these regions. Pugh's 
evaluation focuses principally on the constituency of Dewsbury which the Liberal 
Party held continuously between 1906 and 1914. Labour's share of the vote, however, 
never amounted to more than 21 % and, like Hanley, the party performed badly at a 
by-election. 17 Pugh observes that across the West Riding mining communities as a 
whole Labour never managed to poll more than half of the miners' vote. 18 So, like 
North Staffordshire, Liberalism remained electorally very strong in the region before 
the outbreak of war. Tanner's study also highlights how any advances made by 
Labour in Yorkshire (Bradford and Leeds for example) were only in consequence of 
electoral agreement with the Liberals. 19 Other historians, though, have challenged 
15 See R. McKibbin, Parties and People, p. 32 and P. Clarke, Lancashire, pp. 395-399. 
16 See M. Pugh, 'Yorkshire and the New Liberalism'. 
17 The Dewsbury by-election took place in 1908. Labour attained 20.2% of the vote. Compa~ed t? 
Hanley this w~s much better althou~h Pugh sees it as ~oor (an? illustrative ofL~bour ~ea,kness sJn"ce It 
had declined SInce the general electIOn), see M. Pugh, YorkshIre and the Nev, Liberalism, p. 011_ 4 
18 Ibid. 
19 See D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 259. 
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these interpretations, maintaining that the Liberals' electoral support amongst the 
working-classes was beginning to decline. 20 
Like Pugh and Purdue's research, a number of other studies examining constituency 
or regional politics in the early twentieth century have also concluded that the Liberals 
appeared well equipped to withstand the challenge of Labour before 1914. Morgan, 
for example, contends that in Wales, despite some considerable class-conflict in the 
industrial sphere, Lib-Labism remained the 'dominant and unifying creed' in the 
• 21 M ··1 S k regIOn. oreover, SImI ar to to e-on-Trent and Manchester, Morgan claims that 
those Labour members who were returned, were 'wholly of the Lib-Lab persuasion' 
and, significantly, as in Stoke-on-Trent, their appeal emanated from a predominant 
nonconformist tradition. Morgan suggests, however, that (like Stoke-on-Trent) 
Liberal-Labour relations were deteriorating by the eve of war. 22 Stead's study of 
Wales provides further insight into the character of Lib-Lab politics and he shows 
how the Lib-Labers possessed a highly distinct political outlook. He concludes that 
they saw themselves essentially as 'direct labour representatives' in a way that, they 
believed, the LRC could never be; yet by 1914 it appeared that 'the society that had 
made Lib-Labism was already moving away from it'. 23 Analysis of Stoke-on-Trent 
after 1900 lends support to the first point; the Lib-Labers did not see their position as 
resting upon 'labels or argument' because (to use Stead's expression) 'they were the 
argument in that they saw themselves as professional representatives of labour' and 
they became so well entrenched that they became 'great survivors' .24 In industrial 
North Staffordshire, where Lib-Labism had become exceptionally pronounced, 
politicians such as Enoch Edwards and John Ward became remarkably significant 
political players in the region and this happened very quickly; the key point, however, 
is that they retained their personal political loyalties and (more significantly) their 
politics continued to permeate the local culture for some considerable time.25 The 
second point, with regards to society moving away from Lib-Labism, however, is less 
20 See K. Laybourn and 1. Reynolds, Liberalism and the Rise of Labour, 1880-191-1. London, 1984 and 
T. Woodhouse, Nourishing the Liberty Tree, Liberals and Labour in Leeds, 1880-191-1 (Keele 1996). 
21 K. O. Morgan, 'New Liberalism and the Challenge of Labour', p. 172. 
22 See ibid, pp. 172-73. 
23 See P. Stead, 'Establishing a Labour Heartland', pp. 69-72. 
2~ Ibid. 
25 This was especially the case with John Ward who effectively persisted as a 'Lib-Laber' long after the 
phrase (and concept) had disappeared from the national consciousness. 
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easily applicable to industrial North Staffordshire. 
Like Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent, in Scotland, as Fraser's work illustrates, little 
evidence exists to suggest that the Labour Party was on the verge of making a 
significant electoral breakthrough?6 The Scottish coalfields represent a particularly 
useful region with which to compare industrial North Staffordshire. There were a 
number of by-elections between 1911 and 1914 which make such comparison 
especially interesting. Fraser highlights how (as in Stoke-on-Trent) Labour's progress 
in the Scottish mining districts was sluggish; the party's organisation remained weak 
and popular support was limited.27 This was evidenced by poor performance in the 
four by-elections contested during the period.28 The first in September 1911 in 
Kilmarnock saw the Liberals successfully defend the seat; Labour came bottom only 
managing to obtain 19. % of the vote compared to the Liberals' 48%. What was 
especially relevant about this election was that the Labour candidate (who was an 
agent to Keir Hardie's Ayrshire miners) had served on the town council and was 
widely perceived to be an exceptionally strong candidate. After the election, Fraser 
notes how the experience led to increasingly embittered relations. Another by-election 
in Midlothian took place shortly after the Hanley by-election (in September 1912) and 
it is usually claimed that Labour's actions here were in deliberate reprisal over what 
had happened in Hanley?9 On this occasion the Labour Party was extremely astute in 
selecting a candidate who would be more acceptable to Liberal supporters because, as 
Fraser notes, he was as 'solid a Liberal as they came'. Furthermore, the candidate 
demonstrated some astuteness by making land reform the central plank of his 
campaign. Unlike Hanley and Kilmarnock, however, Labour intervention caused the 
Liberals to lose the seat (with the Unionists managing to slip in on a tiny minority). 
This highlighted how Labour intervention could have significant consequences for the 
26 See W. Hamish Fraser, 'The Labour Party in Scotland' in K. D. Brown, The First Labour Party, pp. 
52-59. 
27 Some of these areas were very similar to the North Staffordshire Potteries in that the percentage of 
the miners within the total electorate was roughly the same (20%)) although like North Staffordshire, 
the miners' wielded exceptional influence on local politics. Religious make-up was also similar in this 
part of Scotland. These areas have identical patterns of development before and after the war. 
28 The following section is based upon details provided in W. Hamish Fraser, 'The Labour Party III 
Scotland' in K. D. Brown, The First Labour Party, pp. 54-56. 
29 Given the history of this particular constituency, it was perceived to have tremendous symbolic 
importance for the Liberals, not to mention the fact that the outgoing member was also the Liberal 
Chief Whip. That Labour chose to contest this seat was quite remarkable. 
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Liberals in an area perceived to be one of the party's heartlands.3o Furthermore, if it 
was the case, like Crewe, that the Labour Party's intervention in Midlothian was in 
revenge over Hanley, it provides a striking reminder of the damage to Liberal-Labour 
relations that experience had inflicted. The following two years saw the Liberal and 
Labour parties in conflict in by-elections in South Lanark and Leith and each of these 
also illustrated the detrimental impact of the collapse of the Progressive Alliance. 
Similar to Stoke-on-Trent, therefore, parts of Scotland could be perceived as areas 
where one might expect to see an identifiable advance of Labour (on the basis of the 
socio-occupational composition of the electorate) yet this did not happen. But, at the 
same time, clearly there had developed within the Labour Party an apparent 
determination for independence which, ultimately, threatened the viability of the 
policy of the Progressive Alliance and thus the whole stability of the Edwardian 
political system. 
As in many other areas across the country, the First World War had a significant 
impact on the Liberal Party in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent. In both localities the 
Liberal Party lost all of its parliamentary representation in the 1918 general election, 
seeing its share of the vote fall dramatically (the lowest being 20% of the vote in 
Manchester and 7% in Stoke-on-Trent).31 In Manchester, the 1918 general election 
saw a significant swing to the Conservative Party. These results cannot be attributed 
solely to the operation of the 'coupon', however, since Liberal candidates performed 
badly irrespective of whether their opponents possessed the 'coupon' or not; the 
winning (couponed and uncouponed) Unionists in Withington and Exchange were 
returned with 69% and 70% of the vote respectively (see chapter 4: figures 6 and 7). 
Analysis of the 1918 general election campaign in Manchester illustrates the general 
tone of the Liberal candidates in relation to the Coalition and the terms of the peace 
settlement and it is not hard to see why they would have been severely disadvantaged 
within a climate of anger, bitterness and considerable confusion just four weeks after 
the cessation of hostilities. This was the essential context of the 1918 general election. 
There was clearly some variation in relation to how far individual Liberal candidates 
30 The previous general electi?ns had seen the Liberals obt~ining 60-63% of the vote. o. , 
31 It averaged at around 30% m Manchester, however, and It ought to be ~oted ~hat the 7 Yo m Stoke-o.n-
Trent was in the context of two Liberal candidates (the de-selected radical LIberal Robert OuthwaIte 
who stood as an independent Liberal) and an official (Asquithian) Liberal, so a truer total Liberal poll 
was, in fact, 2 I ~ o. 
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were prepared to pledge support for the Coalition. A number made it clear that they 
were unprepared to surrender to (as they perceived it) caucus dictation and they 
consequently adopted a distinctly anti-Coalition stance on the election platforms. 
Others remained more cautious. Yet set against the backdrop of an intensely patriotic 
(and pro-Coalition) campaign by the Conservatives, all Liberal candidates in 
Manchester in 1918 were likely to have been perceived by the (significantly female) 
electorate as unpatriotic and anti-government. Furthermore, arguments surrounding 
the continuation of the Coalition and the coupon tended to dominate the debate on the 
election platforms for the Liberals throughout the entire campaign but this possibly 
served to distract attention away from constructive debate on actual issues of post-war 
reconstruction. Although some Liberals (Butterworth, Stott and Burditt especially) did 
focus attention to a wider array of issues (in relation to domestic and foreign policy) 
and appeared progressive they continued to be embroiled in debate surrounding the 
election itself. Each of these also adopted distinctly anti-conscription platforms which 
might also have rested uncomfortably within the current climate of public opinion.32 
Though, as this study shows, in Stoke-on-Trent the Labour candidates (and one 
Liberal) there had also adopted ferociously anti-government and anti-war platforms 
and yet they polled very well on the basis of such. One cannot conclude, therefore, 
that such a stance would inevitably alienate voters. The Labour Party's campaign in 
Manchester in 1918 whilst still focused in many ways on the ethics of the election 
itself did, however, provide at least a greater degree of attention to practical issues 
surrounding post-war reconstruction. As the Manchester Guardian concluded, Labour 
stood out as the party with an 'entirely independent standpoint and focused in its 
future aims' .33 Moreover, as one Liberal organiser expressed 'the Labour manifesto 
commanded the attention of Liberal supporters' .34 In a way, it seems the Liberals 
satisfied no-one because they were perceived as either too 'left-of-centre' for some 
(i.e. soft on Germany and dubious in their views on aspects such as conscription) or 
not radical enough for others. Essentially the Liberal campaign fell flat because it was 
32 It does not appear to have made a significant difference whether a ~iberal. c~ndidate was especially 
anti-Coalition or not. The most vocal anti-government Liberals (m Wlthmgton, Exchange and 
Rusholme received 31 %, 30% and 19% of the vote respectively compared to 35%, 30% a~? 20% in 
Moss Side Hulme and Blackley where the Liberals had been greater supporters of the CoalitIOn. Note 
that the tw~ lowest figures (in Rusholme and Hulme were in the context of multi-party contests. 
33 Manchester Guardian, 14th December 1918. 
34 See secretary's report evaluating the 1918 general election, Midland Liberal Federation .\Iinllil's. 21 ,{ 
march 1919. 
neither one thing nor the other, and there was also the added burden of a lack of 
unifonnity across the party in respect to attitudes towards the Coalition and the wider 
policy agenda. 
Before 1914 the Progressive Alliance had been a critical feature of the political 
system; its collapse heralded an altogether new era in British politics. In Manchester 
there were 3 three-cornered contests in 1918 which did not bode well for prospects of 
the re-establishment of the Progressive Alliance. In Rusholme and Hulme the Liberals 
outpolled Labour opponents by 3% and 17% of the vote respectively while in 
Blackley the Labour candidate managed to outpoll the Liberals by 5% of the vote (see 
chapter 4: figures 1-3). The Rusholme result represented a greater disappointment for 
the Liberals perhaps since this seat was traditional Liberal suburban heartland. It 
could be suggested that Labour's challenge in a seat such as Rusholme was highly 
symbolic. The Labour Party possessed no real prospect of capturing the seat (at that 
stage) but the party's intervention was likely to seriously undermine the Liberal's 
chances of overtaking the Conservatives. Blackley saw the performance of the two 
left-of-centre parties more or less equally divided and so, again, demonstrating that 
the breakdown in progressive co-operation was simply likely to produce a result 
unfavourable to both parties. In straight fights against the Conservatives the Liberal 
and Labour candidates averaged at around 30-35% of the vote (although in Clayton 
Labour polled slightly higher at 38%). Understandably, there were many uncertainties 
in relation to future political alignments in 1918 but a feature of central importance of 
the general election was that there had been no immediate transfer of allegiance from 
the Liberals to Labour in Manchester. Despite what has been mentioned previously in 
relation to Labour policy in 1918 the party's position had only marginally been 
improved (in tenns of total vote polled). The local party itself bemoaned how "the 
working classes had failed to be radicalised by the experience ofwar,.35 Yet, this was 
a little pre-emptive; given the political and electoral context of the 1918 general 
election it was simply too early to make predictions about future party prospects. 
Despite the fact that the Liberals lost all of their parliamentary representation in 
Manchester in 1918 which could not be viewed as anything other than a disaster. the 
35 See Manchestl!r Labour Party Annual Report, 1918. 
party's electoral base had not collapsed completely however, and the low poll was 
entirely explainable within the context of the current political situation. The party split 
was not as serious as in other parts of the country and the local organisation appears to 
have remained robust (if a little strained). The Liberal Party in Manchester knew it 
would face monumental difficulties over the coming years but it did not believe the 
damage inflicted at the 1918 general election would be permanent. One local 
newspaper effectively expressed the prevailing mood within the Liberal ranks when it 
contended that it would be 'rash in the last degree to take the 1918 general election as 
providing any trustworthy criteria as to the relationships of parties to the electorate'. 36 
In contrast to Manchester the striking feature of the 1918 general election in Stoke-on-
Trent was the advance made by the Labour Party. Stoke-on-Trent saw a significant 
swing to Labour and given the electoral history of the area the results amounted to a 
near destruction of the Liberal Party. Of the two contested seats in Stoke-on-Trent in 
the 1918 general election Labour was returned in one (Burslem) where the party had 
obtained nearly 45% of the total vote37 and had come extremely close to capturing the 
other (Hanley) where it was just 1.7% behind the winning (couponed) Coalitionist. 
The Liberal vote had plummeted; the party came bottom of the poll in both 
constituencies (with 180/0 and 7.3% of the vote in Burslem and Hanley respectively).38 
There were a great many aspects which disadvantaged the Liberals in 1918 and these 
need little re-iteration but a key question is what factors facilitated such a reversal of 
fortune for the Labour Party in Stoke-on-Trent in the 1918general election? Careful 
evaluation of the election campaigns leads one to the conclusion that policy and issues 
were of critical importance. An obvious feature of the 1918 general election was the 
sheer forcefulness of the Labour candidates' campaigns. Of course, the Labour 
candidates were fiercely anti-Coalition and they were vehemently opposed to a 
vindictive peace settlement but beyond these aspects they campaigned on a forward-
looking, constructive, highly emotive, and (most significantly) relevant policy 
platform. Both candidates were well established local Labour-trade union officials but 
36 Oldham Chronicle, 4th January 1919. 
37 The winning margin over the second placed Coalition Conservative was 7%. _ .. 
38 Figures calculated from F. W. S. Craig. British Parliamentary Election Results, 1918-1 ~49, pp. 2).)-
254. Note that in Hanley the independent Liberal (Outhwaite) who had not been sanctIoned b: the 
party obtained 13.6~ 0 of the vote thus the true Liberal poll amounted to :::0.9%. 
that alone IS insufficient m explaining their success m 1918. Policy had to be 
important. 
Before the 1922 general election voters in Manchester had two opportunities to 
express a verdict on the performance of the Coalition Government - one very early 
(nine months after the 1918 general election) and the other during the later stages of 
the Coalition's life (in February 1922). The Rusholme by-election in September 1919 
provided a striking reminder that the Progressive Alliance in Manchester had been 
repudiated by the Labour Party. A noticeable feature of the Rusholme by-election was 
the remarkable similarity of the Liberal and Labour campaigns. Both candidates came 
from the radical wings of their parties and each articulated exceptionally advanced 
policy. Both focused attention on a wide array of issues including the necessity for a 
capital levy, nationalisation (both of which the two candidates supported), the 
government's flawed foreign policy, profiteering, objection to conscription, land 
reform and housing. The combined progressive vote at the Rusholme by-election 
amounted to 50.3% of the total. The Liberals believed that Labour intervention had 
"gifted' the seat to the Tories whilst for Labour the result confirmed the party's 
decision to stand. Perhaps the Liberal candidate's radicalism had alienated some 
Liberal supporters and they simply abstained (the turnout was in fact relatively low). 
The Rusholme by-election confirmed Labour's ambition39 and demonstrated how far 
the party had come in terms of policy but most significantly it highlighted the 
continuing difficulties facing the Liberal Party in Manchester (as indeed nationally). 
On this occasion it could not be suggested that the Liberals had performed poorly 
because they were insufficiently radical. Of course, it may have been the opposite yet 
whatever the case the result in Rusholme served to demonstrate the abyss the Liberal 
Party was in and in a reversal of pre-war politics it seemed that the position of the 
Liberals was very much dependent upon the acquiescence of the Labour Party. 
The Clayton by-election in February 1922 saw an uncomplicated fight between 
Labour and the Conservatives. It represented a key test for the Labour Party. Analysis 
39 Nationally, between 1919 and 1922 there were 81 by-elections an.d of ~hese 47 saw L~bo.ur 
candidates. Many of those which were uncontested were in rural constituenCies; see R. Mci\.Jbbm, 
Ei'o/ution, p. 113. 
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of this campaign shows how the Labour Party moved in to claim its Liberal 
inheritance. The Labour candidate (John Sutton) conducted an exceedingly 
progressive campaign. Moreover, as the Manchester Guardian rightly acknowledged, 
it amounted to a very 'Liberal programme' .40 Sutton fought a determined campaign 
focusing attention principally on the failure of the Coalition Government to carry 
through the promises which had been made in 1918. In particular, he launched a 
ferocious assault upon the government's policy on education enshrined most clearly 
within the (recently published) Geddes Report; he argued that this was a blatant 
attempt to 'rob the children of the war dead,.41 Sutton provided considerable detail on 
Labour's 'forward policy' on issues such as housing, pensions and unemployment 
alongside proposals for a more progressive foreign policy. Sutton himself was an 
extremely capable advocate of Labour's policy programme; he appeared confident 
and articulate although at the same time his speeches remained consistently based 
upon the essential premise that by its policy programme the Coalition Government 
had betrayed the 'uncounted war dead'. Capturing the seat with a majority of nearly 
4,000 (and obtaining 57.1 % of the total vote) the Clayton by-election represented a 
significant victory for Labour in Manchester; the party had virtually doubled its vote 
since the general election of 1918. For the Manchester Liberals, however, it simply 
served to demonstrate the need for the two progressive parties to establish 'some sort 
of accord' since had there been a split vote the seat was likely to have been lost to the 
Conservatives. At the same time, however, the Liberals in Manchester recognised the 
chances of this happening were probably limited. 
The 1922 general election saw the Liberals reunited in Manchester and outwardly at 
least the party appeared re-energised and expectations of a recovery were high. 
Liberal candidates (with a few exceptions) continued to adopt conservative platforms 
and the majority continued to place Free Trade at the forefront of their campaigns. 
Historians have acknowledged that the left of the Liberal Party had become weaker in 
the aftermath of the First World War42 and detailed examination of Manchester would 
lend support to this view. On top of this, of course, the Liberal Party remained 
lumbered with weak national leadership (as well as the continued split). Yet the 
40 See Manchester Guardian, 18th February 1922. 
41 See Manchester Guardian, 4th February 1922. 
42 See, for example, D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 383 and pp. 377-380. 
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Liberal Party performed well in the 1922 general election in Manchester. Analysis of 
the results across the seven constituencies the party contested shows how the Liberal 
vote had increased significantly since the last general election. Apart from Platting 
(where the Liberal vote was a disaster) the party saw polls of 49%, 42% and 43% (in 
Withington, Exchange and Hulme). Of the 4 three-cornered contests the Liberals 
managed to outpoll Labour their opponents in three of these ((Rusholme, Blackley 
and Moss Side) although, of course, a split progressive vote simply served to allow 
the Conservatives to win. 
Nationally, the most significant feature of the 1922 general election was the advance 
made by the Labour Party. In Manchester, Labour saw no real breakthrough: in fact, 
the results were disappointing for the party; from seven candidates Labour secured the 
return of just three. Four constituencies saw three-cornered contests and three of these 
saw Labour placed below the Liberals. Admittedly, two of these were middle-class 
suburbs and the other was socially mixed so it could be interpreted that Labour had 
polled relatively well. Though, at the same time (against Conservative opposition) the 
Labour Party only just managed to hold on to the seats that it already held. Labour's 
overall parliamentary representation in Manchester did not change in 1922 suggesting 
that locally the advance of the party had come to a standstill. While the Labour 
candidates had campaigned on the same principal issues as their counterparts in 
Stoke-on-Trent (the Capital Levy, unemployment and the housing question) the 
electoral results were markedly poorer. The immediate post-war period was an 
equally frustrating one for the Labour Party in municipal politics in Manchester. 
While the Labour Party expanded rapidly in 1919 (as it did elsewhere) it subsequently 
found great difficulty in progressing from there. In Manchester the Liberals clearly 
struggled without the Progressive Alliance whilst at the same time the Labour Party 
found it impossible to advance on its current position across the city. This contrasted 
greatly with Stoke-on-Trent, where the Labour Party was able to consolidate its 
expansion at both the municipal and parliamentary level. Why this might have been 
the case will be discussed below. 
In Stoke-on-Trent the 1922 general election further cemented the 'rise of Labour' in 
the borough. The Labour Party successfully held Burslem. captured Hanley and 
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perfonned exceptionally well in Stoke.43 All three Labour candidates in 1922 adopted 
radical policy programmes and were all capable advocates of economic and social 
refonn. Their campaigns focused attention upon a perceived inequality of sacrifice 
during and since the war and the increasingly illiberal policies of the Coalition 
Government. As across the country, much of the debate during the 1922 general 
election in Stoke-on-Trent was focused upon Labour's policy agenda, principally 
restorative economic justice (the Capital Levy). Throughout the campaign Labour's 
opponents (with the exception of one Liberal) launched the most vitriolic assault upon 
Labour and what they perceived to represent 'dangerous socialism'. The Labour 
candidates held their nerve, however, staunchly defending their and their party's 
position. As this study shows, the Liberal Party in Stoke-on-Trent emerged from the 
1922 general election no better than it had been four years earlier. In Hanley. despite 
conducting a radical campaign the Liberal candidate came bottom of the poll (below 
an Independent who was perceived by that time to have become a somewhat eccentric 
lone political wanderer).44 Like Manchester, the 1922 general election saw no 
recovery for the Liberal Party in industrial North Staffordshire. 
Historians have interpreted the role of the First World War in the political re-
alignment which followed in different ways but there are some common themes. Both 
Hart and Clarke, for example, have claimed that the post-war shift in political 
allegiance was deeply connected to the fact that after 1918 the Liberals were no 
longer 'progressive' .45 Clarke even went so far as to say that in Lancashire Liberalism 
could only return MPs on the basis of 'a sort of nonconformist bastard Toryism' .46 
The Liberal Party's astonishing reversal in fortune, of course, did not happen because 
of policy; it was a product of historical accident (internal disintegration during the 
war) but although speculative one could suggest that had the Liberals offered a more 
43 The result in Burslem was extremely close; Labour held the seat with a winning margin of just 0.8% 
(of the total vote) over the second placed National Liberal. Hanley saw a more convincin? ~ictory with 
Labour capturing the seat with a margin of 20% of the second placed Ind~pendent (the slttmg member 
who had stood as a Coalitionist/ NDP in 1918). In Stoke Labour obtamed nearly 40% of the vote 
against firmly entrenched member John Ward who had stood as ind~pendent Lab?ur.in 1922 withi~ the 
context of a local Conservative-Liberal pact in his support. WIth no orgamsatlOn or established 
presence (not to mention the near cult-like status locally of Ward) and amidst tremendous press 
hostility, the Labour Party did extremely well in Stoke. . ' 
44 In Burslem the National Liberal did better obtaining 49.4% of the vote but given that hiS platform 
had essentially been a Conservative one it would be wrong to classify him as a Liberal. 
45 See M. Hart, 'Liberals, War and the Franchise', English Historical Review. 97 (1982), pp. 820-3:2. 
46 See P. Clarke, Lancashire, p. 397. 
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relevant, constructive and radical policy programme between 1918 and 1922 the party 
might have recovered some of the lost ground. As it was, however, in a complete 
reversal of the pre-war political situation, the Labour Party managed to out-trump the 
Liberals in terms of policy. Analysis of electoral politics and political change in the 
localities examined here suggests that the Liberal Party for the most part did not meet 
the needs of the post-war world. Between 1918 and 1922, on top of factors such as 
internal division, weak (if barely existent) national leadership and poor organisation 
the Liberal Party appeared out-of-touch in relation to policy and, ultimately, found it 
difficult to keep apace with the challenge of Labour. But at the same time even when 
Liberal candidates did articulate advanced policy they fared badly.47 There were very 
few of these, however, and the greater number of Liberal candidates appeared 
lacklustre and regressive. 
Turner's research offers an illuminating insight into how new electors voted in 
immediate post-war elections (191811922) and he concluded that the percentage of 
new voters in a given constituency made a significant difference, though the results 
went in a different direction to what historians might expect. His research showed that 
the greater the number of new voters the less the constituency tended towards Labour; 
so rather than propelling the Labour Party forward franchise reform proved to be a 
hindrance.48 The significant implication of this therefore is that existing (largely trade 
union based) support continued, in the short-term at least, to form the bedrock of 
Labour's support and thus, crucially, the party did well in areas where there was 
already an established 'presence'. One could suggest that this might include an area 
such as industrial North Staffordshire where the Labour Party already had a strong 
presence, albeit one which had been within the context of alliance with Liberalism. 
Issues and policies may have facilitated a smooth transference of allegiance because 
the Labour Party was not so dissimilar to the Liberals; the party was progressive, 
reformist and (most importantly) practical in the same way that the Liberals had 
been.49 Turner's research also suggests that after 1918 it was within the mining 
constituencies in particular that the switch to Labour was strongest. This begs the 
47 This was the case in 1919 at the Rusholme by-election although the fact that there emerged a very 
public local party debate on whether he was :ight to pursue such a radical programme possibly led 
voters to believe the party was not fully committed to such reform. 
48 See J. Turner 'Labour Vote and the Franchise' in History and Computing (1997), pp. 136-142. 
49 Tanner place~ considerable emphasis on the view that the Progressi\e Alliance disintegrated because 
Labour finally came into its Liberal political inheritance, see D. Tanner. Political Change. p. -+ 16. 
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question as to whether such transference from Liberal to Labour was connected 
exclusively to the experience of war or whether it could have happened any",,-ay. 
Clearly, these are extremely important points for consideration. Some historians have 
suggested that on the basis of the available evidence Labour's prospects in the mining 
constituencies were already 'reasonably fair' before 1914, not least because the new 
generation of leaders appeared more committed to Labour and this may have ruptured 
the traditional allegiance to Liberalism.5o It ought to be noted, however, that this view 
has been significantly challenged and as this study illustrates the experience of the 
Hanley by-election appears to sit uncomfortably with such an assertion. 51 Although it 
is wise to remember that there were mitigating factors which ought to be borne in 
mind when reflecting on the Labour poll on that occasion and, of course, Hanley was 
not in any case an exclusively mining constituency. It is difficult to accurately predict 
the Labour Party's prospects from that point; they mayor may not have improved. 
Whatever the case, however, Stoke-on-Trent, saw a significant transfer of allegiance 
from Liberal to Labour from 1918 which reflected a pattern in many other areas of the 
country (Scotland, Wales and the North-East for example). 
In light of Turner's argument it is important to recognise that an essential context for 
Labour's expansion may have been a change in the allegiance of existing voters. 
Thus, the suggestion that Labour's developing radicalism before the war may have 
laid the foundation for the more pronounced radicalism of the post-war years might be 
of significance. Whatever the case, however, it is imperative to recognise that the 
post-war re-alignment was not influenced exclusively by new voters with new 
allegiances but also old voters with transferred allegiances (from Liberal to Labour). 
When in 1922 new voters with little (if any) 'fixed' political loyalties came into the 
equation that facilitated an even more spectacular Labour expansion. So, essentially, 
new male voters in 1922 consolidated Labour's already dramatically improved 
electoral position in areas such as Stoke-on-Trent. This raises the question as to the 
precise role of sociological factors in explaining post-war electoral change and 
ultimately it must be concluded that other aspects must have contributed significantly 
to political re-alignment in the immediate aftermath of the First World War. The 
50 See R. Gregory, Miners and British Politics, p. 191. . . 
51 For an alternative perspective on this aspect see, D. Tanner, 'The Labour Party an~ Electoral PO~I~IC~ 
in the Coalfields' in k Campbell, N. Fishman and D. Howell . Miners. Umons and Pol,t,cs 
(Aldershot, 1996). 
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evidence presented within the present study strongly suggests that policy and issues 
played a critical role in propelling Labour forward as the principal party of the 
working-classes in Stoke-on-Trent. Of course, elsewhere in the less industrialised 
parts of Staffordshire the Labour Party's progress remained more fragmented 52 but 
even so the occupational make-up of the electorate cannot fully explain different 
political outcomes although, of course, it still needs to be taken into account alongside 
the impact of immediate political issues. Nonetheless, this study strongly suggests that 
it is essential not to overlook the power of politics and the way in which political 
campaigning and organisation influenced, shaped and reconstructed public opinion 
and in the process encouraged new political allegiances. This underlines the point that 
overwhelmingly concept-driven (absolute sociological) approaches to electoral 
politics seem slightly unhelpful if we seek to obtain a fully contextualised 
understanding of political change in the aftermath of the First World War. 
This analysis of Stoke-on-Trent has shown how industrial North Staffordshire was a 
region where popular working-class Liberalism remained extremely strong before the 
outbreak of war and even though this was underpinned by a political culture of Lib-
Labism the prospect of an imminent and independent Labour breakthrough appeared 
unlikely. After the war, however, the electoral politics of the region changed 
dramatically; very quickly Stoke-on-Trent became one of Britain's Labour 
strongholds whilst the Liberal Party's position had been decimated. Analysis of the 
electoral campaigns during the 1918 and 1922 general elections suggests that policy 
and issues were likely to have been of central importance in such a restructuring of 
party politics in the area. 
A significant aspect of McKibbin's argument in his earlier work (Evolution of the 
Labour Party) was that party loyalty was increasingly conditioned by class. 
Consequently, Labour's advance was based upon a 'slow change in the way political 
52 Across Staffordshire as a whole the Labour Party performed exceptionally well from 1918. Whilst in 
predominantly middle-class areas such as Burton and Stone Labour sa,:" little progress, in the rest of the 
county the party's advance was rapid. In Stafford and Lichfield, whIle not yet a.ble t~ capture seat.s, 
Labour polled extremely well (obtaining 41% and 47% of the vote in these respec~lvely III 1922) and III 
the more solidly working class areas such as Cannock and Kings\\inford the S\\Illg to La?our was as 
strong as it was in Stoke-on-Trent; both of these constituencies were captured by Labour III 1918 and 
were subsequently held by the party in 1922. 
affiliations were decided'. 53 In Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent the evidence suggests 
that before 1914 class had yet to become the overriding determinant of political 
allegiance and clearly traditional loyalties remained strong up to the outbreak of \var. 
Careful examination of electoral politics in Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent between 
1906 and 1914 tends to lend support to Tanner's contention that, in reality, people 
were not 'blank slates' and 'existing allegiances could not be ruptured easily [with] a 
new political culture created overnight' .54 
From 1918 political events helped Labour expand but we ought not to assume that 
political allegiances were simply constructed from above. Electoral change was more 
complex than that. As Tanner comments, 'Labour's [as yet] half-formed 
breakthrough ... had to be built into a firm political platform'. 55 Analysis of Stoke-on-
Trent and Manchester suggests that in the former this happened much quicker than in 
the latter. Manchester saw relatively slow Labour growth when compared to Stoke-
on-Trent from 1918. This is perhaps surprising given that before the outbreak of war 
Stoke-on-Trent appeared to be an area where one would never have predicted an 
imminent Labour advance whilst in Manchester the Labour Party's position might 
have appeared slightly more positive (although only just). But, whatever the character 
of political change, one point ought to be recognised and that is that the political 
activists in the constituencies contributed greatly to building that platform. To refer 
back to a statement by Tanner cited earlier within this study; ultimately, the Labour 
Party 'created its own expansion'. 56 As this study of Manchester and Stoke-on-Trent 
reflects, the role of policy and the individual politicians' advocacy of the respective 
party programmes ought to be recognised as being of central importance in electoral 
politics and in the consequent political outcomes. 
In conclusion, this thesis supports the view that the British Liberal Party appeared to 
remain strong before the outbreak of war in 1914 and, although it might be wise not to 
overstate the case, it seems unlikely there would be an imminent Labour 
breakthrough. But much depended on the future of the Progressive Alliance and there 
were uncertainties in this respect. For how long the Progressive Alliance \Hmld 
53 R. McKibbin, Evolution, p. 243. 
54 D. Tanner, Political Change, p. 421. 
55 Ibid, p. 124, 
56 D. Tanner. 'Class Voting and Radical Politics', p. 106. 
remain a permanent feature on the political landscape remains conjecture. but what is 
indisputable is that the intervention of a world war served to destroy it and this 
changed British politics forever. Arguably, political change in Britain after 1900 can 
be seen to have been largely defined by the rise and fall of the Progressive Alliance. 
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Municipal Election Results, Stoke 1919-1922 
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Fig. 336 Political balance of municipal council, Manchester 1906 to 1921 
Size of group 1906 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 19 20 21 
Liberal 34 32 23 25 27 29 26 27 23 17 6 
Labour & Socialist 12 1 1 8 10 15 16 16 15 30 35 34 
Conservative 43 47 54 56 57 55 58 55 52 45 51 
Independent 3 3 12 14 6 5 5 8 6 6 7 
Progressive 6 6 11 
MPU & Liberal !v1PU 8 8 
Fig. 337 Political balance of municipal council , Stoke-on-Trent 1919 to 1922 1 
Size of group 1919 1920 1921 1922 
Independent 66 67 63 70 
Labour 38 37 41 34 
I Created in 19 10, the (federated ) Borough Coullcil o f S l o ~ e - o l1- Trcll l did flOl rO\\C\~ a part: Illlllll'al 
comp lex ion 
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